Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...without first registering in accordance with this part [Sections 559.553 and 559.555] . . . and thereafter maintaining a valid 9 registration.”.10 FLA . STAT . §559.553(1) and (2). Section 559.553 of the FCCPA does not itself provide a private right of action. FLA . STAT . §559.72 (identifying types of FCCPA violations that give rise to a private cause of action and omitting §559.553)....

...The FCCPA also makes clear that its remedies are “cumulative to other sanctions and enforcement provisions” for any violation by an out-of-state consumer debt collector. FLA . STAT . §559.565. Relevant to the question presented here, the FDCPA and FCCPA have certain parallels. For instance, Section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA prohibits a debt collector from “asserting the existence of [a] legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.”12 See FLA . STAT . §559.72(9); compare 15 U.S.C. 11 One authority explains that the FDCPA “establishes minimum boundaries for unlawful debt collection, leaving intact state laws which provide higher levels of consumer protection from collection activity.” 104 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 3d 1, § 5 (2009) (citing Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., 396 F.3d 227, 236 n. 11 (3rd Cir.2005)). 12 In contrast to the FDCPA, Section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the debt collector defendant possessed actual knowledge that the threatened means of enforcing the debt was 11 §1692e(5). At least one federal district court has held that no state cause of action exists under §559.72(9) of the FCCPA for failure to comply with the registration requirement of §559.553....

...that are not expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law; § 1692g, failing to give notice as required by the statute; and § 1692i, bringing a legal action (the garnishment) in an improper venue. Cliff also alleges a violation of § 559.72(9) of the Florida Act, which prohibits a debt collector from claiming, attempting, or threatening to enforce a debt when the debt collector knows that the debt is not legitimate, or asserting the existence of some other legal right when the...

...atute that provides debtors with protection from abusive, fraudulent, and deceptive collection practices. Like the FDCPA, the Florida Act includes a list of prohibited collection practices that give rise to a private cause of action. Fla. Stat. §§ 559.72, 559.77. Cliff contends that OSI’s conduct violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9), which prohibits a debt collector from asserting the existence of a legal right (in this case, the right to deny Cliff’s hearing request and garnish his wages) when the collector knows that the right does not exist. We must decide whether Cliff’s claim under Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) is preempted by the HEA. 2....

...c. Conflict Preemption Conflict preemption, the final step in our preemption analysis, presents a more challenging task in this case. We first consider whether it is possible to comply with the HEA and Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) at the same time....

...23 Cliff’s request, may also have been required to postpone the issuance of a garnishment order pending the outcome of a pre-garnishment hearing. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1095a(a)(5), (b). To comply with Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9), OSI must not have asserted the existence of a legal right which it knew did not exist. We conclude that a third-party debt collector like OSI can comply with the HEA and Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) simultaneously. A claim under § 559.72(9) requires the misrepresentation of a “legal right” or an attempt to collect a debt that is “not legitimate.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...Fla. 2000). The HEA is just such a statute; the HEA and its regulations define the rights of lenders, guaranty agencies, third-party debt collectors, and debtors when federal student loans are collected. Because the claimed violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) is based upon the alleged misrepresentation of a legal right established by the HEA, we conclude that OSI could have complied with both the HEA and § 559.72(9). 24  We do not suggest that it is always possible to comply with the HEA (and its regulations9) and the Florida Act....

...sionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation.” Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 369, 106 S. Ct. 1890, 1898-99 (1986). 10 For example, the telephone calls and letters might violate Fla. Stat. § 559.72(7), which prohibits a debt collector from willfully communicating with the debtor with such frequency as can reasonably be expected to harass the debtor. 25 enough for us to conclude that Cliff’s claim brought under § 559.72(9) is preempted, especially when it is clear that third-party debt collectors can comply with both the HEA and Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9). Because compliance with federal and state law is possible, OSI seeks refuge in the last possible ground for preemption, vigorously contending that the Florida Act stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s objectives in enacting the HEA....

...t only those state laws contrary to or inconsistent with the collection procedures mandated by the regulations and those laws that would frustrate the purpose of the HEA). But OSI does not contend that the state law provision at issue, Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9), would prohibit, restrict, or impose burdens on the completion of these contacts....

...Under this provision, OSI cannot “[c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...s that are not legitimate or asserting rights that do not exist. Therefore, the Secretary of 30 Education’s Notice of Interpretation does not suggest that a cause of action under Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) is preempted.12 Although Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) does not impose burdens on the completion of the sequence of collection activities, OSI contends that other provisions of § 559.72 impose burdens on collection activity and, as a result, the entire Florida Act should be preempted....

...viewed the Oregon statute broadly, concluded that the statute “consists entirely of restrictions and prohibitions on collection activity,” and held that the entire statute is preempted. 94 F.3d at 1266. We acknowledge that other subsections of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 may hinder or restrict the completion of the required collection activities....

...provision by provision in order to determine whether any provision is inconsistent with the HEA.”). In fact, many provisions of state consumer protection statutes do not conflict with the HEA or its regulations, and many state law provisions, including Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9), actually complement and reinforce the HEA....

...Because the wage garnishment section and several other sections of the HEA include clauses that expressly preempt certain provisions of state law, we conclude that the HEA does not occupy the field of student loan debt collection, thus there is no field preemption. We also conclude that Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) does not actually conflict with the HEA because third-party debt collectors can comply with both the HEA and Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) and because a cause of action under § 559.72(9) does not stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s objectives for the HEA. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred when it concluded that Cliff’s claim under Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) was preempted by the HEA. B....

...e pled to state a prima facie case. See 1692k(a), (b)(2), and (c). B. Count II Count II of plaintiff's complaint alleges violations of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 559.55 to 559.785 ("FCCPA") by Assetcare and Equifax. Section 559.72, entitled `Prohibited practices generally,' lists seventeen debt collection actions that violate the FCCPA....

...Paragraph 9 states that no person shall: Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist. Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9). The plaintiffs allege that the defendants are prohibited from attempting to collect money for services covered by an HMO from an HMO subscriber under Fla. Stat. § 641.315(3), and that their actions therefore violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...he guise of the fair debt collection laws" because the FCCPA does not contemplate transporting liability from one statute to another. However, the defendants have not pointed to any case law supporting this proposition. A plain reading of Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) indicates that it prohibits enforcement of a debt when a person knows the debt is not legitimate or asserts the existence of a legal right that is known not to exist....

...legal process); § 1692e(14) (using name other than own, i.e. State Attorney); § 1692f(1) (requesting amounts not authorized by contract or Florida law); and § 1692g(a) (failing to provide validation notice). The particular allegations as to the FCCPA include Fla Stat. § 559.72(1) (simulating a law enforcement officer); § 559.72(7) (harassment); § 559.72(9) (asserting existence of right when known such right does not exist); § 559.72(10) (simulating legal process or giving appearance of being approved by a government 1 For purposes of this opinion, the Court refers collectively to ACCS and the various ACCS officers as “ACCS.” 3 agency, when it is not); § 559.72(11) (using attorney’s stationery); and § 559.72(12) (oral communication giving false impression that person is associated with an attorney). After a period of discovery, Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their claims, while Defendants moved for summary judgment on ground...

...Hal Castillo of Lewis, Paul, Isaac & Castillo, Jacksonville, for appellee. ERVIN, Judge. Ford Motor Credit Company appeals jury verdicts awarding Sheehan compensatory and punitive damages on one count of a complaint charging intentional infliction of mental distress and a second count alleging *958 a violation of Section 559.72(7), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...The following day, Sheehan's automobile was repossessed by Search International, an independent contractor with Ford Credit. The jury awarded Sheehan $4,000 compensatory damages and $11,000 punitive damages. As to that count charging a violation of Section 559.72(7), we conclude the statute has no application since it cannot regulate actions of individuals in Michigan or Rhode Island....

...of great public interest: MAY ONE RECOVER DAMAGES FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF SEVERE MENTAL DISTRESS WHICH IS NOT INCIDENTAL TO OR CONSEQUENT UPON ANY SEPARATE TORT OR OTHER ACTIONABLE WRONG? The verdict entered on the count finding a violation of Section 559.72(7) is reversed, and the judgment entered upon the common law count is affirmed....

...r legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 194, 302). Chase Home Finance argues that the Court should dismiss Count XIV because Plaintiff asserts only conclusory allegations that Chase Home Finance violated section 559.72(9)....

...are hereby declared unlawful.” He sought a 7  Case: 15-14415 Date Filed: 05/08/2018 Page: 8 of 28 Consumer Collections Practices Act (“FCCPA”), Florida Statutes § 559.72(9),8 by seeking to collect an amount in excess of the fee schedule....

...Fla. Stat. § 501.211(1). Bailey also sought “actual damages, plus attorney’s fees and court costs” on the ground that he “suffered a loss as a result of a violation of this part.” Id. § 501.211(2). 8 Florida Statutes § 559.72(9) provides: “In collecting consumer debts, no person shall ....

...31 AFFIRMED. 31 Given our disposition of this case, Count V, Bailey’s unjust enrichment claim, fails to state a claim because AMC was entitled to bill a reasonable fee for its services. In a single sentence in Count IV, Bailey alleged that AMC violated Florida Statutes § 559.72(18), which prohibits “[c]ommunicat[ing] with a debtor if the person knows that the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address.” Since Bailey has not discussed this issue in his brief on appeal, he has waived it....

...Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010). The Florida Collections Act also defines and protects an individual’s right to privacy with regards to consumer collections practices in the state. Id. In particular, Florida Statute Section 559.72 provides: In collecting consumer debts, no person shall: **** (9) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some oth...

...**** (18) Communicate with a debtor if the person knows that the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address . . . . Fla. Stat. § 559.72. Plaintiffs allege that, in violation of § 559.72(9), Defendant attempted to collect a debt that Defendant knew was not legitimate when Defendant (1) placed 26  Case: 17-10584 Date Filed: 03/25/2019 Page: 27 of 60 auto-d...

...Two of these letters were sent after Defendant became aware that Plaintiffs had retained counsel. Accordingly, Plaintiffs argue that in sending these two particular letters, Defendant also violated that part of the Florida statute prohibiting communication with a debtor whom one knows to be represented by an attorney: § 559.72(11). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant on each of these claims....

... Case: 17-10584 Date Filed: 03/25/2019 Page: 30 of 60 purchase and bill Plaintiffs for fire insurance for property they no longer owned, based on a debt they no longer owed. In analyzing Defendant’s potential liability under § 559.72(9), the district court assumed that “the ‘debt,’ whether it be the underlying Second Loan, the need for hazard insurance, or the bill for the ‘forced place’ insurance, was not legitimate and that the Defendant knew or should ha...

...lacked actual knowledge of the lender-placed insurance letter violations. We have stated 42  Case: 17-10584 Date Filed: 03/25/2019 Page: 43 of 60 that “[i]n contrast to the FDCPA, Section 559.72(9) of the [Florida Collections Act] requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the debt collector defendant possessed actual knowledge that the threatened means of enforcing the debt was unavailable.” LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1192 n.12....

...**** (9) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist. Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...§ 1692e(2)(A), by misrepresenting the amount of the debt owed, and by adding a payoff fee; (3) 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1), by adding an unauthorized payoff fee to the amount owed; (4) 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11), by failing to include the warning required by that section, in their correspondence; and (5) Fla.Stat. § 559.72(9) (1995), by knowingly adding unauthorized charges for payoff fees to mortgage loans, where the notes and mortgages allowed prepayment without charge....

...refore are not subject to the FDCPA; and (2) that even if the Court finds them to be "debt collectors," they did not violate the provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 1692 enumerated by the Sandlins; and (3) the Sandlins failed to state a claim under Fla.Stat. § 559.72(9) (1995), because the payoff fees requested were not a prepayment penalty, but were implicitly authorized under paragraph 7(E) of the note....

...Since it is not clear that the Sandlins can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief, this Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss as it applies to the allegations of violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. Finally, the Sandlins allege that Defendants violated Fla.Stat. § 559.72(9), the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, by attempting to collect a debt that they knew was not legitimate, because the note allowed for prepayment without a penalty....

...s not apply to "portions of a debt." This Court has addressed Defendants' first two arguments above and found in favor of Plaintiffs in denying Defendants' Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. The third argument is also without merit. Fla.Stat. § 559.72(9) provides as follows: In collecting consumer claims, no person shall: (9) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a consumer claim when such person knows that the claim is not legitimate or some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist....

...CONCLUSION This Court finds that Defendants Shapiro & Fishman and Shapiro are debt collectors under the FDCPA, and that they have failed to show that the Sandlins can prove no set of facts that would entitle them to relief for the alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A); 1692e(11); 1692f(1) and Fla. Stats. § 559.72(9)....

...Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Docket Nos. 20 and 28) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint be DENIED as to the alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A); 1692e(11); 1692f(1) and Fla.Stats. § 559.72(9) and GRANTED as to alleged violations under 15 U.S.C....

...limitations was subject to tolling pursuant to § 8117. Accordingly, based on the undisputed facts of record, Defendants did not have the requisite actual knowledge that their claim was time-barred so as to subject them to liability under Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...the FDCPA, Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment must be granted. II. Florida Consumer Collections Practices Act (FCCPA) Plaintiffs argue that Defendants violated the FCCPA by attempting to collect a debt that they knew was not legitimate. Section 559.72(9) of the Florida Statutes provides: In collecting consumer claims, no person shall: (9) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a consumer claim when such person knows that the claim is not legitimate or some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist. Fla Stat. § 559.72(9). After reviewing the record, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to assert anything more than opinion, conjecture, and conclusions in support of their allegation that Defendants violated Section 559.72; therefore, their partial motion for summary judgment must be denied as it pertains to the FCCPA....

...ves an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a)(4). The Florida Consumer Credit Practices Act (FCCPA) is narrower in scope than the federal act. F.S. § 559.72(9) states that in collecting debts, no person shall claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of a legal right when that person knows that the right does not exist....

...Cook from a summary final judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of Blazer Financial Services, Inc., on July 18, 1975, and an order entered by the trial court on May 15, 1975, dismissing Cook's counterclaim for failure to state a cause of action under Sections 559.55(1), 559.72, and 559.77, Florida Statutes. The sole question involved on appeal is whether or not Cook's counterclaim stated a cause of action. Cook's counterclaim alleged that Blazer, in collecting its claim against her, engaged in certain practices which are specifically prohibited by § 559.72, Florida Statutes....

...ttempts to collect or collects consumer claims owed or alleged to be owed to another person. Blazer is admittedly not a collection agency as defined by that statute but is a small loan company which was attempting to collect its own claim from Cook. Section 559.72, under which Cook's counterclaim was filed (and which we have quoted in part above), is entitled "Prohibited Practices Generally" and provides that "no person shall" engage in the thereafter listed prohibited practices....

...nlarged by the title. 30 Fla.Jur. "Statutes" § 108 (1974); Richardson v. City of Miami, 144 Fla. 294, 198 So. 51 (1940); Foley v. State, Fla., 50 So.2d 179 (1951). If there is any doubt or ambiguity as to the meaning of the word "person" as used in § 559.72, such meaning is made perfectly clear by the title to the original session law, Chapter 72-81, Laws of Florida, which provides in pertinent part as follows: "AN ACT relating to the regulation of consumer collection practices; providing defi...

...The provisions of Chapter 559, Part V, Florida Statutes, relate to licensing a collection agency and the penalties which a collection agency may incur when it engages in the prohibitive practices set out therein, and specifically in Florida Statutes 559.72 and 559.73....

...unication stated that MERS is a creditor on the individual's mortgage loan obligation. ( Id. at ¶ 21). The FCCPA count essentially alleges that MERS "engaged in a pattern and practice of illegal debt collection practices" in violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...Fourth, MERS' actions do not, on their face, violate the FCCPA based on recent Florida court decisions holding that MERS has standing to foreclose mortgages in Florida. Fifth, though plaintiffs allege that MERS engaged in certain conduct, none of that conduct violates any provision of § 559.72 of the FCCPA or any provision of the FDUTPA....

...Litigation Privilege In response to MERS' motion to dismiss, plaintiffs limit their FCCPA claim to pre-suit communications that the plaintiff borrowers allegedly received from MERS before foreclosure proceedings were instituted against them. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that MERS violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) in causing such pre-suit communications to be sent representing it was a "creditor" of the plaintiffs. Section 559.72(9) provides: In collecting consumer debts, no person shall: Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate or assert the existence of some legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist. Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...2d DCA Feb.21, 2007) and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Revoredo, 955 So.2d 33, 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), that MERS, as the holder of a promissory note secured by a mortgage, has standing to bring a foreclosure action. Thus, filing a foreclosure lawsuit is not a debt collection practice under § 559.72 of the FCCPA....

...Pre-Suit Notices The remaining and central issue is whether the pre-suit letters or notices like *1362 that sent to the Taylors and attached to the Second Amended Complaint representing MERS as a "creditor" or "owner" of the promissory note violates § 559.72(9) of the FCCPA. (Doc. 39-2, Amend.Compl., ¶¶ 15, 26(a) & (f), 30(b) & (c), 40, 50, 52, 56, 59 & Ex. A). Whether or not this precise conduct violates § 559.72(9) appears to be an issue of first impression. The Court begins by parsing the language of that statute. Because § 559.72(9) reads in the disjunctive, there are two ways for a debt collector (assuming arguendo MERS qualifies as such) [6] to violate it....

...The debt collector can (1) "[c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate;" or (2) "assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist." Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) (emphasis added)....

...Thus, even taking all of the allegations in the complaint as true, MERS did not "claim," "attempt" or "threaten to enforce" a debt or obligation "that it knew was not legitimate." The issue then becomes whether MERS, via the Marshall Watson law firm (presumably hired by MERS to foreclose), violated the latter portion of § 559.72(9) by representing itself as the "creditor to whom the debt is owed" (i.e., asserting a legal right it knows does not exist). [7] Plaintiffs posit that because MERS is not truly a "creditor" [8] in that MERS has not extended credit and is not directly owed any money, MERS has asserted a legal right that it knows to be untrue, which is in violation of § 559.72(9)....

...Plaintiffs simply cannot establish that the use of the term "creditor" creates some situation that legitimately prejudices a borrower or identify any harassing motive behind its use. The language of the FCCPA confirms the statute's intent is to eradicate abusive conduct. The nineteen subsections in § 559.72, which can form the bases of private rights of action under the Act, seek to curb actions such as: (1) threats of force or violence (§ 559.72(2)); (2) threats of intentionally making misrepresentations to damage an individual's credit (§ 559.72(3)); (3) disclosure of information affecting an individual's reputation to third parties when there is no business need to do so (§ 559.72(5)); (4) harassment of a debtor (§§ 559.72(7) & (8)); (5) the use of communications that simulate authorized legal or judicial process or that have the appearance *1364 of being authorized by a government, governmental agency or an attorney (§ 559.72(10)); (6) communications with a debtor under the guise of an attorney by using stationery of an attorney or forms only an attorney is authorized to prepare (§§ 559.72(11) & (12)); and (7) threats to publish before the general public the name of a debtor (§ 559.72(14)). See Fla. Stat. § 559.72....

...thout first registering as a Florida debt collector (¶ 42) and failed to comply with § 559.715 when it obtained the right from third party mortgage note owners to collect a debt (¶ 57). However, none of these allegations fall under the purview of § 559.72. Because § 559.77 only provides a private right of action for violations of § 559.72, these remaining allegations are not actionable by these private plaintiffs....

...the registration requirements of an out-of-state debt collector in Florida and (2) § 559.78 enables the State Attorney to seek injunctive relief against FCCPA violators. To extend a private right of action to acts other than those proscribed under § 559.72 would impermissibly alter the unambiguous language of § 559.77....

...ress terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power") (citation omitted). The remaining allegations in the Second Amended Complaint alleging that MERS violated sections of the FCCPA (other than § 559.72) are due to be dismissed with prejudice as no such claims are available under the FCCPA....

...46) and the Court held oral argument (Doc. 57). [3] Fla. Stat. § 559.77, titled "Civil Remedies", is the enabling statute that permits a private right of action under the FCCPA. Section 559.77(1) provides: "A debtor may bring a civil action against a person violating the provisions of s. 559.72 in a court of competent jurisdiction of the county in which the alleged violator resides or has his or her principal place of business or in the county wherein the alleged violation occurred." Section 559.77(2), again citing § 559.72, provides that "[u]pon adverse adjudication, the defendant shall be liable for actual damages and for additional statutory damages of up to $1,000...." [4] In Echevarria, et al....

...d Amended Complaint, and the parties having stipulated that the Court can consider it without transforming the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion, the Court considers the mortgage. [10] The only Florida case the Court could find interpreting § 559.72(9) is Fox v. Barnett Recovery Corp., 544 So.2d 1157 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). The Fox court affirmed a trial court Order dismissing a counterclaim under § 559.72(9) alleging that it was a violation of the statute for a collection agency to make the statement in a collection letter that it would "assess" a $350 attorneys' fee if it was forced to hire an attorney to foreclose on the account. Fox, 544 So.2d at 1158. The court reasoned that this was not the kind of "wrongful threat within the meaning of section 559.72(9), Florida Statutes." Id....

...ollector is the law firm and MERS cannot be held vicariously liable for its acts. The Court does not reach this issue based on its holding that the representations of MERS as a "creditor" (whether from MERS or its law firm) do not violate Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...using false or deceptive representation in attempting to collect a debt without a proper license in Florida (Count I); and violations of the FCCPA for mailing "dunning letters" [2] without being licensed as a debt collector pursuant to Fla. Stat. §§ 559.72 and 559.565 (Count II)....

...aintiff without first registering with the Florida Department of Banking. Thus, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted on this issue as well. 3. State Law Claim The only remaining issue is whether defendant violated the FCCPA, Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9), by failing to register with the Florida Department of Banking before it sent a collection letter to plaintiff....

...See also Wade, 87 F.3d at 1101. Here, the Court has granted summary judgment for defendant on the federal *1304 claims. Therefore, the only remaining issue is one of state law. Moreover, the state law claim raises a novel question of Florida law, i.e., the interpretation of §§ 559.72(9) and 559.565(1)....

...[21] The court notes that Ferguson did not plead a violation of § 1692e(10) in his complaint, but raised it for the first time in his summary judgment motion. Assuming arguendo that plaintiff has properly raised this claim, summary judgment is nonetheless appropriate in favor of defendant. [22] Section 559.72(9) of the Florida Statutes provides "no person shall ......

...On both of these occasions, Beneficial's agents communicated with Harris' employer in an effort to collect the outstanding obligation. In January, 1975, Harris filed an action in the Circuit Court for Duval County, alleging that the defendant had violated the provisions of the Consumer Collection Practices Act (CCPA), Section 559.72(4), Florida Statutes: "In collecting consumer claims, whether or not licensed by the division, no person shall: "(4) Communicate or threaten to communicate with a debtor's employer prior to obtaining final judgment against the debtor,...

...ained." The original complaint was dismissed upon motion of the defendant, Beneficial. Thereupon, plaintiff filed his amended complaint. *198 Ultimately Beneficial filed an amended motion to dismiss the amended complaint, challenging the validity of Section 559.72(4), Florida Statutes, as an unconstitutional infringement of the right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment....

...tual damages or $500, whichever is greater, constituted an unconstitutional deprivation of defendant's property without due process of law. In an opinion and order dated September 24, 1975, the trial court rejected Beneficial's free speech attack on Section 559.72(4), Florida Statutes, but declared the minimum damage award provision of Section 559.77(1) to be unconstitutional on due process grounds. Plaintiff Harris appeals the latter decision, while defendant Beneficial has filed a cross-appeal on its unsuccessful free speech challenge to the statute. After carefully considering Beneficial's constitutional challenge to Section 559.72(4), Florida Statutes, we have concluded that it must be rejected....

...We concur with Harris that the minimum award reasonably can be construed as providing a penalty designed to dissuade consumer collection agencies from engaging in the conduct proscribed, even where the legal standard of malice is not met. In enacting Section 559.72(4), supra, the Legislature prohibited a course of conduct which until then apparently was widely followed by consumer finance companies and collection agencies....

..."Legal Notice for Return of Property" to the door of her residence. On October 30, 1995, Whigum filed a complaint against Heilig-Meyers contending that the printed notice was an unlawful practice under the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, section 559.72(10) & (11), Florida Statutes....

...C. The Act seeks in part to protect in-state consumers from the illegal and/or unscrupulous practices of debt collectors *812 and other persons. [1] Coastal Physician Svcs. of Broward County, Inc. v. Ortiz, 764 So.2d 7 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(on reh'g); § 559.72, Fla....

...Because the allegations addressed GMAC's attempts to collect on this loan, GMAC cannot be considered a "debt collector" under sections 559.55(6)(a) and (f). Still, Schauer maintains GMAC would still qualify as a "person" otherwise subject to the Act under section 559.72, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...(16) Mail any communication to a debtor in an envelope or postcard with words typed, written, or printed on the outside of the envelope or postcard calculated to embarrass the debtor. An example of this would be an envelope addressed to "Deadbeat, John Doe." Section 559.72, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...no person shall ..." There is no allegation that the defendant was collecting consumer claims. Plaintiff does not even allege what was in the envelope, nor what the purpose of the communication was. Plaintiff failed to allege ultimate facts necessary to show that he has a cause of action under Section 559.72(16)....

...he defective pleading an opportunity to amend, unless it is apparent that the pleading cannot be amended so as to state a cause of action. 10 Fla.Jur., Dismissal § 33, at page 544. In this case plaintiff may be able to state a cause of action under Section 559.72(16) if he is allowed to file an amended count two....

...d debt (violation of § 1692e(10)); and, d. use of a form and reproduced signature for the purpose of deceiving consumers into believing an attorney was involved in collecting the debt (violation of § 1692j). Count Il-violation of Florida Statutes, § 559.72(10)-(11), by use of communication falsely giving the appearance of being authorized, issued or approved by an attorney-at-law....

...im, denied Heard's counterclaim and assessed attorney's fees against Heard in the amount of $400.00. [1] Heard raises two points on appeal: (1) The court erred in entering judgment against Heard on her counterclaim since the word "family" as used in Section 559.72(5), Florida Statutes (1975), could not be reasonably construed to include an intimate friend who is not living with Heard....

...-founded nor brought for the purposes of harassment. Mathis, in response to Heard's argument, replies that since the loan to Heard was made without interest, the disclosure of the debt to a person not a member of Heard's family was not prohibited by Section 559.72(5)....

...t violated any provision of the Consumer Collection Practices Act, and failed to show the necessary malice, moral turpitude, wantonness, outrageous aggravation or reckless indifference to the rights of others to be entitled to punitive damages." [2] Section 559.72(5), Florida Statutes (1975), provides: "In collecting consumer claims, whether or not licensed by the division, no person shall: * * * * * * (5) Disclose to a person other than the debtor or his family information affecting the debtor'...

...Filed: 11/14/2012 Page: 2 of 11 judgment to Wendy Yunker in her lawsuit alleging a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.. and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act ("FCCPA"), Fla. Stat. § 559.72....

...In the prior appeal we held that the complaint stated causes of action against Morse for fraud, as well as under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), section 501.203(8), Florida Statutes, and against both defendants under the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA), section 559.72, Florida Statutes....

...e harassing telephone calls which violated the FCCPA was tried, and a jury awarded plaintiff $5,500 in damages. GMAC has cross-appealed the judgment entered on that verdict, which we address first. The claim against GMAC under the FCCPA was based on section 559.72(7), Florida Statutes 1999, which provides: In collecting consumer debts, no person shall: (7) Willfully communicate with the debtor or any member of her or his family with such frequency as can reasonably be expected to harass the debt...

...Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla.2000), and that GMAC is accordingly entitled to a summary judgment. The telephone calls, about which there was no dispute, were as a matter of law neither frequent nor so harassing so to violate section 559.72(7), Florida Statutes. Plaintiff also alleged a violation of FCCPA, section 559.72(9), which provides that it is unlawful for a person to: (9) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows t...

...Byrne, 11 F.3d 1270, 1276 (5th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2680, 129 L.E d.2d 814 (1994), Palmer v. Hospital Authority of Randolph County, 22 F.3d 1559, 1568 (11th Cir.1994). While Gables may be subject to liability under Fla. Stat. § 559.72 for actions it took as a person or entity collecting consumer debts, Gables still does not meet the statutory definition of a debt collector under Florida law....

...rdict). Our court explained: Ford Motor Credit Company appeals jury verdicts awarding Sheehan compensatory and punitive damages on one count of a complaint charging intentional infliction of mental distress and a second count alleging a violation of Section 559.72(7), Florida Statutes (1975).[FN1] FN1....

...The following day, Sheehan's automobile was repossessed by Search International, an independent contractor with Ford Credit. The jury awarded Sheehan $4,000 compensatory damages and $11,000 punitive damages. As to that count charging a violation of Section 559.72(7), we conclude the statute has no application since it cannot regulate actions of individuals in Michigan or Rhode Island.[FN2] FN2....

...The Debtor contends that Asset has engaged in illegal debt collection practices pursuant to the obligation between the parties as defined in Fla. Stat. § 559.55(1). Furthermore, Asset has engaged in consumer collection conduct that violates Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9), and based on the same, the Debtor has sustained economic damages for which she is entitled to compensation pursuant to Fla....

...nt, dated August 31, 2005. The second-amended complaint alleges claims under the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, sections 559.55-.785, Florida Statutes (2004). In count one, entitled "Improper Debt Collection," the Plaintiffs allege under section 559.72 that the Hospital "has attempted to collect non-existent or exaggerated debts from the Plaintiffs." In count two, entitled "Illegal Collection Practices," the Plaintiffs allege that the Hospital engaged in collection tactics intended to harass the Plaintiffs and force them to pay an alleged debt that was not owed....

...§ 501.201 et seq. (“FDUTPA”) (Counts I-IV); • Defendants breached the mortgage agreement and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied therein (Counts V-VHI); • Defendants violated the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (“FCCPA”) (Counts IXX); and • Defendant AHMSI was unjustly enriched (Count XI)....

...Exxon Corp., 61 F.Supp.2d 1300, 1303 (S.D.Fla.1999) (“[w]hether the covenant has been breached is generally a question of fact”). 3. Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act Martorella alleges in Counts IX and X that AHMSI and Deutsche Bank violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9), which makes it unlawful to “[c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows the right does not exist.”...

...ring a related foreclosure action and, thus, the litigation privilege bars Plaintiff's recovery. (Docs. 7 at 5-6; 12 at 5-6). Second, Defendants maintain Plaintiff's claims fail because Meyer did not allege they had actual knowledge under Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)....

...16-61856-CIV-DIMITROULEAS, 2017 WL 244111 , at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2017) ). While the Court is not convinced that the litigation privilege applies at this stage in the proceedings, Defendants' second contention-that Plaintiff has failed to allege a plausible claim under Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) -carries the day. Under Counts II and IV, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)....

...This section provides that no person shall *1243 "[c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist." Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) (emphasis added). "Section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the debt collector defendant possessed actual knowledge that the threatened means of enforcing the debt was unavailable." LeBlanc v....

...2017) ("The plaintiff cannot merely plead that the defendant had knowledge, but instead must plead sufficient factual allegations to show how the defendant had that knowledge." (citing Reese , 686 F. Supp. 2d at 1312 )). Because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that state a plausible claim for relief under Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9), Counts II and IV are dismissed....

...plaintiffs. Thus, the final judgments awarding both compensatory and punitive damages based upon plaintiffs' claim of intentional infliction of mental and emotional distress are reversed. Nevertheless, defendant's conduct clearly is in violation of § 559.72(10), Fla....

...308, 171 So. 214 (1936). Accordingly, the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to enter a new judgment in favor of plaintiffs for $500, together with court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. Reversed and remanded with directions. NOTES [1] "559.72 Prohibited practices generally....

...ng collection of the account. Hummel eventually filed suit in the county court against FNANB and LTD Financial and alleged that the sending of the collection letter violated a provision of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (the Act). See § 559.72, Fla....

...n for harassment or invasion of privacy. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277, 278 (Fla.1985); Ponton v. Scarfone, 468 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Shortes also argues, on appeal, that this count states a cause of action under section 559.72(9)....

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. November 16, 2011. *180 Bruce Committe, Pensacola, for Appellants. John L. Wilkins of Arnold and Wilkins, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellees. VAN NORTWICK, J. Robin Morgan appeals a final judgment dismissing her counterclaim for damages under section 559.72, Florida Statutes (2009), a part of the Florida Consumer Collection Protection Act (FCCPA), for allegedly abusive conduct in collecting a debt....

...ny party seeking to collect a consumer debt. Following a hearing, the circuit court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss. In pertinent part, the order provides: THE COURT FINDS that the consumer debt collections prohibitions of Fla. Stat. 559.72, the alleged violations of which are the basis of Morgan's allegations in her counter claims against (1) Wilkins, (2) Arnold & Wilkins, P.A., and (3) Jane Doe Debbie, only apply to debt collectors, and the statute defines "debt collectors" as...

...Appellees argue, however, that the trial court reached the right result for the wrong reason because Morgan's debt was not a debt within the purview of the FCCPA since the debt did not flow from an extension of credit. They are incorrect. The FCCPA precludes certain conduct "[i]n collecting consumer debts...." § 559.72, Fla....

...an extension of credit. Appellees' erroneous argument that there must be an extension of credit for the FCCPA to apply is premised on the definition of "debt collector." [2] However, a debt collector is not the only party to whom the FCCPA applies. Section 559.72 provides that "no person" shall engage in certain practices while attempting to collect a consumer debt....

...Pierre v. Winn Dixie Stores, Inc., 592 So.2d 1252, 1253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), which explained that "[c]learly, by its unambiguous *182 terms, the Act applies only to the collection of consumer claims and requires the extension of credit. §§ 559.55(1), 559.72, Fla....

...a debt by a consumer debt collector. Read’s complaint alleged that MFP violated the FCCPA when it left these messages because it failed to provide meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity. She asserted that this constituted a violation of section 559.72(7), which prohibits a consumer debt collector from engaging in “conduct which can reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the debtor.” Alternatively, Read alleged that MFP’s messages violated section 559.72(9), which prohibits a consumer debt collector from attempting to collect a debt when the debt is not legitimate or from “asserting] the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” The...

...t actually sued upon. In this case, Read contends that MFP violated the FCCPA by failing to provide meaningful disclosure of its identity in both of the messages. However, Read points to no provision of the FCCPA that requires such disclosure. Under section 559.72(15), a consumer debt collector may not “[rjefuse to provide adequate identification of herself or himself or her or his employer or other entity whom she or he represents if requested to do so by a debt- or from whom she or he is collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt.” (Emphasis added.) But Read did not allege — nor could she allege — that MFP refused any request to provide identifying information. Thus, Read did not — and cannot — allege a violation of section 559.72(15)....

...FCCPA — the act under which she actually sued. This failure was fatal to Read’s complaint. Apparently recognizing this dilemma, Read alleged in her complaint that MFP’s failure to provide identifying information in its messages violated either section 559.72(7) or section 559.72(9)....

...Through a series of convoluted steps, Read argued that these two statutes, which clearly do not deal with what information a debt collector must impart when leaving an answering machine message for a debtor, nevertheless require consumer debt collectors to disclose information over and above what is set forth in section 559.72(15)....

...Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959)); see also Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Survivors Charter Sch., Inc., 3 So.3d 1220, 1233 (Fla.2009) (noting that “specific statutes covering a particular subject area will control over a statute covering the same subject in general terms”). Here, section 559.72(15) specifically defines the circumstances under which a consumer debt collector must provide identifying information to a consumer in Florida when collection phone calls are made. Even assuming that Read could show that sections 559.72(7) and 559.72(9) cover this same subject, the specific provisions of section 559.72(15) would control. In addition, courts will not interpret a statute in such a way as to render portions of it meaningless. See, e.g., Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So.2d 360, 366 (Fla.2005). If section 559.72(7) and/or section 559.72(9) were interpreted to require a consumer debt collector to affirmatively disclose identifying information to a Florida consumer without a request from the consumer, this would render section 559.72(15), which requires the disclosure of this information only upon request, meaningless....

...t federal or Florida, see Clayton v. Bryan, 753 So.2d 682, 634 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) — the plaintiff must nevertheless bring his or her claim pursuant to the applicable statute. Moreover, Read’s alternative assertion that MFP’s messages violated section 559.72(9) is without merit. To show a violation of section 559.72(9), “it must be shown that a legal right that did not exist was asserted and that the person had actual knowledge that the right did not exist.” Pollock v. Bay Area Credit Serv., LLC, No. 08-61101-Civ, 2009 WL 2475167 , at *9 (S.D.Fla. Aug.13, 2009) (emphasis added). Thus, for example, a plaintiff may establish a violation of section 559.72(9) by showing that the debt collector garnished wages in violation of the statutory requirements for garnishment, see Cliff v....

...egal or not. Further, if, as Read asserts, MFP’s failure to comply with the provisions of the FDCPA somehow constituted the “assertion of a legal right,” then any and all violations of any provision of the FDCPA would constitute a violation of section 559.72(9) as a matter of law, which is clearly not the case. See Beeders, 2010 WL 2696404 , at *6 (holding that “a violation of the federal statute does not automatically constitute a violation of the state statute”). To show a violation of section 559.72(9), Read was required to point to some independent legal right that MFP improperly asserted when it left the messages on her answering machine....

...We also note that both the FDCPA and the FCCPA prohibit a consumer debt collector from disclosing any information about the consumer's alleged debt, or the attempts at collection thereof, to any third party without the consumer’s prior consent. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b), 1692b(2); § 559.72(5), Fla....

...mortgage servicing companies where the debt was not in default at the time it was assigned and, therefore, the FDCPA claim in count I is dismissed with prejudice. 2. Failure to State a Claim under the FCCPA Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violates section 559.72(7), 559.72(9), and 559.72(18) of the FCCPA....

...d address, unless the debtor's attorney fails to respond within 30 days to a communication from the person, unless the debtor's attorney consents to a direct communication with the debtor, or unless the debtor initiates the communication, Fla. Stat. § 559.72(7), (9) and (18)....

...Based upon this language Defendants argue that they are not debt collectors and, therefore, the FCCPA claim should be dismissed with prejudice. In his Opposition, Plaintiff argues that there is one important distinction between the FDCPA and the FCCPA—that is, the FCCPA is not restricted to debt collectors, as Fla. Stat. § 559.72(7) specifically provides that "in collecting consumer debts, no person shall ..." engage in the prohibited collection practices delineated in the statute....

...specific substance of any call, how the calls were harassing, the legal right asserted, why the legal right did not exist, Defendants' relationship to him, the amount of the debt, or the instrument reflecting the debt. To establish a violation under section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA, "it must be shown that a legal right that did not exist was asserted and that the *1373 person had actual knowledge that the right did not exist." Pollock v....

...plaintiff failed to plead any facts that the defendants had knowledge that they were pursuing a debt that they were not legally entitled to). Moreover, courts have held that a "demand for payment upon a legitimate debt will not support a claim under section 559.72(9)." Locke, 2010 WL 4941456, at *3 (holding that nothing in the FCCPA prevented Wells Fargo from attempting to collect on the outstanding amounts owed by the plaintiff for their mortgage loan)....

...at ¶ 20, and that Defendants have servicing rights as to that loan, id. at ¶ 15; [DE-22-1]. As such, it is unclear to the Court what illegitimate debt Defendants are alleged to have attempted to enforce or a how Defendants asserted legal rights that did not exist in violation of section 559.72(9). Regardless, such conclusory allegations are clearly insufficient under Twombly, and fail to put Defendants on notice as to the specific violations alleged against each of them. As such, Plaintiff's claim for violation of section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA in count II is hereby dismissed without prejudice....

...ge or intent as to each Defendant, and identify facts showing how the debt at issue was illegitimate or what legal right was asserted and how that legal right somehow did not exist as to each Defendant. In regard to Plaintiff's claims under sections 559.72(7) and 559.72(18), the Court finds that these claims likewise should be dismissed without prejudice as Plaintiff improperly lumps Defendants together in these claims despite that Defendants are separate and distinct legal entities. In regard to the section 559.72(7) claim, Plaintiff alleges that "Defendants have on many occasions called Plaintiff directly, multiple times a day, attempting to collect the debt," [DE-22, ¶ 61]. Similarly, in regard to the section 559.72(18) claim, Plaintiff alleges that he "communicated to Defendants he was represented by counsel and requested that all information be forwarded to counsel from then on," but that "Defendants ......

...the purported conduct they are alleged to have committed. It is inconceivable to the Court that both Defendants could have somehow made each alleged call, yet that is exactly what Plaintiff appears to be alleging. As such, the claims under sections 559.72(7) and 559.72(18) are dismissed without prejudice....

...r a More Definite Statement [DE-24] is hereby GRANTED; *1376 2. The Second Amended Complaint [DE-22] is hereby DISMISSED in its entirety as follows: a. The FDCPA claim in count 1 is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice; b. The FCCPA claims under sections 559.72(7), (9) and (18) in Count II are hereby DISMISSED without prejudice; c....

...Story appeals from an adverse judgment entered on a directed verdict for appellee Fields at the close of Story's evidence in a jury trial. Story's claim is that Fields, in an effort to collect a consumer debt of Story's, engaged in practices prohibited by Section 559.72 and made actionable by Section 559.77, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...information affecting Story's reputation to persons whom Fields should have known had no legitimate business need for the information, and that Fields' representative used "willfully abusive language in communicating with the debtor or his family." Section 559.72(5), (8), (10). We believe the trial court erred in holding the evidence insufficient on Story's claim that Fields willfully communicated with him and his family with such frequency as to constitute harassment under Section 559.72(7): "In collecting consumer claims, ......

...Story testified that he returned some but by no means all of Allen's calls, spoke with him at least once a week, and finally told Allen to stop bothering him and to take the matter to court, for he did not intend to pay. We do not underestimate the difficulties presented by the deceptively simple language of Section 559.72(7)....

...How frequent must communication be to constitute harassment? Suggestions of a wholly quantified standard seem artificial, because the effect of repeated telephone calls is colored by their tone and purpose. See Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 457, 469-73 (1974). The proposers of legislation similar to Section *677 559.72(7) suggest that such an "admittedly imprecise" provision invokes the "role of the courts ......

...er considering not only the frequency of the calls but also the legitimacy of the creditor's claim, the plausibility of the debtor's excuse, the sensitivity or abrasiveness of the personalities and all other circumstances that color the transaction. Section 559.72(7) is not entirely without semblance of objective, predictable standards....

...also Dezell v. King, 91 So.2d 624, 626 (Fla. 1956). Malice, on the other hand, imports a wrongful act done to inflict injury or without a reasonable cause or excuse. Wilson v. O'Neal, 118 So.2d 101 (Fla.1st DCA 1960). The standard that emerges from Section 559.72(7) therefore concerns the purpose as well as the frequency of the creditor's calls....

...Subsequently a dispute arose over the Morgans' obligation to pay a down payment sum. The Morgans denied liability, and Lindell turned the debt claim over to a collection agency. Ultimately, the Morgans sued Lindell, asserting a violation of Florida's Consumer Collection Practices Act, section 559.72, Florida Statutes (1997), and libel per se....

...On appellee's motion, the trial court dismissed Count I without leave to amend and Count II and III with leave to amend. The appellate presentation is directed totally at the propriety of the claim stated in Count I. The issue thus joined is whether the claim as alleged falls within the purview of §§ 559.72 and 559.77 F.S....

...the undersigned attorney and has agreed to pay him a reasonable fee for his representation herein. WHEREFORE Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendant in the amount of $500.00, plus costs, interest, and attorneys fees." Appellant asserts that § 559.72(9) F.S....

...apply only to a "collection agency" as that term is defined in § 559.55. True it is that the greatest portion of §§ 559.55-559.78 deals with collection agencies and their regulation and control by the Division of General Regulation of the Department of Business Regulation. However, § 559.72 is not restricted to collection agencies....

...Thus, the circuit court had jurisdiction of the claim. [3] Since the trial judge did not state his reasons for dismissing the complaint, it may be that the dismissal resulted from the allegation that appellee knew "or should have known" that the claim was not legitimate. Section 559.72(9) F.S....

...It may be that appellant intends to pursue Counts II and III, which were dismissed without prejudice. On remand leave to amend said counts should be allowed. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. MAGER and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] "559.72 Prohibited practices generally....

...lutions, Inc., and Merchants Association of Florida, Inc. In addition to adding the previously named Defendants, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint added allegations against Defendants for violations of the Florida Consumer Practices Act, Fla.Stat. § 559.72, et seq., defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, negligence, and willful violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C....

...s Third Amended Complaint. C. Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act As to Count II, Plaintiff states that summary judgment is warranted because Defendant's Kostroff and First Card violated the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act. Fla.Stat. § 559.72. Plaintiff states that Defendants Kostroff and First Card violated: Fla.Stat. § 559.72(4) by communicating or threatening to communicate with Plaintiff's employer prior to obtaining a judgment against Plaintiff; Fla.Stat. § 559.72(5) by, according to Plaintiff, disclosing information to a person other than Plaintiff or Plaintiff's family that reflects upon Plaintiff's reputation with knowledge that the person to whom they reported has no legitimate business reason for obtaining the information or that the information is false; Fla.Stat. § 559.72(6) by disclosing information concerning the debts that Defendants Kostroff and First Card knew were reasonably disputed by Plaintiff, without providing the proper disclosures regarding the disputed information; and Fla.Stat. § 559.72(9) by attempting or threatening to enforce a debt with knowledge that the debt was not legitimate. i. Fla.Stat. § 559.72(4) Plaintiff states that Defendant's Kostroff and First Card violated Fla.Stat. § 559.72(4) by publishing an income execution to Plaintiff's employer. Fla.Stat. § 559.72(4) states that a consumer debt collector shall not: Communicate or threaten to communicate with a debtor's employer prior to *1361 obtaining a final judgment against the debtor, unless the debtor gives his permission in writing to contact h...

...Plaintiff has admitted to the existence of a final judgment, and has failed to assert anything more than opinion to establish otherwise. Therefore, the Court finds that summary judgment is not warranted as to Count II of Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint based on Fla.Stat. § 559.72(4). ii. Fla.Stat. § 559.72(5),(6), and (9) Plaintiff states that Defendants Kostroff and First Card violated Fla.Stat. § 559.72(5) by disclosing to Plaintiff's employer the existence of consumer debt information, through the income execution, with knowledge or reason to know, that the information contained therein was false. Fla.Stat. § 559.72(5) states that no consumer debt collector shall: Disclose to a person other than the debtor or his family information affecting the debtor's reputation, whether or not for credit worthiness, with knowledge or reason to know that the other person does not have a legitimate business need for the information or that the information is false.... Plaintiff states that Defendants Kostroff and First Card violated Fla.Stat. § 559.72(6) by disclosing information relating to a debt that Defendants Kostroff and First Card knew or had reason to know was disputed by Plaintiff. Fla.Stat. § 559.72(6) states that a consumer debt collector shall not: Disclose information concerning the existence of a debt know to be reasonably disputed by the debtor without disclosing that fact....

...ispute was made within the preceding 90 days.... In addition to the above allegations, Plaintiff states that summary judgment is warranted against Defendants Kostroff and First Card because Defendants Kostroff and First Card have violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9). Fla.Stat. § 559.72(9) states that a consumer debt collector must not "[c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist...." In support of the allegation that Defendants Kostroff and First Card violated Fla.Stat. § 559.72(5), Plaintiff states that Defendants Kostroff and First Card violated *1362 Florida law by publishing the income execution to Plaintiff's employer....

...Card's alleged knowledge. In particular, Plaintiff failed to address the fact that the income execution was published to Plaintiff's employer only after the final default judgment was entered against Plaintiff. In the paragraph devoted to Fla.Stat. § 559.72(6), Plaintiff merely states that "[Defendant] First Card's records clearly show that the debt claimed in the original action against Plaintiff was disputed by Plaintiff. [Defendant] Kostroff could have easily ascertained this information through a limited investigation." (Dkt.144). Plaintiff cites no evidence and submits no other argument on the alleged violations of Fla. Stat. § 559.72(6). In connection with Fla.Stat. § 559.72(9) Plaintiff states that Defendants Kostroff and First Card violated the law by filing the New York lawsuit against Plaintiff....

...the validity of the debt. After thoroughly reviewing the entire record of this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Count II of Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint based on alleged violations of Fla.Stat. § 559.72(5), (6), and (9) must be denied....

...C. § 1692f." ( Id. at ¶¶ 35-36). Plaintiff alleges filing the untimely state suit also violated the FCCPA, because Defendants asserted "the existence of some other legal right when [they knew] the right [did] not exist, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)." ( Id....

...alleging that the five letters sent between May 16 and December 13, 2013 violated the FDCPA, the FCCPA, or both. The homeowners alleged that Affinity violated two FCCPA provisions when it sent the first two letters demanding $1,000. They alleged that Affinity violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)6 by demanding payment of a debt that it knew was illegitimate and Fla. Stat. § 559.72(18)7 by communicating directly with the homeowners about a debt when it knew that they were represented by counsel....

...from “[c]laim[ing], attempt[ing], or threaten[ing] to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert[ing] the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9). 7 This provision prohibits direct communication with a debtor who the collector knows is represented by counsel. See Fla. Stat. § 559.72(18). 8  Case: 15-14136 Date Filed: 11/09/2016 Page: 9 of 19 The homeowners also brought several counts against Meloni, six of which also named Marbella and are relevant to this appeal.8 The homeowners alleged that Meloni violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) by demanding payment of a debt that Meloni knew was illegitimate in the three letters sent on August 9, September 10, and December 13 and threatening to file a lien or institute a foreclosure action when Meloni knew it could do neither. The homeowners further alleged that Meloni violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72(15) by failing to provide appropriate proof that it was licensed to collect debts in Florida.9 They alleged that Marbella was vicariously liable for these FCCPA violations as well. Affinity and Marbella moved for summary judgment...

...to “provide adequate identification of herself or himself or her or his employer or other entity whom she or he represents if requested to do so by a debtor from whom she or he is collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72(15). 9  Case: 15-14136 Date Filed: 11/09/2016 Page: 10 of 19 The district court granted Affinity’s and Marbella’s motions, holding that the HOA fine was not...

...ding representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt”), and id. § 1692f (prohibiting “[a] debt collector” from employing “unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt”), with Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (regulating the conduct of any “person” collecting debts)....

...On June 15, 2011, Kelliher filed a four-count complaint in state court against Target and Bonded (Doc. # 2). Counts One and Two of the Verified Complaint allege that Target's actions violated the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA), specifically Fla. Stat. § 559.72(18) and 559.72(9). Counts Three and Four allege that Bonded violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) and the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C....

...Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting Fed. R.Civ.P. 7(a) and 10(c)). Thus, the Court may consider the various exhibits attached to the Verified Complaint without converting the Motion to Dismiss into one for summary judgment. III. Analysis Section 559.72 of the Florida Statutes prohibits certain consumer debt collection practices. In particular, Fla. Stat. § 559.72(18) makes it unlawful to [c]ommunicate with a debtor if the person knows that the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney's name and address, unless the de...

...collect the debt indirectly on its behalf. Target argues that it sent the statements pursuant to federal requirements and that no applicable law requires it to notify a debt collector that Kelliher is represented by counsel. In addition, Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) makes it unlawful to "claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or asserts the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist." Kellihe...

...ting consumer debts, from claiming, attempting, or threatening to enforce a debt when that person knows the debt is not legitimate, or from asserting the existence of any other legal right with the knowledge that the right does not exist. Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) (2014)....

...d, accordingly, is not limited to “debt collectors.” See Bacelli v. MFP, Inc., et al., 729 F.Supp.2d 1328 (M.D.Fla. 2010). The third prong requires an act or omission prohibited by the FCCPA. In addition to these elements, several subsections of § 559.72 require an allegation of knowledge or intent by the defendant in order to state a cause of action....

...collectors in order to state a cause of action.”)(omitting internal quotations). *1115 In this case, Foxx fails to specify which subsection Defendants allegedly violated. Foxx sets forth verbatim the conduct proscribed by the statutory language of § 559.72, which describes the practices prohibited by the FCCPA; however, he fails to describe Defendants’ conduct that he claims violated the FCCPA....

...to collection activity arising from the Loan; and (3) Defendant engaged in a plethora of acts and omissions prohibited by the FDCPA and FCCPA. For instance, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated: i. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) and Florida Statutes, § 559.72(18) by communicating with Plaintiff about the Loan when: (1) Defendant knew that Plaintiff was repre *1291 sented by Attorney Gingo with respect to the Loan; (2) Attorney Gingo’s contact information was known or readily ascertainable to Defendant; and (3) Attorney Gin-go had not consented to direct communication with the consumer (see Doc. 1, ¶¶ 79(c), 132(e)); ii. Florida Statutes, § 559.72(7) by engaging in conduct and repeatedly communicating with Plaintiff in a manner reasonably expected to harass Plaintiff (see id....

...¶¶ 79(h), (i), CDs (k), (l), (n), (u), (v), (w),- (x), (y)); ■ vn. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2)(A) and (8) by failing to disclose and.falsely representing to CRAs and Plaintiffs minor son the correct amount and legal status of the Loan (see ⅛-¶¶ 79(o), (p), (q), (r)); viii. Florida Statutes, §§ 559.72(5)' and (9) by disclosing information concerning Plaintiffs credit reputation and attempting to enforce the Loan even though Defendant knew or had reason to know that the disclosed information was false, the Loan was not legitimate, and Defendant had no right to enforce the Loan (see id,, ¶¶ 132(a), (d)); ix....

...Specifically, Plaintiff alleges, in the Amended Complaint, that in telephone messages she received on October 15 and 16, 2007, the Defendant failed to identify itself and failed to indicate the purpose of the messages. Plaintiff claims violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11), as well as Florida Statute § 559.72(9)....

...formation about the world" and will not make "unreasonable misinterpretations." Rivera v. Amalgamated Debt Collection Servs., 462 F.Supp.2d 1223, 1227 (S.D.Fla.2006) (quotations omitted). For its part, the Florida Consumer Collections Practices Act, Section 559.72(9) prohibits persons, in collecting consumer debts, from "claim[ing], attempt[ing], or threaten[ing] to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate or assert[ing] the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist." Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...E-47; DE-48] is DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART. 2) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support [DE-81] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. *1325 3) Plaintiff's claims premised on 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(6) and Florida Statute § 559.72(9) are dismissed, as are her requests for declaratory and injunctive relief....

...Based on these allegations, Lima brings claims against BANA and the APA Defendants for violations of: (1) the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et- seq. (“FDCPA”); (2) the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 559.72 et seq....

...ise failed to meet her satisfaction, the letter did contain all of the information required by statute. Lima’s FDCPA claim against the APA Defendants therefore must be dismissed. B. FCCPA Lima has not stated a viable claim that Defendants violated Section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA. Section 559.72(9) provides that no person shall “[c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” Fla.- Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...§ 1692g(a), either in the initial communication with Plaintiffs, or in writing within 5 days thereafter” (Count IV). Plaintiffs also seek relief against Bayview under the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”), Florida Statute section 559.55 et seq., on the ground Bayview violated Florida Statute section 559.72(9) by “knowingly claiming, attempting, or threatening to enforce a debt when the debt is not legitimate, or asserting the existence of some other legal right when the right does not exist.” (Count V)....

...away. (See id.). At this point, it is too late and prejudicial to allow Plain *1246 tiffs another chance to fix a defective pleading. The FDCPA claims are therefore dismissed with prejudice. B. FCCPA Claim Count V seeks relief under Florida Statute section 559.72(9), which provides, “[i]n collecting consumer debts, no person shall ... [c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) (alterations added)....

...ory damages in the amount of $1,000 per violation of the FCCPA must be dismissed because the statutory language of the FCCPA does not permit such an award. The relevant part of the FCCPA states “any person who fails to comply with any provision of § 559.72 is liable for actual damages and for additional statutory damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000, together with court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the Plaintiff.” Fla....

...The issues before us in this appeal concern only Laughlin's claim of a violation of FCCPA by Phillips. Laughlin asserts that multiple violations of FCCPA were committed by Phillips. More particularly, Laughlin alleges that Phillips has violated subsections (4), (5), (7), and (10) of Section 559.72, by communicating with her employer about the debt owed to Household....

...on down if it had not been so conveyed over the phone. Further, Phillips' records show that on November 11, 2002, the date appearing on the message slip, a collection agent from Phillips spoke with Baker. Laughlin also asserts that Phillips violated Section 559.72(18), which prohibits direct contact with the debtor once the creditor knows that the debtor has retained counsel....

...Phillips responds that they did not receive notice that Laughlin was represented until December 16, 2002, at which time they assert that they made no further contact with Laughlin. Laughlin also alleges that an employee of Phillips, Layn Offenberger (a/k/a Ms. Sheridan), violated Section 559.72(7) and (8), by willfully speaking to her in an abusive and threatening manner....

...rable to Laughlin, create issues of material fact. For example, record evidence gives rise to questions of fact as to whether an employee of Phillips spoke with Baker, Laughlin's supervisor, with respect to the collection of the debt in violation of Section 559.72(4); and whether Laughlin's former counsel provided notice of representation to Phillips, after which representatives of Phillips contracted Laughlin in violation of Section 559.72(18)....

...one of the prohibited practices in the FCCPA. Phillips also asserts that Laughlin has not shown that the communications with Laughlin's employer has affected her reputation *514 and that, under Heard v. Mathis, 344 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), the section 559.72(5) claim cannot proceed. In Heard, this court determined that to bring a claim based on a violation of section 559.72(5), one must show: "(1) that there was a disclosure of information to a person other than a member of the debtor's family, (2) that such person does not have a legitimate business need for the information, and (3) that such information has affected the debtor's reputation." Id....

...In light of these factual conflicts, we hold that summary judgment was erroneously entered in favor of Phillips and Offenberger. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. LEWIS, and ROBERTS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 559.72, Florida Statutes (2002), provides, in pertinent part: In collecting consumer debts, no person shall: * * * * * *3 (4) Communicate or threaten to communicate with a debtor's employer prior to obtaining final judgment against the debtor...

...f her or his family; (10) Use a communication which simulates in any manner legal or judicial process or which gives the appearance of being authorized, issued or approved by a government, governmental agency, or attorney at law, when it is not; [2] Section 559.72(18), Florida Statutes (2002), provides: In collecting consumer debt, no person shall: (18) Communicate with a debtor if the person knows that the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or c...

...less the debtor's attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to a communication from the person, unless the debtor's attorney consents to a direct communication with the debtor, or unless the debtor initiates the communication; [3] Section 559.72(8), provides: Collecting consumer debt, no person shall: (8) Use profane, obscene, vulgar, or willfully abusive language in communicating with the debtor or any member of her or his family;

...The Complaint was removed to federal court and then amended. (Docs. 1, 17.) The Amended Complaint alleges that I.C. System violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., (Count One), the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act ("FCCPA"), Fla. Stat. § 559.72, (Count Two), and committed the common law tort of invasion of privacy by intruding upon the Bishops' seclusion (Count Three)....

...application rendered the registration void under Fla. Stat. § 559.563, and that, in its attempt to collect a consumer debt while in possession of a void registration, BCC violated the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act ("FCCPA"), Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...¶¶ 15-16; 23-24). In its Motion, BCC moves for partial summary judgment on Count III of Conner's Amended Complaint, arguing that its alleged failure to comply with Fla. Stat. § 559.553 does not give rise to a private right of action under Fla. Stat. § 559.72....

...BCC's argument is essentially that, even accepting as true Conner's allegation that BCC omitted its mailing address in the application and that this omission rendered its registration void, Conner does not have a valid cause of action under Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...that BCC did not provide its mailing address in its application for registration and that this failure rendered the registration void. Conner asserts that BCC's attempt to collect a debt while in possession of a void registration violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9), which provides that, "[i]n collecting consumer debts, no person shall: ....

...[c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist." Florida law provides citizens with a private right of action for alleged violations of Fla. Stat. § 559.72. See Fla. Stat. § 559.77(1). BCC argues that a violation of the registration statute, Fla. Stat. § 559.553, does not give rise to a private right of action under Fla. Stat. §§ 559.72 and 559.77(1)....

...[2] As an initial matter, it is clear that Conner may not assert her claim directly under Fla. Stat. § 559.553, which does not itself provide for a private right of action. Conner appears to be aware of this fact, as she asserts her cause of action under Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9). The question, then, is whether a failure to comply with Fla. Stat. § 559.553 constitutes a violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...It appears that this issue is one of first impression. See Ferguson v. Credit Mgmt. Control, Inc., 140 F.Supp.2d 1293, 1303 (M.D.Fla.2001) (noting, after dismissing federal claims, that issue of whether an unregistered debt collector's sending of collection letter violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) had not been addressed by Florida courts and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C....

...§ 1367); Thibodeau v. Credit Adjustment Bureau, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEIS 87573, at *5-6 (M.D.Fla. Nov. 4, 2006) (same). Thus, the Court must look to the statute itself and related case law in evaluating the parties' arguments. The clause of Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) on which Conner premises her claim prohibits "asserting the existence of [a] legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist." Conner argues that BCC's provision of incomplete information to the state rendered its regist...

...n of a void registration violated Fla. Stat. § 559.553. Because Section 559.553 requires registration, Conner presumably reasons, BCC's sending of the collection letter while not in compliance with that statute constituted, to track the language of Section 559.72(9), the assertion of the existence of a legal right — the right to collect a debt — when BCC knew the right did not exist....

...Had the Florida legislature intended to enact a private right of action for violations of Fla. Stat. § 559.553, it could have done so, either by explicitly including language authorizing a private right of action in the statute itself, or by referencing Section 559.553 in Fla. Stat. § 559.72. Had the legislature intended to include "attempting to collect a consumer debt while in possession of a void registration" as a violation of the FCCPA, it could have included such language in Section 559.72. Because the legislature chose not to do so, the undersigned is not inclined to, nor can she, read such a cause of action into the language of Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...sting that prior approval of the Department must be received before consumer collection activities may be undertaken. *1362 Welch v. Florida West Coast, Inc., 816 So.2d 711, 714 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Consequently, the undersigned finds that Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) does not allow a private right of action for violations of Fla....

...be proven to have occurred, and accordingly Claim I does not state a claim on which relief may be granted. Count III—Violation of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act In Count III, the Plaintiff alleges that HFC and R & L violated section § 559.72(9), Florida Statutes (2009), otherwise known as the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act ("FCCPA")....

...§ 1681p; Clay v. Equifax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952, 958 (11th Cir. 1985). The Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”) prohibits, inter alia, contacting a debtor directly when that person is represented by an attorney regarding the debt. Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18). The FCCPA also prohibits attempting to enforce a debt when the debt is known to be illegitimate, id. § 559.72(9), and disclosing information affecting the debtor’s reputation to a third party other than the debt- or’s family if the third party does not have a legitimate business need or if the information is false, id. § 559.72(5)....

...ive years after the violation occurred). As would many of her FCCPA claims—based on dozens of monthly debt collection statements that CITI sent her beginning in January 2014 despite knowing that she was represented by an attorney. See Fla. Stat. §§ 559.72 (18), 559.77(4) (providing a two-year statute of limitations for these FCCPA claims)....

...tices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1962 et seq. (FDCPA) (Count II); and seeks injunctive relief and monetary sanctions for discharge injunction violations (Count III). (Id.). Specifically as to the FCCPA Count, Leahy-Fernandez alleges Bayview violated Sections 559.72(7), (9), and (18)....

...Failure to State a Claim Bayview raises four points as to how Leahy-Fernandez failed to state a claim for relief; namely, (1) there was no attempt to collect a debt, (2) Bayview was not on notice that Leahy-Fernandez was represented with respect to the Debt, (3) Leahy-Fernandez’s claims under Section 1692d of the FDCPA and Section 559.72(7) of the FCCPA fail as a matter of law, and (4) the Debt is not illegitimate....

...In addition, the letters attached to the Complaint as Exhibits A and C support the conclusion that Leahy-Fernandez has alleged sufficient facts to survive the Motion. (Doc. # 1-2 at 1, 27). 3. Claims for Harassment Bayview argues that Leahy-Fernandez’s claims under Section 1629d of .the FDCPA and Section 559.72(7) of the FCCPA fail as a matter of law. The Court agrees. Section 1629d reads, “[a] debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of debt.” And Section 559.72(7) reads, “no person shall......

...ember, and (15) the debt collector’s simulating or threatening legal process. Id. Leaving aside the factors that do not address mailings, the Court determines the communications by Bayview were not violative of either Section 1629d of the FDCPA or Section 559.72(7) of the FCCPA....

...1456, 1466 (C.D.Cal.1991), did not use abusive language, did not threaten Leahy-Fernandez, and did not contact Leahy-Fernandez’s friends, co-workers, or family members. As such, Bayview’s Motion is granted to the extent it seeks dismissal of Leahy-Fernan-dez’s claims under Section 1629d of the FDCPA and Section 559.72(7) of the FCCPA. 4. Illegitimate Debt Bayview argues “there is no basis to claim the [D]ebt is not ‘legitimate’ under § 559.72(9).” (Doc. # 19 at 24-25). Section 559.72(9) states a debt collector may not “[e]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” Bayview, however, provides no case law in support....

...Trent, 618 F.Supp.2d at 1361 (internal quotation marks omitted). It follows from Eider that although the mortgage lien survived the discharge, the debt as against Leahy-Fer-nandez personally is no longer legitimate and, thus, attempts to collect from her personally violate Section 559.72(9)....

...the FDCPA. Likewise, the Court finds that neither the Bankruptcy Code nor TILA preempts the FCCPA. However, Count I is dismissed to the extent it is based on (1) the three letters, which were not mortgage statements, sent to Leahy-Fernandez and (2) Section 559.72(7)....

...(d) DENIED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Counts I and II on the ground that Bayview was not on notice that Leahy-Fernandez was represented; (e) GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Counts I and II insofar as Counts I and II are based on Section 559.72(7) and Section 1692d, respectively; and (f) DENIED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Count I on the ground that the Debt is not illegitimate....

...This is an appeal from a final summary judgment holding that the defendant Continental Casualty Company was not obligated to furnish coverage to its insured, the plaintiff, Collection Bureau of Orlando, Inc., in a separate action wherein the plaintiff was sued for damages under Florida Statutes, Section 559.72. Section 559.72 prohibits certain debtor harassment practices. Continental's policy provided coverage when its insured was sued for any violation of an individual's right of privacy. In enacting Florida Statutes, Sections 559.72 and 559.77, the legislature has provided a cause of action in debtor harassment situations not previously passed on or specifically recognized by the courts of this state....

...Under the law of contracts insurance policies are to be liberally construed in favor of the insured. 18 Fla.Jur. Insurance, § 407. In this case we hold that the terms of the insurance policy does provide the insured with coverage for actions brought against it under the provisions of Florida Statutes, Sections 559.72 and 559.77....

...case provided. Dated at Gainesville, Fl. this 16th day of May A.D. 19 73 Appellant sought $500 actual damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, costs and an injunction against appellee enjoining further violations of Chapter 559, Florida Statutes. Section 559.72, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part as follows: "In collecting consumer claims, whether or not licensed by the division, no person shall: * * * * * * (10) Use a communication which simulates in any manner legal or judicial pr...

...Barchard in the foreclosure action. When Kass Shuler rejected the demand, Weis-berg sued the firm in county court, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 , and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, section 559.72, Florida Statutes (2009)....

...ade pursuant to the modification. Gann further alleged that the Bank breached its duty to her and ignored the terms of the modification. She asserted that in its collections actions and communications to her the Bank violated the FCCPA, including section 559.72(9), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...inferences therefrom construed in favor of the nonmoving party." Id. The trial court confines itself to considering the four corners of the complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Swope Rodante, P.A. v. Harmon, 85 So. 3d 508, 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Section 559.72(9) provides as follows: In collecting consumer debts, no person shall: .... (9) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist. With reference to section 559.72(9), the gist of Gann's claim is that the Bank sought to enforce a debt that was not legitimate because the parties had entered into a modification of the loan and that Gann was current on her payments. In the section allowing for civil remedies against a person violating the provisions of section 559.72, the FCCPA states that "[i]n applying and construing this section, due consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the -4- Federal Trade Commission and the fed...

...collection of debts. It is not meant to preclude a creditor or someone otherwise holding a secured interest from invoking legal process to foreclose." Id. at 1361. The court concluded that "filing a foreclosure lawsuit is not a debt collection practice under § 559.72 of the FCCPA." Id. The court then went on to consider whether presuit letters or notices violated section 559.72(9). The court determined that MERS' conduct did not violate section 559.72(9) because the debt was legitimate and MERS as mortgagee had the ability to foreclose. Id. at 1362. The court also determined that MERS did not violate section 559.72 by referring to itself as a "creditor" in the notice....

...Moreover, Florida courts have recognized that the FCCPA applies not only to debt collectors but also to any "person." See Schauer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance -7- Corp., 819 So. 2d 809, 812 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002); see also § 559.72 (providing that "[i]n collecting consumer debts, no person shall ....

...at 812 n.1. Furthermore, in Morgan v. Wilkins, 74 So. 3d 179, 181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), the appellees conceded "that the trial court was in error when it ruled that FCCPA pertains only to debt collectors, as that term is defined in the Act." The court stated that "[s]ection 559.72 provides that 'no person' shall engage in certain practices while attempting to collect a consumer debt." Id.; see also Kelliher, 826 F....

...itor" is almost identical to the language in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. [16] However, the Plaintiffs claim that under Florida's consumer collection practices law, a consumer may sue a creditor directly. *1155 Pursuant to Florida Statute § 559.72, "[i]n collecting consumer debts, no person shall ..." engage in the prohibited collection practices delineated in the statute....

...or cause shown. IT IS SO ORDERED. DONE and ORDERED. NOTES [1] The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants' conduct violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10), (5), and 15 U.S.C. § 1692i. [2] The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants' conduct violates Fla. Stat. § 559.72(7), (9) and Fla....

...aintiffs family.” Since defendant’s response is entirely dependent on its Collection Activity Records, this Count is not appropriate for summary judgment for the same reasons given above. In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “violated § 559.72(7) of the Florida Consumer Collections Practices Act by willfully communicating with a debtor or any member of his family with such frequency as would reasonably be expected to harass the debtor or the debt- or’s family, or such other con...

...It is at least 14, perhaps as many as 55, but in any case it is inappropriate at this stage in the litigation to decide whether the actual number of calls amounts to a violation of the FCCPA. First, the Court cannot determine whether Defendant violated § 559.72(7) 7 because of the frequency of the calls....

...on for the calls. However, Defendant’s representative took at least three months to correct the mistake, per Defendant’s own admission, so there is a trial issue as to whether Defendant’s conduct was willful. Defendant may also be liable under section 559.72(9) 8 because Defendant may have “know[n]” that the debt was illegitimate as to Plaintiff to the extent required to overcome the safe harbor built into the Act....

...the evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error, notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such error.” Fla. Stat. § 559.77 (3). Neither party disputes that any violation of section 559.72(9) was, at least initially, the result of a mistake; it is not Defendant’s fault that JH provided an incorrect telephone number....

...the Court finds that a called party may bring suit, and that Plaintiff qualifies as a called party. Finally, although the Court is sympathetic to Defendant's policy arguments, they cannot overcome the plain language of the statute. . Florida Statute § 559.72(7) forbids any "person” from: Willfully communicating] with the debtor or any member of her or his family with such frequency as can reasonably be expected to harass the debtor or her or his family, or willfully engaging] in other conduct...

...Making it unlawful for any person to “[c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)....

...of similarly-situated loan borrowers, for breach of fiduciary duty (Count I), negligence (Count II), unjust enrichment (Count III), breach of implied-in-law contract (Count IV), violation of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (Count V), violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act, 815 ILCS 501, et seq....

...ach violation, “whichever is greater.” § 227(b)(3)(B). Thus, Owens-Benniefield cannot recover both actual monetary loss and statutory damages. D. FCCPA In Count 4, Owens-Benniefield alleges Nationstar violated the FCCPA. It “violated sections 559.72(5), (6) when [Na-tionstar] represented .that [Owens-Bennie-fíeld] had defaulted on the debt, while knowing that this information was false” and “violated section 559.72(9) by attempting to enforce a debt ......

...“The second prong differs from the FDCPA in that the FCCPA prohibits acts of ‘persons’ and, accordingly, is not limited to ‘debt collectors.’ ” Id. “The third prong requires an act or omission prohibited by the FCCPA.” Id. Sections 559.72(5) and (6) provide that a person, in collecting a debt, shall not: (5) Disclose to a person other .than the debtor or her or his family information affecting the debtor’s reputation, whether or not for credit worthiness, with knowledge or' r...

...erson who made the original disclosure must reveal upon the request of the debtor within 30 days the details of the dispute to each person to whom disclosure of the debt without notice of the dispute was made within the preceding 90 days. Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (5)-(6)....

...8:11-cv-716-T-30TBM, 2011 WL 1878227 , at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. May 17, 2011)(“Defendant,s motion to dismiss based on preemption is granted to the extent that the FCCPA claim is premised on credit reporting activity.”)., Therefore, at this juncture, the § 559.72(5) and (6) claim survives. Section 559.72(9) prohibits a person, collecting’ a debt from “[c]laim[ing], attempting], or threatening] to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that -the right does not exist.” § 559.72(9)....

...ed through a deed-in-lieu — a fact of which Owens-Benniefield frequently reminded Nationstar. Cf. Leahy-Fernandez v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 159 F.Supp.3d 1294, 1305 (M.D. Fla. 2016)(holding plaintiff debtor had plausibly alleged violation of section 559.72(9) where she alleged her mortgage debt was discharged in bankruptcy but the defendant mortgage servicer still “attempt[ed] to collect from her personally”)....

...[7] The FCCPA prohibits any person, in collecting consumer debts, from "claim[ing], attempt[ing], or threaten[ing] to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate or assert[ing] the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist." Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) (emphasis added)....

...§ 1692c(a)(2), the FCCPA generally prohibits persons from communicating with a debtor "if the person knows that the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney's name and address ...." Fla. Stat. § 559.72(18) (emphasis added). The FCPA also prohibits "willfully engag[ing] in ... conduct which can reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the debtor...." Fla. Stat. § 559.72(7)....

...697, 698-99 (2d Cir.2005), those authorities either do not address the arguments advanced in Randolph or do not involve FDCPA claims based on a violation of the stay or the discharge injunction. FCCPA Claims Against MFP Plaintiff alleges that the MFP collection letters also violated Sections 559.72(7), (9) & (18), Florida Statutes. Section 559(9) prohibits any person from claiming, attempting, or threatening to enforce a consumer debt "when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate." Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) (emphasis added)....

...4th DCA 1976) (striking allegation that a debt collector "should have known" the debt was not legitimate). The undisputed facts demonstrate that MFP did not know that Plaintiff had filed for bankruptcy when it sent the collection letters. Accordingly, MFP is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim under Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9). Similarly, Section 559.72(18) prohibits communicating directly with a debtor only "if the person knows that the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney's name and address." Fla. Stat. § 559.72(18) (emphasis added). As it is undisputed that MFP did not know that Plaintiff was represented by an attorney when it sent the collection letters, MFP is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim under Fla. Stat. § 559.72(18). As to Section 559.72(7), MFP contends that, as MFP admittedly lacked knowledge of Plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding, no evidence of record supports Plaintiff's allegation that MFP "willfully" engaged in conduct that could reasonably be expected to abuse or harass Plaintiff. See Fla. Stat. § 559.72(7); see also Brandt v. I.C. Sys., Inc., No. 8:09-cv-126-T-26MAP, 2010 WL 582051, at *2 (M.D.Fla. Feb. 19, 2010) (suggesting that Section 559.72(7) "requires an allegation of knowledge or intent by the debt collector in order to state a cause of action"). The Court agrees. Plaintiff asserts that Section 559.72(7) requires neither knowledge nor intent....

...Instead, Plaintiff relies on the general proposition [10] that the FCCPA is a strict *1338 liability statute—except where it isn't. [11] As the plain language of the statute requires willful conduct, MFP is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim under Fla. Stat. § 559.72(7)....

...ess MFP's contention that Plaintiff's FCCPA claims are preempted by the United States Bankruptcy Code. FCCPA Claims Against St. Joseph's Plaintiff alleges that by sending Plaintiff the two post-petition hospital bills, St. Joseph's violated Sections 559.72(7), (9) & (18), Florida Statutes. Apparently relying on an agency theory, Plaintiff also alleges that St. Joseph's violated Sections 559.72(7), (9) & (18) by causing MFP to send its post-petition and post-discharge collection letters....

...the errors. Therefore, the court recommends that Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's *1343 violations of sections 1692e(2)(A) and 1692f(1) of the FDCPA claims be denied. B. Alleged Violations of the FCCPA by MFP 1. Sections 559.72(9) and 559.72(18) of the FCCPA Plaintiff argues that MFP violated sections 559.72(9) and 559.72(18) of the FCCPA when it sent three dunning letters to Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel....

...ff had filed for bankruptcy when it mailed the collection notices. The purpose of the FCCPA is to eliminate abusive and harassing tactics in the collection of debts. Trent v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 618 F.Supp.2d 1356, 1361 (M.D.Fla.2007). Section 559.72(9) provides that no person shall "claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate or assert the existence of some other legal right when that person knows that the right does not exist." Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) (emphasis added). Similarly, section 559.72(18), prohibits a person from communicating with a debtor "if the person knows that the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt ..." Fla. Stat. § 559.72(18) (emphasis added)....

...hes MFP knew the debt was not legitimate, MFP knew it was asserting a non-existent right, or MFP knew Plaintiff was represented by counsel when it sent the collection letters. Moreover, Plaintiff's argument that MFP is strictly liable under sections 559.72(9) and 559.72(18) of the FCCPA is without merit because a debtor must demonstrate actual knowledge on the part of the debt collector to establish a violation of these provisions. 2. Section 559.72(7) of the FCCPA Plaintiff also alleges that MFP violated section 559.72(7) by sending out the collection notices to Plaintiff while Plaintiff was protected by the bankruptcy automatic stay and represented by counsel. Pursuant to Section 559.72(7), a person may not "[w]illingly communicate with a debtor or any member of her or his family with such frequency as can reasonably be expected to harass the debtor or her or his family, or willfully engage in other conduct which can reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the debtor or any member of her or his family." Fla. Stat. § 559.72(7). To prove a violation under section 559.72(7), a plaintiff must show (1) that the communication(s) by the debt collector was willfully placed, and (2) that there was a frequency of willful communication that could reasonably be expected to harass the debtor....

...[10] Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 896 So.2d 773 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), rev'd, 950 So.2d 380 (Fla.2007), does not support that proposition. The decision does not address whether the statute requires knowledge or intent and the case apparently involved a claim under Section 559.72(9), which does impose such a requirement. See Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9). [11] See Dkt. 42 at 8 ("The plain language of sections 559.72(9) and (18) require knowledge....")....

...te. Baptista v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 640 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir.2011). The FCCPA is a Florida consumer financial law that prohibits debt collectors from employing abusive, deceptive, and unfair collection practices. Specifically, Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18) prohibits debt collectors from communicating with a debtor if that collector knows that an attorney represents the debtor in connection with the debt....

...sdiction. Mr. Bateman then sued Verizon in state court. He alleged that Verizon attempted to collect a debt previously discharged in the bankruptcy court, in violation of -3- the FCCPA, section 559.72(7), (9), and (18), Florida Statutes (2014).2 Mr....

...Bateman argued that Verizon violated the discharge order, not that "the debt collection letter from Verizon's agent violated the Customer Agreement"). Instead, Mr. Bateman alleges that Verizon violated the FCCPA. This statute imposes legal duties on consumer debt collectors.6 § 559.72; Morgan v....

...rson is collecting or attempting to collect such debts. Unlike the FDCPA, "the FCCPA applies not only to debt collectors but also to any 'person.' " Gann v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 145 So. 3d 906, 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014); see also § 559.72 (providing that "[i]n collecting consumer debts, no person shall ....

...Supp. 3d 1281, 1297 (M.D. Fla. 2016) ("[W]hen a creditor calls the wrong number and mistakenly alleges that the plaintiff owes a debt, the plaintiff is a 'debtor' under the FCCPA."). Accordingly, the alleged statutory violations addressed under section 559.72 arose from Verizon's collection efforts and were not unique to the Customer Agreement....

...uld grant summary judgment on Ms. Martorella’s claim 9 for violation of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”). The FCCPA prohibits a party-from collecting a debt when it “knows that the debt is not legitimate.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)....

...Appellant, Kimberly Wagner, appeals from an order dismissing her complaint against appellee, Garland Strickland. For the reasons stated below, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings. In her complaint, Ms. Wagner alleged that Mr. Strickland engaged in various acts prohibited under section 559.72, Florida Statutes, relating to the collection of consumer debts....

...FCCPA Claim The FCCPA prohibits certain practices in the collection of consumer debts, including communications so frequent as to harass the debtor or other conduct that abuses or harasses the debtor, and attempts to enforce a debt which the collector knows to be illegitimate. See Fla. Stat. *1329 § 559.72 (7), (9)....

...Because the undisputed facts demonstrate that Resurgent and LVNV’s communications were not harassing or abusive, were made in response to inquiries by Arianas, and that LVNV lacked actual knowledge that the debts were illegitimate, summary judgment is due to be granted on the FCCPA claim. § 559.72(7) Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (7) states, “In collecting consumer debts, no person shall ......

...[w]illfully communicate with the debtor ... with such frequency as can reasonably be expected to harass the debtor ..., or willfully engage in other conduct which can reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the debtor.... ” LVNV argues it did not violate § 559.72(7) because neither it nor Resurgent were attempting to collect a debt, and the number and manner of their communications with Arianas were not abusive or harassing as a matter of law....

...e,” and “If we do not receive additional information on this account, we may resume collection efforts.” (Dkt. 20-4 at pp. 1, 6, 7, 9). A reasonable jury could find that the letters were sent in the course of “collecting debts.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 . Material questions of fact preclude summary judgment on the basis that LVNV and Resurgent were not attempting to collect a debt. Nevertheless, summary judgment is due to be granted on the § 559.72(7) claim, because the frequency and manner of the communications were not abusive or harassing as a matter of law. There is nothing in the letters that can be construed as abusive. Cf. Laughlin v. Household Bank, Ltd., 969 So.2d 509, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (denying summary judgment on § 559.72(7) claim because debt collector allegedly made “loud, aggressive ......

...Accounts Receivable Mgmt., Inc., 72 So.3d 179, 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (eighteen calls insufficient as matter of law to violate FCCPA); Schauer v. Morse Operations, Inc., 5 So.3d 2, 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (seven calls insufficient as a matter of law to violate FCCPA). § 559.72(9) Arianas’ claim also implicates § 559.72(9), which states, “In collecting consumer debts, no person shall ......

...legitimate. The statute does not provide for recovery if the creditor merely should have known the debt was not legitimate.”) (emphasis added). Because Arianas is unable to show that LVNV had actual knowledge that the debts were illegitimate, his § 559.72(9) claim fails as a matter of law....

...debt collector did in Schauer. Id. (See Dkt. 85 ¶¶ 12-19). Accordingly, Arianas has failed to demonstrate a dispute of material fact as to LVNV’s actual knowledge of the illegitimacy of the debts, and LVNV is entitled to summary judgment on the § 559.72(9) claim....

...Thus, the offending provision could be severed without affecting the parties' agreement to arbitrate. See Fonte v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc., 903 So.2d 1019, 1020 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 918 So.2d 292 (Fla.2005). Second, Reeves did not specifically demand punitive damages, although section 559.72(2) permits them....

appear to state a cause of action pursuant to section 559.72(5), Florida Statutes. According to section

...d address, unless the debtor's attorney fails to respond within 30 days to a communication from the person, unless the debtor's attorney consents to a direct communication with the debtor, or unless the debtor initiates the communication. Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18)....

...The relevant part of the FCCPA prohibits the use of a "communication which simulates in any manner legal or judicial process or which gives the appearance of being authorized, issued or approved by a government, governmental agency, or attorney at law, when it is not." Fla. Stat. § 559.72(10)....

...the collection activities of attorneys working on its behalf." See Schutz v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 465 F. Supp 2d 872, 875 (N.D.Ill.2006) (collecting cases). [11] Therefore, North Star is a "debt collector" under the FDCPA. iii. Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) Under the FCCPA, a debt collector cannot "claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist." Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...rest rate far above the statutory post-judgment rate of interest. See e.g. Doc. 95-11 at 2. Counterclaim plaintiffs assert that Capital One's "attempt to collect interest rates in excess of Florida's post-judgment and usury laws" violates Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...r and may support counterclaim plaintiffs' other claims in this litigation, the act of proposing a higher rate of post-judgment interest than that provided by statute is insufficient, standing alone, to establish an independent FCCPA violation under § 559.72(9)....

...is issue at a later stage in the litigation. Moreover, the parties should keep the Court informed as to any developments in this evolving area of Florida law. [8] Counterclaim plaintiffs also argue that some of the communications violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...North Star has not shown how this distinction is legally relevant. [12] North Star used the statutory post-judgment interest rate. [13] Accordingly, the Court need not reach counterclaim defendants' argument that it lacked the "actual knowledge" required to establish liability for a violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9). To the extent that North Star argues that the "actual knowledge" requirement also applies to § 559.72(10), that argument is rejected....

...Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201 , et seq. (Count II). Additionally, Plaintiff seeks damages for Defendants’ alleged violations of FDUPTA (Count. III). Plaintiff further alleges violations of the Florida Consumer Collection And Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 559.72 , el seq., (Count IV) and unjust enrichment (Count V)....

...The Second District also addressed the Brindises’ argument that they would have no remedy for the violation of the FCCPA if the notice requirement of section 559.715 was found not to operate as a condition precedent: [T]he FCCPA imposes a sweeping scheme of administrative enforcement. See §§ 559.725, .726, .727, .730, .77, .78, .785. For example, a person who violates any provision of the FCCPA is subject to a cease and desist order. § 559.727....

...ice of the assignment. Further, section 559.715 is contained in a chapter that provides fob sanctions for noncompliance with the chapter’s provisions. Two statutes not applicable here provide for administrative and civil remedies for violations of section 559.72.- See §§ 559.730, .77, Fla....

...Stat. (2012). Another statute provides for criminal penalties for engaging in collections without first registering with the state. See § 559.785, Fla. Stat. (2012). Other statutes provide for sanctions for violations of- any part of the chapter. See § 559.727, Fla....

...The Collection Letter Does Not Violate the FCCPA Unlike the FDCPA, the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act ("FCCPA"), Fla. Stat. §§ 559.55, et seq., applies not only to debt collectors but to any persons collecting a consumer debt. Fla. Stat. § 559.72....

...Counts II and III of the Complaint seek damages from GC Services and Capital One, respectively, for violations of the FCCPA. The Trustee alleges that the alleged defects in the Collection Letter and Validation Notice under the FDCPA are also violations of sections 559.72(7) and (9) of the FCCPA. Fla. Stat. § 559.72 states, in part: In collecting consumer debts, no person shall: ......

...al act [FDCPA]."). Because the Court has determined that the Collection Letter does not violate the FDCPA, the Court concludes that the Collection Letter is not "conduct which can reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the debtor" in violation of section 559.72(7). Nor is the Collection Letter an attempt to enforce a debt that is not legitimate or the assertion of some legal right *705 with the knowledge that the right does not exist in violation of section 559.72(9)....

...The following month, in January 1986, Krombach filed a two count complaint against the bank and the detective agency in Putnam County. Count I was for damages and to recover possession of the vehicle believed to be in Putnam County. Count II was to recover damages and attorney's fees pursuant to section 559.72, Florida Statutes (1985) which prohibits certain consumer collection practices....

...Even if the claims are not barred, BSI contends its conduct does not constitute "debt collection" and the FDCPA and FCCPA therefore do not apply. Id. BSI lastly claims that 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41 requires BSI to send monthly statements to Plaintiff, thereby preempting Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18), and that Plaintiff's claim that BSI should have sent communications to Plaintiff's lawyer is conclusory and deficient....

...At least for the initial communication with the consumer, ICS is entitled to rely on the representations of its clients with respect to consumer debts without the need' to conduct a pre-collection investigation. 4 B. Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”), Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) Plaintiff asserts FCCPA claims against both ICS and MD .Now. The FCCPA generally prohibits debt collection agencies and corporations from claiming, attempting, or threatening to enforce' a debt where such person knows the right does not exist. Fla. Stat. § 559.72 ; Cook v. Blazer Fin.Servs., Inc., 332 So.2d 677, 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). To show a violation of section 559.72(9), “it must be shown that a' legal right that did not exist was asserted and’ that the person had actual knowledge that the right did not exist,” Read v....

...LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir.2010). Green Tree, as a "debt collector,” is regulated under the FCCPA. § 559.55(7), Fla. Stat. The Runyans' home loan is protected as a “consumer debt.” § 559.55(6), Fla. Stat. . § 559.72(1)-(19), Fla. Stat. . Id. at § 559.72(7), (18). The Trustee originally contended that Green Tree also violated the FCCPA by knowingly attempting to enforce an illegitimate debt. Id. § 559.72(9)....

...Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1179 (11th Cir.1985). . Williams v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., - F.Supp.3d -, -, 2015 WL 847381, at *6 (M.D.Fla. Feb. 26, 2015). . Adv. Doc. No. 52 at 102:23-103:1. . Id. at 105:14-17. . Id. at 105:21-22. . § 559.72(18), Fla....

...Therefore, the Court grants the Defendant judgment on the pleadings with respect to the Plaintiffs allegations that the collection letter violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(l). B. Allegations That the Collection Letter Violated the FCCPA. Count Two of the Complaint alleges that the Defendant violated Florida Statute § 559.72(9), which prohibits a debt collector from claiming, attempting, or threatening to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legiti *1344 mate, or asserting the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist....

...27, 2015) (dismissing alleged violation of the FCCPA for failure to serve a notice of assignment pursuant to Florida Statute § 559.715 because the Florida legislature' did not authorize a private right of action to enforce § 559.715). Second, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated § 559.72(9) because the collection letter did not comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). (Compl. ¶ 44(b), ECF No. 1.) Finally, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant violated § 559.72(9) because the Defendant unlawfully displayed a bar code on the envelope used to mail the collection letter in violation of 15 U.S.C....

...The FCCPA prohibits debt collectors from “willfully communieat[ing] with the debtor or any member of her or his family with such frequency as can reasonably be expected to harass the debtor ... or willfully engage in other conduct which can reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the debtor.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (7)....

Act from the prohibited practices set forth in § 559.72, under which Plaintiff brings his claim. See Halsten

...er § 1692k of the FDCPA. The statute provides no numerical limit on the amount appropriate for the actual damages or for the reasonable attorneys' costs. B. FCCPA Claim Plaintiff also seeks relief under Fla. Stat. § 559.77(2) for a violation under § 559.72(7)....

...See 489 F.Supp.2d 1358. Specifically, the Court's Order states, [b]ecause 559.553 requires registration, Connor presumably reasons, BCC's sending of the collection letter while not in compliance with that statute constituted, to track the language of Section 559.72(9), the assertion of the existence of a legal right—the right to collect a debt—when BCC knew the right did not exist....

...* * * Had the Florida legislature intended to enact a private right of action for violations of Fla. Stat. 559.553, it could have done so, either by explicitly including language authorizing a private cause of action in the statute itself, or by referencing Section 559.553 in Fla. Stat. 559.72. Had the legislature intended to include "attempting to collect on a consumer debt while in possession of a void registration" as a violation of the FCCPA, it could have included such language in Section 559.72. Because the legislature chose not to do so, the undersigned is not inclined to, nor can she, read such a cause of action into the language of Fla. Stat. 559.72(9)....

...Accordingly, an award of fees and costs under this statute—15 U.S.C. § 1692k.—is inappropriate. C. Attorney's Fees from Plaintiff Pursuant to Florida Statutes § 559.77 Fla. Stat. § 559.77 allows a debtor to bring a civil action against a person or entity violating the provisions of Fla. Stat. § 559.72—which regulates the collection of debt....

...o enact a private right of action for violations of Fla. Stat. § 559.553, it could have done so, either by explicitly including language authorizing a private right of action in the statute itself, or by referencing Section § 559.553 in Fla. Stat. § 559.72." See Order, 489 F.Supp.2d 1358....

...ney for collection. Appellant debtor filed a "class action" counterclaim alleging that a collection letter sent by appellee collection agency to appellant debtor contained a threat within the meaning of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, section 559.72(9), Florida Statutes....

...We agree with the trial judge that the counterclaim does not state a cause of action because, as a matter of law, the collection letter, the relevant part of which is set forth below, [2] does not constitute a wrongful threat within the meaning of section 559.72(9), Florida Statutes. AFFIRMED. COBB, COWART and DANIEL, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 559.72(9), Florida Statutes, provides that in the collection of consumer claims, no person shall "claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a consumer claim when such person knows that the claim is not legitimate or some other legal right when s...

...“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. B. FCCPA (Count III) In Count III, Plaintiffs assert a claim for violations of subsection 559.72(18) of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits direct communication with a debtor with respect to a debt “if the person knows that the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can readily ascertain, such attorney’s name and address.” “Actual knowledge is required to prove violations of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18).” Nordwall v....

...8:15-cv-1402-T-26EAJ, 2015 WL 10097518 , at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 26, 2015) (holding that allegations that the defendant received notice that the debt was listed in a bankruptcy case in which the plaintiff was represented were sufficient to state a claim under subsection 559.72(18))....

...Section 1692f(l) prohibits “[t]he collection of any amount (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(l). Fla. Stat. Ann. § 559.72 states that no person shall “[c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 559.72 (9)....

...§ 1692f(l) when he collects a fee that is not authorized by state law or the agreement creating the debt.”); see also Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161 , 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A district court need not, however, allow an amendment ... where amendment would be futile”). Plaintiffs claims under Fla. Stat. Ann. § 559.72 (9) however, survive, as the least sophisticated consumer may plausibly believe that the Letter “threaten[s] to enforce a debt” or “assert[s] the existence of some other legal right.” IV....

...trict Court dismissed without leave to appeal Dudley Kinlock’s pro se amended complaint alleging claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 , and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA), Fla. Stat. § 559.72 ....

...hone number. Caceres, 755 F.3d at 1303 n. 2. The FCCPA prohibits anyone, in the course of collecting debts, from using threats or force, and from disclosing information concerning the existence of a debt known to be reasonably disputed. Fla, Stat. §§ 559.72(2), (6)....

...In short, Kinlock failed to plead facts sufficient to sustain an FDCPA claim. Reese, 678 F.3d at 1215 . As to his FCCPA claim, the amended complaint fails to allege facts showing that Wells Fargo was collecting a consumer debt, as defined in the FCCPA. See Fla. Stat. §§ 559.55 , 559.72....

...Collection Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 559.55 et seq. (“FCCPA”) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”). 2 She asserts that ECMC violated various' provisions of the FCCPA— specifically, Fla. Stat. §§ 559.72 (3), (7), (9), and (18) (Count I)....

...also deny Performant’s notice of joinder as it is a nullity. B. Motion to Dismiss Claim against ECMC 1. “Creditor” Exception to the FCCPA The Court will first resolve ECMC’s contention that Plaintiffs FCCPA claim must fail because Fla. Stat. § 559.72 applies only to debt collectors, but Plaintiff has alleged that ECMC is a “creditor” as defined by Fla. Stat. § 559.55 (5), see Doc. 1 ¶ 9. 3 In support of its assertion that Section 559.72 applies only to debt collectors, ECMC does not cite the statutory language....

...FirstBank Florida, 779 F.Supp.2d 1354 , 1357 n. 1 (S.D.Fla.2011) (noting that “Sections 559.553 and 559.555 of the Florida Statutes govern the practices of ‘debt collectors.’ ”) (emphasis added)). Notably, ECMC ignores the plain language of § 559.72, which states simply that “no person shall” engage in the enumerated debt collection practices. And, more troubling, ECMC also ignores the well-established body of case law which clearly indicates that § 559.72 is not restricted to debt collectors....

...Target Nat'l Bank, 826 F.Supp.2d 1324, 1327 (M.D.Fla.2011) (“Although the federal FDCPA does not apply to original creditors, the FCCPA has been interpreted to apply to original creditors as well as debt collection agencies.”). ECMC’s contention that § 559.72 contains some sort of debt collector exception is clearly without merit, 4 and ECMC has not set forth any other reason as to why it should not be considered a “person” covered under § 559.72....

...See 34 C.F.R. § 682.410 (b)(8) (“The provisions- of ... this section preempt any State law, including State statutes, regulations, or rules, that would conflict with or hinder satisfaction of the requirements of these provisions.”), b. Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (3) Florida Statutes § 559.72(3) provides that “no person shall ......

...nts to no provision which requires that a guaranty agency not inform the debtor that the existence of any dispute will also be disclosed, or that precludes the disclosure to consumer reporting agencies of the existence of any dispute, as required by § 559.72(6)....

...Second, ECMC has set forth no reason why requiring a guaranty agency simply to inform the debtor that the existence of any dispute will also be disclosed as required would conflict with or otherwise hinder the satisfaction of its mandated debt collection activities. Indeed, although § 559.72(3) appears to impose a disclosure requirement that is not necessarily dictated by the federal regulation, there is simply no evidence that permitting Plaintiffs claim to proceed would stand as an obstacle to achieving the objectives of the federal regulation. The Court will therefore deny ECMC’s motion to dismiss as it relates to Plaintiffs claim for a violation of § 559.72(3)....

...xtended limitations period “does not present such a threat to the continued participation of lenders in federal student loan programs that the Florida Act can be deemed to obstruct the accomplishment of the objectives of the HEA”). c. Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (7) Florida Statutes § 559.72(7) provides that “no person shall ......

...To begin with, the Court notes that it is not impossible to comply with both the federal regulation and the state law. Indeed, nothing in the federal regulation requires that a guaranty agency behave unreasonably in its attempts to collect on a defaulted loan. However, permitting Plaintiffs § 559.72(7) claim to proceed would stand as an obstacle to achieving the objectives of the federal regulation....

...Guaranty agencies are mandated to exercise diligent efforts to collect on a defaulted loan, and subjecting them to liability in those instances in which they mistakenly seek to recover from an incorrect party would irreconcilably conflict with that mandate. In sum, Plaintiffs claim for a violation of § 559.72(7) is preempted because it would stand as an obstacle to achieving the objectives of the federal regulation. Accordingly, the Court will grant ECMC’s motion to dismiss as it relates to Plaintiffs claim for a violation of § 559.72(7). d. Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) Florida Statutes § 559.72(9) provides that “no person shall ......

...n requirements set forth in 34 C.F.R. § 682.410 (b)(6), which consist of a specific set of actions a guaranty agency must take in attempting to collect on a defaulted loan. The Court disagrees. It is clearly possible to comply with both the HEA and § 559.72(9), and there is no conflict between the Florida provision and the federal regulation....

...Payco, 363 F.3d at 1129 . Tellingly, ECMC advances no evidence in support of its argument and only asserts in a conclu-sory manner that “[the] federal collection requirement preempts Plaintiffs misidenti-fication claims under Florida Statute *1347 § 559.72(9).” Doc. 15 at 11. The Court will therefore deny ECMC’s motion to dismiss to the extent that it argues that Plaintiffs claim under § 559.72(9) is preempted by the HEA. e. Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18) Florida Statutes § 559.72(18) generally prohibits a person who is attempting to collect on a debt from communicating with the debtor if the person knows that the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to that debt....

..., direct communications with the borrower, while the other prohibits such communications if the borrower is represented by an attorney. Compare, e.g., 34 C.F.R. 682.410(b)(6)(ii) (“the agency must send a notice to the borrower ”) with Fla. Stat. 559.72(18) (“no person shall ......

...e). Finally, as discussed in Section III.B.2.C, supra, the Court rejects Plaintiffs argument premised on the fact that she is not the “borrower.” The Court will therefore grant ECMC’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiffs claim for a violation of Section 559.72(18). 3. Failure to State a Claim for Violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) ECMC finally argues that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for a violation of Florida Statute § 559.72(9) because she has not adequately alleged that ECMC knew that the debt it was attempting to collect was not legitimate. The Court disagrees. The Court recognizes that Section 559.72(9) requires actual knowledge....

...complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 . Accepting the facts alleged in the Complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs favor, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for relief under § 559.72(9)....

...uld reasonably be inferred that ECMC gained actual knowledge, because Plaintiff alleges that ECMC continued its collection activities even after all of these communications, Compl. ¶ 31-32. Plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for a violation of Section 559.72(9)....

...Accordingly, the Court will deny ECMC’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs claim for a violation of that section. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED: 1. ECMC’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 15) is GRANTED-IN-PART and DENIED-IN-PART. 2. The violations of Florida Statutes §§ 559.72(7) and 559.72(18) alleged in Count I are hereby DISMISSED....

...ct a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that purpose,” and that in subsequent communications, the debt collector must identify itself as a debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(ll). The Florida Consumer Collections Practices Act, Section 559.72(9) prohibits persons, in collecting consumer debts, from “claim[ing], attempt[ing], or threatening] to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)....

...for personal, family, or household purposes (iv) during the two year period prior to the filing of the Complaint through the date of class certification. To establish a violation under the Florida Consumer Collections Practices Act, Florida Statute Section 559.72(9), it must be shown that a legal right that did not exist was asserted and that the person had actual knowledge that the right did not exist. See Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)....

...After approximately a month, when notified by the insurance agency that the premiums had not been paid, Tallahassee Title stopped payment on the check given Dean and issued a new one to the insurance agency. Dean then instituted this suit, pursuant to Section 559.77, Florida Statutes (1979), for violation of Section 559.72. The trial judge found that Tallahassee Title’s conduct in refusing to close the sale unless Dean agreed to the withholding of the alleged debt to the third party insurance agency constituted a violation of the prohibitions set forth in Sections 559.72(7) and (9) and awarded actual damages of $1361.47 (the amount of the withheld insurance claim) and twice that amount as punitive damages, plus costs and an attorney’s fee of $1000.00. Considering the spirit and purpose of Part Y of Chapter 559, “The Consumer Collection Practices Act,” we see no error demonstrated in the trial court’s finding that appellant violated Section 559.72, thus entitling appellee to actual damages, costs, and attorney’s fees....

...for lack of consideration; 2) denying foreclosure on the mortgaged property under the court's equitable powers; and 3) awarding Appellees Charles Morrison and Shirley Morrison $100,000 in damages on a counterclaim alleging the United States violated section 559.72, Florida Statutes (2001), by reporting derogatory credit information and filing suit on the debt....

...real property, which could not provide the foundation for a counterclaim based on an action for money damages. Additionally, Appellees asserted in their counterclaim that the agency wrongfully reported derogatory credit information, in violation of section 559.72(5), Florida Statutes, which is recognized as a tort....

ALTENBERND, Judge. Edward S. Desmond appeals a final summary judgment entered in his action against Accounts Receivable Management, Inc. (ARM), for alleged violations of section 559.72, Florida Statutes (2006), which regulates consumer debt collection practices....

...tions. HSBC settled *181 the claims against it shortly after ARM received the final summary judgment that Mr. Desmond challenges in this appeal. The Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act regulates debt collection in Florida. See §§ 559.55-.78. Section 559.72 prohibits specifically enumerated, inappropriate debt collection practices. Subsection 559.72(7) provides that a person collecting a debt shall not [wjillfully communicate with the debtor or any member of her or his family with such frequency as can reasonably be expected to harass the debtor or her or his family, or willfully...

...ufficient to present a jury question), with Schauer v. Morse Operations, Inc., 5 So.3d 2, 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding as a matter of law that seven debt collection calls over a six-month period were neither frequent nor so harassing as to violate section 559.72(7))....

...We disagree with the trial court on one narrow issue. Under the Act, “unless the context otherwise indicates,” a “debt- or” means not only an actual debtor, but also “any natural person ... allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” § 559.55(2). Because the context of subsection 559.72(7) does not indicate otherwise, an alleged debtor is protected by the Act from the prohibited practices set forth in this subsection....

...of the eighteen telephone calls to explain that the calls were being made in error, we believe that a jury could conclude that ARM “willfully engage[d] in other conduct which can reasonably be expected to abuse or harass” such an alleged debtor. § 559.72(7)....

...Liberty Cmty. Mgmt., Inc., 702 F.3d 1298, 1299 (11th Cir.2012). Plaintiff also brings claims against both NSI and SAC under the FCCPA, Florida’s analogue to the FDCPA, which prohibits various practices in “collecting consumer debts.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 ; Oppenheim v....

...er the FDCPA or that SAC was “collecting consumer debts” under the FCCPA. Additionally, both sides move for summary judgment on Plaintiffs FCCPA claims, which allege that Defendants’ conduct was harassing and abusive in violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (7), and that Defendants attempted to enforce a debt they knew was not legitimate, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)....

...Moreover, Campbell’s own testimony indicates that SAC counsels debtors on their “repayment options,” which suggests, at the very least, an indirect attempt to obtain payment on a debt. Id.; 16 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Defendants’ Motion is therefore denied on this issue. 2. Violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d and Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (7) The FDCPA prohibits the use of harassing, oppressive, or abusive measures to collect a debt, including “[c]ausing a phone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number'” 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5). The FCCPA similarly prohibits a person from willfully communicating, “with a debtor or any member of her or his family with such frequency as can reasonably be expected to harass.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (7)....

...stop calling, Plaintiff is entitled to have a factfinder determine whether the calls were harassing or abusive under the FDCPA and FCCPA. Defendants’ Motion is therefore denied on Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692d and Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (7)....

...he contrary. Ortega v. Collectors Training Inst. of Ill., Inc., No. 09-21744-CIV, 2011 WL 241948 , at *9 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 24, 2011) (surveying cases). Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion is denied on her claims pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692d and Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (7). 3. Violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) The FCCPA prohibits a person from claiming, attempting, or threatening “to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate,” or from asserting “the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)....

...did she otherwise allege that Plaintiff was obligated to pay a debt. (See Pl. Dep. at 21). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to come forward with sufficient evidence to demonstrate that she is a “debtor” entitled to sue for a violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9). Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is therefore granted as to Counts II and IV, to the extent these counts allege a violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9). As discussed above, the Motion is denied as to Counts II and IV to the extent these counts allege a violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (7). Accordingly, it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED: (1) Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. # 91) is GRANTED IN PART as to Counts II and IV, to the extent that Counts II and IV allege violations of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)....

...mages within the jurisdictional limit of that court. The claim contained two theories. First, Mr. Myers alleged that DISH willfully engaged in conduct that could reasonably be expected to abuse or harass him or a member of his family in violation of section 559.72(7). Second, he alleged that DISH attempted to collect a debt while knowing that it was not a legitimate debt in violation of section 559.72(9)....

...Ultimately, the jury found that DISH had not attempted to collect a debt while knowing *75 that it was not a legitimate debt but found that DISH had willfully engaged in conduct that could reasonably be expected to abuse or harass Mr. Myers or a member of his family in violation of section 559.72(7)....

...§ 1692f. Section. 808 provides that a debt collector may not use any false or misleading representation when attempting to collect a debt. 15 U.S.C.§ 1692e. 4 In Count VI, Rojas alleges that Dyck-O’Neal violated the FCCPA. (Id. at ¶ 68). Rojas cites Section 559.72, Florida Statutes, which provides: “In collecting consumer debts, no person shall ......

...violation, 2 Hunstein brought two additional claims on statutory grounds, alleging violations of a different section of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f; Fla. Stat. § 559.72(5)....

...llant. Kenneth L. Paretti of Quinton & Paretti, P.A., Miami, for appellee. WARNER, J. Appellant, a leased vehicle customer, appeals from the county court’s summary disposition of her complaint against the appellee dealer for damages under section 559.72, Florida Statutes (2019), known as the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”)....

...The FCCPA provides: In collecting consumer debts, no person shall: .... (9) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist. § 559.72(9), Fla....

...Consumer Collection Practices Act. See §§ 559.55–559.785, Fla. Stat. (2022). We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We reverse, concluding the trial court erred in dismissing the case based on an incorrect interpretation of section 559.72(3), Florida Statutes. I. Baldwin had medical lab work performed at Labcorp’s facility in DeLand, Florida....

....... PROTECT YOUR CREDIT HISTORY AND ACT IMMEDIATELY. 2  As a result of these alleged debt collection efforts, Baldwin brought the underlying cause of action 1 claiming that Labcorp violated section 559.72(3), Florida Statutes, by “threatening” in its notice to disclose the debt to a third party without also notifying him of his right to have the dispute disclosed as well. Labcorp moved to dismiss the case with prejudice because Baldwin failed to allege it knew the debt was “reasonably disputed,” which Labcorp argued was necessary under section 559.72(6), Florida Statutes, to trigger its responsibility under subsection (3) to inform Baldwin that his dispute would accompany any report to a third party....

...See id. 3 true, and construe all reasonable inferences from the allegations in favor of the plaintiff as the non-moving party. See id. Here, Baldwin argues that the trial court dismissed his claim based on an erroneous interpretation of section 559.72(3). More specifically, the trial court determined that section 559.72(3) did not require Labcorp to advise Baldwin of his statutory right to have his dispute communicated along with the reporting of the debt unless Labcorp knew the debt was reasonably disputed, as contemplated by 559.72(6). As a result, Baldwin was required to allege that Labcorp knew he reasonably disputed the debt before he could state a cause of action for a violation of section 559.72(3). Baldwin argues the trial court’s interpretation of section 559.72(3) was error....

...(“In the event of any inconsistency between any provision of this part and any provision of the federal [Fair Debt Collection Practices Act], the provision which is more protective of the consumer or debtor shall prevail.” (emphasis added)). To effectuate this purpose, section 559.72 prohibits numerous debt-collection practices....

...ho disputes a consumer debt” that the collector will disclose information affecting the debtor’s creditworthiness without also notifying the debtor that the existence of the dispute will also be disclosed “as required by subsection (6).” See § 559.72(3), Fla. Stat. Subsection (6) mandates that a debt collector shall not “[d]isclose information concerning the existence of a debt known to be reasonably disputed by the debtor without disclosing that fact.” § 559.72(6), Fla....

...ion (3) to notify Baldwin that any disclosure to a collections agency would be accompanied by the disclosure of his dispute. Labcorp’s argument fails. B. In deciding this case, which requires us to interpret section 559.72(3), Florida Statutes, we first look to the text of the statute. In doing so, “our task is to give effect to the words that the legislature has employed in the statutory text....

...(quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 167.) “[P]roper interpretation requires consideration of the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 1. Section 559.72(3) specifically requires: In collecting consumer debts, no person shall ....

...indirectly, information affecting the debtor’s 5  reputation for credit worthiness without also informing the debtor that the existence of the dispute will also be disclosed as required by subsection (6). § 559.72(3), Fla....

...Pertinent to our analysis, subsection (6) provides in part: In collecting consumer debts, no person shall . . . [d]isclose information concerning the existence of a debt known to be reasonably disputed by the debtor without disclosing that fact. § 559.72(6), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Thus, it is important to note—the plain text of each subsection makes clear that section 559.72(3) governs Labcorp’s communication with “a debtor who disputes a consumer debt,” while subsection (6) governs Labcorp’s communications with third parties, such as a collections agency....

...Baldwin makes no claim Labcorp violated subsection (6) in communications to third parties. The debtors contemplated in subsection (3) are not limited to those who are known to “reasonably” dispute a debt. Rather, subsection (3) applies more broadly to “a debtor who disputes a consumer debt.” See § 559.72(3), Fla....

...Thus, under this canon of interpretation, subsection (6)’s requirement that Labcorp knew the debt to be “reasonably disputed” governs its disclosure of the debt to third parties—and not its communications to debtors under subsection (3). Nonetheless, Labcorp argues that because section 559.72(3) includes the modifying clause “as required by subsection (6),” Labcorp had to know Baldwin’s debt dispute was reasonable before it was required by subsection (3) to notify Baldwin that any disclosure to a collections agency would be accompanied by the disclosure of his dispute....

...e sensible as a matter of grammar.” See Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mercury Indem. Co. of Am., 380 So. 3d at 480. Here, the qualifying phrase “as described by subsection (6)” in section 559.72(3) is immediately preceded by the word “disclosed.” See § 559.72(3), Fla....

...Importantly, that is the same word used in subsection (6) governing Labcorp’s communication with third parties, which requires Labcorp to disclose the debtor’s dispute along with the existence of the debt when it knows the debt is “reasonably disputed.” See § 559.72(6), Fla....

...The clause simply does not reach the more remote antecedent of subsection (3) regarding Labcorp’s obligation to “[tell] a debtor who disputes a debt” that information affecting his creditworthiness will be disclosed to others. 3. Finally, our interpretation of section 559.72(3) is consistent, not only with the immediate context of the section’s text and other subparts, but with the broader context of the Act as a whole and its expressed purpose to protect consumer debtors....

...icant omission substantially affecting the rights of the consumer. Accordingly, this Court declines to dismiss Count I. II. Pearson’s FCCPA Claim Convergent also moves to dismiss Count II of Pearson’s Complaint alleging a violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)....

...1 The arbitration clause also provides: “If any part of the Arbitration Clause, other than waivers of class action rights, is deemed or found to be unenforceable for any reason, the remainder shall remain enforceable.” Baldwin filed a putative class action alleging that Regions violated section 559.72(16), Florida Statutes (2010), 2 of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (“the FCCPA”), by sending correspondence to him and other debtors that contain the words “Consumer Collections” printed on the outside of the envelopes, and that these envelopes were calculated to embarrass them....

...§ 1692 , is a remedial statute). The remedial portion of the FCCPA is set forth in section 559.77. Baldwin’s argument focuses on the interpretation of section 559.77(2), which provides as follows: Any person who fails to comply with any provision of s. 559.72 is liable for actual damages and for additional statutory damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000, together with court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the plaintiff. In determining the defendant’s liability for any additional statutory damages, the court shall consider the nature of the defendant’s noncompliance with s. 559.72, the frequency and persistence of the noncompliance, and the extent to which the noncompliance was intentional....

...shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action. Any claim or dispute is to be arbitrated by a single arbitrator on an individual basis and not as a class action. You expressly waive any right you may have to arbitrate a class action. . Section 559.72 provides: "In collecting consumer debts, no person shall: ......

expected to abuse or harass the debtor.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72(7). II. Motions at Issue On June 25, 2015, pursuant

...dismiss KAC's amended complaint, which sought damages pursuant to the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA) when landlord American Homes sought possession of residential property by first posting, face out, a three-day notice of nonpayment of rent. See § 559.72, Fla....

...We affirm. In its amended complaint, KAC sued as the assignee of American Homes' former tenant Johnny Smith,1 seeking statutory damages related to an alleged violation of the FCCPA. See § 559.77 (providing for actual and statutory damages related to any violation of the provisions of section 559.72). American Homes owns the residential property rented to Smith. In its amended complaint, KAC alleged American Homes violated section 559.72(5)2 by posting a three-day notice to the door of the property, "as is required by statute when commencing an eviction action." See §§ 83.56(3), (4), .59, Fla....

...amended complaint and a supplement to the amended motion to dismiss, in which American Homes argued, in pertinent part, that its 1 The tenant, Johnny Smith, is not a party to this action and was not a party to the underlying amended complaint. 2 Section 559.72 governs the collection of consumer debts and provides that no person shall: (5) Disclose to a person other than the debtor or her or his family information affecting the debtor's reputation, whether or...

...prejudice," and thus, the Fourth District's reversal in Yoss has no bearing on our opinion here. Id. at 842. KAC also raises in this appeal that the trial court erred in invoking the specific-governs-over-general principle where sections 83.56 and 559.72(5) do not conflict....

...more sent the statements in connection with collecting a debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e (prohibiting a debt collector from making “false, deceptive, or misleading representations . . . in connection with the collection of any debt”); Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9) (prohibiting an “attempt ....

...d its discretion when it denied class certification with respect to the FCCPA claim. To establish that Rushmore violated the FCCPA, the Sellerses must prove that Rushmore attempted to enforce a debt that it knew was not legitimate. See Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9)....

...On remand, the district court may consider whether any other elements or defenses related to the FCCPA claim raise individualized questions, including whether Rushmore had actual knowledge that the debts were not legitimate. See Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9). “In contrast to the FDCPA, Section 559.72(9) of the (“With respect to a decision we would review only for an abuse of discretion, we generally decline to substitute our judgment about the matter when the district court has not yet decided it and leave the decision for th...

...CompuMail used that information to generate and send a dunning letter to Hunstein. Hunstein filed a complaint, asserting violations of both the FDCPA, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b), 1692f, and the Florida Con- sumer Collection Practices Act, see Fla. Stat. § 559.72(5)....

...either the FDCPA or the FCCPA must allege and prove a violation of the act actually sued upon. Id. Here, Kelly raises only a violation of the FCCPA, the state law. The FCCPA provides that no person shall engage in certain practices while attempting to collect a consumer debt. § 559.72, Fla....

...ation of the WCL. Despite this warning, Sheridan sent yet another bill to Davis in July 2015. In response to this third demand for payment, Davis filed suit against Sheridan in circuit court. Her amended complaint alleges violations of the FCCPA, section 559.72(9), for attempting to collect an illegitimate debt, and section 559.72(5), for disclosing false information to a collection agency. The second set of defendants in this consolidated case, Laboratory Corporation of America and Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings (collectively, Labcorp), also provided medical testing in connection with Davis's work injury. Davis alleges that, like Sheridan, Labcorp billed her twice for an illegitimate debt, once in May 2014 and again in September 2014. She therefore filed a separate FCCPA claim against Labcorp for violations of section 559.72(9). After a period of complex litigation in both lawsuits, Sheridan and Labcorp moved for judgments on the pleadings....

...(8), which question or dispute arises after -4- January 1, 1994." § 440.13(11)(c) (emphasis added). On the other hand, the FCCPA creates "a civil action against a person violating the provisions of s. 559.72." § 559.77(1). And section 559.72 states that "[i]n collecting consumer debts, no person shall . . . [c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist." § 559.72(9) (emphasis added)....

...other than the debtor or her or his family information affecting the debtor's reputation . . . with knowledge or reason to know that the other person does not have a legitimate business need for the information or that the information is false." § 559.72(5). We first note that the terms "reimbursement" and "collection" do not mean the same thing....

...actices. In light of the presumption against implicit repeals, we think the better view is to read both statutes in harmony by allowing courts to refer to the WCL to determine the legitimacy of debts in FCCPA actions.2 A claim under section 559.72(9) has three elements: an illegitimate debt, a threat or attempt to enforce that debt, and knowledge that the debt is illegitimate....

...105, 108 (2016). -8- that debt fulfills the first element necessary to trigger FCCPA liability. Thus, the debts for medical services that Davis did not owe pursuant to the WCL constitutes an element of her FCCPA claims. This rationale applies just as well to Davis's section 559.72(5) claim because the legality of sending a bill collector after Davis also depends on the validity of the Sheridan debt....

...Applying this rule, section 440.13(11)(c)'s language eliminating circuit court jurisdiction over "any matters concerning reimbursement" is very general and broad. In contrast, section 559.77(1) creates a private cause of action for violations of section 559.72. Within section 559.72, subsections (5) and (9) prohibit certain debt collection practices -9- with far greater specificity....

...2d DCA 1991) (stating that when statutory language is ambiguous, a court should consider whether an interpretation yields unreasonable results). In addition to the provisions invoked here, the FCCPA also provides that "[i]n collecting consumer debts, no person shall . . . use or threaten force or violence." § 559.72(2)....

...determination which no Florida state court appears to have made and which this court has not been asked to make in this case. Cf. Steiner & Munach, P.A. v. Williams, 334 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (concluding that medical providers of non-WCL services violated section 559.72(10), Florida Statutes (1973), which addressed prohibited practices in the collection of consumer claims, defined as the obligation for payment of money "arising out of a transaction wherein credit has been ....

...Survivors Charter Sch., 3 So. 3d 1220, 1233 (Fla. 2009); accord Read v. MFP, Inc., 85 So. 3d 1151, 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Here, the FCCPA regulates consumer debt collection practices generally and sets forth prohibited debt collection practices. See § 559.72; Read, 85 So....

...necessary to determine whether there exists an ambiguity not otherwise evident on the face of the statute at issue. See id. at 732. "This is true because '[w]here possible, 8Ms. Davis does not distinguish between her FCCPA claims so as to argue that her section 559.72(5) claim may not concern reimbursement. - 23 - courts must give effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another.' " Id....

..."Had the Florida legislature intended to enact a private right of action for violating [section 440.13], it could have done so, either by explicitly including language authorizing a private right of action in the statute, or by referencing [chapter 440] in [section] 559.72." See id....

...It sought a declaratory judgment against the Bank and SunTrust, as well as damages to compensate borrowers for this improper practice by the Bank as to borrowers. It also added a count against SunTrust for violation of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, pursuant to section 559.72, Florida Statutes (2017), in connection with the unauthorized inclusion of attorney’s fees in the amounts due....

...§ 1692 (Fair Debt Collection Practices Act) and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 . BACKGROUND Plaintiffs’ cause of action is predicated on the Fail’ Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (FDCPA) and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (FCCPA)....

...“In determining whether a class will be certified, the Court will not examine the merits of the case.” Id. Plaintiffs contend Plaintiffs’ claim is valid under the FDCPA and the FCCPA. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (e) prohibits the use of threats of unintended actions or actions that cannot be legally taken. Florida Statute § 559.72(9) prohibits the practice of a debt collector to “......

...ent by an attorney. [1] The parties agree that DKA is not an attorney or a law firm. Counts II and III state claims against DKA and West Coast, respectively, for violations of the FCCPA. The Trustee alleges that both Defendants violated Fla. Stat. §§ 559.72(7), (9) and (11) by communicating with the Debtor under the guise of an attorney, willfully engaging in conduct which can reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the Debtor, and asserting the existence of a legal right when the Defendants knew the right did not exist....

...§ 559.77(5). See In re Cooper, 253 B.R. 286, 290 (Bankr. N.D.Fla.2000) (stating that "the [FCCPA] is narrower in scope than the federal act [FDCPA]."). In Counts II and III, the Trustee alleges that DKA and West Coast, [4] respectively, violated Fla. Stat. §§ 559.72(7), (9) and (11) by "using the stationery of an attorney" through the use of the name "Douglas Knight & Associates, Inc." on the Collection Letter. The relevant portions of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 state In collecting consumer debts, no person shall: ....

...Because the Court has found, as a matter of law, using the least-sophisticated consumer standard, that the Collection Letter does not violate the FDCPA, there is likewise no FCCPA violation. As the Collection Letter does not represent that it was sent by an attorney, there is no violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72(11). Thus it follows that the Collection Letter does not constitute the willful engagement "in other conduct which can be reasonably expected to abuse or harass the debtor" in violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72(7) or the assertion of "the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist" in violation of Fla....

...Diversified Collection Serv., Inc., 380 F.3d 316 (8th Cir.2004). [4] Unlike the FDCPA, liability under the FCCPA is not limited solely to debt collectors, and applies to any person collecting a consumer debt, including the original creditor. Fla. Stat. § 559.72 [5] See Federal Home Loan Mortg....

...[w]illfully communicate with the debtor or any member of her or his family with such frequency as can reasonably be expected to harass the debtor or her or his family, or willfully engage in other conduct which can reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the debtor or any member of her or his family." § 559.72(7), Fla....

...1), and thus only calls made on or after May 28, 2013, are actionable here. And because it is undisputed that RoundPoint did not make any calls after May 5, 2014, the relevant *1319 period during which calls were made is May 28, 2013, through May 5, 2014-less than one year. In arguing that RoundPoint violated section 559.72(7), Harrington relies largely on the number of calls made during the period at issue-262 or 263, 22 an average of about 23 calls per month....

...The Court does not find that RoundPoint's calling strategy as explained by Hughes is per se impermissible or harassing, and again, considering that no calls were ever answered, the repeated calling and leaving of messages does not rise to the level of a section 559.72(7) violation under the circumstances of this case....

...And once RoundPoint was asked to stop calling Harrington, the calls immediately ceased. In sum, Harrington failed to establish by a preponderance of evidence at trial that RoundPoint's calls from May 28, 2013, to May 5, 2014, were abusive or harassing under section 559.72(7), Florida Statutes....

...represented by counsel, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (Count I); (2) collecting a debt previously paid, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) (Count II); (3) communication with a consumer represented by counsel, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18) (Count III); and (4) collecting a debt previously paid, in violation of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) (Count IV)....

...The Court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 . ii. Analysis a. Claims for Communication with Consumer Represented by Counsel in Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (Count I) and Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18) (Count III) Both parties move for summary judgment on Counts I and III, which are brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) and Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18)....

...dress, unless the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to a communication from the debt collector or unless the attorney consents to direct communication with the consumer; or 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2). In addition, Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18) provides: *1309 In collecting consumer debts, no person shall: ......

...d address, unless the debtor's attorney fails to respond within 30 days to a communication from the person, unless the debtor's attorney consents to a direct communication with the debtor, or unless the debtor initiates the communication. Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18). Courts have interpreted Sections 1692c(a)(2) and 559.72(18) in similar fashion. In particular, both statutes require a debtor demonstrate that a debt collector "knows" or has "knowledge" that the consumer is represented by an attorney "with respect to" a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) ; Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18). With respect to both Section 1692c(a)(2) and 559.72(18), courts have uniformly interpreted the knowledge requirement to require that a debt collector have "actual knowledge" of attorney representation "with respect to" the specific account at issue....

...PNC Mortgage , 2015 WL 4095350 , at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 7, 2015) (same); Bacelli v. MFP, Inc. , 729 F.Supp.2d 1328 , 1343 (M.D. Fla. 2010) (same); Suszko v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC , No. 8:16-CV-2333-T-36AAS, 2016 WL 7440953 , at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2016) ( Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18) requires actual knowledge "that the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to such debt"); Erickson v....

...Parties' arguments Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Counts I and III for two reasons. First, Defendant argues that even if it communicated directly with Plaintiff, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) and Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18), there is insufficient evidence which, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant had actual knowledge that Plaintiff was represented by counsel with respect to the debt at issue in this case....

...Mail, the attached [Accounting] letter from Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC addressed to my son." ii. Court's ruling The Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Counts I and III. 2 To prevail on a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) or Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18), a debtor must prove that: (1) a debt collector communicated with a consumer; (2) in connection with the collection of a debt; (3) where the debt collector had actual knowledge that the consumer is represented by an attorney with respe...

...Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Counts I and III, subject to Defendant's ability to prove its bona fide error defense at trial. b. Claims for Collecting a Debt Previously Paid in Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) (Count II) and Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) (Count IV) Both parties move for summary judgment on Counts II and IV, which are brought under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) and Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)....

...(2) The false representation of- (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; or (B) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2). In addition, Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) provides: In collecting consumer debts, no person shall: ... (9) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist. Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)....

...§ 1692e(2), a debt collector is liable where it attempts to collect a debt and, in doing so, falsely represents the "character, amount, or legal status" of the alleged debt. Bohringer v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC , 141 F.Supp.3d 1229 , 1234 (S.D. Fla. 2015). Similarly, a debt collector is liable under Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) by claiming, attempting or threatening to enforce a debt that it is not entitled to collect. However, unlike 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2), Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) also requires that the debt collector have actual knowledge that the debt collector did not, in fact, have the right to collect the alleged debt. Williams v. Educational Credit Mgmt Corp. , 88 F.Supp.3d 1338 , 1347-48 (M.D. Fla. 2015) ; Mesa v. Law Enf't Sys., LLC , No. 15-21089-CIV, 2015 WL 12804525 , at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2015) ("For example, section 559.72(9) requires not only the debt be invalid, but also the debt collectors must affirmatively know it is invalid."). Here, Plaintiff alleges claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) and Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) based entirely on allegations that Defendant attempted to collect a debt that had already been paid pursuant to a settlement agreement, D.E. 1 ¶¶ 26, 34. In addition, to satisfy the requirements of Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9), Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant actually knew that the *1314 amount sought to be collected was "not valid," D.E....

...pute received by Defendant that the Account did not belong to Plaintiff." D.E. 41 p. 11. Lastly, Defendant argues that, in any event, it is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Plaintiff's FCCPA claim, brought in Count IV, because Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9), like Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18), requires proof of "actual knowledge," and a reasonable jury could not conclude that Defendant had "actual knowledge" that the Account and settlement had been finalized....

...e lawfully received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) ; Fonseca v. Focus Financial Servs. , No. 15-80410-CIV, 2016 WL 4146663 , at * 1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2016). Similarly, a debtor proceeding under Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) must prove that a debt collector: (1) claimed, attempted or threatened to enforce a debt; and (2) had actual knowledge that the debt collector did not have a legitimate "or some other legal right" to collect such debt. Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) ; Sellers v....

...feat each of Plaintiff's FDCPA and FCCPA claims, for three reasons. First, with respect to Plaintiff's claims that Defendant directly contacted him when he was represented by counsel, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2) (Count I) and Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18) (Count III), Defendant argues that any such letter could only have been sent inadvertently because: (1) Ms....

...oversee that its procedures are being followed." D.E. 41 pp. 15-16. Second, with respect to Plaintiff's claims that Defendant attempted to collect a debt that it lacked legal authority to collect, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2) and Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9), by sending the February 1, 2017 Attorney Response Letter, Defendant argues that an unintentional bona fide error occurred, whereby Defendant sought to collect a debt from Plaintiff, because: (1) on or before December 13, 2016, the part...

...f bona fide error. In his briefing, Plaintiff argues that the evidence shows that Defendant either "knew or should have known" that it sought to collect an invalid debt. D.E. 38 pp. 7-8. However, Defendant can only be liable for violating Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) if Plaintiff shows, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant actually knew that it sought to collect an invalid debt....

..., 333 So.2d 65 , 67 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) ("Since the trial judge did not state his reasons for dismissing the complaint, it may be that the dismissal resulted from the allegation that appellee knew 'or should have known' that the claim was not legitimate. Section 559.72(9) F.S....

...After receiving the reinstatement letter, the borrower filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaim, which he later amended. In the amended pleading, the borrower, individually and as class representative, set forth a claim against the law firm for violation of the FCCPA, section 559.72, Florida Statutes (2017), which prohibits a person from knowingly attempting to collect an illegitimate debt....

...4th DCA 2007). The FCCPA provides: “In collecting consumer debts, no person shall . . . [c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” § 559.72(9), Fla. Stat. “A claim under section 559.72(9) has three elements: an illegitimate debt, a threat or attempt to enforce that debt, and knowledge 1 The underlying foreclosure action brought by U.S....

...(CRM), was responsible for reimbursing Sheridan and Labcorp. In turn, -3- Davis maintained that Sheridan and Labcorp’s attempts to collect the debt from her constituted an attempt to collect an illegitimate debt, violating section 559.72, Florida Statutes (2014), of the FCCPA. In response, Sheridan and Labcorp asserted that the trial courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction for the alleged FCCPA violations....

...A,” reversed both trial court dismissals, and certified to this Court the question -4- of great public importance set forth above. Davis, 281 So. 3d at 1261, 1267. II Section 559.72 of the FCCPA prohibits various debt collection practices....

...he right does not exist.” Section 559.77 contains provisions authorizing and governing civil remedies for violations of the FCCPA. Subsection (1) provides that “[a] debtor may bring a civil action against a person violating the provisions of s. 559.72.” Subsection (2) provides for the award of “actual damages and for additional statutory damages ....

...Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges. JORDAN, Circuit Judge: Constance Daniels sued Select Portfolio Servicing under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq., and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 559.72, alleging that a series of monthly mortgage statements mis- stated a number of items, including the principal amount due. She claimed that, by sending her the incorrect mortgage state- ments, Select Portfolio violated the FDCPA’s prohibit...

...ons, and unfair practices. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(10), 1692f(1). She also claimed that the statements violated the FCCPA’s prohibitions on harassment and on attempts to collect on debt that is not legitimate. See Fla. Stat. §§ 559.72(7), 559.72(9)....

...court’s order) and demanding a specific line-by-line accounting of the deferred balance amount. Select Portfolio did not respond to the letters. In June of 2018, Ms. Daniels sued Select Portfolio under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e, 1692f, and the FCCPA, Fla. Stat. §§ 559.72(7), 559.72(9)....

...IV Ms. Daniels alleges that Select Portfolio, by sending her mortgage statements with incorrect information about her debt under the promissory note, violated §§ 1692d, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(10), and 1692f(1) of the FDCPA and §§ 559.72(7) and 559.72(9) of the FCCPA....

...Dan- iels require that the challenged communications be “in connec- tion with the collection of a[ ] debt.” See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d, 1692e(10), 1692f(1). The substantive FCCPA provisions similarly require that the challenged action be made in connection with “collecting [a] . . . debt[.]” Fla. Stat. §§ 559.72(7), 559.72(9)....

...tomatically lead to liability under the substantive provisions of the FDCPA or the FCCPA. In order for Ms. Daniels to prevail on her claims, she will need to show that the statements violated §§ 1692d, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(10), and 1692f(1) of the FDCPA and/or §§ 559.72(7) and 559.72(9) of the FCCPA....

...§ 1692e, or (3) “use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt,” id. § 1692f. Similarly, the relevant Florida Consumer Col- lections Practices Act (“FCCPA”) provisions require the action to be made in connection with “collecting [a] . . . debt.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72(7), (9). In Reese v....

...Lippman of Lippman Law Offices, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee. LaROSE, Judge. KAC 2021-1, LLC (KAC), as assignee of the tenant, Jeneka Hill, appeals the final order dismissing its complaint for alleged violations of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (the Act). See § 559.72, Fla....

...court to permit KAC to amend its complaint. I. Background KAC argues that in posting the eviction notice, Hudson publicly disclosed that the tenant owed money to the landlord. This, according to KAC, violated section 559.72 of the Act....

...under the Act, and that Hudson "disclosed information concerning the 1 Given our disposition, we need not address the other issues KAC raises on appeal. 2 existence of a debt known to be reasonably disputed by the debtor" under section 559.72(6). The trial court also found that amending the complaint would be futile....

...Moreover, De Castro did not request the personnel files of the employees, simply their addresses. Petitioner also claims that the court’s order, requiring it to produce telephone records and correspondence involving other debtors, would violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692c (2000) and subsections (5) and (14) of section 559.72, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...Moreover, petitioner would not be communicating with a third person “in connection with the collection of any debt.” Id. It would be delivering documents to a party in connection with a lawsuit over deceptive and unfair trade practices. Similarly, section 559.72 does not apply to the furnishing of documents in this suit. That statute prohibits certain practices “[i]n collecting consumer debts.” § 559.72, Fla....

...5/01/2020 Page: 6 of 21 The district court relied on this threshold finding to grant DISH summary judgment on Medley’s FCCPA claims. The court first found that DISH did not attempt to collect an illegitimate in debt in violation of FCCPA § 559.72(9) because DISH’s alleged unlawful contact with Plaintiff concerned only the Pause debt that was not discharged....

...Likewise, the communications to DISH from Medley’s attorneys stated that they represented Medley concerning the discharged services debt; DISH directly contacted Medley only about the non-discharged Pause debt; thus DISH did not violate FCCPA § 559.72(18)’s prohibition on directly contacting a debtor it knows to be represented by counsel....

...B. FCCPA CLAIMS Medley appeals the district court’s rulings in favor of DISH on her FCCPA 10  Case: 18-13841 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 11 of 21 claims under § 559.72(9) and § 559.72(18). FCCPA § 559.72(9) prohibits any person, in collecting consumer debts, from attempting to enforce a debt that person knows is not legitimate, or from asserting the existence of any other legal right who knows the right does not exist. Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9). FCCPA § 559.72(18) prohibits any person, in collecting consumer debts, to communicate with a debtor if that person knows that the debtor is represented by an attorney “with respect to such debt[.]” Fla. Stat. § 559.72(18). Medley contends that DISH violated FCCPA § 559.72(9) by attempting to collect debt it knew had been discharged in bankruptcy and violated § 559.72(18) by directly contacting her about such debt knowing she was represented by counsel. The district court ruled in favor of DISH on both claims based on its threshold finding that the Pause debt had not been discharged in Medley’s bankruptcy. As to Medley’s § 559.72(9) claim, the court reasoned DISH properly attempted to collect the Pause debt because it had not been discharged. As to Medley’s § 559.72(18) claim, the court found that although DISH knew Medley was represented by counsel with respect to the discharged services debt, it had no knowledge that Medley was represented by counsel with respect to the non-discharged Pause debt it was attempting to collect; thus, DISH’s direct contacts were permissible....

...5/01/2020 Page: 6 of 21 The district court relied on this threshold finding to grant DISH summary judgment on Medley’s FCCPA claims. The court first found that DISH did not attempt to collect an illegitimate in debt in violation of FCCPA § 559.72(9) because DISH’s alleged unlawful contact with Plaintiff concerned only the Pause debt that was not discharged....

...Likewise, the communications to DISH from Medley’s attorneys stated that they represented Medley concerning the discharged services debt; DISH directly contacted Medley only about the non-discharged Pause debt; thus DISH did not violate FCCPA § 559.72(18)’s prohibition on directly contacting a debtor it knows to be represented by counsel....

...B. FCCPA CLAIMS Medley appeals the district court’s rulings in favor of DISH on her FCCPA 10  Case: 18-13841 Date Filed: 05/01/2020 Page: 11 of 21 claims under § 559.72(9) and § 559.72(18). FCCPA § 559.72(9) prohibits any person, in collecting consumer debts, from attempting to enforce a debt that person knows is not legitimate, or from asserting the existence of any other legal right who knows the right does not exist. Fla. Stat. § 559.72(9). FCCPA § 559.72(18) prohibits any person, in collecting consumer debts, to communicate with a debtor if that person knows that the debtor is represented by an attorney “with respect to such debt[.]” Fla. Stat. § 559.72(18). Medley contends that DISH violated FCCPA § 559.72(9) by attempting to collect debt it knew had been discharged in bankruptcy and violated § 559.72(18) by directly contacting her about such debt knowing she was represented by counsel. The district court ruled in favor of DISH on both claims based on its threshold finding that the Pause debt had not been discharged in Medley’s bankruptcy. As to Medley’s § 559.72(9) claim, the court reasoned DISH properly attempted to collect the Pause debt because it had not been discharged. As to Medley’s § 559.72(18) claim, the court found that although DISH knew Medley was represented by counsel with respect to the discharged services debt, it had no knowledge that Medley was represented by counsel with respect to the non-discharged Pause debt it was attempting to collect; thus, DISH’s direct contacts were permissible....

...§§ 101 etseq. . The remaining counts of the Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Counts IV, V and VI, sought relief under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ( 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)), the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (Florida Statutes § 559.72(9)) and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ( 15 U.S.C....

...Bank failed to conduct a reasonable investigation. 15 Accordingly, U.S. Bank’s Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted as to Count I of the Amended Complaint. IV. FCCPA A. Applicable Law In Count II of the Amended Complaint, Finster asserts a claim against *1318 U.S. Bank pursuant to section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA....

...This statute provides that: “In collecting consumer debts, no person shall:... (9) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” See Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) (emphasis added)....

...��actual knowledge of the impropriety or overreach of a claim.” See Lamb v. Household Fin. Corp. III, (In re Lamb), 409 B.R. 534, 541 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2009); see also LeBlanc v. Unifund OCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185 , 1192 n.12 (11th Cir. 2010) (“Section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that the debt collector defendant possessed actual knowledge that the threatened means of enforcing the debt was unavailable.” (citing McCorriston v....

....The Court notes that as Finster has consented to a bench trial in this matter, the undersigned would have been the fact-finder had this claim survived summary judgment. See Order (Doc. 78), entered January 17, 2017. . In the Amended Complaint, Finster alleges that U.S. Bank violated section 559.72(9) in the following ways: by attempting to repudiate the loan modification without notifying Plaintiff of the asserted clerical errors that it contends rendered the permanent loan modification agreement un- recordable or attempting to...

...Salzgeber. The jury also found Dr. Sal-zgeber’s conduct supported an award of punitive damages. Mr. Kelly sought and was awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to section 559.77, Florida Statutes (1995), as a result of the damage award claimed pursuant to section 559.72(7)....

...Specifically, Count I of Debtor's Complaint alleges that Wells Fargo's loan collection activities violated the automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). The remaining thirty-five counts of the Complaint are based on alleged violations of the FCCPA. Thirty-three of these counts allege that Wells Fargo violated Section 559.72(18), Florida Statutes, by contacting the Debtor after it had knowledge that she was represented by an attorney....

...ith respect to the debt and had knowledge of Plaintiff's attorney's name and contact information. [3] *873 That the continued communication with Plaintiff, Opal Bate, in an attempt to collect a debt, constitutes a direct violation of Florida Statute § 559.72(18). [4] In two additional counts, the Debtor alleges that Wells Fargo violated section 559.72(17) by impermissibly contacting the Debtor after 9:00 p.m. and before 8:00 a.m. in attempts to collect the past-due balance on her mortgage loan and that Wells Fargo violated Section 559.72(7) by repeatedly contacting the Debtor in a harassing manner....

...Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 2 Bankr.Dev. J. 171, 173 n. 19 (1985) (stating that extreme abuses are sometimes not remedied because the FDCPA does not apply to banks, credit unions, loan companies, retailers, and private individuals collecting debts). [88] See Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (providing that "[i]n collecting consumer debts, no person shall ...") (emphasis added)....

...Specifically, the FCCPA provides: “In collecting consumer debts, no person shall: ... (9) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence or some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) (emphasis added). Put another way, “[t]o establish a violation under section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA, [as opposed to its federal counterpart,] it must be shown that a legal right that did not exist was asserted and that the person had actual knowledge that the right did not exist.” Bentley v....

...Ultimately, the fact that Seterus violated the law is not the same as proof that Seterus knew that it violated the law.-To rule otherwise would be to render .the requisite “actual knowledge” element of the FCCPA superfluous. Absent evidence of actual knowledge, Seterus cannot be held liable under' section 559.72(9). See McCorriston v. L.W.T., Inc., 536 F.Supp.2d 1268, 1279 (M.D.Fla.2008) (finding that “[d]efendants had a good faith basis [and] ... did not have the requisite actual knowledge ... to subject them to liability under Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)”)....

...r/loan servicer of including a “cost that had not been incurred ... in the amount that borrowers were required to pay to reinstate their mortgages” ipso facto amounted to “attempting to collect a debt that they knew was not legitimate” under section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA....

...ayments before his payments were due, which also suggests that Defendant was autodialing Plaintiff. ¶¶20, 21. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the TCPA claim shall be denied. *1251 B. Count II for Violations of the FCCPA (1) Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (7) Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s actions violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (7), which provides that “[i]n collecting consumer debts, no person shall [wjillfully communicate with the debtor or any member of her or his family with such frequency as can reasonably be expected to abuse or harass the debtor or any member of her or his family.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (7)....

...before they were due, Defendant continued to call him many times in an attempt to collect monthly payments that were not yet due. Under these circumstances, the Court finds the allegations sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. (2) Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9) Plaintiff also claims that Defendant’s actions violated Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9), which provides that “[i]n collecting consumer debts, no person shall [c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9). “To establish a violation under section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA, ‘it must be shown that a legal right thát did not exist was asserted and that the person had actual knowledge that the right did not exist.’ ” Bentley v....

...Plaintiff also sufficiently alleges that Defendant was attempting to collect payments from him when they were not yet due, i.e., that Defendant was asserting a legal right that did not exist. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss the claim for violation of section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA shall be denied....

...The relevant portion of the FCCPA provides: “[i]n collecting consumer debts, no person shall: ... (9) Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that 'the right does not exist.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)....

...[5] And during one of the collection calls, the Defendant allegedly used abusive language, telling the Debtor "If you did not have insurance or the ability to pay for your children's health care, you should not have taken her to the hospital." [6] That conduct, the Trustee alleges, violates sections 559.72(7)-(9), Florida Statutes, of the FCCPA. [7] Those sections prohibit a creditor from (i) willfully engaging in harassing or abusive conduct (section 559.72(7)); (ii) using profane, obscene, vulgar, or willfully abusive language in attempting to collect a debt (section 559.72(8)); and (iii) attempting to collect a debt that is not legitimate (section 559.72(9))....

...conduct. [8] The Defendant initially moved to dismiss the Trustee's Complaint because, according to the Defendant, the Trustee failed to state a claim under the FCCPA. [9] The Court denied the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Trustee's claim under section 559.72(7) (harassing or abusive conduct). [10] But the Court dismissed the Trustee's claim to the extent it was based on alleged violations of sections 559.72(8) (using profane language) and 559.72(9) (collecting illegitimate debt). [11] The Court's dismissal of the Trustee's claim under section 559.72(8) was with prejudice....

...f you [the Debtor] did not have insurance or the ability to pay for your children's health care, you should not have taken her to the hospital." [42] The Court, however, has already determined that those allegations do not give rise to a claim under section 559.72(8), which prohibits a creditor from using profane, obscene, vulgar, or willfully abusive language to collect a debt....

...Plaintiff argued the proffered text messages reasonably supported punitive damages because Defendant’s threats to tarnish her record and make her regret her intransigence could “reasonably be expected to abuse or harass” Plaintiff in violation of the FCCPA, specifically section 559.72(7), Florida Statutes (2022)....

...Defendant’s conduct constituted intentional misconduct or gross negligence as defined in section 768.72. Instead, Plaintiff merely alleged that Defendant’s conduct could “reasonably be expected to abuse or harass.” That allegation tracks the language of section 559.72(7), Florida Statutes (2024), and supports Plaintiff’s underlying claim for violation of the FCCPA, but it is insufficient to support a punitive damages claim under section 768.72....

...Count I alleged that the Trust had disclosed to a person other than Previte or her family (specifically, the FedEx driver) information affecting Previte’s reputation, and the Trust knew or had reason to know that the other person did not have a legitimate business need for the information, in violation of section 559.72(5), Florida Statutes (2023). Count II alleged that the Trust had posted Previte’s name to the public to enforce or attempt to enforce collection of a consumer debt, so the 8-Day Notice was a “deadbeat list” in violation of section 559.72(14), Florida Statutes (2023). The Trust moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing the FCCPA claims were not assignable because the claims were personal to Previte....

wherein credit has been offered or extended.” § 559.72 provides: “In collecting consumer claims . no

relates to consumer collection practices. Section 559.72, F.S., provides in pertinent part: In collecting

...llecting consumer debts ... [c]laim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 . To establish a violation under section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA, “it must be shown that a legal right that did not exist was asserted and that the person had actual knowledge that the right did not exist.” Bentley v....

...tion of section 817.535 of the Florida Statutes, against the Association, Essig, and LAS; Count III—violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act against Essig; and Count IV—violations of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, section 559.72(9), Florida Statutes, against the Association, Essig, and LAS, based on communications with Moise for debt collection purposes and by filing the underlying lawsuit, despite having knowledge that the Association...

...8, 2020), this Court held that the litigation privilege was not applicable under the circumstances. In both cases, it was asserted in the respective operative complaints that Rhonda Hollander, P.A. and Rhonda Hollander (collectively, “Hollander”) allegedly violated section 559.72, Florida Statutes (2014), of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, by sending threatening collection letters demanding the payment of maintenance assessments, and other amounts pursuant to the Declaration....

...in the broader context of the FCCPA further undermines the Brindises' position. The Brindises argue that if compliance with section 559.715 is not a condition precedent to suit, they will have no remedy for the alleged failure to provide notice. Section 559.72 prohibits specified debt collection practices. For example, it prohibits a debt collector from using threats of force or violence, wrongful disclosure of information, abusive or harassing techniques, abusive language, and improper timing of collection phone calls. See, e.g., § 559.72(2), (5), (6), (8), (17); Dish Network, 87 So. 3d at 74 (stating a claim that Dish (1) willfully engaged in conduct that could reasonably be expected to abuse or harass in violation of section 559.72(7), and (2) attempted to collect a debt while knowing that it was not a legitimate -8- debt in violation of section 559.72(9)).5 The Brindises do not claim that U.S....

...Bank engaged in such untoward tactics. If it had, the legislature has created private causes of action for consumers to recover damages and other relief. See § 559.77. Those remedies, however, do not extend to section 559.715. Indeed, the prohibitions in section 559.72 do not include the alleged failure to give notice. But, the FCCPA imposes a sweeping scheme of administrative enforcement. See §§ 559.725, .726, .727, .730, .77, .78, .785. For example, a person who violates any provision of the FCCPA is subject to a cease and desist order. § 559.727....

...They contend that Gann compels the conclusion that filing a foreclosure suit constitutes a section 559.715 "action to collect a debt." But, Gann does not implicate section 559.715. In Gann, a mortgagor sued under the FCCPA, alleging illegal collection practices by a creditor in violation of section 559.72(9), Florida Statutes (2011)....

...d some rights. Next, the majority points out that the Brindises could have sought relief under the sections of the FCCPA that provide for administrative enforcement. For - 17 - example, section 559.725 provides that consumers' complaints against debt collectors must be investigated and section 559.727 provides that corrective actions may be taken to remedy violations....

...Prior to trial appellees filed an offer of judgment in the amount of $502 as to each of the counterclaimants. *117 At trial the court directed a verdict in favor of appellants on their counterclaims, concluding that appellees had violated Sections 559.72(4) and (6). 1 The court instructed the jury that it must return a verdict for each appellant for not less than $500. Appellants objected to this instruction because they contended that appellees had violated two provisions of Section 559.72, i....

...Thereafter, the court entered judgment on the verdicts and also allowed Peters and Kasten attorneys fees of $800 each. The sole question on appeal is appellants’ contention that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that appellants were entitled to damages of $500 for each violation of Section 559.72....

...hey were enacted, that does not afford us the opportunity to enlarge upon the remedy authorized by the Legislature. There is no indication in Section 559.77(1) that a debtor bringing suit thereunder is to recover at least $500 for every violation of Section 559.72. Paraphrasing, it simply provides that a debtor may bring a civil action against a person violating the provisions of Section 559.72 and upon a decision in favor of the debtor the defendant shall be liable for the debtor’s actual damages or $500, whichever is greater, together with attorneys fees and costs....

...However, appellants did not prevail on appeal. Thus, it would appear there is no authority for allowing appellants attorney’s fees for this appellate proceeding. Accordingly, our previous allowance of attorney’s fees is vacated. DOWNEY, HERSEY and HURLEY, JJ., concur. . Section 559.72, Florida Statutes (1975), in pertinent part provides: In collecting consumer claims, whether or not licensed by the Division, no person shall: * * * * * * (4) Communicate or threaten to communicate with a debtor’s employer prior to o...

STONE, Judge. We affirm a summary judgment entered in favor of Winn Dixie. The appellant sued for an alleged violation of the section 559.72, Florida Statute (1981), Consumer Collection Practices Act, alleging that Winn Dixie’s collection practices violated the act....

...saction. The salesman was not connected to Winn Dixie other than through cashing the third party check. Clearly, by its unambiguous terms, the Act applies only to the collection of consumer claims and requires an extension of credit. §§ 559.55(1), 559.72, Fla.Stat....

...tic stay imposed under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), (b) judgment awarding compensatory and punitive damages, plus attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(k), (c) an order declaring that ICS violated the Debtors' rights under Florida Statutes section 559.72 (relating to fair debt collection practices), and (d) judgment awarding the Debtors actual damages and statutory damages in the amount of $1,000.00, plus attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant to Florida Statutes section 559.77. In the Motion, the Debtors request summary judgment on all relief addressed in the Complaint other than the determination of damages. At the hearing on the Motion, the Debtors withdrew their requests for relief under sections 559.72 and 559.77 of the Florida Statutes....

...In an amended complaint, she asserted three claims against Cohen and GM: Count I, a claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq.; Count II, a claim under the Florida Con *606 sumer Collection Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 559.72 ; and Count III, a claim under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C....

...§ 227 et seq, by calling Plaintiffs cell phone numbers using an automated dialer or a prerecorded voice without his consent. (Doc. #37 at ¶¶ 52-54). Count II alleges that RoundPoint violated two subsections of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act CFCCPA), Fla. Stat. § 559.55 et seq. RoundPoint allegedly violated § 559.72(7) by calling Plaintiff and his family with such frequency as could reasonably be expected to harass them. (Doc. #37 at ¶ 60). Round-Point also allegedly violated § 559.72(18) by calling Plaintiff when it knew an attorney represented him on the debt for which RoundPoint was attempting to collect....

...em. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss Count I as against MultiBank. B. Count II — Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act The Court now turns to Count II, in which Plaintiff claims RoundPoint violated sections 559.72(7) and (18) of the FCCPA....

...ommunication occurred outside the limitations period. This, clearly, was not Congress’s intent. Finally, because the statute of limitations proscribes Plaintiffs claims that predate May 28, 2013, RoundPoint argues that Plaintiffs allegations under § 559.72(18), which prohibits any commu-nieation with a debtor if the person knows that the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to the debt, are likewise barred given counsel withdrew from representation prior to May 28, 2013. (Doc. #38 at 3-4); see Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (18). Plaintiff agrees and withdraws that claim. (Doc. #39 at 16). 2. Statutory Damages Under the FCCPA, ‘[a]ny person who fails to comply with any provision of § 559.72 is liable for actual damages and for additional statutory damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000, together with court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the plaintiff.' Fla....

PER CURIAM. We agree with the trial court’s finding that, as a matter of law, the document sent by MRC of Hialeah, Inc. to Lazaro Almagro did not violate Section 559.72, Florida Stat *333 utes (1997)....

...ER, J. Yarelys Ramos appeals the trial court’s summary final judgment order entered in *1151 favor of appellee, CACH, LLC, on her counterclaim alleging violation of Florida’s Consumer Collection Practices Act (“FCCPA”). 1 See §§ 559.715; 2 559.72, 3 Fla....

...In her answer, Ramos asserted affirmative defenses as well as a counterclaim. In her counterclaim, Ramos asserted two claims arising from CACH’s alleged violation of the notice provision in section 559.715: (1) CACH’s violation of the notice provision constitutes a violation of section 559.72(9) and (2) her entitlement to declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to sections 559.77 5 and 86.021 6 of the Florida Statutes (2010)....

...tter of law.... [T]he standard of review is de novo.” Volusia Cnty. v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So.2d 126, 130 (Fla.2000). Ramos first contends that a violation of the FCCPA’s notice provision simultaneously constitutes a violation of section 559.72(9), which establishes a cause of action against creditors....

...Specifically, Ramos argues: Appellants’ first cause of action claimed that when CACH issued its collection letter only two days after assignment, it was asserting the existence of a legal right (the right to collect the debt) that it knew it did not have in violation of section 559.72(9)....

...16, 2008), where the court addressed the same legal argument raised by Ramos here. The Thomas court rejected the argument, explaining: In general, a statute that does not purport to establish civil liability ... will not be construed as establishing a civil liability. The FCCPA creates a civil remedy only for a violation of § 559.72— Absent an indication of legislative intent to create a private cause of action for a violation of § 559.715, such a remedy may not be judicially engrafted onto the FCCPA. The plaintiff attempts to avoid the statutory scheme by alleging that CRS’s violation of section 559.715 constitutes an unlawful attempt to enforce a debt pursuant to section 559.72(9)....

...ssignment is made, but at least 30 days before any action to collect the debt.” Thus, the 2010 changes to section 559.715 merely changed when notice is due; the changes did not create a private cause of action. Weakening Ramos’ argument further, section 559.72 currently makes no reference to the FCCPA’s notice provision....

...at *1 (citations omitted). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had violated the FCCPA’s notice requirements by seeking to collect the plaintiffs’ debts before providing them with notice of the assignment to Dyck-O’Neal. The plaintiffs argued *1153 that section 559.72(9) triggers liability for the violations of the notice provision. Of consequence, the Wright court observed the following: [The plaintiffs] base[d] their argument on § 559.72(9)’s clause that prohibits asserting] the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist....

...In rejecting this argument, the Wright court emphasized legislative intent and the FCCPA’s structure: A debt collector’s obligation to provide a notice of assignment is set forth in a separate section, § 559.715, and no analogous requirement is contained in § 559.72. Had the Florida legislature intended to enact a private right of action for violating § 559.715, it could have done so, either by explicitly including language authorizing a private right of action in the statute, or by referencing § 559.715 in § 559.72....

...notice of assignment. Id. (citations omitted). The court then concluded: In short, Plaintiffs cannot avoid the statutory scheme by alleging that Defendant Consuegra’s violation of § 559.715 constitutes an unlawful attempt to enforce a debt under § 559.72(9)....

...gment on her request for declaratory relief because she was “entitled to a declaration regarding the statutes at issue; specifically, whether notice of assignment is a condition precedent to collecting the debts at issue' and whether CACH violated section 559.72(9) by attempting to collect debts when it knew it did not have the right to collect such debts.” We disagree....

...as practical after the assignment is made, but at least 30 days before any action to collect the debt. The assignee -is a real party in interest and may bring an action to collect a debt that has been assigned to the assignee and is in default.” . Section 559.72(9) states: "In collecting consumer debts, no person shall: Claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.” ....

...See Equity Residential Prop. Trust v. Yates, 910 So.2d 401 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Whigum v. Heilig-Meyers Furniture Inc., 682 So.2d 643, 646 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). . Section 559.77 states the "[a] debtor may bring a civil action against a person violating the provision of s. 559.72 in the county in which the alleged violator resides or has his or her principal place of business or in the county where the alleged violation occurred.” ....

..."When viewed in its entirety, the purpose and intent of the [FCCPA] ... is to eliminate abusive and harassing tactics in the collection of debts." Brandt v. I.C. System, Inc. , No. 8:09-cv-126-T-26MAP, 2010 WL 582051 , at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2010). "Section 559.72, entitled 'Prohibited practices generally,' lists [nineteen] debt collection actions that violate the FCCPA." Kaplan v. Assetcare, Inc. , 88 F.Supp.2d 1355 , 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2000). In this case, Plaintiff claims that Defendant has violated Section 559.72(9), which states: "In collecting consumer debts, no person shall .......

...claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist." With *1326 respect to determining what constitutes a misrepresentation of a legal right under Section 559.72(9), the Court "must refer to other statutes that establish the legitimacy of a debt and define legal rights." See Cliff v. Payco Gen. American Credits, Inc. , 363 F.3d 1113 , 1126 (11th Cir. 2004). To establish a violation under Section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA, "it must be shown that a legal right that did not exist was asserted and that the person had actual knowledge that the right did not exist." Daniel v....

...nd Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. 31). Miller alleges that Defendant Ginny's, Inc. ("Ginny's") violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA"), 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(iii), and the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act ("FCCPA"), § 559.72 of the Florida Statutes, by repeatedly calling her cellular telephone after she orally advised Ginny's that she would not pay on an account and requested that it stop calling her....

...isions. § 559.77(1), Fla. Stat. (2017). Unless the context otherwise indicates, a "debtor" is defined as "any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt." Id. § 559.55(8). Miller qualifies as a debtor. 1. Harassing Phone Calls Section 559.72(7) of the FCCPA prohibits people collecting consumer debts from "[w]illfully communicat[ing] with the debtor ......

...Because the FCCPA states that "due consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the ... federal courts relating to the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA")," district courts have applied the standards of the FDCPA when interpreting section 559.72(7)....

...For the reasons previously discussed in connection with Miller's TCPA claim, there is contradictory evidence regarding whether Miller requested that Ginny's stop calling her, and, therefore, summary judgment cannot be granted on Miller's claim under section 559.72(7) of the FCCPA. 2. Asserting a Legal Right that Does Not Exist Section 559.72(9) of the FCCPA prohibits people collecting consumer debts from "assert[ing] the existence of some ......

Act, § 501.201 et seq., Florida Statutes, and § 559.72, Florida Statutes, dealing with consumer collection

documents are legal process. Florida Statutes, § 559.72(10) of the CCPA provides: ' In collecting consumer

...��FDUTPA”), Fla. Stat. § 501.201 , et seq. (Count II). Additionally, Plaintiff seeks damages for Defendants’ alleged violations of FDUTPA (Count III). Plaintiff alleges violations of the Florida Consumer Collection And Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 559.72 , et seq., (hereinafter “FCCPA”) (Count IV) and unjust enrichment (Count V)....

...he same flaw of individualization as Proposed Class I. Seeking payment of a legitimate debt does not violate the FCCPA; rather, to “claim, attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows that the debt is not legitimate.” Fla. Stat. § 559.72 (9)....

...Count I alleges that RoundPoint and MultiBank violated the TCPA by calling Plaintiffs cell phone numbers using an automated dialer or a prerecorded voice without his consent. (Doc. # 37 at ¶¶ 52-54). Count II alleges that RoundPoint violated two subsections of the FCCPA. RoundPoint allegedly violated § 559.72(7) by calling Plaintiff and his family with such frequency as could be expected to harass them. (Doc. #37 at ¶60). RoundPoint also allegedly violated § 559.72(18) by calling Plaintiff when it knew an attorney represented him on the debt for which RoundPoint was attempting to collect....

...Defendants responded to these allegations by filing a motion to dismiss, seeking to dismiss Count I as to MultiBank and Count II in its entirety. (Doc. # 38). The Court denied Defendants argument as to Count I. (Doc. #63). But after Plaintiff conceded the § 559.72(18) violation should be dismissed, the Court granted Defendants’ motion as to Count II, in part. (Doc. # 63). The Court dismissed the § 559.72(18) violation and limited Plaintiffs recovery to statutory damages not to exceed $1,000 for the remaining FCCPA claim....

...to satisfy an ensuing lien. Dr. Costa filed suit in the circuit court alleging claims for civil theft, conversion, and statutory violations of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (2021), the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, section 559.72(18), Florida Statutes (2021), and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, section 501.201 et seq., Florida Statutes (2021)....

...In this case, Mr. Reed sued Bay Area Credit Service, LLC under both the Federal and Florida Fair Debt Collection Practices Acts for failing to identify itself as a debt collector when leaving two separate messages on his phone. 15U.S.C. § 1692d(6), (e)(ll); 559.72 Fla....

...That number again is 1-866-488-4299. When calling please reference the following number. Mr. Reed filed suit six days after the second phone call, on February 11, 2008. I note that although Mr. Reed asserted a claim for this same behavior under: Fla. Stat. 559.72(9) which prohibits attempting to collect a debt which the debt collector knows to be invalid or otherwise unenforceable; and § 559.72(7) which prohibits a debt collector from “willfully communicatfing] with the debtor ......

small claims court alleging a violation of section 559.72(9), Florida Statutes (2019), of the Florida

Consumer Collection Practices Act, see Fla. Stat. § 559.72(5). As relevant here, the district court dismissed

...ry duty, negligence, unjust enrichment, breach of implied-in-law contract, and violation of the FCCPA. See 10  Case: 18-14490 Date Filed: 04/10/2020 Page: 11 of 31 Fla. Stat. § 559.72.6 The Borrowers Lawson-Ross and Byrne alleged that they and the other class members spent years making payments that they believed, based on Great Lakes’s representations, qualified for the PSLF Program, only to find out years later th...

...In the Notice, the Secretary announced that “Congress intended section 1098g to preempt any 6 The FCCPA prohibits false representations regarding the character or status of a debt and forbids use of deceptive debt collection methods. Fla. Stat. § 559.72. 11  Case: 18-14490 Date Filed: 04/10/2020 Page: 12 of 31 State law requiring lenders to reveal facts or information not required by Federal law.” Id....