673.1041
Negotiable instrument.
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673.1041 Negotiable instrument.—
(1) Except as provided in subsections (3), (4), and (11), the term “negotiable instrument” means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(a) Is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder;
(b) Is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(c) Does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order may contain:
1. An undertaking or power to give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment;
2. An authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral;
3. A waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor;
4. A term that specifies the law that governs the promise or order; or
5. An undertaking to resolve, in a specified forum, a dispute concerning the promise or order.
(2) The term “instrument” means a negotiable instrument.
(3) An order that meets all requirements of subsection (1), except paragraph (a), and otherwise falls within the definition of “check” in subsection (6) is a negotiable instrument and a check.
(4) A promise or order other than a check is not an instrument if, at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder, it contains a conspicuous statement, however expressed, to the effect that the promise or order is not negotiable or is not an instrument governed by this chapter.
(5) An instrument is a “note” if it is a promise and is a “draft” if it is an order. If an instrument falls within the definition of both “note” and “draft,” a person entitled to enforce the instrument may treat it as either.
(6) The term “check” means a draft, other than a documentary draft, payable on demand and drawn on a bank or a cashier’s check or teller’s check. An instrument may be a check even though it is described on its face by another term, such as “money order.”
(7) The term “cashier’s check” means a draft with respect to which the drawer and drawee are the same bank or branches of the same bank.
(8) The term “teller’s check” means a draft drawn by a bank:
(a) On another bank; or
(b) Payable at or through a bank.
(9) The term “traveler’s check” means an instrument that:
(a) Is payable on demand;
(b) Is drawn on or payable at or through a bank;
(c) Is designated by the term “traveler’s check” or by a substantially similar term; and
(d) Requires, as a condition to payment, a countersignature by a person whose specimen signature appears on the instrument.
(10) The term “certificate of deposit” means an instrument containing an acknowledgment by a bank that a sum of money has been received by the bank and a promise by the bank to repay the sum of money. A certificate of deposit is a note of the bank.
(11) A warrant of this state is not a negotiable instrument governed by this chapter.
History.—s. 2, ch. 92-82; s. 49, ch. 2025-92.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 39
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1995–2025 · leading case: Arnold, Matheny, Pa v. First Am. Holdings
Arnold, Matheny, Pa v. First Am. Holdings (2008)
“Considering that a check is a negotiable instrument, the most relevant provisions governing the status of the funds represented by an issued check, specifically as to who is in "possession" or "control," are those found within the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). The U.C.C. has…”
Any Kind Checks Cashed, Inc. v. Talcott (2002)
“§ 673.1041(2) & (5), Fla. Stat. (2001). [5] Section 560.”
Walton v. Clark & Washington, P.C. (2011)
“§ 673.1041(6), Fla. Stat. 27 . § 673.1131(1), Fla.”
Bank of New York Mellon v. Garcia (2018)
“See § 673.1041, Fla. Stat. (2016); see also § 673.”
In re Elowitz (2016)
“Fla. Stat § 673.1041(1). “An instrument is a ‘note’ if it is a promise and is a ‘draft’ if it is an order.”
Madura v. Bac Home Loans Servicing, LP (2014)
“” Fla. Stat. § 673.1041 (1). An instrument is not negotiable if it states “any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money.”
Nagel v. Cronebaugh (2001)
“§ 673.1041(1), Fla. Stat. (1993); see United Nat'l Bank of Miami v.”
THIRD FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIAITON OF CLEVELAND v. LEAH G. KOULOUVARIS A/ K/ A LEAH KOULOUVARIS (2018)
“" § 673.1041(1), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added).”
Sims v. NEW FALLS CORP. (2010)
“2d DCA 1975); see also §§ 673.1041(1)(c), 673.1061(1)(b),(c), Fla.”
SCADIF, S.A. v. First Union National Bank (2002)
“If the appellate court had applied the “four corners” rule, the factual issue could not have arisen, as a check is defined in section 673.1041(6), Florida Statutes, as a “draft, other than a documentary draft, payable on demand.”
JOANNE LIUKKONEN v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING LLC (2018)
“See § 673.1041, Fla. Stat. (2016); see also § 673.”
Perry v. Fairbanks Capital Corp. (2004)
“1021, or any other writing that evidences a right to the payment of money, is not itself a security agreement or lease, and is of a type that is transferred by delivery in the ordinary course of *727 business with any necessary endorsement or assignment.”
— 673.1041(1) — 18 cases
Nagel v. Cronebaugh (2001)
“§ 673.1041(1), Fla. Stat. (1993); see United Nat'l Bank of Miami v.”
THIRD FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIAITON OF CLEVELAND v. LEAH G. KOULOUVARIS A/ K/ A LEAH KOULOUVARIS (2018)
“" § 673.1041(1), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added).”
Perry v. Fairbanks Capital Corp. (2004)
“1021, or any other writing that evidences a right to the payment of money, is not itself a security agreement or lease, and is of a type that is transferred by delivery in the ordinary course of *727 business with any necessary endorsement or assignment.”
In re Elowitz (2016)
“Fla. Stat § 673.1041(1). “An instrument is a ‘note’ if it is a promise and is a ‘draft’ if it is an order.”
— 673.1041(1)(a) — 1 case
— 673.1041(1)(c) — 2 cases
Sims v. NEW FALLS CORP. (2010)
“2d DCA 1975); see also §§ 673.1041(1)(c), 673.1061(1)(b),(c), Fla.”
— 673.1041(2) — 3 cases
Any Kind Checks Cashed, Inc. v. Talcott (2002)
“§ 673.1041(2) & (5), Fla. Stat. (2001). [5] Section 560.”
— 673.1041(5) — 3 cases
In re Elowitz (2016)
“Fla. Stat § 673.1041(1). “An instrument is a ‘note’ if it is a promise and is a ‘draft’ if it is an order.”
Paramount v. Gilbert (2004)
Lucas v. Bankatlantic (2006)
— 673.1041(6) — 6 cases
Arnold, Matheny, Pa v. First Am. Holdings (2008)
“Considering that a check is a negotiable instrument, the most relevant provisions governing the status of the funds represented by an issued check, specifically as to who is in "possession" or "control," are those found within the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). The U.C.C. has…”
Walton v. Clark & Washington, P.C. (2011)
“§ 673.1041(6), Fla. Stat. 27 . § 673.1131(1), Fla.”
Any Kind Checks Cashed, Inc. v. Talcott (2002)
“§ 673.1041(2) & (5), Fla. Stat. (2001). [5] Section 560.”
SCADIF, S.A. v. First Union National Bank (2002)
“If the appellate court had applied the “four corners” rule, the factual issue could not have arisen, as a check is defined in section 673.1041(6), Florida Statutes, as a “draft, other than a documentary draft, payable on demand.”
Lucas v. BankAtlantic (2006)
— 673.1041(7) — 1 case
Arnold, Matheny, Pa v. First Am. Holdings (2008)
“Considering that a check is a negotiable instrument, the most relevant provisions governing the status of the funds represented by an issued check, specifically as to who is in "possession" or "control," are those found within the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). The U.C.C. has…”
— 673.1041(l)(c) — 1 case
Sims v. NEW FALLS CORP. (2010)
“2d DCA 1975); see also §§ 673.1041(1)(c), 673.1061(1)(b),(c), Fla.”
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