Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...check. Here, the checks that Nowell presented to Bank of America had been endorsed by NGI Marine, the party to which they were made out. Bank of America then deposited the checks into the account number listed on the check’s endorsement. Second, section 673.1101 of the Florida Code provides that the party entitled to cash a check is determined based on the intent of the signer of the check.1 Therefore, the technical discrepancy between the name on the checks (NGI Marine) and the name on the account (Nowell Group, Inc.) is ultimately 1 Section 673.1101 provides, in relevant part: (1) The person to whom an instrument is initially payable is determined by the intent of the person, whether or not authorized, signing as, or in the name or behalf of, the issuer of the instrument....

...identified in the instrument by a name or other identification that is not that of the intended person. ... (3) A person to whom an instrument is payable may be identified in any way, including by name, identifying number, office, or account number. . . . Fla. Stat. § 673.1101 7 irrelevant because it is clear that Nowell intended the checks to be deposited into his account at Bank of America, and the intent of the signer of the check is what matters....

...trustee is sufficient to establish standing to foreclose, in terms of the identity of the person or entity entitled to enforce the note, regardless of whether the identity of the trust is clear from note, together with any indorsements or allonges. Section 673.1101, Florida Statutes (2017), provides that: (3) A person to whom an instrument is payable may be identified in any way, including by name, identifying number, office, or account number....

...A trust, an estate, or a person described as trustee or representative of a trust or estate, the instrument is payable to the trustee, the representative, or a successor of either, whether or not the beneficiary or estate is also named[.] § 673.1101(3)(b)(1), Fla....

...J & D sought damages against Skyscraper under the factoring agreement and separately against Hyatt and the bank for negotiation of the two checks. Hyatt answered and raised the bank's "fault" as an affirmative defense. The bank answered and raised Section 673.1101(4), Florida Statutes (1993) as an affirmative defense....

..., and thus the bank could properly negotiate the checks based upon the endorsement of either of the two payees. The bank further argued that the checks were drafted ambiguously as to whether they were payable alternatively or jointly, and thus under Section 673.1101(4), Florida Statutes, the checks would be construed as a matter of law to be payable alternatively. Hyatt's position was that the checks were not ambiguous, were payable jointly and not alternatively, and thus under Section 673.1101, the checks could only be negotiated by endorsement of both of the payees. J & D similarly argued that the checks were payable jointly. The trial court granted Summary Judgment in favor of the bank, finding that Section 673.1101(4) precluded the bank's liability....

...e to the persons alternatively." The net effect of the amendment was to change the presumption. What was unambiguous before is now ambiguous. Turning to our jurisdiction, Florida has adopted the statutory revision to UCC 3-110, with its enactment of Section 673.1101, Florida Statutes (1992). Section 673.1101(4) now provides the following: (4) If an instrument is payable to two or more persons alternatively, it is payable to any of them and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced by any or all of them in possession of the instrument....

...f them and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced only by all of them. If an instrument payable to two or more persons is ambiguous as to whether it is payable to the persons alternatively, the instrument is payable to the persons alternatively. § 673.1101(4), Fla....

...he bank. The court found that, On its face, the Check is payable to two or more persons and, as a matter of law, the payee designation on the Check is ambiguous as to whether it is payable to the persons alternatively. Id. at 127. The court cited to § 673.1101(4), Fla....

...the judicial interpretation of the other state as persuasive authority in interpreting the Florida statute.’” Id. at 380 (quoting Dunn v. Doskocz, 590 So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991)). 2. Sections 673.4141 and 673.1101 of Florida’s UCC Having earlier determined that Markel American did not waive its § 673.4141 argument, we must reconcile two provisions of Florida’s UCC....

...22-13338 Opinion of the Court 11 accepted by a bank, the drawer is discharged, regardless of when or by whom acceptance was obtained.” Markel American argues that this provision is dispositive in its favor. Section 673.1101(4), on the other hand, states that where “an instrument is payable to two or more persons not alternatively, it is payable to all of them and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced only by all of them.�...

...We survey the relevant case law as to each theory. Markel American contends that we should adopt the Sev- enth Circuit’s approach in Thirteen Inv. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co. Grand Rapids Mich., 67 F.4th 389 (7th Cir. 2023)—the only one of our sister 5 Comment 4 to § 673.1101 provides, in part: If an instrument is payable to X and Y, neither X nor Y acting alone is the person to whom the instrument is payable....

.... . X or Y, acting alone, cannot be the holder or the person entitled to enforce or negotiate the instrument because neither, acting alone, is the identified per- son stated in the instrument. § 673.1101 cmt....

...treatment costs.” Id. The hospital responded that because it never received actual compensation, it was not paid as required. Id. In analyzing Texas’s statutory equivalent to UCC § 3-110 (and Florida Statute § 673.1101), the Texas Supreme Court noted that Massachusetts’ highest court had applied the same language and concluded that (1) one co-payee could not have become a holder of a draft without the other co-payee’s endorse...

...State Farm was not discharged of its underlying obligations.” Id. at 541. Turning to the Florida UCC, we note that there is some ten- sion between the two provisions that the parties urge us to apply. Section 673.1101(4) states that joint payees must act together, such that discharge of the obligation can only occur “by all of them.” In contrast, § 673.4141(3) states that the drawer’s obligation is dis- charged upon acceptance by a bank....

...Ultimately, we agree with the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Thirteen Investment Company and conclude that § 673.4141(3) con- trols the outcome here. It is true that, for a check with non-alter- native co-payees, § 673.1101(4) states that a single co-payee, acting alone, cannot be the holder of the instrument and that an instru- ment cannot be negotiated, discharged, or enforced by that single payee. But § 673.1101(4) mainly deals with the concept of whether a single co-payee, acting alone, is a “holder” of that draft. McAllen, for instance, concluded that the obligation was not discharged spe- cifically because payment was never made to a holder under Texas’s statutory equivalent to § 673.1101(4). 433 S.W.3d at 541. In other words, as relevant here, § 673.1101(4) tells the drawee-bank who it should recognize as the “holder” of the draft being presented to it. On the other hand, § 673.4141(3) explicitly states that when “a draft is accepted by a bank, the dr...

...“which provided that the drawer is discharged only if the holder ob- tains acceptance.” § 673.4141 cmt.3. (emphasis added). Therefore, under Florida’s version of the UCC, it is immaterial whether TDL was or was not a “holder” under § 673.1101(4), because under § 673.4141(3), a bank’s acceptance 6 of the draft discharges the drawer’s obligation either way. In other words, § 673.4141(3) insu- lates the drawer of a properly-issued draft from the risk that a bank will fail to recognize the proper holder identified by § 673.1101(4). As in Thirteen Investment Company, the drawee-bank here dis- bursed, solely to TDL, the payment that covered VFS’s incurred losses under its insurance policy. Under § 673.1101(4), TDL was not the holder of the draft, and the bank’s acceptance of the draft upon presentation by TDL appears to be contrary to that statute’s instruction....

...This also rec- onciles any apparent tension between the two Florida UCC provi- sions. While Markel American’s obligation has been discharged under § 673.4141(3), the underlying obligation on the checks them- selves has not been discharged under § 673.1101(4), but rather sus- pended under § 673.3101, and it may still be enforced against the bank. IV....

...ntified "US Bank" as the "creditor." The copy of the note showed Novastar as the lender and contained no blank or special indorsement. Rather, it showed that Novastar was the original owner and holder of a note that had not been negotiated. See §§ 673.1101(1) (identifying the party to whom an instrument is initially payable), .2011(2) (defining the steps Novastar was required to take to negotiate the instrument as transfer of possession and indorsement).5 evidence twenty days before th...

...the note without any indorsement. We need not address what this undated, indorsed note may have proved about whether the bank had standing to enforce the note at the time of trial by way of either a second indorsement or as a successor trustee. See § 673.1101(3)(b)(1) (indicating that holdership of a note specially endorsed to a trustee may become payable to a successor trustee)....

...e where the wife sought additional funds from the husband after closing. Rather, the wife merely sought what the MSA contemplated, that being an even split of net proceeds from the sale. Notably, the check was made payable to both parties. Under section 673.1101(4), Florida Statutes (2023): “If an instrument is payable to two or more persons not alternatively, it is payable to all of them and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced only by all of them.” Thus, the husband could not unilaterally endorse and deposit the check into his own account....

...1 The trial court determined that Gomez owed money to appellee CVPort Services, LLC. Gomez argues that the trial court erred, however, in entering judgment against him based on a two-payee promissory note, because only CVPort demanded judgment. Gomez relies on section 673.1101(4), Florida Statutes, claiming that an instrument payable to two parties jointly must be jointly enforced....

...CVPort filed suit for breach of contract, and eventually moved for summary judgment, which motion was granted. Gomez filed a timely notice of appeal. II. Gomez argues that the trial court erred in granting final summary judgment in CVPort’s favor.2 Gomez claims that section 673.1101(4), Florida Statutes, read in conjunction with the promissory note, prevented CVPort from enforcing the note without Edex joining in the enforcement action....

...orced only by all of them. If an instrument payable to two or more persons is ambiguous as to whether it is payable to the persons alternatively, the instrument is payable to the persons alternatively. Id. (emphasis added). Section 673.1101(4) contemplates only scenarios where an instrument “is payable to two or more persons.” Id....

...ncipal and accrued interest . . . shall be payable in full . . . unless converted to equity . . . .”) (emphasis added). 5 The note was therefore no longer “payable two or more persons” as required by section 673.1101(4)....

...r ultimately mailed a check for the $1,995.00 amount, the insurer sent that payment to the wrong party. Under Florida law, the assignee could not endorse the check mailed by the insurer without the signature of both the assignee and the insured. See § 673.1101(4), Fla....

...ed, discharged, or enforced by any or all of them in possession of the instrument. If an instrument is payable to two or more persons not alternatively, it is payable to all of them and may be negotiated, discharged, or enforced only by all of them. § 673.1101(4) (emphasis added). The documents cited in this case reflect that the payees hold their interests "not alternatively." Therefore, only all of the payees could seek enforcement by way of assignment of rents. Because Appellees only constituted some of the payees, section 673.1101(4) prevented them from seeking assignment of rents....

...hat of the payee. At the outset, the check at issue is an instrument. See § 673.1041(5),(6). Here, the “person whose intent determines to whom [the] instrument is payable” “is ... the person ... signing as ... the issuer of the instrument.” § 673.1101(1), Florida Statutes (2004)....