Cases from cite.case.law:

DESERT SURVIVORS, v. US DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2018)

. . . . § 418.309(b)(1) to calculate hospice cap liability for any hospice.' " Id. . . .

SOUTHEAST ARKANSAS HOSPICE, INC. v. SEBELIUS,, 1 F. Supp. 3d 915 (E.D. Ark. 2014)

. . . . § 418.309(b), previously included a “streamlined methodology” that several courts, including one in . . . In 2011, SEARK obtained a permanent injunction enjoining the Secretary from enforcing 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)-(d) (eff. . . . As amended, 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(c) now includes a “proportional” methodology consistent with the requirements . . . Several courts specifically addressing the validity of 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1) rejected Fifth Amendment . . .

FULL LIFE HOSPICE, LLC, v. SEBELIUS,, 709 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 418.309, to calculate the amount of this cap. . . . . § 418.309, but it establishes a specific procedure for bringing such claims. . . . Full Life’s original complaint raised claims attacking the validity of 42 C.F.R. § 418.309. . . . to implicitly endorse an administrative ruling which intends to continue using [42 C.F.R. § 418.309,] . . . Again, regardless of the validity of 42 C.F.R. § 418.309, which is an issue we need not address here, . . .

HOSPICE OF NEW MEXICO, LLC, a v. SEBELIUS,, 435 F. App'x 749 (10th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 418.309(b), the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) regulation implementing . . . appeals were pending, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, like the district court, determined 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . . In contrast, the implementing regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 states in relevant part: For purposes of . . . In April 2008, a fiscal intermediary, applying the formula outlined in 42 C.F.R. § 418.309, sent Hospice . . . The Court has only found that 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1) is invalid and [Hospice] would be better off . . .

ZIA HOSPICE, INC. v. SEBELIUS,, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (D.N.M. 2011)

. . . . § 418.309(b)(1)(a). . . . Accordingly, Plaintiff has challenged the hospice cap calculations imposed under § 418.309(b)(1). . . . In each case, Zia specifically challenges the validity of 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1), arguing that the . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1). . . . . 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1) is invalid and may not be enforced against Plaintiff. . . .

SOUTHEAST ARKANSAS HOSPICE, INC. v. SEBELIUS,, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Ark. 2011)

. . . . § 418.309(b)(1). . . . long as [a hospice-care provider] can point to some concrete harm logically produced by 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . . reasons set forth in the litany of authorities cited above, the Secretary’s regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . .

LOS ANGELES HAVEN HOSPICE, INC. a v. SEBELIUS, O., 638 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 418.309, pursuant to which Haven Hospice was ordered to repay more than $2.3 million it received . . . In an attempt to ameliorate this prejudice, HHS established the “shift” embodied in 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . . HHS argued that Haven Hospice lacked standing to challenge 42 C.F.R § 418.309(b) because the hospice . . . Turning to the merits, the district court concluded that the hospice cap regulation, 42 C.F.R § 418.309 . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1). . . .

LION HEALTH SERVICES, INC. a v. SEBELIUS,, 635 F.3d 693 (5th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 418.309(b)(1) (the “Regulation”), a regulation promulgated by the Secretary of the U.S. . . . In 1983, the Secretary promulgated 42 C.F.R. § 418.309, a regulation purporting to implement 42 U.S.C . . . the cap period) and ending on September 27 (35 days before the end of the cap period). 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . . validity of the Secretary’s single-year allocation method of calculation prescribed by 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . . CONCLUSION We join a unanimous group of district courts around the country in finding that 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . .

AUTUMN JOURNEY HOSPICE, INC. v. SEBELIUS, U. S., 753 F. Supp. 2d 135 (D.D.C. 2010)

. . . . § 418.309. . . . Id. § 418.309(b)(1) (emphasis added). C. . . . It challenges the repayment demand on the grounds that 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1), the regulation pursuant . . . On November 3, 2009, the PRRB granted the plaintiff’s request for EJR of the validity of 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . . the plaintiff in Russell-Murray was a hospice care provider challenging the validity of 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . .

NATIVE ANGELS HOME CARE AGENCY, INC. v. SEBELIUS,, 749 F. Supp. 2d 370 (E.D.N.C. 2010)

. . . . § 418.309(b)(1) is invalid and contrary to law. . . . . § 418.309(b)(1) dictates how to determine the number of Medicare beneficiaries that a hospice provider . . . Thus, Native Angels seeks summary judgment [D.E. 14] as to its claim that 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1) is . . . Accordingly, Native Angels has standing to challenge regulation 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1). III. . . . C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1) are invalid as a matter of law. . . .

AFFINITY HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. d b a v. SEBELIUS, U. S., 746 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 2010)

. . . . § 418.309. . . . Id. § 418.309(b) (emphasis added). . . . They challenge these repayment demands on the grounds that 42 C.F.R. § 418.309, the regulation pursuant . . . granted plaintiff Destiny Hospice’s request for EJR of its challenge to the validity of 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . . administrative process and is now before the court is the Administrator’s authority to utilize 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . .

RUSSELL- MURRAY HOSPICE, INC. v. SEBELIUS, U. S., 724 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2010)

. . . . § 418.309. . . . Id. § 418.309(b) (emphasis added). . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1). . . . Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(i)(2)(C) with 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1). . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1). Accordingly, the decisions cited by the defendant are inapposite. . . . .

AFFINITY HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC. d b a v. SEBELIUS, U. S., 720 F. Supp. 2d 12 (D.D.C. 2010)

. . . . § 418.309. . . . Id. § 418.309(b) (emphasis added). . . . They challenge these repayment demands on the grounds that 42 C.F.R. § 418.309, the regulation pursuant . . . plaintiffs’ request for expedited judicial review of their group challenge to the validity of 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . .

IHG HEALTHCARE d b a v. SEBELIUS,, 717 F. Supp. 2d 696 (S.D. Tex. 2010)

. . . . § 418.309(b)(1) is unlawful and is hereby set aside; 3. . . . enjoined from this day forward from enforcing against Grace any repayment demand pursuant to 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . . Grace contends these demands, calculated under HHS regulation 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1), are overstated . . . Is 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1) consistent with the Medicare Act? . . . The court finds § 418.309(b)(1) regulation is facially invalid and may not be enforced. . . .

ZIA HOSPICE, INC. v. SEBELIUS,, 723 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (D.N.M. 2010)

. . . . § 418.309(b)(1), the “Hospice Cap Regulation,” on the grounds that it does not comply with its parent . . . prescribes a method of computing the maximum amount that a hospice provider may be reimbursed. 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . .

TRI- COUNTY HOSPICE, INC. v. SEBELIUS, U. S., 788 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (E.D. Okla. 2010)

. . . . § 418.309(b), conflicts with the plain language of the governing statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(i)(2)(C . . . the question of law “certified” for resolution by the PRRB is the validity or invalidity 42 C.F.R. § 418.309 . . . Simply put, “Section 418.309(b)(1) clearly does not follow the method described in § 1395f(i)(2)(C). . . .

HOSPICE OF NEW MEXICO, LLC, a v. SEBELIUS,, 691 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (D.N.M. 2010)

. . . . § 418.309(b)(1) is invalid and should be set aside, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgement/Stay (Doc . . . PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The case involves the validity of federal regulation 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1), . . . Prior to addressing the parties’ arguments with respect to the validity of 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1), . . . A declaration that 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1) is invalid. 2. . . . A declaration that 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b)(1) is invalid. 2. . . .

LION HEALTH SERVICES, INC. v. SEBELIUS,, 689 F. Supp. 2d 849 (N.D. Tex. 2010)

. . . As relief, plaintiff seeks (a) declarations that (i) § 418.309(b)(1) is unlawful and set aside and (ii . . . For these reasons, plaintiff has standing to challenge the validity of § 418.309(b)(1). C. . . . Section 418.309(b)(1) clearly does not follow the method described in § 1395f(i)(2)(C). . . . See 42 C.F.R. §§ 418.3, 418.309(a). . . . See 42 C.F.R. §§ 418.3, 418.309(a). . . .