Cases from cite.case.law:

CANONSBURG GENERAL HOSPITAL, v. BURWELL, U. S., 807 F.3d 295 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 413.30(e). . . . . § 413.30(e)(1). . . . “violate[d] the applicable cost limit statu[t]e, 42 U.S.C. § 1395yy(c), and regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . the patients treated and are necessary in the efficient delivery of needed health care.” 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . (f)(1) (1996) (currently promulgated with non-material alterations at 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e)(1)); see . . .

CANONSBURG GENERAL HOSPITAL, v. BURWELL, U. S., 420 U.S. App. D.C. 190 (D.C. Cir. 2015)

. . . . § 413.30(e). . . . . § 413.30(e)(1). . . . “violate[d] the applicable cost limit statu[t]e, 42 U.S.C. § 1395yy(c), and regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . the patients treated and are necessary in the efficient delivery of needed health care.” 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . (f)(1) (1996) (currently promulgated with non-material alterations at 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e)(1)); see . . .

GLOBAL IMPEX, INC. v. SPECIALTY FIBRES LLC,, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1268 (N.D. Ga. 2015)

. . . Code § 413.30. . . .

CANONSBURG GENERAL HOSPITAL, v. SEBELIUS, U. S., 989 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2013)

. . . . § 413.30. . . . . § 413.30] may be granted to a new SNF,” 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(d), and a provider who receives such an . . . circumstances specified, separately identified by the SNF ..., and verified by the intermediary.” 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . the patients treated and are necessary in the efficient delivery of needed health care.” 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . conflicts with the applicable cost limit statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395yy(c), and regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . .

STORMANS INCORPORATED, v. SELECKY,, 906 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2012)

. . . ADF’s petition reflects 413.30 hours worked, and Becket’s requests 894.750 hours worked. . . .

DIRECTV GROUP, INC. v. UNITED STATES,, 670 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 413.30(a)(1) (1978). . . . Id. § 413.30(a)(3). . . .

DIRECTV GROUP, INC. v. UNITED STATES,, 670 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012)

. . . . § 413.30(a)(1) (1978). . . . Id. § 413.30(a)(3). . . .

WHIDDEN MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, v. SEBELIUS,, 828 F. Supp. 2d 218 (D.D.C. 2011)

. . . . § 413.30. The caps are referred to as “routine cost limits” (RCLs). . . . under Medicare, under present and previous ownership, for less than three full years.” 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . (e) (1997) (now codified at 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(d)). . . . certified under Medicare, under present and previous ownership, for less than three full years. 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . Elizabeth’s, 396 F.3d at 1233 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e) (1997)). . . .

SELECT SPECIALTY HOSPITAL- BLOOMINGTON, INC. v. SEBELIUS, U. S. t, 774 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.D.C. 2011)

. . . . § 413.30(d) (regulating skilled nursing facilities), are unavailing. See Pis.’ Mot. for Summ. . . .

BAPTIST MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, d b a v. SEBELIUS, U. S., 768 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 413.30, includes provisions for exceptions. . . . Id.; 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e). . . . Under § 413.30(c), a provider must make an RCL exception request “within 180 days of the date on the . . . Furthermore, the Secretary reasonably interpreted § 413.30(c) in light of her reopening regulations. . . . Accordingly, having found that the Secretary’s issue-specific interpretation of 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(c) . . .

RAYTHEON COMPANY, v. UNITED STATES,, 92 Fed. Cl. 549 (Fed. Cl. 2010)

. . . that “ERISA” does not contain the same definitions of “pension plan,” as do CAS 412.30(a)(13) and CAS 413.30 . . . CAS 412.30(a)(20), 48 C.F.R. § 9904.412-30(a) (20) (2010); CAS 413.30(a)(12), 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-30 . . . costs fall within the express terms of the definition of pension costs under CAS 412.30(a)(20) and CAS 413.30 . . . CAS 412.30(a)(20), 48 C.F.R. § 9904.412-30(a)(20); CAS 413.30(a)(12), 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413~30(a)(12) . . . CAS 412.30(a)(20), 48 C.F.R. § 9904.412-30(a)(20); CAS 413.30(a)(12), 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413-30(a)(12) . . .

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, v. UNITED STATES,, 92 Fed. Cl. 798 (Fed. Cl. 2010)

. . . CAS 413.30(a)(3), 4 C.F.R. § 413.30(a)(3) (1977), defines actuarial gains and losses as “[t]he effect . . .

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS M. D. ANDERSON CANCER CENTER, v. SEBELIUS,, 706 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2010)

. . . . § 413.30(b)(1). . . .

HENRY FORD HEALTH SYSTEM, d b a v. SEBELIUS, U. S., 680 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2009)

. . . . § 413.30. . . .

CBS CORPORATION, v. UNITED STATES,, 90 Fed. Cl. 466 (Fed. Cl. 2009)

. . . CAS 413.30(a)(20), 48 C.F.R. § 9904.413.30-(a)(20) (1995). . . .

DIRECTV GROUP, INC. v. UNITED STATES,, 89 Fed. Cl. 302 (Fed. Cl. 2009)

. . . . § 413.30(a)(ll) (1986). The term "closing” is not defined. . . .

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO MEDICAL CENTER, d b a v. SEBELIUS,, 645 F. Supp. 2d 648 (N.D. Ill. 2009)

. . . . § 413.30. . . .

RHODE ISLAND HOSPITAL, v. O. LEAVITT,, 548 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2008)

. . . . § 413.30. . . .

ST. GERTRUDE S HEALTH CENTER, a v. O. LEAVITT,, 583 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (D. Minn. 2008)

. . . . § 413.30(e). B. Factual and Procedural Background St. . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e). 1. . . . The issue of whether section 413.30(e) is ambiguous has yet to be addressed by the Eighth Circuit. . . . Thompson, 353 F.3d 661, 665 (9th Cir.2003) (holding that section 413.30(e) is inherently ambiguous); . . . Gertrude does not qualify as a new provider under section 413.30(e). 4. . . .

ST. ANTHONY S HEALTH CENTER, v. O. LEAVITT, U. S., 579 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2008)

. . . . § 413.30(c). . . . The Defendant’s Interpretation of 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 is Entitled to Substantial Deference In support . . .

MONTEFIORE MEDICAL CENTER, v. O. LEAVITT, U. S., 578 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D.D.C. 2008)

. . . . § 413.30(f)(1) (1986). . . . During the periods in question, the atypical cost exception was covered by 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(f). . . . . § 413.30(e). .The cost limits for SNFs are determined based on the mean per diem costs of “peer groups . . .

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, v. UNITED STATES,, 84 Fed. Cl. 129 (Fed. Cl. 2008)

. . . See CAS 413.30(a)(1), 42 Fed.Reg. at 37,196 (defining “actuarial assumption” as a “prediction of future . . .

JORDAN HOSPITAL, v. O. LEAVITT,, 571 F. Supp. 2d 108 (D.D.C. 2008)

. . . . § 413.30(a)-(b) (1996).. . . . Id. § 413.30(d). . . . the fiscal intermediary for a new provider exemption, which tolls the 180 day period, see 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . See id. § 413.30(d). The provider may then appeal the agency’s decision to the Board. . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(d). . . .

CARNEY HOSPITAL TRANSITIONAL CARE UNIT, v. O. LEAVITT, U. S., 549 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D.D.C. 2008)

. . . . § 413.30(e). (See id. ¶ 30.) . . . Carney Hospital Transitional Care Unit is dissatisfied with this decision, as provided at 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . The new provider exemption appears at 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(d) in the current regulations. . . . .

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, v. UNITED STATES,, 78 Fed. Cl. 336 (Fed. Cl. 2007)

. . . CAS 413.30(a)(4) (emphasis added). . . . CAS 413.30(a)(2) (emphasis added). . . . CAS 413.30(a)(1) (emphasis added). . . . CAS 413.30(a)(l 1). . . . . CAS 413.30(a)(4) (emphasis added). . . . .

AT T CORP. v. UNITED STATES,, 76 Fed. Cl. 297 (Fed. Cl. 2007)

. . . . § 413.30(a)(11). . . . As the Government explained during oral argument:. 413.30(a)(19) says segment means one of two or more . . .

CONWED CORPORATION, v. UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,, 443 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2006)

. . . award of subrogation damages for this employee is $8,331.21, rather than $7,917.91, a difference of $413.30 . . .

S. C. MANAGEMENT, INC. d b a v. LEAVITT,, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (E.D. Mo. 2005)

. . . . § 413.30. See also Good Samaritan Hosp. v. . . . In 42 C.F.R. 413.30(e)(1996), the Secretary created an exemption from RCLs for new providers of SNF services . . . Thompson, 251 F.3d 1141, 1149 (7th Cir.2001); 42 C.F.R. 413.30(e). . . . On February 23, 1994, Twin Rivers formally requested a new provider exemption under 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . Management, Inc.’s requested new provider exemption under 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e)(1996) for its 1993 and . . .

MILTON HOSPITAL TRANSITIONAL CARE UNIT, v. THOMPSON,, 377 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C. 2005)

. . . . § 413.30(e) (1997). Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 5. . . . certain cost limits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c, 1395d, 1395i, 1395x(b), (i), 1395yy(a) and 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . reporting period beginning at least two years after the provider accepts its first patient.” 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . stated herein, this exhibit would not provide support for the Administrator’s decision. .42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . .

RUSH PRESBYTERIAN- ST. LUKE S MEDICAL CENTER, v. G. THOMPSON,, 362 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2005)

. . . . § 413.30(a) (1998). . . . Id. § 413.30(c). . . . . § 413.30(f). . . . Id. § 413.30(c). . . . ’s request to HCFA. 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(c). . . .

ST. ELIZABETH S MEDICAL CENTER OF BOSTON, INC. v. G. THOMPSON, U. S., 396 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

. . . . § 413.30(e) (1997) (now codified at 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(d)). . . . certified under Medicare, under present and previous ownership, for less than three full years. 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . previous ownership” as a SNF or equivalent,- it could not qualify as a “new” provider under 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e) (1997). . . .

ST. ELIZABETH S MEDICAL CENTER OF BOSTON, INC. v. G. THOMPSON,, 307 F. Supp. 2d 73 (D.D.C. 2004)

. . . . § 413.30(e). . . . Under 42 C.F.R. § 413.30: Exemptions from the limits imposed under this section may be granted to a new . . . In addition, even if a provider does not qualify as a new provider under the express terms of § 413.30 . . . In contrast, the Sixth and Fourth Circuits have held that § 413.30 is not ambiguous. . . . The new provider exception is now codified at 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(d). . . . .

ASHTABULA COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER, v. G. THOMPSON,, 352 F.3d 1090 (6th Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 413.30(e) provides for an exemption from the SNF routine service cost limits for new providers. . . . Although the term “provider” is not defined in § 413.30(e), its meaning is made clear by referencing . . . In this case, ACMC represents the “provider of inpatient services” contemplated by § 413.30(e). . . . However, we conclude that the language of section 413.30(e) has a plain meaning. . . . Accordingly, we hold that ACMC is entitled to “new provider” status pursuant to section 413.30(e). . . .

PROVIDENCE HEALTH SYSTEM- WASHINGTON, v. G. THOMPSON,, 353 F.3d 661 (9th Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 413.30(e) (1996). We hold that 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e) is ambiguous. . . . We hold that the plain language of 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e) does not clearly address whether Summitview’ . . . Ohio 2002), in support of its argument that 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e) is unambiguous. . . . Here, Providence’s attempt to cast 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e) as unambiguous must fail. . . . The new provider exemption can now be found at 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(d). . . . .

SELECT SPECIALTY HOSPITAL OF ATLANTA, v. G. THOMPSON, v. G. v. G. v. G. v. G. v. G. v. G. v. G. St. v. G. v. G. v. G. v. G. v. G. v. G. v. G., 292 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C. 2003)

. . . . § 413.30 et seq. B. . . .

ALLEGHENY TELEDYNE INCORPORATED, v. UNITED STATES,, 316 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 413.30(a)(11). . . . , plants, or other subdivisions of an organization reporting directly to a home office.” 4 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . .

ALLEGHENY TELEDYNE INCORPORATED, v. UNITED STATES,, 316 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 413.30(a)(ll). . . . , plants, or other subdivisions of an organization reporting directly to a home office.” 4 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . .

VENCOR, INC. d b a d b a d b a v. STANDARD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY,, 317 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 413.30(a)(1) (“This section implements section 1861(v)(l)(A) [codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)] of . . . . § 413.30. . . .

ST. LUKE S METHODIST HOSPITAL, v. G. THOMPSON,, 315 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 413.30 (1996), sets forth general rules to establish “reasonable” limits for provider costs, as well . . . The district court concluded that PRM § 2534.5 was “an unreasonable interpretation of 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . we must give to PRM § 2534.5, which the Secretary characterizes as the agency’s interpretation of § 413.30 . . . Luke’s is entitled to reimbursement is established by the plain language of § 413.30(f), which permits . . . See 42 U.S.C. 1395x(v)(l)(A); see also 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(f)(1) (1996). . . .

SOUTH SHORE HOSPITAL, INC. d b a v. G. THOMPSON,, 308 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2002)

. . . . § 413.30(e)(2) (1994). . . . At issue here is an exemption for “new providers” of skilled nursing services. 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e)( . . . turn now to the Secretary’s construction and application' of the new provider exemption, 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . This case hinges on the meaning of the phrase “previous ownership,” and section 413.30(e)(2) neither . . . operated as the [same] type of provider (or the equivalent)” for the prescribed period. 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . .

MARYLAND GENERAL HOSPITAL, INCORPORATED, d b a v. G. THOMPSON,, 308 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2002)

. . . . § 413.30(e) (1996). . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e). . . . Section 413.30(e) does not define “provider,” but the structure and wording of the regulation suggest . . . is now found, in slightly revised form, at section 413.30(d) (2001). . . . The references in this opinion to section 413.30 are to the 1996 version of the regulation. . . . . . § 413.30(e)(1996). Therefore, I respectfully dissent. I. . . . ownership” of the certificates in determining the length of time a provider has “operated.” 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . The Secretary has fulfilled his obligation through regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e), and has sought . . . Secretary’s interpretation that MGH is not entitled to the “new provider” exemption set forth in § 413.30 . . .

ASHTABULA COUNTY MEDICAL CENTER, v. G. THOMPSON,, 191 F. Supp. 2d 884 (N.D. Ohio 2002)

. . . . § 413.30(e) (“the new provider rule”). . . . certified for Medicare, under present and previous ownership, for less than three full years. 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . Pro. 25(d). .During the relevant time period, the new provider rule appeared at 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e) . . . It has since been moved, after certain amendments not relevant here, to 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(d). . . .

SOUTH SHORE HOSPITAL d b a v. G. THOMPSON, U. S., 204 F. Supp. 2d 76 (D. Mass. 2002)

. . . . § 413.30(e) provides exemptions for new SNFs that have “operated as the type of SNF (or the equivalent . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e). This regulation has been redesignated as 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(d). . . . on behalf of the Secretary of Health and Human services regarding Medicare payments. . 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . (e). . 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.30(a)(1) and (2) allows Medicare to establish limits on SNF costs recognized . . . Airport Impact, 192 F.3d at 203. . 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e). . . . .

ST. LUKE S METHODIST HOSPITAL, v. G. THOMPSON,, 182 F. Supp. 2d 765 (N.D. Iowa 2001)

. . . Pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(f)(1), St. . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(f). . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(f)(1). . . . Is PRM § 2531.5 an unreasonable interpretation of 12 C.F.R. § 413.30? . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(f)(l)(ii). . . .

TELEDYNE, INC. v. UNITED STATES,, 50 Fed. Cl. 155 (Fed. Cl. 2001)

. . . . § 413.30(a)(ll) (1986). The term “closing” is not defined. . . . usually identified with responsibility for profit and/or producing a product or service.” 4 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . CAS 413.30(a)(20) provides as follows: Segment closing means that a segment has (i) been sold or ownership . . . sale, which occurred after the 1995 CAS 413 became effective, is a segment closing as provided in CAS 413.30 . . . The amended CAS 413.30(a)(20) provides in relevant part: “Segment closing means that a segment has (i . . .

MARYLAND GENERAL HOSPITAL, INC. d b a v. G. THOMPSON,, 155 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Md. 2001)

. . . . § 413.30(e)(1996). Section 413.30(e) provides: Exemptions. . . . are “new” so as to deem a SNF a new provider that makes the word “provider” ambiguous as used in § 413.30 . . . at a different result, Plaintiff argues that the test as to whether an exemption is granted under § 413.30 . . . Section 413.30(e), however, nowhere speaks of assets being operated or not operated. . . . exceptions” to the routine cost limits for two of the cost years in question pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . .

PARAGON HEALTH NETWORK, INC. d b a a k a v. G. THOMPSON,, 251 F.3d 1141 (7th Cir. 2001)

. . . . § 413.30(e) exempted “new providers” from the RCLs for a period of up to two years. . . . Secretary’s Interpretation 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e) contains an exemption to the Medicare RCLs for a “new . . . The Secretary claims that the current interpretation of 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(e) is not new, but does not . . . Having found that Seminole Rock deference is warranted, we next determine whether 42 C.F.R. § 413.30( . . . Paragon also has a few policy arguments as to why the Secretary’s construction of 42 C.F.R. § 413.30( . . .

MAXIMUM HOME HEALTH CARE, INC. v. E. SHALALA,, 136 F. Supp. 2d 814 (M.D. Tenn. 2000)

. . . . § 413.30 (emphasis added). . . .

ST. ELIZABETH S MEDICAL CENTER OF BOSTON, INC. v. SHALALA,, 91 F. Supp. 2d 419 (D. Mass. 2000)

. . . . § 413.30(a)(1), (e)-(h). . . . . § 413.30(e). . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(c). . . .

GRANCARE, INC. v. SHALALA,, 93 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2000)

. . . . § 413.30 (1993) (emphasis added). See also 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 (1992) (same text). . . .

ST. FRANCIS HEALTH CARE CENTRE, v. SHALALA,, 205 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 2000)

. . . . § 413.30(f), the Health Care Financing Administration granted upward adjustments to HB-SNFs that demonstrated . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(f). In the years 1984-1990, St. . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(f). . . . rule adds a fifth, unwaivable requirement to the four reimbursement criteria set out in 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . The PRM rule cannot be construed as an “interpretation” of 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 The majority concludes . . . . § 413.30), and a PRM provision (PRM § 2534.5) interpreting the regulation. 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1395yy: The . . . Id. at § 413.30(a). The regulation provides as follows: % H* (a)(2) General principle. . . . Neither Congress in 42 U.S.C. § 1395yy nor the Secretary in 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 mandated that a HB-SNF . . . should only be adjusted upward “to the extent the costs are reasonable.” 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(f). . . . extent to which costs for atypical services are “reasonable.” 42 C.F.R. § 413.30(f). . . .

VENCOR INC. d b a d b a d b a v. STANDARD LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY,, 65 F. Supp. 2d 573 (W.D. Ky. 1999)

. . . . § 413.30. . . . on a per beneficiary, per admission, per discharge, per diem, per visit, or other basis. 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . .

EAGLE HEALTHCARE, INC. v. E. SHALALA,, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999)

. . . See also 42 C.F.R. 413.30 (1992) (same text). . . . The PRRB determined that thesd market rates did not constitute “cost limits” under 42 C.F.R. 413.30. . . . The HCFA found that the market rates did not constitute cost limits under 42 C.F.R. 413.30. . . . See 42 C.F.R. 413.30(f). . . . See 42 C.F.R. 413.30(f). . . .

FOOTHILL PRESBYTERIAN HOSPITAL, v. E. SHALALA,, 152 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1998)

. . . when a provider may request a TEFRA limit adjustment after a reopening, that its interpretation of § 413.30 . . .

ST. FRANCIS HEALTH CARE CENTRE, v. A. SHALALA,, 10 F. Supp. 2d 887 (N.D. Ohio 1998)

. . . . § 413.30(f), for determining the amount of the exception from the routine cost limits imposed by the . . . the patients treated and are necessary in the efficient delivery of needed health care. 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . may make adjustments in the limits ... to the extent the Secretary deems appropriate); 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . implementing regulation provides that the “actual cost of items or services” may be reimbursed. 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . .

SATSKY v. UNITED STATES, 993 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D. Tex. 1998)

. . . . § 413.30, and provides that reimbursable provider costs under Medicare may not exceed the costs recognized . . .

ANAHEIM MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, v. E. SHALALA, ANAHEIM MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, v. E. SHALALA,, 130 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 1997)

. . . . § 413.30(a)(2), (c)-(f) (describing procedure for deriving the RCL). . . . the services are furnished, the size of the hospital, and the type of patients treated. 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . .

FRENCH HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, a v. E. SHALALA,, 89 F.3d 1411 (9th Cir. 1996)

. . . . § 413.30. . . . See 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.30(c) & (f). Blue Cross denied the hospital’s request on January 10, 1991. . . .

RYE PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL CENTER, INC. v. E. SHALALA,, 52 F.3d 1163 (2d Cir. 1995)

. . . . § 413.30 (1993). . . .

METHODIST HOSPITAL OF SACRAMENTO, v. E. SHALALA,, 38 F.3d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

. . . See 42 CFR § 413.30 (1993). . . . .

FRENCH HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, v. SHALALA,, 841 F. Supp. 1468 (N.D. Cal. 1993)

. . . . § 413.30(f), a provider may request an exception from the imposition of routine cost limits (“RCL”) . . . within 180 days of the issuance of the NPR. 42 C.F.R. 413.30(c), (f). . . . then makes a recommendation to HCFA as to whether to grant the request for an exception. 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . . See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo (a); 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.1835, 413.30(c). . . . Board review may be extended until HCFA completes its review of the exception request. 42 C.F.R. § 413.30 . . .

MT. DIABLO HOSPITAL, v. E. SHALALA, MEMORIAL HOSPITALS ASSOCIATION, v. E. SHALALA,, 3 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1993)

. . . . § 413.30(e), (f). Memorial does not appeal the denial of its request for an exemption. . . . .