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Florida Statute 440.30 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 440.30 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XXXI
LABOR
Chapter 440
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 440.30
440.30 Depositions.Depositions of witnesses or parties, residing within or without the state, may be taken and may be used in connection with proceedings under the Workers’ Compensation Law, either upon order of the judge of compensation claims or at the instance of any party or prospective party to such proceedings, and either prior to the institution of a claim, if the claimant is represented by an attorney, or after the filing of the claim in the same manner, for the same purposes, including the purposes of discovery, and subject to the same rules; all as now or hereafter prescribed by law or by rules of court governing the taking and use of such depositions in civil actions at law in the circuit courts of this state. Such depositions may be taken before any notary public, court reporter, or deputy, and the fees of the officer taking the same and the fees of the witnesses attending the same, including expert witness fees as provided by law or court rule, shall be the same as in depositions taken for such circuit courts. Such fees may be taxed as costs and recovered by the claimant, if successful in such workers’ compensation proceedings. If no claim has been filed, then the carrier or employer taking the deposition shall pay the claimant’s attorney a reasonable attorney’s fee for attending said deposition.
History.s. 30, ch. 17481, 1935; CGL 1936 Supp. 5966(30); s. 13, ch. 18413, 1937; s. 1, ch. 28228, 1953; ss. 17, 35, ch. 69-106; s. 17, ch. 74-197; s. 15, ch. 75-209; s. 23, ch. 78-300; ss. 23, 124, ch. 79-40; s. 21, ch. 79-312; s. 43, ch. 89-289; s. 56, ch. 90-201; s. 52, ch. 91-1; s. 7, ch. 91-46.

F.S. 440.30 on Google Scholar

F.S. 440.30 on Casetext

Amendments to 440.30


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 440.30
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 440.30.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

HYMAN, v. D. BROWN,, 927 F.3d 639 (2nd Cir. 2019)

. . . Law § 440.30(1)(a). . . .

HYMAN, v. D. BROWN,, 197 F. Supp. 3d 413 (E.D.N.Y. 2016)

. . . . § 440.30(l)(a), Hy-man sought DNA testing on the intact 9mm Intratech pistol found in Whitmore’s car . . . devoid of character and weight because none of the alleged retractions are sworn as required by C.P.L. § 440.30 . . . record should be denied because he failed to comply with the “sworn allegation” requirement of C.P.L. § 440.30 . . . N.Y.C.P.L. § 440.30(4)(b). . . .

SUAREZ, v. STEWARD ENTERPRISES Co., 164 So. 3d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Code R. 60-0-6.114(1) & (2); see also § 440.30, Fla. Stat. (2005).” In Pierre v. . . .

NEWTON, v. CITY OF NEW YORK,, 779 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2015)

. . . Law § 440.30(l-a) (McKinney 1994). . . . Law § 440.30(l-a)(b). . . . Section 440.30(l-a)(a) was not enacted until 2004. . . . Law § 440.30(l-a)(a) (McKinney 2004), with N.Y.Crim. Proc. Law § 440.30(l-a) (McKinney 1994). . . . . Law § 440.30(1-a)(b); see 2004 N.Y. Sess. Laws 2794 (McKiiiney). . . .

HIRSH, v. B. McARDLE,, 74 F. Supp. 3d 525 (N.D.N.Y. 2015)

. . . That claim was denied pursuant to CPL § 440.30(4)(b). . . . April 22, 2013) (finding denial of motion under § 440.30(4)(b) to be determination on the merits arid . . . Smith, 858 F.Supp.2d 229, 236 (N.D.N.Y.2012) (concluding that § 440.30(4)(b) constituted a decision on . . . July 27, 2007) (holding that because “section 440.30(4) applies, by its own terms, only when a trial . . . court denies a motion to vacate ‘[u]pon considering the merits,’ ... a denial pursuant to CPL § 440.30 . . .

MATTHEWS, v. RAYMOND, T., 562 F. App'x 43 (2d Cir. 2014)

. . . Law § 440.30(6), can be seen to be in tension with Strickland’s requirement that petitioners need only . . .

SMITH, v. FISCHER,, 957 F. Supp. 2d 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)

. . . . § 440.30(4)(c) which indicates that a court may deny a C.P.L. § 440 motion if ‘an allegation of fact . . .

CVS CAREMARK CORPORATION v. LATOUR,, 109 So. 3d 1232 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 440.30, Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .

SHANNON, v. CHENEY BROTHERS INC., 98 So. 3d 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . The E/C took Shannon’s deposition prior to the institution of any claim, as permitted by section 440.30 . . . Fees Due Under Section 440.30 Section 440.30, Florida Statutes (2010), is the specific provision within . . . See § 440.30, Fla. Stat. . . . is a “claim” as the term is used in section 440.30. . . . Ch. 79-40, § 23, Laws of Fla.; see also § 440.30, Fla. Stat. (1979). . . .

LOPEZ, v. L. MILLER,, 906 F. Supp. 2d 42 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . . § 440.30(4)(a).) . . . (Id. at 10 (citing C.P.L. § 440.30(4)(d)).) . . .

PEPE, v. WALSH,, 31 F. Supp. 3d 441 (N.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . The County Court cited CPL § 440.30(4)(b) in support of its decision and noted that Petitioner’s claim . . . report had been intentionally altered to conceal the true arrest date of the witness .... ” Section 440.30 . . . Scully, 875 F.Supp. 182, 192-93 n. 9 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (all holding that denial under § 440.30(4)(b) due . . . Oct. 15, 2007) (finding that denial pursuant to § 440.30(4)(b) was a decision on the merits subject to . . . This Court previously adopted the view that a § 440.30(4)(b) denial is not a procedural bar. . . .

E. PARKER, Jr. v. T. SMITH,, 858 F. Supp. 2d 229 (N.D.N.Y. 2012)

. . . The state court denied petitioner’s motion pursuant to CPL § 440.30(2), (4)(a), (4)(b) and (4)(d). . . . Section 440.30(4)(b) provides that, “[ujpon considering the merits” of a section 440 motion, the court . . . This court, however, has previously held that because section 440.30(4) opens with an explicit reference . . . to “considering the merits of the motion,” a denial based on section 440.30(4) is “a decision on the . . . The Second Circuit has reached a similar conclusion regarding section 440.30(4)(c). Garcia v. . . .

ARROYO, v. LEE,, 831 F. Supp. 2d 750 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . The court relied on CPL section 440.30(4)(b), holding that the motion did not have the necessary sworn . . . The state court rejected these claims under section 440.30(4)(b), because defendant’s moving papers did . . . July 2008 Order; § 440.30(4)(b). . See id. . See id. . See id. . 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). . . . .

GRAVES, v. T. SMITH,, 811 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . . § 440.30 in Kings County Supreme Court seeking to vacate his conviction on two grounds: 1) the “prosecutor . . . Pursuant to CPL § 440.30, People v. Graves, Ind. No. 9064/95 (Kings Cnty. Sup.Ct. Jan. 10, 2006). . . .

NEWTON, v. CITY OF NEW YORK J. J., 784 F. Supp. 2d 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . Procedure Law (“Section 440.30(1-a)”), which provides, in substance, that a post-conviction defendant . . . L. § 440.30(1-a)(a). The quoted language was originally the full extent of § 440.30(1-a). . . . Upon the enactment of § 440.30(1-a)(b), the original language was placed under the heading of § 440.30 . . . Id. § 440.30(1-a)(b). . Pl. Mem. at 4 (emphasis omitted). . McKithen, 626 F.3d at 145. . . . . See § 440.30(1-a)(b). . See Pl. Mem. At 6. . . . .

PUNSKY, v. CLAY COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 60 So. 3d 1088 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . claimant, the judge entered an amended final order, rejecting arguments that sections 440.13(5) and 440.30 . . . Claimant contends that sections 440.13(5) and 440.30, Florida Statutes (2004), control the disposition . . . Section 440.30 permits fees charged by court reporters and witnesses to “be taxed as costs and recovered . . . Claimant’s argument that the language of section 440.30 “expressly limits” the award of costs for depositions . . .

W. DEARSTYNE, v. MAZZUCA,, 48 F. Supp. 3d 222 (N.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . Law § 440.30(l-a). . . . L. § 440.30(l~a)(a). . . . C.P.L. § 440.30(l-a). However, in District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. . . . Law § 440.30(l-a) with Brady v. . . . Accordingly, the County Court denied the claim pursuant to CPL § 440.30(4)(b). . . .

M. LINNEN, v. POOLE,, 766 F. Supp. 2d 427 (W.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . motion [alleging ineffective assistance of counsel] is therefore denied (CPL 440.10(2)(a), (c); CPL 440.30 . . .

BAPTISTE, v. ERCOLE,, 766 F. Supp. 2d 339 (N.D.N.Y. 2011)

. . . See CPL § 440.30(4)(a). . . . The state court's decisions were based on, and in compliance with section 440.30(4)(a). . . .

MIXON, v. A. SEDITA, III,, 757 F. Supp. 2d 229 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30(1-a) (“440 motion”), seeking DNA testing of evidence secured in connection . . .

McKITHEN, v. BROWN, s, 626 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2010)

. . . Law § 440.30(1-a)(a). . . . Law § 440.30(1-a)(a). B. . . . Law § 440.30(1-a)(a) in his case. . . . Law § 440.30(1-a)(a). . . . Law § 440.30(1-a)(a). C. . . .

E. MILES, Jr. v. CONWAY,, 739 F. Supp. 2d 324 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Law § 440.30(4)(b)). . . .

NEWTON, v. CITY OF NEW YORK T. As O J. J. As, 738 F. Supp. 2d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . New York's subdivision 1-a to New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.30 ("section 440.30(l-a)(a) . . . L. § 440.30(l-a)(a). See, e.g., Fuentes v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. . . . court denied post-conviction defendant's request for access to evidence for DNA testing under section 440.30 . . . preservation of evidence, a fact which could unfortunately serve to circumvent the spirit of section 440.30 . . .

BARNEY, v. T. CONWAY,, 730 F. Supp. 2d 264 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Section 440.30[sic] to Set Aside Sentence and to Vacate Judgment.” . . . C.P.L. § 440.30 sets out the circumstances under which the motion court may deny, without a hearing, . . . The substance of Barney's pleading makes clear that the reference to § 440.30 was a simple error, and . . .

BORCYK, v. LEMPKE,, 727 F. Supp. 2d 189 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . . § 440.30(4)(b) (“Upon considering the merits of the motion, the court may deny it without conducting . . . Borcyk states that he fears that this holding based upon C.P.L. § 440.30(4)(b) is a procedural bar. . . . 440.10 motion ‘[u]pon considering the merits of the motion,’ ” and therefore “a denial pursuant to § 440.30 . . . failed to come forward the first time with sufficient proof, [he] will be barred by CPL 440.10(3)(c) and 440.30 . . . C.P.L. § 440.30(1) lists the grounds upon which a trial court may order vacatur of a judgment; it does . . .

MONTGOMERY, v. WOOD,, 727 F. Supp. 2d 171 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Law § 440.30(4)(b). . . . and the trial court denied them because they were not supported by sufficient facts, citing C.P.L. § 440.30 . . .

SMITH, v. PEREZ,, 722 F. Supp. 2d 356 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Smith states that she “is raising the same grounds that she raised on direct appeal and her 440.30[sic . . .

CHARRIEZ, v. GREINER,, 265 F.R.D. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30(1-a). The motion was denied. See Decision and Order, People v. . . . Proc. § 440.30(1-a)(a); citing People v. . . .

M. LINNEN, v. POOLE,, 689 F. Supp. 2d 501 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . motion [alleging ineffective assistance of counsel] is therefore denied (CPL 440.10(2)(a), (c); CPL 440.30 . . .

NEWTON, v. CITY OF NEW YORK T. O J. J., 681 F. Supp. 2d 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . In 1994, New York enacted subdivision 1-a to New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.30 (“section . . . 440.30(l-a)(a)”), permitting a postconviction defendant to “request the performance of a forensic DNA . . . After section 440.30(l-a)(a) was enacted, Newton made three additional requests to obtain a DNA test . . . L. § 440.30(l-a)(a). . See Deposition of ADA John Carroll, Ex. . . . L. § 440.30(l-a)(a). Accord Fuentes v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Coir. . . .

WARNEY, v. MONROE COUNTY, C., 587 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2009)

. . . Law 440.30(l-a) (McKinney 2004) (the “440 motion”), seeking access to the blood evidence found at the . . .

In J. SMITH,, 349 F. App'x 12 (6th Cir. 2009)

. . . Law § 440.30(l-a)(a) (emphases added in McKithen)). . . .

R. TAYLOR, v. TGI FRIDAY S, INC., 16 So. 3d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . R. 60Q-6.114(1) & (2); see also § 440.30, Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .

W. BURCH, II, v. T. MILLAS,, 663 F. Supp. 2d 151 (W.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . . § 440.30(2) and (4)(a), (b). . . .

DISTRICT ATTORNEY S OFFICE FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT v. OSBORNE, 557 U.S. 52 (9th Cir. 2009)

. . . . § 440.30(l-a) (West 2005)); Act of May 9, 1997, Pub. Act No. 90-141, 1997 Ill. . . . . §440.30(l-a) (West 2005); N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §15A-269 (Lexis 2007); N. D. Cent. . . .

MOHSIN, v. EBERT,, 626 F. Supp. 2d 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . coram nobis (the "Coram Nobis Motion”), and a second motion to vacate judgment pursuant to CPL Section 440.30 . . .

FORE, v. ERCOLE,, 594 F. Supp. 2d 281 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)

. . . . § 440.30, in which he alleged the following: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for: (a) his failure . . .

CARRION, v. T. SMITH,, 549 F.3d 583 (2d Cir. 2008)

. . . suggests that the basis for the New York Supreme Court’s decision was New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30 . . .

C. PARKER, v. ERCOLE,, 582 F. Supp. 2d 273 (N.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . See CPL § 440.30(4)(a). . . .

McKITHEN, v. BROWN,, 565 F. Supp. 2d 440 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . Law § 440.30(l-a), McKithen brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Queens County District . . . to the knife is precluded by the state court’s decision that he was not entitled to testing under § 440.30 . . . Law § 440.30(l-a), seeking court-ordered DNA testing of the knife to determine if Rose McKithen’s blood . . . Brown argues that if McKithen’s injury preexisted the § 440.30(l-a) motion, his claim must have accrued . . . Brown himself appears to agree that this is the correct interpretation of § 440.30(l-a). . . .

CAMPBELL, v. T. POOLE,, 555 F. Supp. 2d 345 (W.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . . § 440.30(4)(b) and (d). . . .

GOLDBERG, v. TRACY,, 247 F.R.D. 360 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)

. . . hearing, to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence, every fact essential to support the motion” (CPL § 440.30 . . .

KNIGHT, v. J. WALSH,, 524 F. Supp. 2d 255 (W.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . objection for the record, such that the claim is now proeedurally barred pursuant to § 440.10(3)(e) and § 440.30 . . .

VELAZQUEZ, v. POOLE,, 614 F. Supp. 2d 284 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . Law § 440.30(4)(b), which authorizes denial of a motion to vacate judgment without a hearing if the defendant . . . (See discussion infra at 313-14, 318-19). .Specifically, Section 440.30(4)(b) provides that "[u]pon considering . . . Law § 440.30(4)(b). . . . . Law § 440.30(4)(b) (see discussion supra at 306-07, n. 6), constitutes an independent and adequate state . . . .2005) (gathering cases detailing the Circuit split on the issue, and concluding that because “Section 440.30 . . .

CHARLES, v. FISCHER,, 516 F. Supp. 2d 210 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . Law § 440.30(4). . . . Law § 440.30(4). . . . Law § 440.30(4) is procedural in nature, or on the merits. Compare Williams v. . . . Herbert, 369 F.Supp.2d 376, 389 (W.D.N.Y.2005) (holding that a determination under Section 440.30 is . . . If Judge Gulotta’s rejection of the petitioner’s argument based on Section 440.30(4) is procedural in . . .

BENNETT, v. S. FISCHER,, 246 F. App'x 761 (2d Cir. 2007)

. . . Law § 440.30, and because his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed to satisfy the requirements . . .

RUSTICI, v. PHILIPS,, 497 F. Supp. 2d 452 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . N.Y.C.P.L. 440.30(4)(a). . . .

DIAZ, v. T. CONWAY,, 498 F. Supp. 2d 654 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . November 7, 2002, more than ten years after the denial of his appeal and eight years after NYCPL § 440.30 . . . (l-a) (“§ 440.30”) had taken effect, Diaz moved, pro se, pursuant to that statute to vacate his judgment . . . corpus alleging the following grounds: (1) new evidence exists in the form of DNA testing pursuant to § 440.30 . . . Although Diaz had the right to pursue his § 440.30 motion at any time after his conviction, the “factual . . . . could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence” as early as the date on which § 440.30 . . .

OSORIO, v. CONWAY,, 496 F. Supp. 2d 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)

. . . Law § 440.30(4)(b), but consented to petitioner’s request for a hearing pursuant to N.Y.Crim. Proc. . . . Law § 440.30(5). . . .

McKITHEN, v. BROWN,, 481 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007)

. . . Law § 440.30(l-a)(a), to compel, inter alia, DNA testing of the knife admitted into evidence at trial . . . Subsection l-a(a) of § 440.30 provides: Where the defendant’s motion requests the performance of a forensic . . . Law § 440.30(l-a)(a) (emphases added). . . . “naked assertion” that McKithen could have brought a federal constitutional claim as part of his § 440.30 . . . The state court, in denying McKithen’s § 440.30 motion to have the knife tested, reached the conclusion . . .

BAKER, v. MURRAY,, 460 F. Supp. 2d 425 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . Petitioner filed a motion to vacate pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30 and an application . . .

A. BARNARD, Jr. v. BURBARY,, 452 F. Supp. 2d 178 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . .”) § 440.30. . . . Because C.P.L. § 440.30 does not provide a basis for a motion to vacate; it only specifies the procedural . . .

D. ULRICH, v. BERBARY,, 445 F. Supp. 2d 267 (W.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . . § 440.30. . . .

O. HARVEY, a k a v. PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK,, 435 F. Supp. 2d 175 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . . §§ 440.10, 440.20, and 440.30. He claimed that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective. . . .

YOUNG, v. M. P. McGINNIS,, 411 F. Supp. 2d 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)

. . . . § 440.30(4)(b) and (d). Id. at 7-8. . . .

C. GREINER, v. WELLS,, 417 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005)

. . . Citing New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.30, which states that motion papers must contain sworn . . . Citing New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.30(4)(b), the court explained that “the Supreme Court . . . Wells presented his case as “an excellent opportunity to clarify the CPL 440.30[4][b] requirement that . . . Law § 440.30(1). . . . . Law § 440.30(4)(b). . . . .

MCDONALD, v. SMITH,, 134 F. App'x 466 (2d Cir. 2005)

. . . We need not reach the question of whether New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30(l-a) creates a liberty . . . Law §§ 440.30(1-a), 450.10(5), 450.90 (McKinney Supp.2005); People v. . . . Law § 440.30(l-a) motion for forensic DNA testing tolled the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § . . .

SINGLETARY, v. FISCHER,, 365 F. Supp. 2d 328 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)

. . . state court was properly pointed out by the state Supreme Court Justice ruling on it as follows: CPL § 440.30 . . . CPL § 440.30(4)(b) states that a Court may deny a CPL § 440.10 motion, without a hearing, when an allegation . . .

GONZALEZ- PENA, v. HERBERT, J., 369 F. Supp. 2d 376 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)

. . . Law § 440.30(4)(b) and Romero v. . . . Law § 440.30(4)(b) ] would create a procedural bar”); Roberts v. . . . Law § 440.30(4)(b) is a decision on the merits. E.g., Lou v. . . . Law §§ 440.30(4)(b) and 440.30(4)(d) were not procedurally barred; state’s argument that the § 440 court . . . Because Section 440.30 refers to the procedures for deciding Section § 440.10 motions, and Section 440.30 . . .

ESCUTIA, v. GREENLEAF PRODUCTS, INC., 886 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Discovery by deposition is permitted under section 440.30, Florida Statutes (2000), and its scope is . . .

GARCIA, v. A. PORTUONDO, L., 104 F. App'x 776 (2d Cir. 2004)

. . . Law § 440.30(4)(c), was based on an “independent and adequate state procedural ground,” which prevents . . . Under § 440.30(4)(c), a court presented with a motion to vacate a judgment pursuant to N.Y. Crim. . . . We agree with the District Court that, based upon the plain language of § 440.30(4)(c), the state court . . . conclusively refuted” Garcia’s constitutional claims seems to be a most unreasonable application of § 440.30 . . .

BENNETT, v. ARTUZ,, 285 F. Supp. 2d 305 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)

. . . Law §§ 440.10 and 440.30, challenging the trial judge’s exclusion of one of his witnesses, alleging prosecutorial . . .

ROSA, v. HERBERT,, 277 F. Supp. 2d 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)

. . . Id. § 440.30(l)-(5). . . . Proc. § 440.30(1). . . . Undoubtedly, section 440.30 reflects important state policy. . . . Law § 440.30(l)-(5). . . . Law § 440.30(4)(d). . . .

PINCKNEY, v. DUFRAIN,, 59 F. App'x 383 (2d Cir. 2003)

. . . petitioner moved in New York Supreme Court, Kings County, under New York Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”) § 440.30 . . . Under CPL § 440.30(l-a), defendants convicted prior to January 1, 1996 may request a DNA test on certain . . .

JELINEK, v. COSTELLO,, 247 F. Supp. 2d 212 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)

. . . appeal but the defendant unjustifiably failed to do so), and New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440.30 . . . trial court’s invocation of New York Criminal Procedure Law sections 440.10(2)(a), 440.10(2)(c) and 440.30 . . . Feb. 17, 2000) (adequacy of section 440.30(1)). . . .

MONTALVO, v. MANTELLO,, 233 F. Supp. 2d 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)

. . . Montalvo’s claim was based on facts that were unsupported by sworn allegations as required by CPL § 440.30 . . .

AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF WORKERS COMPENSATION PROCEDURE, 829 So. 2d 791 (Fla. 2002)

. . . same manner and for the same purpose as provided in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure or section 440.30 . . .

HOLLAND, v. E. IRVIN,, 45 F. App'x 17 (2d Cir. 2002)

. . . Dep’t 2002) (affirming County Court’s denial of a motion made pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30 . . .

KATOWSKI, v. GREINER,, 212 F. Supp. 2d 78 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)

. . . past the procedural barrier of CPL 440.10(2)(c), his motion would be summarily denied, pursuant to CPL 440.30 . . .

SPERINGO, v. MCLAUGHLIN,, 202 F. Supp. 2d 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)

. . . (“CPL”) § 440.10 and 440.30, asserting that (1) Speringo was denied effective assistance of trial counsel . . .

HARVEY, v. F. HORAN, Jr. s R., 285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2002)

. . . Law § 440.30 (McKinney Supp. 2001); Fla. Stat. . . .

SANTIAGO, v. MILLER,, 180 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

. . . Court for an order pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law (“NYCPL”) §§ 440.10(l)(b), (d), (f), and 440.30 . . .

JONES, v. B. DUNCAN,, 162 F. Supp. 2d 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)

. . . See CPL § 330.40(2)(a) & (e)-(f) (governing CPL § 330.30(3) motions); CPL § 440.30(4)(b) (governing CPL . . .

DIAZ, v. GREINER,, 110 F. Supp. 2d 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)

. . . See CPL § 440.30. . . .

K A RADIOLOGIC TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, INC. X- v. COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK J., 189 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 1999)

. . . . § 440.30. . . .

M. FRANZA, v. STINSON,, 58 F. Supp. 2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)

. . . . § 440.30 and follow the dictates of the [New York] Court of Appeals.” (Pet. at 35.) A. . . .

ERDHEIM, v. H. GREINER,, 22 F. Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)

. . . .); CPL §§ 440.10, subd. 2, ¶ (b), 440.30, subds. 2, 4; see also People v. . . .

K A RADIOLOGIC TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, INC. X- v. J. WING,, 13 F. Supp. 2d 264 (N.D.N.Y. 1998)

. . . . § 440.30. . . . See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(xi)(3); 42 C.F.R. § 440.30; see also Granato v. . . . (c) Furnished by a laboratory that meets the requirements of part 493 of this chapter. 42 C.F.R. § 440.30 . . . See 42 C.F.R. § 440.30; 42 C.F.R. § 494.1; 42 C.F.R. § 493.2. . . .

In AMENDMENTS TO THE FLORIDA RULES OF WORKERS COMPENSATION PROCEDURE, 674 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 1996)

. . . same manner and for the same purpose as provided in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure or section 440.30 . . .

KARELL, v. MIAMI AIRPORT HILTON MIAMI HILTON CORPORATION,, 668 So. 2d 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . requisite jurisdictional authority can be implied from several statutory provisions as follows: sections 440.30 . . . Section 440.30 specifically authorizes the JCC to order the taking of depositions before a claim is filed . . . Unlike section 440.30, dealing with the taking of depositions, and unlike section 440.33(1), as implemented . . .

WRIGHT, v. INDUSTRIAL AUTOMOTIVE F. A. W. A., 662 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . below, challenges a workers’ compensation order denying his claim for attorney’s fees under section 440.30 . . . Counsel for claimant subsequently filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees pursuant to section 440.30, Florida . . . the motion on the ground that the Request for Assistance was a “claim” within the meaning of section 440.30 . . . the claimant’s deposition was taken prior to the filing of a “claim” as the term is used in section 440.30 . . . We find that the reference to a filing of a “claim” in section 440.30, Florida Statutes (1993) should . . .

SOUTHEAST RECYCLING CORPORATION v. McCLURE,, 658 So. 2d 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . generally outside the scope of discovery allowed in workers’ compensation cases pursuant to section 440.30 . . .

SIMS, v. SUPERINTENDENT OF CLINTON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, DANNEMORA, NEW YORK,, 887 F. Supp. 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)

. . . . § 440.30(4)(d), denied the appeal on May 10, 1994. . . .

ROBERTS, v. J. SCULLY,, 875 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)

. . . Alternatively, she argued that the motion should be denied on procedural grounds under N.Y.Crim.Proc.L. 440.30 . . . (See N.Y.Crim.Proc.L. § 440.30(4)(b).) . . . .

KOHLER, Jr. v. KELLY,, 890 F. Supp. 207 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)

. . . raising this claim because it was not raised properly in state court, and was denied pursuant to CPL § 440.30 . . .

HANNA, v. INDUSTRIAL LABOR SERVICE, INC., 636 So. 2d 773 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . . § 440.30 & 440.33, Fla.Stat.; Fla.R.Work.Comp. 4.090(a) (discovery); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.380(d). Fla. . . .

E. CLAIR, v. GLADES COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, 635 So. 2d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . . § 440.30, Fla.Stat. (1991); Suburban Propane v. . . .

PAULK, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, 615 So. 2d 260 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . find no impermissible conflict between section 440.13(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), and section 440.30 . . . upon the occurrence of these circumstances, without regard to the more general provisions in section 440.30 . . .

COLSON, v. MITCHELL,, 798 F. Supp. 966 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)

. . . petitioner refiled his motion to vacate, this time conforming his pleadings to the requirements of CPL § 440.30 . . .

DELGADO, v. WALKER,, 798 F. Supp. 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)

. . . New York Criminal Procedure Law § 440.30(7) specifically instructs that a court, in denying a motion . . . Proc.Law § 440.30(7) (McKinney 1987). . . . Petitioner’s complaint about the trial court’s noncompliance with § 440.30(7), a state law, is not a . . .

AMENDMENTS TO FLORIDA RULES OF WORKERS COMPENSATION PROCEDURE, 603 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1992)

. . . It is derived substantially from ^section 440.30, Florida» Statutes {1979). 1984 RevisiomAmendment. . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. HOKE,, 928 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1991)

. . . Proc.Law §§ 440.30(1) and (4)(b). . . .

SUBURBAN PROPANE, v. ESTATE OF PITCHER,, 564 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . Statutes (1989), and that the ordered depositions exceed the scope of discovery as set forth in Section 440.30 . . . Section 440.30, Florida Statutes (1989), provides: Depositions of witnesses or parties ... may be taken . . . Third, the taking of depositions is, pursuant to Section 440.30, Florida Statutes (1989), governed by . . . and ... used in connection with proceedings under Chapter 440, Florida Statutes[,]” and with section 440.30 . . . Thus, after considering rule 4.090(a) and section 440.30 in pari materia with the provisions of section . . .

HOLLAND, v. COURTESY CORPORATION, 563 So. 2d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . . § 440.30, Fla.Stat. (1989); Rule 4.090(e), Fla.W.C.R.P. . . .

IAFORNARO, v. CHARTER BUILDERS, 557 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . The court explained that Section 440.30, Florida Statutes, addressed the taking of depositions in workers . . . Section 440.30, Florida Statutes (1987), still reads as quoted by the Harbin court. . . .

A. SABER, v. J. DILEO,, 723 F. Supp. 1167 (E.D. La. 1989)

. . . Performance Motor owes one-third of the costs and expenses accrued as of March 16, 1989, which is $440.30 . . . Leader Buick’s share includes one-third until March 16, 1989 ($440.30), and one-half until their settlement . . . Defendant Dileo owes one-third until March 16, 1989 ($440.30), one-half until Leader Buick’s settlement . . .

THE FLORIDA BAR. In Re WORKERS COMPENSATION RULES OF PROCEDURE, 535 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1988)

. . . It is derived substantially from § 440.30, Fla.Stat.1979. 1984 Committee Note: Subsections (b) through . . .

ELLIS, A By ELLIS v. PATTERSON, In, 713 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Ark. 1988)

. . . These services include: inpatient hospital services (440.10), other laboratory and x-ray services (440.30 . . .

BEDNARIK, v. EBASCO SERVICES, 527 So. 2d 251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . appeals from the denial by the deputy commissioner of his claim for attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 440.30 . . . Based on this attendance, the claim for the fee pursuant to § 440.30 was filed (if no claim has been . . . pleading, both claims remained pending at the tíme of the deposition, barring the award of fees under § 440.30 . . . claims were pending at the time of these depositions so as to bar the fee sought pursuant to Section 440.30 . . .

WHALEY, v. J. RODRIGUEZ,, 840 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1988)

. . . [b], 440.30, subds. 2, 4; see also People v. . . .