CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 1st District Court of Appeal | 1992 WL 355446
...da Statutes." The complaint also contains the following allegations: The Division is charged with the responsibility of... protecting the rights and interests of the consumers of the State of Florida. The Division has authority pursuant to [s]ection 570.544(11), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...this action"; and "[t]hat the laws of *737 the State of Florida do not prohibit the pawn of an automobile and/or automobile title." To support its claim that it "ha[d] statutory authority and standing to bring this action," the Division relied upon section 570.544(11), Florida Statutes (Supp....
...n damaged or [were] being damaged" by Quick Cash; and (3) "that the public health, safety, or welfare [was] endangered or [was] likely to be endangered by [the] consumer ... service" being offered by Quick Cash. Therefore, according to the Division, section 570.544(11) clearly conferred upon it the authority to maintain the action. In response, Quick Cash argued that section 570.544(11) had not been intended by the legislature to expand the Division's authority. Rather, according to Quick Cash, it was necessary to read section 570.544(11) together with section 570.544(10), which reads: If the [D]ivision by its own inquiry, or as a result of complaints, has reason to believe that a violation of the laws of the state relating to consumer protection has occurred or is occurring, it may conduct an inve...
...the Department of Legal Affairs and any state attorney, if the violation has occurred or is occurring within his judicial circuit, shall have the authority to bring an action in accordance with the provisions of chapter 501. According to Quick Cash, section 570.544(11) was intended by the legislature to permit the Division to seek injunctive relief on its own, without the necessity of coordinating with either the Department of Legal Affairs or a state attorney, only when a violation of chapter 5...
...Because the Division had conceded in a legal memorandum that "[t]he instant case does not involve [c]hapter 501," Quick Cash contended that the Division did not have standing to maintain it. In its summary judgment, although noting that Quick Cash had not attacked section 570.544(11) as unconstitutional, the trial court nevertheless expressed concern as to the constitutionality of that statute if it were to be interpreted as argued by the Division....
...The trial court recognized that the legislature had not specified to what "laws" the phrase "the laws of the state relating to consumer protection" had been intended to refer. However, it noted that chapter 501, Florida Statutes, was titled "Consumer Protection." It noted also that the Division's interpretation of section 570.544(11) would permit the argument that laws relating to many types of transactions already heavily regulated by other departments or agencies e.g., banking, securities, public utilities, insurance, etc....
...er 501," the trial court denied the Division's motion for partial summary judgment, and granted Quick Cash's motion for summary judgment. While we share the trial court's concern regarding the logical implications of the Division's interpretation of section 570.544(11), we are unable to agree with the trial court's interpretation of that statute. It is our responsibility to determine what the legislature intended when it passed section 570.544(11)....
...obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power." American Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Florida v. Williams,
212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968). Accord Holly v. Auld,
450 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1984). We find the language of section
570.544(11) to be clear and unambiguous....
...e interests of the consumers of this state have been damaged or are being damaged[;] or [3] that the public health, safety, *739 or welfare is endangered or is likely to be endangered by any consumer product or service... ." Because we conclude that section 570.544(11) is clear and unambiguous, we find it unnecessary to resort to rules of statutory construction....
...mer protection" as intended to refer only to chapter 501, Florida Statutes (except sections
501.91 through
501.923) to be unsupported by any such rule. On the contrary, the fact that the legislature referred specifically to chapter 501 violations in section
570.544(10), but did not do so in section
570.544(11), is strong evidence that it intended the phrase "laws of the state relating to consumer protection" used in section
570.544(11) to refer to something other than chapter 501....
...iven a liberal construction in favor of the public." Department of Environmental Regulation v. Goldring,
477 So.2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1985). We have not overlooked the fact that subsection (11) appears to be somewhat inconsistent with the other parts of section
570.544, which other parts seem to contemplate that the Division's principal roles would involve coordination and advice, rather than enforcement....
...on. Quick Cash of Clearwater, Inc. v. Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Consumer Services,
605 So.2d 898, 901 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The court was not required to determine the full extent of the Division's powers pursuant to section
570.544(11) because it concluded that the Division's authority clearly extended to violations of chapter 501; the Division had pleaded violations of chapter 501; and Quick Cash conceded that the Division possessed the power under the statute to address perceived violations of chapter 501....
...iled to explain why it did not believe that the statute should be read as written by the legislature. We share the concerns of the trial court and the Second District Court of Appeal regarding the problems that might result from an interpretation of section 570.544(11) based upon the plain meaning of the words used....
...Whether what it has passed is wise or not is for the legislature to decide. See, e.g., Moretrench American Corp. v. Taylor Woodrow Construction Corp.,
565 So.2d 861 (Fla. 2d *740 DCA 1990); Pfeiffer v. City of Tampa,
470 So.2d 10 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). We express no view regarding the constitutionality of section
570.544(11), because Quick Cash did not raise that issue in the trial court. We hold today only that section
570.544(11) vests in the Division the power and authority to file and to maintain civil actions such as that involved here....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 1992 WL 206432
...Likewise, we do not consider whether the transactions may result in illegal usury or whether they are otherwise an appropriate subject for criminal prosecution. We determine merely whether the Division has authority to file an action to enjoin these activities under section 570.544(11), Florida Statutes (1991). We answer that question with a qualified, and somewhat preliminary, yes. II. THE HILLSBOROUGH CASE The Division's authority to bring suit concerning consumer issues is located in two subsections of section 570.544, Florida Statutes (1991)....
...ctrine of dangerous instrumentality. See Kraemer v. GMAC,
572 So.2d 1363 (Fla. 1990); Lynch v. Walker,
159 Fla. 188,
31 So.2d 268 (1947). If this circumstance is adequately alleged and proven, we conclude that the Division would have authority under section
570.544(11), Florida Statutes (1991), to obtain an injunction....
...address. We have avoided any broad holding because the records on appeal are sparse and the applicable statutes are disjointed and confusing. We strongly encourage the legislature, at its earliest opportunity, to review both the authority granted in section 570.544(10) and (11), Florida Statutes (1991), and its overall regulation *903 of both buy/sell agreements and loan transactions by pawnbrokers....
...Although we have concluded that interest rates on loans at pawnshops may currently be subject to usury regulation under these circumstances, the legislature could make the law in this area far more precise. Moreover, as argued by Quick Cash, we suspect that section 570.544(11) was intended as emergency authority to the Division to prevent serious, imminent risk of bodily injury, property damage or health hazards without time-consuming coordination with the Attorney General. As worded, however, this statute is much broader. The state has a strong interest in protecting consumers, but there will be chronic problems determining the authority of the Division and that of other departments of the executive branch unless section 570.544, Florida Statutes (1991), is clarified....
