Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...(1983) (attorney fees assessed against condemning authority in eminent domain proceedings). The second category adopts the English Rule, authorizing the prevailing party, whether plaintiff or defendant, to recover attorney fees from the opposing party. See, e.g., § 713.29, Fla....

...4th DCA 1992), in which the court certified the following as questions of great public importance: IS AN OWNER WHO PREVAILS ON A COMPLAINT BY A CONTRACTOR OR SUB-CONTRACTOR TO ENFORCE A MECHANIC'S LIEN UNDER PART I, CHAPTER 713, FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER 713.29, EVEN THOUGH, IN THE SAME SUIT, THE CONTRACTOR PREVAILED AGAINST THE OWNER ON A CLAIM FOR MONEY DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE CONTRACT, BOTH CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION? DOES THE TEST OF MORITZ V. HOYT FOR DETERMINING WHO IS THE PREVAILING PARTY FOR THE PURPOSES OF AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES APPLY TO FEES AWARDED UNDER SECTION 713.29, FLORIDA STATUTES? Prosperi, 609 So.2d at 59....

...The claims based on quantum meruit and account stated were denied. As a consequence, the court entered judgment in favor of the contractor for $17,309.06 but denied the contractor's claim for attorney's fees. The court also denied the owner's claim for attorney's fees (1) under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1989), on the premise that he was not the prevailing party and (2) under section 713.31, Florida Statutes (1989), because the fraudulent affidavits were not used as the basis for the lien and the final affidavit correctly stated the amount which was due and owing....

...low the trial judge to determine from the record which party has in fact prevailed on the significant issues tried before the court." Id. at 810. It may be that the supreme court will extend that test to cases involving attorney's fees awarded under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1991). Indeed there is room in the statute for such an equitable approach. See e.g. S.C.M. Assoc. Inc. v. Rhodes, 395 So.2d 632, 634 n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Prosperi, 609 So.2d at 59. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1989), provides that in any action brought to enforce a mechanic's lien, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee....

...2d DCA 1986), each of which had held that the party obtaining the greater award was the prevailing party even though that party rather than the other had breached the contract. We also believe it is significant that in 1977 the legislature amended section 713.29 to provide that the attorney's fees awarded under that section should be taxed as part of costs "as allowed in equitable actions." Ch....

...NOTES [1] For purposes of this opinion, the net judgment rule comes into play when the claimant fails to foreclose a mechanic's lien but obtains a judgment for the underlying claim which exceeds any claim of the owner. As applied, the rule automatically precludes the owner from recovering attorney's fees under section 713.29. It has no relevance to an award of attorney's fees to the claimant because an unsuccessful lien claimant cannot recover attorney's fees under section 713.29.

...Rule 11 is intended to deter frivolous suits, not to deter novel legal arguments or cases of first impression. In bringing this suit plaintiffs acted reasonably under the circumstances. 19 Finally Trapanese claims that two Florida statutes, Fla.Stat. Secs. 713.29 and 57.105, provide bases for an award of fees. Section 713.29 mandates an award of fees to the prevailing party in an action brought to enforce a mechanic's lien pursuant to Chapter 713....

...rmined as a matter of law that plaintiff had failed to establish any lien; and secondly, whether the trial court erred in failing to award attorneys' fees to appellants (being the prevailing parties in the mechanics' lien proceedings) as required by Section 713.29, Florida Statutes 1969, F.S.A....

...tional minimum amount of that court. In such latter case a judgment for the lesser amount is clearly valid; [10] the judgment in this case should be no less valid. We come now to the question of attorneys' fees as raised by appellants' second point. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes 1969, F.S.A., provides as follows: "In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be dete...

...We conclude therefore that the trial judge was correct in not awarding attorneys' fees to either of the parties to this cause. We emphasize here that what we have just said is in no way an equivocation of our earlier conclusions regarding the "one form of action" under the new merger rule. The word "action" as used in Section 713.29, supra, is not modified in any way by the new rule....

...a Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law." [5] There is no corresponding authorization of section 627.428 attorney's fees against a surety issuing a transfer-of-lien bond. Instead, mechanic's lien proceedings are governed by Chapter 713 of the Florida Statutes. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1987), provides that a prevailing party in a mechanic's lien enforcement *250 action is entitled to recover attorney's fees "which shall be taxed as part of [the prevailing party's] costs." Accordingly, we agree with the court below that "[t]here is no need ......

...importance. We therefore have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We rephrase the certified question as follows: Where a lienor obtains a judgment against a property owner in an action to enforce a construction lien brought pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2005), are trial courts required to apply the "significant issues" test articulated in Prosperi v....

...e of awarding attorneys' fees? We answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative and hold that trial courts are required to apply the "significant issues" test of Prosperi to evaluate entitlement to prevailing party attorneys' fees under section 713.29, even when the lienor obtains a judgment on the lien....

...After setting off that figure against the agreed lien amount of $12,725, the net result was a judgment for $1,525 in favor of Gale Industries. Thereafter, each party concluded that it was the "prevailing party" and filed cross-motions to tax attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...The Tryteks recovered $11,200 on their counterclaim. Gale only offered a discount of from $320 to $3200. Therefore, this Court finds that the Tryteks prevailed on the "significant issue" of this case and are the prevailing parties entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to § 713.29, F.S....

...Code, Inc., 626 So.2d 1360 (Fla.1993), modified the "prevailing party" rule by applying the "significant issues" test. However, it concluded that the "significant issues" test of Prosperi applies only where the contractor is unsuccessful in its lien foreclosure action. The Fifth District concluded that under section 713.29, a contractor who obtains any monetary judgment pursuant to a construction lien claim would ordinarily be the prevailing party, and in this case, the contractor did receive a judgment of $1,525....

...the trial court's determination of prevailing party should be affirmed. Both parties assert that one or the other must be the prevailing party. The main issue in this case is what factors enter into a determination of "prevailing party" pursuant to section 713.29....

...State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830, 832 (Fla.1993). In this case, entitlement to attorneys' fees is based on statute. We thus start with the language of the lien statute that concerns the award of attorneys' fees in an action to enforce a lien. Section 713.29 was first enacted by the Legislature in 1963. Ch. 63-135, § 1, Laws of Fla. Section 713.29 states: In any action brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under this part, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial and appeal or for arbi...

...(Emphases added.) Although the Legislature expressly defined several terms within the Construction Lien Law in a section *1199 entitled "Definitions," it did not define the term "prevailing party," see § 713.01, Fla. Stat. (2005), nor does a definition appear in section 713.29....

...airness and equity in actions brought pursuant to the lien law. The notion that equitable principles should apply in determining "prevailing party" attorneys' fees has been utilized in this Court's opinions deciding attorneys' fees in the context of section 713.29....

...Grove, Inc., 472 So.2d 1177 (Fla.1985), the Court examined a case in which a litigant had offered an amount to settle that was equal to the amount recovered. This Court found that "in order to be a prevailing party entitled to the award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, a litigant must have recovered an amount exceeding that which was earlier offered in settlement of the claim." Id. at 1179. This Court explained that it based its decision on the purported policy underlying section 713.29: The award of attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party in a mechanic's lien action serves to encourage settlement of disputes before resorting to litigation....

...e the claim, allows the plaintiff a free throw of the dice in an attempt to squeeze the last penny out of the claim. Id. at 1178-79 (emphasis added). Our decision in C.U. Associates explicitly stands for the proposition that the underlying policy of section 713.29 is to "encourage settlement of disputes before resorting to litigation." However, the case also implicitly espouses equitable principles by preventing a plaintiff who has recovered a judgment from unjustly being awarded attorneys' fees...

...eded the amount of the judgment. Subsequently, this Court decided Prosperi, which is also based on basic principles of fairness and an interest in discouraging needless litigation. The rule of Prosperi is that in determining "prevailing party" under section 713.29, the trial court should look to which party prevailed on the "significant issues," as recognized in our case of Moritz that had been decided the previous year....

...The trial court denied both parties' claims for fees, and on appeal the district court affirmed, certifying the following question: "Does the test of Moritz v. Hoyt for determining who is the prevailing party for the purposes of awarding attorney's fees apply to fees awarded under section 713.29, Florida Statutes?" 626 So.2d at 1361. [7] In concluding that the "significant issues" test adopted in Moritz was applicable to claims under section 713.29, this Court discussed what appellate courts had termed the "net judgment rule," which in essence precluded an owner from recovering attorneys' fees under section 713.29 where a claimant fails to foreclose a mechanic's lien but obtains a judgment on other non-lien claims that exceeds any claim of the owner....

...ost on the only issue litigated and received a judgment on its recorded lien of $12,725 in the amount of only $1,525. We are concerned that fees may have driven the litigation and prevented the parties from resolving the case. The overall purpose of section 713.29 and attorneys' fee statutes in general is to discourage rather than encourage needless litigation....

...(2008) ("Except as provided in this section, all mediation communications shall be confidential. A mediation participant shall not disclose a mediation communication to a person other than another mediation participant or a participant's counsel."). Our conclusion is consistent with our precedent and section 713.29....

...[12] Moreover, this *1204 conclusion is consistent with our decision in C.U. Associates, where we held that on remand the trial court could find that neither party was the "prevailing party" entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. 472 So.2d at 1179. Finally, our decision does not conflict with section 713.29, which requires only that the "prevailing party is entitled to recover" a reasonable attorneys' fee....

...QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, and CANADY, JJ., concur. POLSTON and LABARGA, JJ., did not participate. NOTES [1] The question that was certified by the Fifth District states: When a lienor obtains a judgment against a property owner in an action to enforce a construction lien brought pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2005), does the trial court have the discretion to apply the "significant issues" test articulated in Prosperi v....

...[7] The district court also certified the following question: Is an owner who prevails on a complaint by a contractor or sub-contractor to enforce a mechanic's lien under Part I, Chapter 713, Florida Statutes (1989), entitled to attorney's fees under 713.29, even though, in the same suit, the contractor prevailed against the owner on a claim for money damages for breach of the contract, both claims arising out of the same transaction? Prosperi, 626 So.2d at 1361....

...urt decisions. [10] Trytek's breach of contract counterclaim is a compulsory counterclaim because both the lien claim and the breach of contract counterclaim arose from the same transaction or occurrence. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a). Thus, although section 713.29 applies only to lien claims, Trytek's judgment on its counterclaim could be considered in the trial court's determination of the prevailing party because the counterclaim is considered as part of the lien claim....

...The issues before us are whether the appellant is entitled to attorney's fees and costs for the dismissed action, and if so whether a judgment for those fees and costs must be entered as soon as the original action is dismissed rather than as a part of the new action. The controlling legislation is Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975): "In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by the court, which...

...yment of costs of the claim previously dismissed as it may deem proper and shall stay the proceedings in the action until the party seeking affirmative relief has complied with the order." We hold, in accord with previous judicial interpretations of Section 713.29, Florida Statutes, that where a mechanic's lien claim is voluntarily or involuntarily dismissed, the party against whom the claim was brought is the "prevailing party" and is entitled to recover attorney's fees and costs....

...Appellees counterclaimed, contending appellant had breached the contract and had committed architectural malpractice. Upon conclusion of appellees' evidence at the nonjury trial the court dismissed the malpractice count of appellees' counterclaim. Section 713.29, Fla....

...es upon remand, Hernandez v. Travelers Insurance Co., 331 So.2d 329 (Fla.3d DCA 1976), we cannot accept appellees' argument that the offer of judgment should have been considered by the trial court in determining who was the "prevailing party" under § 713.29.

...Gesco held only that the liability for costs of the surety on the bond and the principal, a lending institution, including attorney's fees, was limited to $100.00, as provided in section 713.24. Symons Corporation, as the prevailing party against the owner, Tartan Lavers Delray, Inc., under section 713.29, is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees for the services of its attorney for trial and this appeal....

...ies themselves, the owner is merely an incidental beneficiary and has no right to enforce the venue provision. See Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1973). Both the appellant and the appellee seek attorney's fees for this appeal pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes. However, the litigation concerning the subcontractor's complaint to foreclose a mechanic's lien has not yet concluded. Therefore, no party is yet a prevailing party under section 713.29....

...Southside did not recover a judgment because the net judgment was in Heindel's favor. Accordingly, Southside was not entitled to attorney's fees because it was not the "prevailing party" recovering judgment under section 501.2105. [2] Although the statutory language in section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1983), providing for attorney's fees in mechanic's lien cases, is somewhat different from that in section 501.2105, both contemplate the award of fees only to a prevailing party. Where a defendant owner successfully defends a mechanic's lien foreclosure, but is held liable in damages for breach of contract, the defendant is not the prevailing party and is not entitled to recover attorney's fees under section 713.29....

...Neubauer Construction Co., 352 So.2d 103 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); General Development Corp. v. John H. Gossett Construction Co., 370 So.2d 380 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). The Emery court addressed this issue as follows: We come now to the question of attorney's fees as raised by appellants' second point. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes 1969, F.S.A., provides as follows: "In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be dete...

...he decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, recently rendered in Gordon v. Warren Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 340 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), wherein they permitted attorney's fees to be recovered under the mechanic's lien statute, Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975), which is similar to Section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1978)....

...The trial court did award Grove attorneys' fees as the prevailing party. The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the award of attorneys' fees, holding that an offer of settlement is irrelevant to the determination of "prevailing party" for purposes of the award of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 713.29....

...fees in this context is to make a formal offer of judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. We would first note that the rule and the statute are separate and that rule 1.442 is not dispositive of the award of attorney's fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1981). Rule 1.442 awards costs to a defendant incurred after the making of an offer of judgment whereas section 713.29 provides for attorney's fees through trial and appeal to either party....

...llows the plaintiff a free throw of the dice in an attempt to squeeze the last penny out of *1179 the claim. In effect, the Third District's construction of the statute leaves the defendant ripe for extortion. Such a result defeats the laudable goal section 713.29 was intended to achieve. Thus, we find that in order to be a prevailing party entitled to the award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, a litigant must have recovered an amount exceeding that which was earlier offered in settlement of the claim....

...Prior to 1987, Florida's mechanics' lien statute provided that any lien transferred to a surety bond must include an amount of $100 to cover costs. § 713.24, Fla. Stat. (1985). The statute also provided that costs were not to exceed $100. Id. Furthermore, under the statute, attorney's fees were to be taxed as costs. § 713.29, Fla....

...evailing in the litigation. See, e.g., § 57.105, Fla. Stat. (1999) (providing sanctions for raising unsupported claims or defenses); § 83.48, Fla.Stat. (1999) (landlord and tenant actions); § 119.12, Fla.Stat. (1999) (public records enforcement); § 713.29, Fla.Stat....

...ted as an action to foreclose a statutory mechanic's lien. Beach Resorts, defendant and appellant herein, specifically assails that portion of the final judgment awarding the plaintiff, Clarmac, attorney fees pursuant to the mechanic's lien statute, Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...bitrator nor was there any special agreement between the parties for payment of the same. Therefore, the remaining question is whether some other statute can be invoked to warrant the awarding of attorney fees attributable to the arbitration herein. Section 713.29 of the Mechanic's Lien Law provides, "In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by the co...

...Resolution of any conflict between the Arbitration Code, which prohibits attorney fees, and the Mechanic's Lien law, which specifically allows such costs, is determined by the nature of the recovery. Emery v. International Glass & Mfg., Inc., 249 So.2d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971). In Emery, involving the construction of Section 713.29, we stated, "......

...SCHEB, J., dissents with opinion. SCHEB, Judge (dissenting). The majority concludes that Clarmac was entitled to enforce its claim of lien through foreclosure proceedings. I agree. I think Clarmac was therefore entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Section 713.29, Florida Statutes, since it prevailed in that proceeding, notwithstanding that it was proper to have the amount of its entitlement determined through arbitration....

...2, 1967), which held that under the mechanics' lien law of Florida, attorney's fees are not to be awarded to the prevailing party at the appellate level, i.e., that Section 84.291 is not applicable to appellate proceedings. (NOTE: In 1967, F.S. 84.291 was changed to F.S. 713.29....

...Appeal erred in awarding attorney's fees to respondents, the prevailing party on appeal, in the absence of express statutory authority to do so. Petitioner contends that the DCA-3 erred in awarding attorney's fees to the prevailing party on appeal. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes, which provides: "In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by the cour...

...1965, 177 So.2d 709, and Babe's Plumbing, Inc. v. Maier, Fla.App. 1966, 194 So.2d 666, deny the award of attorney's fees in mechanic's lien foreclosures for services on appeal, both reasoning that the statute does not provide for fees to an appellee for defending an appeal, the language of § 713.29 does not distinguish between trial and appellate attorney fees; fees are not limited to the lower court....

...Williams et al., 85 So.2d 619 (Fla. 1956); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1968); Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1968). See also, Jackson v. Hatch, supra . We agree with petitioner that the District Court erred in awarding attorney's fees on appeal to respondent since Section 713.29 does not expressly authorize the award of attorneys' fees on appeal and we would adopt the reasoning of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in John T....

...arty's rights under the Arbitration Code. Attorney's Fees McDaniel claims that institution of a mechanic's lien action should operate to entitle the prevailing party to attorney's fees, including those incurred during arbitration. McDaniel relies on Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979), of the Mechanic's Lien Statute which provides that: In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I [the mechanic's lien part], the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the s...

...l, non-appealable order which this court lacks jurisdiction to review. See Trans Atlantic Distributors, L.P. v. Whiland *828 & Co., 646 So.2d 752 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). AFFIRMED. SHARP, W., J. and PERRY, JR., B., Associate Judge, concur. NOTES [1] See § 713.29, Fla....

...action, dismissal without prejudice was proper. Mardan "... may still have (its) remedy at law, however, for damages for breach of contract upon satisfactory complaint and proof." Oper v. Russell, Inc., supra, at 15. As to Mardan's third contention, § 713.29, Fla....

...hanic's lien foreclosure. Three days before the trial was to begin, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the action pursuant to FRCP 1.420(a)(1), 30 F.S.A. The defendants thereupon filed a motion to tax costs, including attorney's fees, pursuant to F.S. 713.29, F.S.A. This appeal is from an order denying defendants' motion. The appellee argues that the court below properly denied attorney's fees because the defendants-appellants were not "prevailing parties" within the meaning of F.S. 713.29, F.S.A....

...The distinguishing factor in the case at bar is, of course, that the defendants here did prevail in all aspects. Our opinion in Emery should not be construed to mean that one who successfully defends a mechanic's lien foreclosure cannot recover an attorney's fee under Section 713.29....

...The order in question is reversed. The case is remanded for the purpose of holding a hearing directed to the award of attorney's fees to the defendants-appellants according to the directions herein. HOBSON, A.C.J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur. NOTES [1] "713.29 Attorney's fees....

...,842.26, computed at 6% from May, 1974. Appellants filed an appeal from that judgment in this court. Thereafter, hearings were held on Avanti's request for attorney's fees, and the trial judge granted "reasonable attorney's fees," in accordance with Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977), over objections of appellants....

...ped construction in February, 1974. The trial judge correctly assessed interest from May, 1974. The trial judge's order on the appellees' motion for attorney's fees stated that they were entitled to "reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 713.29." Appellants contend that attorney's fees should have been assessed according to Sections 627.756 and 627.428, Florida Statutes (1977). Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977), provides that in actions to enforce mechanic's liens under Chapter 713, the prevailing party is entitled to "reasonable attorney's fees." Section 627.428 provides reasonable attorney's fees to an insured who prevails in a suit against an insurer....

...*595 Appellees urge that Midway Shopping Mall, Inc. v. Corky Corp., 257 So.2d 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972), and Traveler's Indemnity Company v. Howell and King, Inc., 336 So.2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) are controlling. In both of those cases it was held that Section 713.29 governed attorney's fee awards in suits by sub-contractors to enforce liens against a general contractor and its surety because the Mechanic's Lien Act was "to be construed liberally to afford laborers and materialmen the greatest prot...

...sums as may be justly due," Traveler's Indemnity, supra, 336 So.2d at 3, or obligating the surety to pay "for all labor and material used or reasonably required for use in the performance of the contract, ..." Midway Shopping Mall, supra, 257 So.2d at 908, was said to include the reasonable attorney's fees Section 713.29 provides for. Here, the parties' contract did not cause the provisions in Section 713.29 to prevail over those in Section 627.756....

...ithin the meaning of Section 718.303(1) and was therefore entitled to an award of attorney fees. We agree. Although there has been no judicial interpretation of the term "prevailing party" as used in Section 718.303(1), Florida courts have construed Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979), an analogous provision in the Mechanics' Lien Statute....

...3d DCA 1983); American Insulation of Fort Walton Beach, Inc. v. Pruitt, 378 So.2d 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Peter Marich & Associates, Inc. v. Powell, 365 So.2d 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). (These cases reached the same holding in interpreting a similar provision of the Florida Statutes, § 713.29.) We find no merit in Antonell's cross-appeal....

...Newport Systems Development Corp., 348 So.2d 328 (Fla.3d DCA 1977), opinion filed January 4, 1977; Mardan Kitchen Cabinets, Inc. v. Bruns, 312 So.2d 769 (Fla.3d DCA 1975); Potts v. Orlando Building Service, Inc., 206 So.2d 221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); Oper v. Russell, 197 So.2d 13 (Fla.3d DCA 1967). Section 713.29, Florida Statutes, provides that the prevailing party in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney....

...Under these statutes, attorney's fees may be awarded even where a party has taken a voluntary dismissal. Dolphin Towers Condominium Association, Inc. v. Del Bene, 388 So.2d 1268 (Fla.2d DCA 1980) [construing Section 718.303(1), Florida Statutes (1979)]; MacBain v. Bowling, 374 So.2d 75 (Fla.3d DCA 1979) [construing Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975)]; Gordon v....

...Petitioner Mainlands also raises the question of whether the district court award of attorney's fees to Wen-Dic was proper at this stage of the proceeding. We agree with Mainlands on this ground and quash the district court award of attorney's fees to Wen-Dic. The district court awarded attorney's fees based on section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, to be determined...

...y's fees herein. As support for his argument, the claimant cites Florida Glass & Mirror Co. v. Economy King Equipment Co., 353 So.2d 596 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). However, that case is clearly not controlling. In Florida Glass, the court first noted that § 713.29, Fla....

...(1977), "any provision of a statute ... providing for the payment of attorney's fees to the prevailing party ... shall be construed to include the payment of attorney's fees to the prevailing party... on appeal." Thus, the Florida Glass decision held that "Section 713.29 when construed in the light of Section 59.46 now permits recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party on appeal." 353 So.2d at 597....

...[3] We note that the line of cases emanating from Gordon v. Warren Heating & Air Conditioning, 340 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) are not applicable in the present case. The attorney's fee statute involved in Gordon expressly provided that the fees were to be taxed as costs. See § 713.29, Fla....

...Judgment was entered in favor of appellant and each party was directed to bear his own costs and attorney's fees. This appeal questions only the correctness of that part of the judgment dealing with costs and attorney's fees. Prior to its amendment in 1977, Section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes provided: In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as part of his costs....

...ling party whole while at the same time discouraging specious claims and defenses. Foxbilt Electric, Inc. v. Belefant, supra . We perceive no change in legislative intent indicated by the two phrases added by the amendment. Accordingly, we hold that Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979) is mandatory and requires the trial court to award an attorney's fee to the prevailing party....

...requiring the contractor to furnish a payment bond. § 713.02(6), Fla. Stat. (1979). When no payment bond has been furnished, a lienor who prosecutes his lien against the improved land is authorized to collect "a reasonable fee" without limitation. § 713.29, Fla....

...Flowers, 43 So.2d 435 (Fla. 1949). Essentially the entire mechanics' lien law is for the benefit of lienors and is to afford the lienor adequate assurance of being fully compensated for his labor, services and material. The section for attorney's fees, section 713.29, is primarily calculated to prevent any diminution of the claimant's full compensation....

...payment bond, as this is a circumstance bearing no relation to the purposes of the statute authorizing reasonable attorney's fees in mechanics' lien cases. To avoid this constitutional problem I would hold section 627.756 inapplicable and would read section 713.29, Fla....

...award) was excessive. We affirm as to the contract claim and as to the counterclaim, but reverse the denial of foreclosure, and remand for a decision regarding attorney's fees "taxed as part of [appellant's] costs, as allowed in equitable actions." § 713.29, Fla....

...Lawsuit Filed His bill still unpaid, Mr. Grant filed the complaint which began the proceedings below on June 19, 1992. Count I sought enforcement of a mechanic's lien under part one of chapter 713, Florida Statutes, and specifically asked for attorney's fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes....

...t of Jackson County had issued a certificate of occupancy. It was error not to allow foreclosure of appellant's mechanic's lien. Barth; Ocean Ridge Dev. When a mechanic's lien is foreclosed, the prevailing party recovers attorney's fees as of right. § 713.29, Fla....

...ion serves to encourage settlement of disputes before resorting to litigation," C.U. Assocs., Inc., v. R.B. Grove, 472 So.2d 1177, 1178 (Fla.1985), or so it is hoped. But "to be a prevailing party entitled to the award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, a litigant must have recovered an amount exceeding that which was earlier offered in settlement of the claim." Id....

...hich authorizes their recovery. Accord Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Lamm, 218 So.2d 219 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 225 So.2d 529 (1969). Indeed, there are some statutes which provide for an award of attorneys' fees to be taxed as costs. E.g., § 713.29, Fla....

...January 25, 1984. Rehearing Denied February 24, 1984. *1086 John A. Barley, Tallahassee, for appellant. Edwin F. Blanton, Tallahassee, for appellees. NIMMONS, Judge. Encompass Incorporated appeals from an order denying its motion for attorney's fees pursuant to Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1981), and pre-judgment interest....

...The trial court entered its order on March 29, 1983, denying Encompass' motion. On April 6, 1983, Encompass executed a satisfaction of the judgment and the satisfaction was subsequently recorded. We first address the question of whether, assuming that Encompass qualified for attorneys fees as a prevailing party under Section 713.29, the absence of any reference in the offer of judgment and in the acceptance thereof precluded Encompass from recovery of fees....

...1st DCA 1979); Parliament Insurance Company v. That Girl In Miami, Inc., 377 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979); cf. Hernandez v. Travelers Insurance Company, 331 So.2d 329 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976). We next determine whether Encompass qualified for attorney's fees as a "prevailing" party under Section 713.29 which provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as part of his costs, as allowed in equitable actions....

...In Emery, a lien claimant was unsucessful on his mechanic's lien foreclosure count but was awarded damages for breach of contract. The Second District reversed the award of attorney's fees to claimant holding that a claimant is not entitled to attorney's fees under Section 713.29 unless his recovery is based upon the lien law....

...which mentioned nothing about a mechanic's lien. [1] Statutes authorizing the award of attorney's fees are considered in derogation of common law so as to require strict construction. Jackson v. Hatch, 288 So.2d 564 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1974) (interpreting Section 713.29); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1967). Particularly in view of the authorities previously cited, we do not believe that Section 713.29 is susceptible to such a construction as would entitle the plaintiff to be regarded as a prevailing party on its mechanic's lien cause of action....

...Galbraith, a dismissed party, may be classified as the "prevailing party"? MacBain v. Bowling, 374 So.2d 75 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), is directly on point and answers the question in the affirmative. MacBain draws upon those cases which have interpreted Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979), which grants reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party in any action brought to enforce a mechanics' lien....

...(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services. (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. In a mechanic's lien foreclosure suit the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney. See Section 713.29, Florida Statutes....

...*1307 Raymond L. Bass of Miller, Bass & Chernoff, Naples, for appellant. James H. Siesky of Siesky and Lehman, P.A., Naples, for appellees. SCHOONOVER, Judge. The appellant, Fashion Tile & Marble, Inc., challenges an attorney's fee award it received pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1985), as the prevailing party in a mechanic's lien action....

...ided in the award." Appellants interpret this provision to exclude the award of attorney fees in arbitration proceedings, relying on a series of arbitration cases involving attorney fees sought in arbitrated mechanics liens foreclosure actions under section 713.29, [3] and on Glen Johnson, Inc....

...t bonds are "different animals". The statutes which authorize attorney fees for parties utilizing one or the other of these remedies are also different, both in form and in their precedent conditions. In order to be entitled to an attorney fee under section 713.29, a person must prevail in an action to enforce a mechanics lien....

...ore, was not liable to Continental. The trial court, in a detailed and well-reasoned order, granted the motion for summary judgment. The court also entered an order granting appellees, as the prevailing parties below, attorney's fees and costs under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...In this case, the undisputed facts established the existence of all of these circumstances and that La Paz was entitled to summary judgment. We, therefore, affirm. We also affirm the trial court's order taxing attorney's fees and costs against Continental pursuant to the stipulation reached between the parties and section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Consequently, we reverse the trial court's award of attorney's fees on Volpe's mechanic's lien action. Harper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Noel, 448 So.2d 587 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Atlantic Gardens Landscaping, Inc. v. Boca Raton Land Dev., Inc., 360 So.2d 1278 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 1361 (Fla. 1979); § 713.29, Fla....

...se. It entered a net judgment [2] in favor of Allbrite for $345,023.53, plus interest, by deducting CDI's award in the Cinema case from the award made to Allbrite in the Mall case. The trial court then awarded attorney's fees to Allbrite pursuant to section 713.29, and denied the same to appellants....

...of N.Y., 125 Fla. 608, 170 So. 664, 666 (1936); Shores Supply Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Inc., 524 So.2d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Wagner. Thus, the trial court erred in treating these two cases as merged. A party is entitled to recover fees pursuant to section 713.29 if successful in prosecuting or defending a mechanic's lien cause of action....

...1st DCA 1984). This is true even where a lawsuit is dismissed. Heidle v. S & S Drywall and Tile, Inc., 639 So.2d 1105 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Accordingly, in the Cinema case Rouse is entitled to an attorney fee award because it prevailed on the lien claim. § 713.29, Fla. Stat. Because the claim on which CDI prevailed was a breach of contract claim, it is not entitled to fees under section 713.29....

...[4] Allbrite is entitled to a separate judgment for damages, interest, attorneys fees and costs in the Mall case. Similarly, in the Cinema case, CDI and Rouse are entitled to a separate judgment for damages, interest, and costs. Rouse is entitled to an attorney's fee award in defeating the lien claim under section 713.29 in the Cinema case....

...Rule 11 is intended to deter frivolous suits, not to deter novel legal arguments or cases of first impression. In bringing this suit plaintiffs acted reasonably under the circumstances. Finally Trapanese claims that two Florida statutes, Fla.Stat. §§ 713.29 and 57.105, provide bases for an award of fees. Section 713.29 mandates an award of fees to the prevailing party in an action brought to enforce a mechanic’s lien pursuant to Chapter 713....

...Sarrow, Miami, for appellee. Before HENDRY, BARKDULL and JORGENSON, JJ. PER CURIAM. When a claimant in a mechanic's lien action recovers a judgment in any amount, [1] a trial court errs in not finding the lienor the "prevailing party" and awarding attorney's fees pursuant to Section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes....

...prevailing party attorneys' fee award is affirmed in part, but the trial court's application of a contingency fee multiplier is reversed. Palm Coast, as the prevailing party on the lien claim on appeal, is entitled to its appellate attorneys' fees. § 713.29, Fla....

...iling party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal or for arbitration, in an amount to be determined by this court, which fee must be taxed as part of his costs, as allowed in equitable actions. § 713.29, Fla....

...3d DCA 1988); Hub Cap Heaven, Inc. v. Goodman, 431 So.2d 323, 324 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) ("When a claimant in a mechanic's lien action recovers a judgment in any amount, a trial court errs in not finding the lienor the `prevailing party' and awarding attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes.")....

...Based upon this test, it is clear to us that Hollub was the prevailing party in the lien action below. Hollub prevailed on the only significant issue in the action below, (i.e., the enforcement of its lien) and received an affirmative judgment on its behalf. The trial court's denial of attorney's fees to Hollub pursuant to section 713.29 was thus error....

...A determination of the applicable statutory provision under which attorney's fees may be claimed depends upon the main cause of action. Id., at 1046. Thus, a claim for attorney's fees in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien will normally be governed by the provisions of section 713.29, Florida Statutes, but a claim for attorney's fees in a suit brought by a subcontractor against a contractor and its surety is an action against the bond, and will be governed by the provisions of section 627.756. Id. In other words, "when a lien is substituted by a bond, the statute which governs the assessment of attorney's fees is not the prevailing party provision under section 713.29, but the insurance provisions under sections 627.428 and 627.756." Shores Supply Co....

...ounterclaim. However, inasmuch as the evidence in this case clearly did not support appellee's Chapter 501 claim, we will assume that attorney's fee award was bottomed upon a finding that appellees were the "prevailing parties" within the meaning of Section 713.29 of the Mechanic's Lien Law. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1983) provides: 713.29 Attorney's fees....

...— In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, to be determined by the court, which shall be *694 taxed as part of his costs, as allowed in equitable actions. Section 713.29's deceptively simple phrase, "prevailing party", has been a fertile source of litigation....

...n favor of the owner whose recovery on a counterclaim for damages caused by the lien claimant's breach of the construction contract exceeds the amount of the lien claim. We hold that the owner is, under such circumstances, the prevailing party under Section 713.29....

...[2] In both cases, both the contractor and the owner lost their respective claims (in the vernacular, a "dogfall"). On appeal in both cases, this court held that since the contractor failed to prove a valid mechanic's lien, it was error for the trial court to deny the owners attorney's fees as prevailing parties under Section 713.29 notwithstanding the fact that the owners had failed to prove their common-law counterclaims....

...[2] In Winnie, the owner's claim was asserted via a counterclaim in the lien foreclosure suit; in Snaidman, the owner's claim was asserted by a separate action which was consolidated with the lien foreclosure. [3] We note that in another context, the courts have declined to apply Section 713.29 in a strictly mechanical manner, preferring instead a common sense approach....

...nderance of the evidence, the faulty claim of lien adversely affected the Stunkels. See Mid-State Contractors, Inc. v. Halo Dev. Corp., 342 So.2d 1078, 1080 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES Both parties have moved for attorney's fees based on section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1991), which allows a prevailing party in an action to enforce a construction lien to recover reasonable attorney's fees for trial and appeal....

...lower court from the amount claimed, but an award was made to the defendant as attorney's fees; no judgment was entered on the counterclaim. The point on appeal is whether there was error in the award of attorney's fees in view of the statute, F.S. § 713.29, F.S.A., providing for a reasonable fee for the prevailing party....

...1965, 177 So.2d 709, and Babe's Plumbing, Inc. v. Maier, Fla.App. 1966, 194 So.2d 666, deny the award of attorney's fees in mechanic's lien foreclosures for services on appeal, both reasoning that the statute does not provide for fees to an appellee for defending an appeal, the language of § 713.29 does not distinguish between trial and appellate attorney fees; fees are not limited to the lower court....

...Florida cases have distinguished attorney's fees for arbitration proceedings from suits to enforce arbitration cases based on the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien. See McDaniel v. Berhalter, 405 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Beach Resorts International. The mechanic's lien statute expressly authorizes such fees. § 713.29, Fla....

...smissed for "strategic" reasons. We therefore reverse the appealed order and remand for a determination and award of a reasonable attorney's fee pursuant to section 723.068. REVERSED AND REMANDED. UPCHURCH, C.J. and COWART, J., concur. NOTES [1] Cf. § 713.29, Fla....

...Welbaum, Guernsey, Hingston, Greenleaf & Gregory, and W. Frank Greenleaf, Coral Gables; Greenberg Traurig, and Alan T. Dimond, Miami, for appellees. Before COPE, GERSTEN, and SHEVIN, JJ. PER CURIAM. DCC Constructors, Inc. ("DCC") appeals a final judgment denying its claim for attorneys' fees under Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1999)....

...nt in the form of a personal check was not valid to satisfy a partial judgment which would toll interest on the judgment. We reverse on the main appeal, finding DCC prevailed in its enforcement of a lien and is thus entitled to attorneys' fees under Section 713.29....

...im against the lien transfer bond in circuit court, but not for the time spent in arbitration. DCC moved for a trial de novo on the issue of its entitlement to attorneys' fees. The trial court found that DCC was not entitled to attorneys' fees under Section 713.29, because DCC was not the prevailing party in an action to enforce a lien transfer bond....

...as a "mechanic's lien"). As this court has previously noted: "When a claimant in a mechanic's lien action recovers a judgment in any amount, a trial court errs in not finding the lienor the `prevailing party' and awarding attorney's fees pursuant to Section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes." Hub Cap Heaven, Inc....

...3d DCA 1983)(footnote omitted). Since DCC received a net award after arbitration on its sole cause of action, and also successfully defeated all of the defendants' affirmative defenses and counterclaims, it was entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party under Section 713.29....

...continued to accrue until the defendants tendered proper payment. See Enriquillo Export & Import, Inc. v. M.B.R. Indust., Inc., 733 So.2d at 1124. Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded for a determination of an attorneys' fees award under Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1999). NOTES [1] Section 713.29 provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under this part, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial and appeal or for ar...

...It then credited the owner for certain items amounting to $5,478.70. The court rejected the owner's position that he was entitled to sums from bringing his building up to code and denied the owner's claim for lost rent. It awarded attorney's fees to the contractor pursuant to the mechanic's lien statute, section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...n completion measured by its rental value during the period of delay. Marshall v. Karl F. Schultz, Inc., 438 So.2d 533 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). The owner is entitled to $525 for lost rent. Because of our holding, the owner is the "prevailing party" under Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1983)....

LAGOA, J. Global Xtreme, Inc. (“Global”) appeals from an order awarding attorney’s fees to Advanced Aircraft Center, Inc. (“Advanced”) pursuant to sections 57.105 and 713.29, Florida Statutes (2010)....

...Advanced filed the 57.105 Motion with the trial court four days later, on August 16, 2010. Subsequently, Advanced filed a counterclaim. Among other things, it sought to foreclose its mechanic’s lien. In its mechanic’s lien count, Advanced alleged that it was entitled to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2010)....

...companying 57.105 Motion. Based on the attorneys’ unsworn statements alone, the trial court determined that the 57.105 Motion had been sent with the July 21 letter, and that Advanced was entitled to attorney’s fees under both sections 57.105 and 713.29....

...3d DCA 2007); Polygram Latino U.S. v. Torres, 751 So.2d 90 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). Because no record evidence establishes that Advanced complied with section 57.105(4), we find that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees pursuant to section 57.105. B. Section 713.29 Alternatively, Advanced argues that the trial court’s order can be sustained as an award made pursuant to section 713.29. This argument is without merit. Section 713.29 is contained in Part I, Chapter 713, “Construction Liens.” Section 713.29 provides: Attorney’s fees In any action brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under this part, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial and appeal or for arbitration, in an amount to be determined by the court, which fee must be taxed as part of the prevailing party’s costs, as allowed in equitable actions. (emphasis added). Advanced sought attorney’s fees under section 713.29 for a lien it filed pursuant to sections 713.58 and 329.51....

...imed on an aircraft. See generally Commercial Jet, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 45 So.3d 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010). Neither section 713.58 nor section 329.51 provides for attorney’s fees. Advanced contends that the phrase “under this part” as used in section 713.29 is ambiguous, and can be read to include all types of mechanic’s liens contained in the entirety of Chapter 713, rather than just the construction liens provided for in Part I of Chapter 713. We disagree that the statute is ambiguous. Based on the plain language of the statute, the phrase “under this part” clearly limits section 713.29 to Part I, “Construction Liens.” The statute does not say “under this Chapter,” which would mean that section 713.29 applies to all types of liens contained in Chapter 713, including possessory liens on personal property....

...Additionally, section 713.001, Florida Statutes (2012), entitled “Short title of part” (referring to Part I) states: “This part may be cited as the ‘Construction Lien Law.’ ” This is a clear statement by the legislature that “under this part” as used in section 713.29 is limited to construction liens. Cf. Mashan Contractors, Inc. v. Bailey, 922 So.2d 330, 330 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (interpreting section 713.29 as applying to construction liens; “‘In any *492 action brought to enforce a [construction] lien ......

...under this part [Part I of chapter 713], the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial and appeal....’”). Therefore, the trial court erred in finding entitlement to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 713.29, where Advanced did not file its lien under Part I, Chapter 713....

...John BUCKHALTER, D/B/a Buckhalter Heating and Air Conditioning, Appellee. No. HH-498. District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. October 3, 1978. *1015 Herbert M. Webb, Gainesville, for appellants. No appearance for appellee. BOYER, Judge. This is an appeal from an order which denied attorney's fees under Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...eging in part a material breach of contract. The trial court determined that neither party had established his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Further, the trial court held that each party should be responsible for his own attorney's fees. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975) of the mechanics' lien law provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as a part of his costs. Winnie was entitled to recovery of attorney's fees under Section 713.29 as the prevailing party since he successfully resisted the mechanics' lien foreclosure action and was not found otherwise liable for damages in the same case....

...ecovery of attorney's fees. Clarmac, a contractor, faced with an agreement mandating arbitration of disputes between it and the property owner, filed a claim of lien against the owner and sued to foreclose the lien under the Mechanic's Lien Statute, Section 713.29, Florida Statutes, which, unlike the Arbitration Code, authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees....

...dy this defect by setting forth the reasons behind the award of attorney's fees in accordance with the criteria outlined in Ironworkers' Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d at 1266. [3] With that direction, the order under review is Affirmed. NOTES [1] Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975), amended by Chapter 77-353, Section 11, Laws of Florida, provided: "In any action brought to enforce a [mechanic's] lien..., the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by the court......

...r to impose a mechanic's lien and award of attorney fees attributable to the arbitration previously conducted." Beach Resorts International v. Clarmac Marine Construction Co., 339 So.2d at 692 (footnote omitted). After the decision in Beach Resorts, Section 713.29, Florida Statutes, was amended to read that "the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, to be determined by the court......

...l contractor and its surety on a transfer bond. Since the appellees were awarded attorneys' fees as prevailing parties in a mechanic's lien action, this award must be reversed without prejudice to the trial court awarding attorneys' fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1981), at the conclusion of the trial....

...$32,411.95 due Frisa with respect to the defective tapping sleeve. Aetna and Frisa contend they would then be entitled to prevailing party status because they were the parties receiving the larger verdict and thus could recover attorney's fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. Balboa Insurance Co., 408 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 1982), the supreme court concluded that when a lien is substituted by a bond, the statute which governs the assessment of attorney's fees is not the prevailing party provision under section 713.29, but the insurance provisions under sections 627.428 and 627.756....

...A claimant seeking to enforce rights under a construction bond is no longer bringing an action to enforce a lien, see Balboa Ins., 408 So.2d at 1047; Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co. of New York v. AIA Insulation Indus., Inc., 390 So.2d 734 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); hence, section 713.29 is not controlling because the language in the statute expressly limits the collection of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in any action brought to enforce a lien....

...Janssen of Riden, Crawford & Janssen, P.A., St. Petersburg, for appellee. GRIMES, Judge. The main issue in this appeal involves the question of who was the prevailing party in *633 a mechanic's lien action for purposes of awarding attorney's fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...able attorney's fees and costs to be awarded to the Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff as the prevailing party under the Complaint for foreclosure of mechanic's lien. On this appeal, S.C.M. claims that the court erred in awarding attorney's fees to Rhodes. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979), reads as follows: *634 713.29 Attorney's fees....

...NOTES [1] We express no opinion on whether we would have reached the same result if Rhodes had conditioned his offer of $8,119.50 upon S.C.M.'s release of further claims against him. [2] While we need not rest our decision on this point, a good argument can be made that when the legislature amended section 713.29 in 1977 (Ch....

...eeding. When a contractor fails to establish a mechanics' lien, but obtains a money judgment in the same case, for labor or materials, or both, furnished for the landowner's benefit, the landowner is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...tractor on its counter-claim (although not in the amount of the counter-claim). The trial court awarded the subcontractor attorneys' fees which was a subject of the appeal. The Third District stated at 242 So.2d 465: "Appellants contend the statute (§ 713.29, Fla....

...r which judgment is awarded against the bonding company because of F.S.A. § 627.0905(2)". (§ 627.0905(2) is the predecessor of § 627.756 cited by Defendant.) The Third District Court of Appeal stated at 257 So.2d 907 and 908: "We hold that F.S.A. § 713.29 is the governing section and that the attorney's fees therein provided is not limited by the provisions of F.S.A....

...Corky, supra . The subject bond states: "... may sue on this bond for the use of such claimant, prosecute the suit to final judgment for such sum or sums as may be justly due claimant." The undertaking of the surety included all sums to be due claimant; § 713.29 included a reasonable attorneys' fee....

...prosecution was granted does not mean the claim for attorney's fees was not made. The record is clear that S & S received appropriate notice. The trial court did have jurisdiction. The only issue remaining is whether Heidle was the prevailing party. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1991), which deals with construction liens, provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien under this part, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of [the party's] attorney f...

...After Englishtown failed to pay Johnson, Johnson sued Englishtown and Balboa and gained a judgment against them. Johnson's complaint originally sought attorney's fees in accordance with the provisions of section 627.756, Florida Statutes (1977). After judgment, however, Johnson persuaded the trial judge that section 713.29 was applicable and secured an award for attorney's fees well in excess of the 12.5% limitation imposed by section 627.756....

...A related question is the award of attorney's fees for the enforcement of a mechanic's lien under chapter 713, Florida Statutes (1977). Section 627.756 relating to the award of attorney's fees for the enforcement of construction bonds was originally codified as section 627.0905 in 1959. Section 713.29 relating to the award of attorney's fees for the enforcement of a lien became law in 1963....

...ent or performance bonds written to indemnify such persons against pecuniary loss by breach of a building or construction contract. It specifically fails to mention actions to enforce equitable or statutory liens in favor of these parties. [1] *1046 Section 713.29, on the other hand, is expressly limited to "any action brought to enforce a lien under part I [Mechanic's Liens]." [2] This seems to indicate the legislature's intent to limit section 713.29 to the enforcement of liens arising under part I of chapter 713....

...The 1977 amendment completely deleted the first subsection, leaving former subsection (2) as the present statute. The statute as thus amended relates solely to bonds for construction contracts and not to the enforcement of statutory liens. With the same pen the legislature broadened section 713.29, allowing attorney's fees in both the trial and appeal stages and equating such fees to those allowed in equitable actions....

...Richardson Electric Co., 364 So.2d 854 (Fla.2d DCA 1978); Continental Casualty Co. v. Krauss Air Conditioning, Inc., 184 So.2d 485 (Fla.2d DCA 1966). Clearly, if the legislature had intended to include the award of attorney's fees for the recovery on construction bonds in section 713.29, it could have done so when that section was first enacted or during the later amendment after several of the conflicting decisions had been decided....

...In Midway the court construed the mechanic's lien law liberally so as to effectuate its purpose of giving materialmen and laborers the greatest possible protection. [4] *1047 It also based the decision on the specific wording of the surety contract. Neither of these reasons, however, provides a sound basis for construing section 713.29 to control in the face of section 627.756....

...ainst a surety on a performance or payment bond are governed by the specific provisions in 627.756. Id. at 594. All five district courts of appeal have been asked to resolve this conflict in the statutes. At one time, three of those courts held that section 713.29 would control the present action....

...[5] Since that time, two of those courts have reversed their holdings [6] and joined the remaining two [7] in holding that, when suit is brought against the contractor and surety for enforcement of the surety bond, attorney's fees are limited to the 12.5% maximum imposed by section 627.756. The distinction is that section 713.29 relates to direct actions against the owner and the property through the legislatively created mechanic's lien statutes....

...4th DCA 1980), the subcontractor filed to foreclose his mechanic's lien and for breach of contract. The Fourth District found the plaintiff's recovery for breach of contract rather than lien and stated: It would seem that, if the awards to the subcontractors resulted from the perfection and enforcement of mechanics liens, Section 713.29 should apply and the award of the attorneys' fees was proper....

...On the other hand, if the awards to the subcontractors arise out of a claim against the payment bond, the attorney's fee would be controlled by Section 627.756(2), Florida Statutes (1977). Id. at 738. The court went on to comment on the effect of section 713.23 on section 713.29. Section 713.29 provides for a reasonable attorney's fee "in any action brought to enforce a lien under Part I" of Chapter 713....

...visions of Part I. The lien claimants [sic] cause of action is upon the bond rather than to enforce a lien under Part I. Thus, Section 627.756(2) should control the attorney's fees. Therefore, we find it is error *1048 to award attorneys' fees under Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...27.756 award for attorney's fees. Further, in the complaint Johnson claimed entitlement to attorney's fees only under the provisions of section 627.756. It was not until the post-judgment motion to tax costs and award reasonable attorney's fees that section 713.29 was raised....

...judgment or decree is for more than $500 nor less than $50 where the judgment or decree is $500 or less. Such owners, subcontractors, laborers and material men shall be deemed to be "insureds" or "beneficiaries" for the purposes of this section. [2] § 713.29 reads as follows: In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as part of his costs....

...ractor. Goodwin therefore is not entitled to an equitable lien on the unpaid funds. The appellant owners have successfully resisted Goodwin's claim for a mechanic's lien. They are entitled, therefore, to a reasonable fee for their lawyer's services. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...against Seaboard when it obtained a judgment against appellants. Compare Prosperi v. Code, Inc., 626 So.2d 1360 (Fla. 1993) (prevailing party test *988 of Moritz applies to attorney's fees awarded to prevailing party in mechanic's lien action under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1989))....

...orida, after it was awarded a recovery of $185.00 in a mechanics lien suit claiming $303.54. Appellee took nothing by his counterclaim. We agree that the court erred in failing to award appellant a reasonable attorney's fee. Chapter 77-353, amending Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977), effective July 1, 1978, reads: In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for tria...

...Reversed and Remanded for a determination of a reasonable attorney's fee for proceedings at trial and on this appeal. ERVIN and BOOTH, JJ., concur. ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., J., dissents. ROBERT SMITH, J., dissenting: By adding the words "as allowed in equitable actions" to Section 713.29, the legislature obviously intended something....

...hed, we have jurisdiction to review the propriety of that determination. The amount of attorneys fees recoverable from Chase Manhattan Bank and Seaboard Surety Co. is controlled by statute. The applicable statutory provisions are Sections 713.24 and 713.29, Florida Statutes. Section 713.29 expressly provides that attorneys fees awarded under Chapter 713, Florida Statutes, are taxed as costs....

...ich such claim of lien was recorded, and costs not to exceed $100. The legislative intent behind this section is clear. A surety is liable for no more than $100.00 in costs to the prevailing party. *541 Construed in para materia, Sections 713.24 and 713.29 provide that a surety's liability for the prevailing party's attorneys fees may not exceed $100, which is the maximum liability of a surety for costs....

...It should be noted that Section 713.08, Florida Statutes, provides for a lien in the amount remaining unpaid to the lienor for labor or services or materials, but does not provide for inclusion of an amount for the attorneys fees and costs which the lienor may incur in enforcing a lien, even though Section 713.29, Florida Statutes, supra, provides for recovery of attorneys fees by the prevailing party which shall be taxed as costs....

...Dykes, Jr., of Landis, Graham, French, Husfeld, Sherman & Ford, P.A., DeLand, for appellee. SHARP, Judge. Appellants bring a timely appeal from the lower court's final judgment awarding damages to appellee, Central Contracting, Inc. and denying appellants' request for attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...g liability. However, a special verdict which finds damages without finding liability is not inconsistent, Tidwell v. Toca, 362 So.2d 85 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 1375 (Fla. 1979), and it does not support an award of damages. Under section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes (1981), the prevailing party in an action to enforce a lien under this chapter may recover attorney's fees....

...is $500 or less. Such owners, subcontractors, laborers and material men shall be deemed to be "insureds" or "beneficiaries" for the purposes of this section. The appellees, on the other hand, contend the allowance of attorneys' fees is controlled by Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977), which provides: Attorney's fees.-In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as part of his costs. It would seem that, if the awards to the subcontractors resulted from the perfection and enforcement of mechanics liens, Section 713.29 should apply and the award of attorneys' fees was proper....

...As we will demonstrate later in this opinion, the subcontractors' claims were properly against the bond rather than the foreclosure of liens against the owner and the property. Resnick Developers South, Inc. v. Clerici, Inc., 340 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). Section 713.29 provides for a reasonable attorney's fee "in any action brought to enforce a lien under Part I" of Chapter 713....

...from the provisions of Part I. The lien claimants cause of action is upon the bond rather than to enforce a lien under Part I. Thus, Section 627.756(2) should control the attorney's fees. Therefore, we find it is error to award attorneys' fees under Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977). Several cases which have treated the dichotomy between Sections 713.29 and 627.756(2) have held that in a case like the one at bar Section 713.29 applies and reasonable attorneys' fees are allowable with no statutory maximum....

...Corry previously was awarded a final judgment against Will-O-Wick, Inc., the apparent owner of the project to which Corry furnished labor and materials, establishing a Chapter 713 lien in the amount of $19,768.34, including costs and attorney's fees assessed under Section 713.29....

...In Trytek, one party prevailed on a construction lien by stipulation before trial but lost on the sole issue argued at trial. Id. at 1196-97. Each party subsequently claimed it was the "prevailing party" for the purpose of determining fees "as part of the prevailing party's costs," pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...dency of the main appeal. While Case No. 83-284 was pending on the cross appeal Magee obtained a judgment in the trial court awarding the owners attorney's fees of $5,000 based upon a finding that Magee was the prevailing party within the meaning of section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...On remand, the trial court may consider the Contractor's claim for prejudgment interest on the amount due under the contract. In addition, the trial court must revisit the parties' claims for attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing party under section 713.29 and under the contract....

...ement and must now pay the [Wolfes’] attorney’s fees and costs.” B. Recovering Costs From The Losing Party Pursuant to Section 57.041 Culpepper contends that the trial court should have awarded it attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to either section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2006) (construction liens and fees statute), 2 its demands for judgment, or section 57.041(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...es incurred by her or him or on the defendant's behalf pursuant to a ... contract from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer.... . Section 713.29 provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under this part, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial and appeal or for ar...

...se. As the prevailing party in an action brought under chapter 713, Florida Statutes (2000), Highlands is entitled to an award of a reasonable attorney's fee and court costs from appellees Helen Connone and the Estate of Eugene Connone (homeowners). § 713.29....

...Accordingly, we must reverse the final judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of an award of prejudgment interest. ATTORNEYS' FEES The Mameles were awarded $16,764.50 in attorneys' fees. The only legal basis for this award was section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1993), which authorizes an award of attorneys' fees and costs to a prevailing party "[i]n any action brought to enforce a lien...." Summerton argues that we must reduce the fee award because the award compensates the...

...for time spent by their attorney in this matter after Summerton's lien claim was abandoned. In this regard, Summerton notes that such *134 hours were not expended in "any action brought to enforce a lien ..." and therefore are not compensable under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...ance due, thereby negating any anticipated profit. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for entry of judgment for the appellee, Willoughby, in the amount of $94,458.00 plus interest of $24,559.08, together with the attorney fees award made pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1989), and costs....

...em as part of his proof of damages in the case. See Mystery Fun House, Inc. v. Magic World, Inc., 417 So.2d 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). However, when attorney's fees are recoverable as costs, such as here under section 83.48, Florida Statutes, or under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (which provides for attorney's fees to be taxed as part of costs to the prevailing party in a mechanic's lien case), attorney's fees may be taxed as costs in a motion which need be made only within a reasonable time after the appeal in the case has been concluded....

...We further note that before the complaint was filed against Monde by Hardrives, Monde offered to pay to Hardrives the amount to which Hardrives was entitled, $3,944.60. [1] Since Hardrives did not accept the amount it should have accepted it was not the prevailing party in this lawsuit as defined in Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...for partial summary judgment and for attorney's fees. In March 1996, GCA filed a motion for summary judgment contending that it was entitled to attorney's fees under paragraph 21.6 of the contract [1] and pursuant to Florida's Construction Lien Law. § 713.29, Fla....

...arising out of, or in any way relating to this Agreement or the subject matter thereof, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover its reasonable attorney's fees and costs including those incurred in conjunction with appellate proceeding. [2] Section 713.29 provides as follows: Attorney's fees....

...hould have granted the owner's motions to dismiss made at trial. Finally, because the contractor failed to prove at trial that he complied with section 713.06(3)(d)1, the lower court erred in entering judgment in favor of the contractor. Pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes, a party who successfully resists a claim to enforce a mechanic's lien is the "prevailing party" and, hence, entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee....

...The day before, March 16, the owners had filed suit against the contractor, claiming damages for the latter's breach of the contract. The actions were consolidated for jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict holding neither party liable to the other. The owners moved for an award of attorney's fees under Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1981), contending they were the prevailing party in the mechanic's lien foreclosure action....

...The circuit court denied their motion and entered final judgment providing that neither party take anything from the other and that each bear his own costs. On this appeal, the owners complain that the circuit court erred in denying their motion for attorney's fees. We agree. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1981), provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, to be determined by the...

...It is evident that the circuit court has impermissibly interrelated the two actions and ruled that the owners must prevail in the whole litigation, including their contract action against the contractor, before becoming entitled to an award of attorney's fees under Section 713.29....

...On the mechanics' lien issue, the trial judge found against Gossett and in favor of GDC. Attorneys' fees were awarded to GDC on the theory that it was the prevailing party in the mechanics' lien proceedings and entitled to an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...This court has previously held that when a contractor fails to establish a mechanics' lien but obtains a money judgment, in the same case, for labor or materials, or both, furnished for the landowner's benefit, the landowner is not entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under Section 713.29....

...Appellant's third point urges that the trial court may not assess as an attorney's fee more than 12 1/2% of the amount for which judgment is awarded against a bonding company because of F.S.A. § 627.0905(2) [1] . The mechanic's lien statute provides in F.S.A. § 713.29, as follows: "713.29 Attorney's Fees....

..."In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as part of his costs." We hold that F.S.A. § 713.29 is the governing section and that the attorney's fees therein provided is not limited by the provisions of F.S.A....

...Hoyt Enterprises, Inc., 604 So.2d 807 (Fla.1992). Moritz established the current rule that the prevailing party is the one who prevails on the "significant issues" in the litigation. See also Presperi v. Code, Inc., 626 So.2d 1360 (Fla. 1993) (applying the rule where fees are sought pursuant to section 713.29)....

...But, we think this matter must also be resolved by a trial on remand, and accordingly we reverse all of the attorney's fee award. If Bryson's oral contract claim is defeated or substantially offset by Elbadramany's damage claim, Bryson would not be entitled to any attorney's fee award pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...When Hoenstine's failure to comply with this jurisdictional requirement was brought to the court's attention via the motion for a directed verdict, the court should have granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Sowers has moved for an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes....

...The plaintiff in this case had an irrigation subcontractor on the job because plaintiff was not licensed to do that part of the work. Another effect of the above reversal is upon the question of attorney's fees. It can be seen from our conclusions that the only party entitled to them under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1985) is the surety as it has prevailed upon the mechanics' lien count....

...This is an appeal from an order denying defendants-McPhersons motion for attorney fees pursuant to his successful defense of a foreclosure action under the Mechanics' Lien Law. We reverse. Briefly, defendant argues that he is the prevailing party and as such, under Section 713.29, F.S....

...f. Since appellant was the defendant below he would not qualify. The order appealed from also cited cases which were based on an earlier version of the statute now in question, a version declared unconstitutional. We hold that there was error below. Section 713.29, F.S....

...See generally J. Batten Corp. v. Oakridge Inv. 85, Ltd., 546 So.2d 68 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). However, we reverse the determination that the lien was valid and accordingly also reverse the award of statutory attorney's fees against the Hanleys pursuant to section 713.29....

...aims against the construction bond posted by Midway Mall. Appellant counterclaimed, under § 713.31, Fla. Stat. 1969, F.S.A., alleging that the appellee had filed a statutory "fraudulent lien"; appellant also filed a motion for attorney's fees under § 713.29, Fla....

...cs' lien by releasing the land and transferring the lien asserted to the fund created by the construction bond and removed the lis pendens filed, this does not constitute the landowner, Midway Mall, the "prevailing party" within the contemplation of § 713.29, Fla....

...The supreme court has considered the effect of a good-faith settlement offer on the determination of which party has prevailed in an enforcement of construction lien case. The supreme court stated, "[W]e find that in order to be a prevailing party entitled to the award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, a litigant must have recovered an amount exceeding that which was earlier offered in settlement of the claim." C.U....

...The trial court struck through two sentences in All-Brite's statement of the evidence and then approved both All-Brite's and the Desrosiers' statements of the evidence. We conclude that the parties and the court substantially complied with Rule 9.200(b)(4). [2] Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1991) provides: "In an action brought to enforce a [construction] lien ......

...1971, 249 So.2d 496; *568 H.D. McPherson, Inc. v. Metro Electric of Orlando, Inc., Fla.App. 1971, 253 So.2d 878; Houdaille-Duval-Wright Company v. Charldon Construction Company, Fla.App. 1972, 266 So.2d 106; Potter v. Rowan, Fla.App. 1972, 266 So.2d 121; § 713.29, Fla....

...Under no other section would a non-prevailing party, be it the government or a private consumer, be liable for attorney's fees. It is doubtful that the Legislature intended this inconsistency. I would affirm the trial court. NOTES [1] § 501.2105(1) Florida Statutes (1979); § 713.29 Florida Statutes (1979); § 718.303(1) Florida Statutes (1979)....

...Waters, Jr., Jacksonville, for respondents. EHRLICH, Justice. We have for review Fixel Enterprises, Inc. v. Theis, 507 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), in which the district court certified the following question: IS THE DEFINITION IMPOSED UPON THE TERM "PREVAILING PARTY" AS USED IN SECTION 713.29, FLORIDA STATUTES, IN C.U....

...rtified the above question which refers to this Court's decision in C.U. Associates, Inc. v. R.B. Grove, Inc., 472 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 1985). In C.U. Associates, this court held that in order to be a "prevailing party" entitled to attorney's fees under section 713.29 Florida Statutes (1981), a litigant, in an action to enforce a mechanics' lien, "must have recovered an amount exceeding that which was earlier offered in settlement of the claim." 472 So.2d at 1179....

...[1] *1017 Fixel urges us to hold that the definition of "prevailing party" adopted in C.U. Associates applies to that term as used in the construction contract at issue. Fixel argues that the term should have but one definition, whether used in a contract or in a statute, such as section 713.29. Because none of the policy considerations underlying section 713.29 are present in this case, we decline to extend the C.U. Associates definition of "prevailing party" outside of the mechanic's lien context. The definition for "prevailing party" adopted in C.U. Associates was based on the underlying policy of section 713.29 to "encourage settlement of disputes before resorting to litigation." 472 So.2d at 1178....

...We went on to reason that "[t]o award attorneys fees and costs when any judgment is won, without reference to earlier, bona-fide good faith offers to settle the claim, allows the plaintiff a free throw of the dice in an attempt to squeeze the last penny out of the claim... . Such a result defeats the laudable goal section 713.29 was intended to achieve." Id. at 1178-79. None of these policy considerations are implicated in the instant case. Therefore, we answer the question certified in the negative and hold that the definition of the term "prevailing party" as used in section 713.29 is not to be extended beyond the context of that statute....

...ney's fee for any action deemed necessary by Leisure Pool to enforce its rights under the agreement. Leisure Pool also claimed entitlement to recover a reasonable *394 attorney's fee as the prevailing party in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien. § 713.29, Fla....

...Catlin, Saxon, Tuttle & Evans and William M. Tuttle, II; Stephen S. Southerland, Miami, for appellees. Before JORGENSON, COPE and FLETCHER, JJ. COPE, Judge. Regency Homes of Dade, Inc. ("contractor") appeals an order awarding attorney's fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes, after the appellee homeowners successfully defended against the appellant contractor's claim to enforce a construction lien....

...The residential *1205 construction contract did not have an attorney's fees clause. The case proceeded to trial, at which the homeowners recovered judgment against the contractor. Judgment was entered in favor of the homeowners on the claim to foreclose the construction lien. The homeowners moved for attorney's fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes....

...The contractor asserts that the case must be returned to the trial court for a new hearing. The beginning point of the contractor's analysis is this court's decision in Metro-Centre Associates v. Environmental Engineers, Inc., 522 So.2d 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). In that case, this court said that under section 713.29, a prevailing owner is not entitled to "recovery of attorney's fees incurred in the breach of contract action ......

...The trial court held that the appellant had complied with the statute, and the record is sufficient to support this conclusion. Even though appellant sought to recover more than the amount of its judgment, appellant was still entitled to attorneys' fees as the "prevailing party" under Fla. Stat. § 713.29....

...In a post-trial hearing the trial court determined the owners were entitled to attorney's fees of $5,625 as the prevailing party on the mechanics' lien claim made by the subcontractor. From the order allowing attorney's fees, the subcontractor perfected this appeal. The sole question presented is whether section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1987), authorizes an owner to recover attorney's fees against a lien claimant who failed to recover on his lien claim but who does recover judgment on a related claim for damages....

...eeding. When a contractor fails to establish a mechanics' lien, but obtains a money judgment in the same case, for labor or materials, or both, furnished for the landowner's benefit, the landowner is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...So the surety was the prevailing party under the lien statute. Finally, the applicable rule in this scenario is spelled out in Winnie v. Buckhalter, 362 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), wherein the court said: Winnie [the owner] was entitled to recovery of attorney's fees under Section 713.29 as the prevailing party since he successfully resisted the mechanics' lien foreclosure action and was not found otherwise liable for damages in the same case....

...tify the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: IS AN OWNER WHO PREVAILS ON A COMPLAINT BY A CONTRACTOR OR SUB-CONTRACTOR TO ENFORCE A MECHANIC'S LIEN UNDER PART I, CHAPTER 713, FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER 713.29, EVEN THOUGH, IN THE SAME SUIT, THE CONTRACTOR *431 PREVAILED AGAINST THE OWNER ON A CLAIM FOR MONEY DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF THE CONTRACT, BOTH CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION? DELL, J., concurs. FARMER, J., concurs specially, with opinion. FARMER, Judge, concurring specially. If this were a case of first impression in this district, I should respectfully disagree with my colleagues on their reading of section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...William P. Jacobson, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellees. PER CURIAM. This was an action to foreclose on a mechanic's lien. Appellant entered a voluntary *362 dismissal. Thereafter, attorney's fees were awarded to appellee under the provisions of Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...oncerns cases where a statute or contract provides for such an award. The cause of action in Randle-Eastern was for wrongful death and there was no statute or mentioned contract mandating attorney's fees. In the instant case there is such a statute, Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...est bidder in accordance with the Judicial Sales Procedure, Section 45.031, Florida Statutes. *1246 Moreover, each party was ordered to pay its own attorney's fees. The statutory basis for an award of attorney's fees in the instant case derives from section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1999), which provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under this part, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorne...

...5th DCA 1994) (citing Sanfilippo v. Larry Giacin Tile Co., Inc., 390 So.2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)); see also CDI Contractors, LLC. v. Allbrite Elec. Contractors, Inc., 836 So.2d 1031, 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ("A party is entitled to recover fees pursuant to section 713.29 if successful in prosecuting or defending a mechanic's lien cause of action."); DCC Constructors, Inc....

...unts owing under the contract. See id. As a consequence of the net judgment in favor of the contractor, the trial court denied the owner’s claim for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the prevailing party fee provision in the mechanic’s lien statute, section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes....

...r against him if the rental agreement contains a provision allowing attorney's fees to the mobile home park owner; to a like effect is F.S. 718.125 as it relates to contract or lease between a condominium unit owner or association and a developer; F.S. 713.29 provides any action brought to enforce a lien, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, and F.S....

...But the "White Lake" and "Tudor Village" claims are not the same. Paltuco was the apartment developer and defendant was the masonry contractor on both projects. That is the only connection between them. In the prior suit, defendant prayed for attorneys' fees. Pursuant to Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975), the court *947 had authority to award reasonable attorneys' fees to defendant as the prevailing party, and to tax the same as costs against Paltuco....

...uired contractor's affidavit within that same ninety-day period. The trial court awarded Regis attorney's fees on the theory that Regis was the prevailing party on the mechanics lien action and was entitled to an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29....

...We agree. When a contractor fails to establish a mechanic's lien but obtains a money judgment in the same case for labor or materials, or both, furnished for the landowner's benefit, the landowner is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under section 713.29....

...FRANK, Judge. The appellant, NCN Electric, Inc., the successful cross-plaintiff before the trial court in a mechanics lien foreclosure action, disputes the denial to it of an attorney's fee. The final judgment entered on the cross-claim states that although § 713.29, Florida Statutes (1983), contemplates that the prevailing party in a mechanics lien proceeding "be made whole by an award of attorney's fees and costs, ......

...The trial court obviously believed the only appropriate stage at which to prove the amount of the fee was during the trial. Apart from the absence of any authority to support that view, the difficulty we have with it derives from two considerations. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1983), provides that: Attorney's fees....

...They argue that the additional fees and costs may be reduced to a monetary judgment, but that no lien can be created against their homestead to assist in the collection of the judgment. The critical issue is whether the language of section 713.06 permits the attorneys' fees and costs ultimately awarded under section 713.29 to become a lien against the property....

...As a creature of statute, construction lien laws must be strictly construed. Stunkel, 660 So.2d at 625. Nevertheless, these statutes must be construed *18 as a whole in light of the legislature's intended policies. Ceco Corp. v. Goldberg, 219 So.2d 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969). The attorneys' fees awarded under section 713.29 are not an element of damages, but are "taxed as part of ......

...d by the trier of fact, to sustain the final judgment in favor of Robert Myers Painting, Inc. against Harkness-Pinkerton, Inc. Those portions of the final judgments are therefore affirmed. The motion for attorney's fees filed by appellee pursuant to Section 713.29 is denied....

...Appellant accurately brings to our attention that we overlooked and failed to consider that, in accordance with the reservation in the final judgments, the trial court thereafter entered supplementary cost judgments and judgments for attorney's fees pursuant to F.S. 713.29 in favor of Robert Myers Painting, Inc....

...and that the entry of those judgments was assigned as error. Having reversed the final judgments as to the imposition of mechanic's liens and foreclosure thereof, we also reverse the subsequent judgments for attorney's fees and costs. It necessarily follows that pursuant to F.S. 713.29, Hawaiian Inn of Daytona Beach, Inc....

...unt sought by appellant on its lien, together with interest and costs, but awarding no attorney's fees. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying attorney's fees to it, since it was clearly the "prevailing party" within the meaning of Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975), which provides: "In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by t...

...Attorney Keyes further testified that he could not break down the attorney's fees between the work done on the counterclaim and the lien foreclosure. [2] We thus confront the second prong of appellees' argument in support of the denial of any attorney's fees to appellant. Appellees assert that the terms of Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975), quoted above, provide for recovery of a reasonable attorney's fee only "(i)n any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter ..." Since appellant's witness testified that he could not break d...

...orney's fees pursuant to that statute to have recovered an amount exceeding that which was earlier offered in settlement of the claim. This court rejected Fixel's argument and declined to extend the definition of "prevailing party" in the context of section 713.29 to the term as it was used in the parties' *565 contract....

...g of the offer." Id. at 1017 n. 1 (emphasis added). In its opinion, the court distinguished the case before it from C.U. Associates, noting that "[t]he definition of `prevailing party' adopted in C.U. Associates was based on the underlying policy of section 713.29 to `encourage settlement of disputes before resorting to litigation.'" Id. at 1017 (quoting C.U. Associates, 472 So.2d at 1178). The court also noted that the result in C.U. Associates was required because to hold otherwise would have defeated the goal section 713.29 was intended to achieve....

...Robinson, Miami, for appellant. Helman & Young and Nard S. Helman, Coral Gables, for appellee. Before BARKDULL, NESBITT and JORGENSON, JJ. JORGENSON, Judge. We reverse the final order of the trial court denying Metro-Centre Associates' motion for attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...In Schabert, the court held that "[w]hen a contractor fails to establish a mechanics' lien, but obtains a money judgment in the same case, for labor or materials, or both, furnished for the landowner's benefit, the landowner is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979)." (Citations omitted.) According to Schabert, Metro-Centre would not merit an award of attorney's fees because Environmental, the contractor, recovered $3,750 on its counterclaim against Metro-Centre for goods sold and delivered....

...Larry Giacin Tile Co., 390 So.2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). This result obtains even where judgment is entered against a landowner in his breach of contract action against the contractor. Snaidman v. Harrell, 432 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The Snaidman court observed that section 713.29 does not require a property owner to prevail in the whole litigation, including contract actions against the contractor, before an award of attorney's fees is merited. The court noted that section 713.29 provides only for fees incident to the foreclosure action....

...We, therefore, reverse the trial court's order and remand to the trial court for assessment of Metro-Centre's reasonable attorney's fees for its defense of the mechanics' lien counterclaim. Reversed and remanded with directions. NOTES [1] The statute provides: 713.29 Attorney's fees....

...— In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as part of his costs, as allowed in equitable actions. § 713.29, Fla....

...2003-94, § 9 at 472, Laws of Fla.; § 57.105(7), Fla. Stat. (2003-2008). [3] In Prosperi v. Code, Inc., 626 So.2d 1360, 1363 (Fla. 1993), the court held that the Moritz test also applied to determine who is the prevailing party for the purposes of awarding fees on a statutory claim brought under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1989).

...5th DCA 1990), we held that under section 57.041, a judge does not have discretion to deny recovery of costs to a prevailing party. Consequently, Ivey, as the party recovering judgment was entitled to an award of costs. We also conclude that Ivey was entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes, [3] because he prevailed on his mechanic's lien claim....

...itled to $46,453.55 after calculating the Salazars' set-off. "When a claimant in a mechanic's lien action recovers a judgment in any amount, a trial court errs in not finding the claimant the prevailing party and awarding attorneys' fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes." DCC Constructors, Inc....

...5th DCA 1994) (citing Sanfilippo v. Larry Giacin Tile Co., Inc., 390 So.2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)); see also CDI Contractors, LLC. v. Allbrite Elec. Contractors, Inc., 836 So.2d 1031, 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ("A party is entitled to recover fees pursuant to section 713.29 if successful in prosecuting or defending a mechanic's lien cause of action."); DCC Constructors, Inc....

...fees. Prosperi v. Code, Inc., 626 So.2d 1360, 1363 (Fla.1993); Moritz v. Hoyt Enters., 604 So.2d 807 (Fla.1992). Id. at 1246. Pursuant to our previous decisions, we conclude that the trial court was required to award Ivey attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29....

...Pavers associated with pool deck stained and/or chipped and/or several areas not level. 10. Site includes inadequate drainage of storm water. [2] Section 57.041, Florida Statutes, provides: The party recovering judgment shall recover all his or her legal costs and charges which shall be included in the judgment. [3] Section 713.29, Florida Statutes, provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under this part, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the service of her or his attorney for trial an...

...Jones, of Moody and Jones, Plantation, for appellant. Michael E. Muchnick, of Shirley D. Weisman, P.A., Pompano Beach, for appellee. GUNTHER, Judge. Plaintiff, Salisbury, appeals an order denying its motion to amend the final judgment to award it attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1985), and costs....

...In making our ruling we have carefully reviewed all the numerous issues raised by Pennington and find them to be without merit. On cross-appeal, Evans raised the denial by the trial judge of his attorney's fees and costs. The parties agree that the prevailing party is entitled to an award of its attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, which provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under this part, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial and appeal or...

...The contractor argues that section 713.31 (2)(c) allows an owner to recover attorney’s fees only if the lienor who filed the fraudulent lien is not the prevailing party. Noting that the Florida Supreme Court has applied the “significant issues” test to statutory construction lien matters under section 713.29, the contractor contends that the “significant issues” test also applies to section 713.31....

...Although Moritz was a common law breach of contract action, the Florida Supreme Court later held that the “significant issues” test of Moritz applies in determining which party, if any, is the prevailing party entitled to an award of fees in construction lien actions brought under section 713.29, Florida Statutes. Trytek v. Gale Indus., Inc., 3 So.3d 1194, 1196 (Fla. 2009); Prosperi v. Code, Inc., 626 So.2d 1360, 1363 (Fla. 1993). The Florida Supreme Court recognized the equitable nature of attorney’s fees awards under section 713.29 and explained that “under most circumstances it would be unfair to require a contractor who recovers the bulk of its claim to pay attorney’s fees for failure to meet the technical requirements of the mechanic’s lien law.” Prosperi, 626 So.2d at 1363 ....

...the trial and ruled in the final judgment that neither party was entitled to an attorney's fee. Appellant having successfully resisted appellee's claim for a mechanic's lien, his attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee for his services pursuant to § 713.29, Fla....

...In an action to foreclose such a lien, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial and appeal... in an amount to be determined by the court, which fee must be taxed as part of the prevailing party's costs, as allowed in equitable actions. § 713.29, Fla. Stat. (1999). Attorney's fees and costs awarded under section 713.29 are included within the lien created by section 713.05. See Zalay v. Ace Cabinets of Clearwater, Inc., 700 So.2d 15, 17-18 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (examining section 713.06(1)). Zalay held that section 713.29 attorney's fees are included within the lien created by section 713.06(1), Florida Statutes (1999). See id. at 18. The language creating the lien in section 713.05 is almost identical to the lien creating language in section 713.06(1). The reasons Zalay articulates for including section 713.29 attorney's fees within the section 713.06(1) lien are equally applicable to the lien at issue in this case, and we expressly adopt them. Section 713.29 fees may properly be taxed after the entry of a final judgment in a lien foreclosure action. See NCN Elec., Inc. v. Leto, 498 So.2d 1377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). This rule makes *657 practical sense. Only the prevailing party is entitled to fees under section 713.29....

...and have determined that none of the challenges raised by either appellant or appellees warrant our disturbance of the "amended final judgment," as there was competent substantial evidence to support the trial judge's findings. However, pursuant to Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977), the trial court erred in denying appellant an award of attorney's fees in its "order on all pending motions." The record demonstrates that appellant was the prevailing party on its counterclaim for foreclosure...

...Salmon's claim of lien was in the amount of $40,688.92, and the complaint ultimately filed sought $41,476.67. By the final judgment, Salmon recovered a lien and judgment in the amount of $16,024.07. As the prevailing party, Salmon is entitled to attorney's fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...The final judgment must be modified to indicate that prejudgment interest accrues from April 21, 1992, the date the contractor's affidavit was served, rather than *840 the claim of lien date selected by the trial court. Both parties seek attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to section 713.29....

...e Contractor's failure to execute a release of lien on the property following the arbitration award. We agree. Because the Rocks were found to be the prevailing party in the lien action, they are entitled to recover their attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...3d DCA 1983); American Insulation of Fort Walton Beach, Inc. v. Pruitt, 378 So.2d 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Peter Marich & Associates, Inc. v. Powell, 365 So.2d 754 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). (These cases reached the same holding in interpreting a similar provision of the Florida Statutes, § 713.29.) Id....

...not under the lien enforcement statute. Apparently, § 85.011(5) has not been addressed previously by a Bankruptcy Court, but courts have addressed the much broader provision for attorneys' fees under Part I of the mechanics' lien statute. Fla.Stat. § 713.29....

...lien was willfully exaggerated and fraudulent. We affirm the appeal and cross appeal, but remand to the trial court for an award of attorney's fees to RSW, as RSW successfully resisted O'Kon's claim for mechanic's lien and is entitled to a fee under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...gs are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, and we will not disturb the trial court's resolution of these factual disputes. AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part and REMANDED to the trial court for an award of fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes....

...em as part of his proof of damages in the case. See Mystery Fun House, Inc. v. Magic World, Inc., 417 So.2d 785 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). However, when attorney's fees are recoverable as costs, such as here under section 83.48, Florida Statutes, or under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (which provides for attorney's fees to be taxed as part of costs to the prevailing party in a mechanic's lien case), attorney's fees may be taxed as costs in a motion which need be made only within a reasonable time after the appeal in the case has been concluded....

...Instead, the court permitted Appel-lee to prove up its defenses. This was error. Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings. Both parties have filed motions in this court seeking an award of appellate attorney’s fees pursuant to section 713.29....

...that the plaintiff had submitted no evidence of having made a contract with its counsel for payment of fees thereto. In a suit for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien such evidence is not a prerequisite to the allowance of fees to the prevailing party. Section 713.29 Fla....

...but disputes the extent of the lien above that amount. The Debtor contends that by failing to obtain a final judgment for attorney's fees and costs, the attorney's fees and costs are unsecured debts. Mayfair asserts that pursuant to Florida Statute Section 713.29 its lien should include pre- and post-judgment interest, attorney's fees and costs....

...s secured claim. In that case, In re Hallmark Builders, Inc., 54 B.R. 120 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1985), the court, without analysis, determined that the attorney's fees incurred during the litigation were secured by the mechanic's lien. *708 Florida Statute Section 713.29 provides that the prevailing party in an action to enforce a lien is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees....

...This statute does not give a court discretion to award fees. Mayfair was the prevailing party in the circuit court litigation. Had the circuit court not deferred the attorney's fee issue, the attorney's fees would have been part of the judgment against the Debtor. Because Section 713.29 requires the trial court to award fees to the prevailing party, which fees should be part of the final judgment, this Court deems Mayfair's lien to be secured to the extent of its attorney's fees....

...The trial court denied appellant an award of costs or attorney's fees against Aetna finding that the action was not an action on the surety bond because that bond had been discharged in the prior judgment. It also found that appellant could not recover attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing party because section 713.29, Florida Statutes was inapplicable to this action....

...1991) (law-of-the-case doctrine applies to matters litigated to *574 finality, not to matters that remain unresolved due to the erroneous ruling of a lower court). We hold that the trial court erred when he failed to reinstate the bond after the first appeal concluded. Appellant also contends that section 713.29, Florida Statutes, entitled it to attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the prior appeal as well as to enforce the lien. Aetna responds that appellant is not entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to section 713.29 because that section provides for attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in an action to enforce a mechanic's lien. According to Aetna this case concerns an action to reinstate a surety bond and not an action to enforce a mechanic's lien. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1989) reads: In any action brought to enforce a lien under Part I, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as part of his costs, as allowed in equitable actions....

...The trial court's reliance on Snead Construction Corp. v. Langerman, 369 So.2d 591 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) was misplaced. Snead concerned a suit on a performance or payment bond against surety insurers to construction contracts. This case did not concern such a bond. We conclude that section 713.29 applies and that the trial court erred by denying appellant, as the prevailing party, attorneys' fees and costs....

...Further, we remand with directions to the trial judge to reinstate the surety bond and to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS AND FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. STONE, GARRETT and FARMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes was recently amended but only to allow a party to recover attorneys' fees and costs for arbitration as well as for trial and appeal.

...Sullivan filed this action. *414 The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Mr. Sullivan in the amount of $14,500.12. Initially, the trial court determined that Mr. Sullivan was entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to the contract and pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2002), as the prevailing party in the litigation....

...Sullivan was not the prevailing party in the litigation and therefore not entitled to attorneys' fees. [1] Mr. Sullivan challenges only the trial court's decision to deny his request for attorneys' fees. When a construction lien is foreclosed, the prevailing party is entitled to attorneys' fees pursuant to section 713.29. However, in C.U. Associates, Inc. v. R.B. Grove, Inc., 472 So.2d 1177 (Fla.1985), the Florida Supreme Court held that "in order to be a prevailing party entitled to the award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, a litigant must have recovered an amount exceeding that which was earlier offered in settlement of the claim." Id....

...of whether offer included costs, interest, and fees incurred up until the time of settlement offer). Thus, although Mr. Sullivan is receiving a favorable judgment in his action to foreclose a mechanic's lien, he may not be the prevailing party under section 713.29 if the Galskes offered to settle with him prior to the lawsuit for an amount that was equal or greater than the award in the judgment....

...In this case, the trial court received some evidence reflecting presuit negotiations at trial, but that evidence was not *415 submitted for the purpose of determining the prevailing party for an award of attorneys' fees. That evidence does not conclusively establish that Mr. Sullivan is not entitled to fees pursuant to section 713.29 under the reasoning in C.U. Associates. We conclude that the trial court correctly granted rehearing in this case on the issue of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 713.29 in order to permit the consideration of presuit negotiations, but the trial court was required to provide the parties with an evidentiary hearing before it determined the factual issues essential to its ruling. [2] In addition to the claim for attorneys' fees pursuant to section 713.29, Mr....

...[3] The trial court appears to have applied the reasoning of C.U. Associates to this alternative basis for fees. In Fixel Enterprises, Inc. v. Theis, 524 So.2d 1015 (Fla.1988), the Florida Supreme Court rejected an argument that the definition of "prevailing party" in section 713.29, as interpreted by C.U....

...tract between the parties. Noting that the definition of prevailing party "adopted in C.U. Associates " was based upon policy considerations stated in chapter 713, the supreme court held that "the definition of the term `prevailing party' as used in section 713.29 is not to be extended beyond the context of that statute." Fixel Enters., 524 So.2d at 1017....

...[4] Accordingly, we affirm the judgment except for the determination of attorneys' fees. We remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Mr. Sullivan is entitled to attorneys' fees as the prevailing party either under his contract with the Galskes, or under section 713.29, or both....

...[2] We note that the Galskes had the burden of proving that they extended a good faith settlement offer in an amount and of a nature greater than the judgment finally obtained by Mr. Sullivan. See C.U. Associates, 472 So.2d at 1179. [3] Although Mr. Sullivan may be able to pursue attorneys' fees under both section 713.29 and his contract with the Galskes, see § 713.30, Fla....

...(2002), the remedies available to enforce the award of fees may vary depending upon the basis for the award, see, e.g., Zalay v. Ace Cabinets of Clearwater, Inc., 700 So.2d 15 (Fla.2d DCA 1997) (interpreting construction lien statutes to permit attorneys' fees awarded under section 713.29 to be included in lien)....

...This is an appeal of a final judgment denying appellant, Oliver General Fence, Inc., an amount of attorney's fees in its mechanic's lien and breach of contract suit against appellees, James and Mary Roche. Appellant seeks its fee under two theories: (1) under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1989) as the prevailing party in a mechanic's lien action; and (2) under the terms of the written contract of the parties....

...The issue of attorney's fees and costs will be decided by the trial judge at a hearing held within 60 days. On May 2, 1991, the trial court entered an order denying both parties' requests for attorneys' fees on the grounds that the case was resolved in settlement and there was no "prevailing party" under section 713.29....

...No additional evidence or testimony was presented to the trial court after mediation. No stipulation of the parties appears in the record authorizing such a finding. Such a finding constitutes fundamental error and cannot stand as the basis of an award of attorney's fees under section 713.29. Thus, the trial court was correct in its denial of statutory attorney's fees. Encompass, Inc. v. Alford, 444 So.2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 453 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1984). The "prevailing party" analysis of section 713.29 has no relevance to this case....

...B & H Construction & Supply Co., Inc. v. District Board of Trustees of Tallahassee Community College, 542 So.2d 382, 387 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 549 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1989). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court denying appellant's claim for attorney's fees under section 713.29 is hereby affirmed....

...Adding the benefit requirement to section 744.108(1) discourages attorneys from bringing guardianship claims that would otherwise be brought. The legislature knows how to write attorney’s fee statutes that require the lawsuit to end successfully. See, e.g., § 713.29, Fla....

...y time period prescribed by the rule, the trial court's fees and costs award must be reversed. In closing, we note that Duncan has properly filed a motion for appellate attorney's fees pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(a)-(b) and section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...MONACO, J. The appellant, Gale Industries, Inc., seeks review of a final order determining that the appellees, Frank J. Trytek and Cathy L. Trytek, were the prevailing parties for the purpose of the trial court's award of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...After setting off that figure against the agreed lien amount of $12,725, the net result was a judgment for $1,525 in favor of Gale Industries. Thereafter, each party concluded that it was the "prevailing party" and filed cross-motions to tax attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...much money should be set off against the Gale Industries lien, and the Tryteks primarily prevailed on their counterclaim. The court then awarded attorneys' fees of $55,982.00 and costs of $4,016.67 in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Trytek. Gale appeals. *807 Section 713.29, Florida Statutes, which concerns attorneys' fees in construction lien cases, states that: [I]n any action brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under this part, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a re...

...Using that test, the trial court is required to decide "which party has in fact prevailed on the significant issues tried before the court." Id. at 810. Not long thereafter the high court addressed the effect of Moritz on the prevailing party language of section 713.29....

...It indicated that: [T]he net judgment rule comes into play when the claimant fails to foreclose a mechanic's lien but obtains a judgment for the underlying claim which exceeds any claim of the owner. As applied, the rule automatically precludes the owner from recovering attorney's fees under section 713.29. It has no relevance to an *808 award of attorney's fees to the claimant because an unsuccessful lien claimant cannot recover attorney's fees under section 713.29....

...*809 In summary, we continue to adhere to the rule that mandates an award of attorneys' fees in favor of a lienor if it is successful in recovering damages in excess of any asserted counterclaim damages in a lien foreclosure action. In cases of this variety, the lienor is the prevailing party for purposes of section 713.29....

...h we passed in accordance with rule 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, as one of great public importance: When a lienor obtains a judgment against a property owner in an action to enforce a construction lien brought pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2005), does the trial court have the discretion to apply the "significant issues" test articulated in Prosperi v....

...Accordingly, we reverse the final judgment in favor of appellee and the trial court's judgment awarding appellee costs and attorney's fees. We remand this case to the trial court with directions to enter judgment in favor of appellant and to award appellant taxable costs and reasonable attorney's fees as provided by Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...68. At the hearing on the latter motion, the trial court awarded costs in the amount of $923.44 and prejudgment interest in the amount of $1,675, for a total of $2,598.44, but denied Willey's prayer for attorney's fees. The court based its denial on section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1990), and found that Willey was not the prevailing party in the case because the amount of Willey's judgment was less than the amount which Roark and F & D offered Willey at mediation. Appellant Willey argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied his prayer for attorney's fees, as it misplaced its reliance on C.U. Associates, Inc. v. R.B. Grove, Inc., 472 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 1985), and section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1990)....

...Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. Balboa Insurance Co., 408 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 1982), noted that section 627.756 specifically fails to mention actions to enforce equitable or statutory liens in favor of owners, subcontractors, laborers and materialmen. Id. at 1045. In contrast, section 713.29 is expressly limited to "any action brought to enforce a lien under part I (Mechanic's Liens)." Id....

...Fitzgerald & Co. v. Roberts Electrical Contractors, 533 So.2d 789, 790 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). "In other words, `when a lien is substituted by a bond, the statute which governs the assessment of attorney's fees is not the prevailing party provision under section 713.29, but the insurance provisions under sections 627.428 and 627.756.'" Id....

...It is obvious the trial court ignored the legal doctrine concerning the contract balance and completion costs and applied an equitable solution by awarding the extras figure. The prevailing party in a mechanics lien foreclosure suit is entitled to an award of attorney fees. § 713.29, Fla....

...January 18, 2012, confirming the arbitration award as to the amount awarded to Mott’s Contracting and the amount credited to the Snells. However, the county court further found that Mott’s Contracting was not entitled to attorney’s fees under section 713.29 because it failed to take any action to enforce the claim of lien under section 713.22 within the sixty days after the lien was contested....

...2 Mott’s Contracting appealed the county court order to the circuit court, asserting that the county court erred in determining *608 that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity of the claim of lien and that Mott’s Contracting was not entitled to fees pursuant to section 713.29. On January 23, 2013, the circuit court reversed the decision of the county court, holding that Mott’s Contracting took the requisite action under section 713.29 because a complaint and counterclaim were timely filed in arbitration....

...Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995) (citing Manatee Cnty. v. Kuehnel, 542 So.2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)). III. Discussion The circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law when it determined that Mott’s Contracting is entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to section 713.29 and that the arbitrator had the authority to “determine the prevailing party’s entitlement to attorney’s fees.” Attorney’s fees may only be awarded when authorized by statute or contract....

...J.A., 963 So.2d 189, 198 (Fla.2007)). As indicated previously, section 713.22(1) requires that the action to enforce the lien be filed in a “court.” The definition section of the Construction Lien Law, section 713.01, does not define court. Importantly, however, section 713.29, which we must read in tandem with section 713.22, distinguishes arbitration and court....

...It is undisputed that Mott’s Contracting failed to file an action to enforce the claim of lien in the court. As such, Mott’s Contracting failed to satisfy the requirements of section 713.22 and is therefore not entitled to attorney’s fees under section 713.29....

...3d DCA 1978) (granting certiorari relief where the circuit court granted attorney’s fees absent authorization by contract or statute). IV. Conclusion The arbitrator lacked authority to determine entitlement to fees, and the award of fees pursuant to section 713.29 was not authorized because Mott’s Contracting failed to satisfy the requirements of the statute....

...y prevails in any action, whether as plaintiff or defendant, with respect to the contract. Here, the issue that was to be decided was the amount of fees that Kelsey was to be awarded, not his entitlement to attorney's fees. In addition, according to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2001): In any action brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under this part, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial and appeal or for arbitration, in an amount to be determined by the court, which fee must be taxed as part of the prevailing party's costs, as allowed in equitable actions. Kelsey prevailed against Metro on its action brought to enforce a lien. Under section 713.29, he is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, in an amount to be determined by the court, which fee must be taxed as part of the prevailing party's costs....

...arty on significant issues in the case. Therefore, we reverse the final order awarding attorney's fees and costs to Yates and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter an order determining that neither party was the prevailing party under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2017), and to deny both requests for attorney's fees in this case....

...Appellants, asserting the rights they had reserved in the joint stipulation and settlement agreement, opposed any costs award and claimed that under section 57.041(1) Growers was not entitled to an award because they did not receive a judgment. Further, they opposed any claim to attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1999), by asserting that Growers had not successfully prosecuted the foreclosure of its mechanics' lien, that Growers lacked a direct contact with the property's owners and, therefore, lacked the necessary privity en...

...Ricardo Pines, and a copy of the lease between appellants and Pines Ranch, Inc. At the hearing, appellants argued that Growers had not shown sufficient evidence to demonstrate that it was the prevailing party under the mechanics' lien law and that section 713.29 provides for attorney's fees to the prevailing party only when that party has an appropriate claim of lien over a piece of real property, which, they further argued, Growers did not....

attorney’s fee in such instances is Fla.Stat. § 713.29. Plaintiff concedes that it is liable for a reasonable

...unt. The *1152 trial court's award of attorney's fees and costs must also be reversed. REVERSED and REMANDED. MONACO, J., and ORFINGER, M., Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [1] §§ 713.05, 713.08, Fla. Stat. (2004). [2] § 713.31, Fla. Stat. (2004). [3] § 713.29, Fla....

...ien have been met. Thus, the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of the law in upholding the lien. Since Petitioner successfully defended against the imposition of the lien, her motion for appellate attorney's fees is GRANTED. See § 713.29, Florida Statutes (2006)....

...The jury awarded damages to Gulfside in the amount of $14,094.97. Both parties claimed that they were the prevailing parties in the case and as such, both filed motions seeking an award of attorneys' fees and costs. The Voses argued they were entitled to fees and costs under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2007), because they prevailed on the construction lien claim....

...applied to the facts of a case, there is no mandatory requirement that a court determine that one party is the "prevailing party." Accordingly, we remand for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the Voses are entitled to attorneys' fees under section 713.29, or if Gulfside is entitled to attorneys' fees under its contract with the Voses....

...The owners counterclaimed for breach of the construction contract and asserted that the contractor had filed a *361 fraudulent claim of lien in violation of section 718.31, Florida Statutes (1995). The contractor pled a claim for attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes, which provides for attorney’s fees for the prevailing party in any action brought under part I of chapter 713....

...ute applicable to a fraudulent or excessive lien. The owners likewise pled entitlement to attorney’s fees under the construction contract which, as already stated, had no such provision. The owners did not plead a claim for attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes, the provision for prevailing party attorney’s fees in construction lien litigation....

...The case proceeded to arbitration, in which the owners received a net award of $113,983 and were found by the arbitrators to be the prevailing parties. After confirmation of the award, the circuit court granted the owners prevailing party attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes. The trial court rejected the contractor’s argument that the attorney’s fee claim should be rejected for failure to plead reliance on section 713.29....

...the statutory or contractual basis on which that party seeks attorney’s fees.” Dealers Ins. Co. v. Haidco Investment Enterprises, Inc., 638 So.2d 127, 130 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). While the owners pled a claim for attorney’s fees, they did not cite section 713.29, which is the basis of the trial court’s fee award....

...the prevailing party is.” The trial court took the testimony of the chairman of the arbitration panel, who said the issue of attorney’s fees arose in the context of chapter 713. While the chairman could not recall whether the discussion involved section 713.29 or section 713.31, the conclusion is inescapable that the discussion involved section 713.29. That is so because only section 713.29 provides for prevailing party attorney’s fees....

...Fallis, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla.1959). *209 We hold, with respect to Paterson’s second appellate point, that it was the prevailing party on its mechanic’s lien foreclosure against Mrs. Bonda and thereby is entitled to recover attorney’s fees under Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1978)....

...Finally, as to Paterson’s third point, Paterson contests the award of $1,500.00 as attorney’s fees to Alva T. Bonda. We affirm the trial court’s award because Alva T. Bonda prevailed against Paterson in the lien foreclosure claim by virtue of the fact that he was granted a pre-trial summary judgment. Section 713.29, supra....

...[1] The parties stipulated to entry of an order confirming the award. Indeed, Oregon paid the award prior to its confirmation. The stipulation required the trial court to determine whether either party was entitled to an award of attorney's fees. K & N sought fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2001), which requires an award in "any action brought to enforce a lien ......

...ALDERMAN, Chief Judge. We have considered the issues raised by the appellant and cross-appellant in this mechanic's lien foreclosure case and find no reversible error. We also grant appellee's motion for attorney's fees. The award of attorney's fees merits discussion. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975), provides for recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party in any action brought to enforce a mechanic's lien. The Supreme Court in Sunbeam Enterprises, Inc. v. Upthegrove, 316 So.2d 34 (Fla. 1975), held that Section 713.29 referred only to attorney's fees at the trial level and did not provide for the allowance of such fees on appeal....

...to the prevailing party on appeal. Section 59.46(1), Florida Statutes (1977) We conclude that the phrase, "entered into after October 1, 1977," refers only to contracts and has no bearing on the time of enactment of statutes. We therefore hold that Section 713.29 when construed in the light of Section 59.46 now permits recovery of reasonable attorney's fees by the prevailing party on appeal....

party statutes found elsewhere in Florida law. Cf. § 713.29, Fla. Stat. (2007) (“In any action brought to

...MMII is not required to obtain a contractor or electrical contractor license, the trial court erred in deeming it unlicensed and unable to enforce its contract against buyers. The remaining issue concerns the award of attorney's fees to buyers under § 713.29....

deficiency judgment, and attorney fees pursuant to § 713.29, costs, pre-judgment interest, and any other relief

...nstruction lien. We also reverse the final judgment awarding attorney’s fees and costs for a redetermination of entitlement to attorney’s fees and their amount. Appellate attorney’s fees and costs shall be awarded to the prevailing party under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2006), after retrial....

MORRIS, Judge. Soares Da Costa Construction Services, LLC (SDC), appeals a final judgment and amended final judgment confirming an arbitration award and determining that Tarragon Development Corporation was entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2006), as the pre *1173 vailing party on a claim of lien which was factually intertwined with the arbitration proceedings between the parties....

...1 SDC moved in the lien foreclosure action to vacate the arbitration award, and thereafter, Tarragon served its response in opposition to the motion to vacate as well as a motion to confirm the arbitration award. In its motion to confirm the arbitration award, Tarragon sought prevailing party attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 713.29 as well as the discharge of SDC’s lien....

awarding attorney’s fees to Paint Spot pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2013). These consolidated

...BARKDULL, Judge. This is an appeal, brought by the plaintiff in the trial court, from an order denying its claim for a mechanic's lien pursuant to Chapter 713, Florida Statutes, and from an order assessing attorney's fees and costs against it pursuant to Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...The cause came on for final hearing before the court, who entered a final judgment denying the claim of lien and reserved jurisdiction to assess attorney's fees and costs. Subsequently, the court entered a supplemental judgment awarding defendants costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Section 713.29....

...Continental Casualty Company (“Continental”) appeals from an order awarding attorney’s fees to A.W. Baylor Versapanel-Plastering, Inc. (“Baylor”) in a post-arbitration proceeding. The arbitration panel had declined to award either party attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2007), after finding that neither was the “prevailing party.” That statute provides for an award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an action to enforce a claim on a bond under chapter 713....

...These statutes generally permit, inter alia, an award of attorney’s fees to a subcontractor who obtains a judgment against a surety insurer under a payment or performance bond for pecuniary loss resulting from a contractor’s contractual breach. We reverse because we conclude that section 713.29 is the controlling statute in this case....

...al. Based on an arbitration provision in the ACI-Baylor contract, the parties were ordered to arbitration. Prior to the arbitration hearing, the parties entered a stipulation requesting that the panel determine entitlement to attorney’s fees under section 713.29 as well as the quantum, if any, of an award: 1. The parties agree that the Arbitrators are requested to determine the assessment of attorneys’ fees, arbitrators’ fees, and the AAA fees and costs in connection with this arbitration proceeding under application of FI. St. Section 713.29. 2. The parties agree that the Arbitrators are to determine both entitlement to an award under Section 713.29 in terms of “prevailing party” as well as the quantum, if any, of an award....

...r delay damages. The damages awarded Baylor were for far less than the amount of its claim. Prior to the arbitration panel addressing the attorneys’ fees issue, Baylor submitted a memorandum of law seeking attorney’s fees not only under sections 713.29, but also pursuant to sections 627.756 and 627.428. After declining to award attorney’s fees under section 713.29, the arbitrators concluded that they were not authorized to address Baylor’s claim for fees under sections 627.756 and 627.428: The Panel, having reviewed the sub-mittals of the parties on the issue of who may be the prevailing party for purposes of awarding attorneys’ fees and costs, does hereby decide and determine that there is no prevailing party in this action. This determination is limited to a determination of prevailing party under the provisions of Sec. 713.29, Fla. Stat., it being the view of the Panel that the agreement of the parties limits the jurisdiction of the Panel to claims for attorneys’ fees under Sec. 713.29....

...627.428 and 627.756, Fla. Stat. Baylor then filed a motion with the circuit court to recover attorney’s fees under sections 627.756 and 627.428. In its motion, Baylor did not challenge the arbitration panel’s denial of its claim for fees under section 713.29, but rather argued that sections 627.756 and 627.428 provided an “alternative basis” to award fees. The *940 trial court erred in accepting this argument because these statutes apply conflicting standards in determining entitlement to fees with section 713.29 being the controlling statute. Section 713.29 is directed exclusively to actions brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond brought under chapter 713....

...recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial and appeal or for arbitration, in an amount to be determined by the court, which fee must be taxed as part of the prevailing party’s costs, as allowed in equitable actions. § 713.29, Fla....

...any is found to be the prevailing party on the significant issues. Under this scenario, the claimant, not the bonding company, would be entitled to attorney’s fees if sections 627.756 and 627.428 governed, while the opposite outcome would occur if section 713.29 controlled....

...at 1061 (“A rule of statutory construction which is relevant ... is that where two statutory provisions are in conflict, the specific provision controls the general provision”) Here it is undisputed that Baylor’s action against Continental was a claim to enforce a section 713.23 bond. Given that section 713.29 applies solely to actions brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under chapter 713, we conclude that it is the controlling statute in this case....

...(By contrast, sections 627.756 and 627.428 would appear to control if the payment bond was a common law bond). Although not necessary to our disposition in this case, it further appears that prior to the arbitration proceedings, both parties properly recognized that section 713.29 was the controlling statutory provision; hence, the stipulation that the arbitration panel would determine the issue of attorney’s fees “under application of FI. St. Section 713.29.” 2 The trial court should have denied Baylor’s motion for attorney’s fees....

...The statute sets forth the language that must be contained in a payment bond in order for the bond to qualify as a section 713.23 payment bond. Here, the parties stipulated that the bond in question was a 713.23 payment bond. . Prior to a 1992 statutory amendment, section 713.29 applied only to actions "brought to enforce a lien” under chapter 713....

...orce a chapter 713 bond. See, e.g., Julian E. Johnson & Sons, Inc. v. Balboa Ins. Co., 408 So.2d 1044, 1046 (Fla.1982) ("Clearly, if the legislature had intended to include the award of attorney’s fees for the recovery on construction bonds in section 713.29, it could have done so_”). In 1992, section 713.29 was amended to extend its application to actions brought "to enforce a claim against a bond under this part.”

...decision. On June 13, 2003, the trial court entered a final judgment imposing a mechanic's lien and retained jurisdiction for consideration of costs and attorney's fees. On July 11, 2003, the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney's fees, pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...g a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of voluntary dismissal." The question is which judgment in this case triggered the 30-day requirement for filing the motion for attorneys' fees. The basis upon which the plaintiff sought fees was section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2003), which provides for attorney's fees in actions seeking to impose a mechanic's lien. When the August 24, 2001 judgment was entered, the plaintiff's request for a mechanic's lien had been denied. Therefore, the court could not award fees under section 713.29 at that time....

...Rhodes, 395 So.2d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), this court has taken the view that “a claimant who succeeds in establishing a mechanic’s lien and receives a judgment in his favor in any amount whatever is necessarily the ‘prevailing party’ under Sec[tion] 713.29" without regard to whether the judgment recovered exceeds, equals or is less than any prelitigation offer....

...f wanted to recover such fees and costs, it could have renewed its prelitigation offer in the form of a Rule 1.442 offer of judgment after litigation began. 5 That not having occurred, the final judgment must be affirmed in all respects. Affirmed. . Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1981), provides: “In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I, the prevailing party shall be entitled to *1110 recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, to be determin...

awarded the appellant in attorney’s fees under Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979) was unreasonably low

seek attorney’s fees under the lien statute. See § 713.29, Fla. Stat. (2010). The problem with this argument

...See Johnson & Bailey, 517 So.2d at 778 . Finally, McCown challenges the award of attorney’s fees. Given our resolution of the first issue, we vacate the award of fees. Further proceedings will determine the prevailing party entitled to fees and costs in accordance with section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1987)....

governed by Chapter 713 of the Florida Statutes. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1987), provides that a prevailing

...nforce said lien. Such deposit or bond shall be conditioned to pay any judgment or decree which may be rendered for the satisfaction of the lien for which such claim of lien was recorded. Prior to the amendment, section 713.24 limited costs to $100. Section 713.29 states that attorney’s fees are taxed as costs....

. OTT, Judge. We reverse the trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs made pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1983), Florida’s Mechanics’ Lien Law....

...division property free of the lien. After trial, the lower court ruled that appellant was entitled to recover from the registry fund the full amount stated in its claim of lien. Appellant moved for an award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 713.29, which provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as part of his costs, as allowed in equitable actions....

...Appellee ignores the statutory definition of lienor which includes one who “has a lien or prospective lien _” § 713.01(10), Fla. Stat. (1983). GDC’s interpleader action caused the lien to be transferred to the registry fund. Such action does not deprive appellant of the status of prevailing party for purposes of section 713.29....

...shall enter such a declaration. Additionally, irrespective of Aquastar’s claim – and the trial court’s finding – that Avant’s lien was fraudulent, Avant did not prevail on its claim seeking to enforce its lien, thereby entitling Aquastar, pursuant to 713.29 Florida Statutes, 17 to those reasonable attorney fees Aquastar incurred defending against Avant’s lien claim. On remand, the trial court shall conduct whatever proceedings the trial court deems appropriate to determine those reasonable attorney’s fees to which Aquastar is entitled pursuant to section 713.29. H....

...under this part, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial . . . in an amount to be determined by the court, which fee must be taxed as part of the prevailing party’s costs. . . .” § 713.29, Fla....

...the trial court erred by not awarding it reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 713.31(2)(c), to the extent that Aquastar seeks recovery of such fees that would not be duplicative of fees the trial court may award pursuant to section 713.29 (see section II.G.2., supra), on remand the trial court shall conduct whatever proceedings it deems necessary to determine whether, in light of the holdings contained in this opinion, Aquastar is the prevailing party on the signific...

...��s construction lien was fraudulent, and remand to the trial court to: (i) enter an order discharging the lien; (ii) conduct those proceedings it deems necessary to determine those reasonable attorney’s fees to which Aquastar is entitled under section 713.29; and (iii) to determine, in light of the holdings in this opinion, whether Aquastar is the substantially prevailing party entitled to reasonable fees and costs pursuant to section 713.31(2)(c), to the extent that these fees are not duplicative of section 713.29 fees. We reverse the Amended Final Judgment to the extent that it concluded that Avant committed a FDUTPA violation....

...he trial judge to determine from the record which party has in fact prevailed on the significant issues tried before the court.” Id. at 810 . It may be that the supreme court will extend that test to cases involving attorney’s fees awarded under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1991)....

GROSS, J. Pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400(c), appellants seek review of an award of appellate attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2002)....

erred in awarding attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1973), which is the statute

ORFINGER, C.J. GMPF Framing, LLC appeals a final judgment that determined Villages at Lake Lily Associates, LLC was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2010)....

...The trial court discharged the claim of lien, but additional claims for the imposition of an equitable lien and unjust enrichment remained pending. Nonetheless, Villages filed its motion for entry of a final judgment of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 713.29. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that Villages was entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing party under section 713.29 and entered a final judgment of attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $44,429.50....

...Generally, attorney’s fees are not awarded unless authorized by statute or contract. Trytek v. Gale Indus., Inc., 3 So.3d 1194, 1198 (Fla.2009); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830, 832 (Fla.1993). Here, Villages sought attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 713.29, which provides for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party in a lien claim. However, under section 713.29, the prevailing party is not necessarily the party who recovers a net judgment....

...Sorrentino v. River Run Condo. Ass’n, 925 So.2d 1060, 1065 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006); Granoff v. Seidle, 915 So.2d 674, 677 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Construction cases often involve complex factual determinations and multiple theories of recovery. Although section 713.29 applies only to lien claims, GMPF still had pending claims for quantum me-ruit and equitable lien against Villages that should have been considered in the court’s determination of the prevailing party because these claims involved the same transaction....

...Civ. P. 1.170; see also Trytek, 3 So.3d at 1203 n. 10 (noting that homeowners’ breach of contract counterclaim was compulsory counterclaim because both lien claim and breach of contract counterclaim arose from same transaction, and therefore, while section 713.29 applies only to lien claims, homeowners’ judgment on counterclaim could be considered in trial court’s determination of prevailing party). For example, where an owner successfully defends a mechanic’s lien foreclosure, but is held liable in damages for breach of contract, the owner is not the prevailing party and is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees under section 713.29....

...y. 1 However, that determination should be made at the conclusion of the case. REVERSED AND REMANDED. PALMER and JACOBUS, JJ., concur. . Because GMPF failed in its statutory lien claim, it would not be entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under section 713.29....

...chanic's lien foreclosure brought by Peninsular should have been awarded to them and against Safeco. I. In support of their first point, appellants rely upon the language of the bond 1 and Standard’s March 25,1974 sub-contract with the hospital, 2 Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1973), 3 and the theory of indemnity as a matter of law....

...and Contractor or either of them in such suits, whether such liens or claims arise before or after final payment. No payment for work under this agreement shall be made to the Sub-Contractor until the Owner shall have paid the Contractor therefor. . Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1973) provided: In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as part of his costs....

...e defenses. There was never a pre-trial order entered in the case. There are no stipulations of record in which any request for attorney’s fees was made by appellants in the proceedings below. While appellee requested attorney’s fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1993) in their complaint, such a request by one party does not cure the other party’s failure to request fees under the same statutory or contractual authority....

...o either party and did not reserve jurisdiction to do so at a later time. Not until after the entry of the final judgment did appellants file a “Motion to Tax Costs” which, for the first time, included a request for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 713.29....

...By a separate count United claimed the same damages from Safeco. Goldberger’s answer denied the debt, asserted the posting of a payment bond by Safeco pursuant to Section 713.23, Florida Statutes (1975), and alleged United should be required to pay Goldberger’s attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 713.29. In addition, Goldberger filed a counterclaim asserting entitlement to attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975), and the statutory sanctions authorized for wilful exaggeration of a claim for a mechanic’s lien....

...There were three claims involved in this suit: United’s claim against Safeco on the payment bond and United’s claim against Goldberger, both alleged in the complaint, and Goldberger’s claim against United alleged in the counterclaim. The prevailing party on each of those claims was entitled to attorney’s fees under Section 713.29 if those claims were properly pleaded....

...The court did not err in finding that the claims were inextricably intertwined, and there was accordingly no need to apportion. We also agree with appellant Bader that, because he prevailed on appellee’s attempt to establish a lien against him individually, he is entitled to attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...[The contractor] is the prevailing party in this action on the following claims to wit: Foreclosure of Construction Lien [Count I] and Breach of Contract [Count III]. [The contractor] is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 713.29 and the Contract. 2....

...ion costs; all costs and reasonable attorneys fees at all levels of proceedings including appeals and post-judgment, plus pre-judgment and post- judgment interest at the highest maximum rate allowed by law. . . . Further, section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2018), governs attorney’s fees in a construction lien action, and states, in pertinent part: In any action brought to enforce a lien ....

...services of [their] attorney for trial and appeal or for arbitration, in an amount to be determined by the court, 9  which fee must be taxed as part of the prevailing party’s costs, as allowed in equitable actions. § 713.29, Fla. Stat. (2018). “Attorney’s fees and costs awarded under section 713.29 are included within the lien created by section 713.05.” Parsons v....

...“A satisfaction signifies that the litigation is over, the dispute is settled, the account is paid.” Morris N. Am., Inc. v. King, 430 So. 2d 592, 592 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Here, the litigation was not over, the dispute was not settled, and accounts were not paid because, pursuant to the parties’ contract and section 713.29, the homeowner still owed the contractor’s attorneys’ fees, costs, and pre- and post-judgment interest....

...d pursuant to the final judgment exceeds the settlement offer. Thus, as stated in C.U. Associates, Inc. v. R.B. Grove, Inc., 472 So.2d 1177, 1179 (Fla.1985), “in order to be a prevailing party-entitled to the award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 713.29, a litigant must have recovered an amount exceeding that which was earlier offered in settlement of the claim.” Since, based on the foregoing considerations, the amount recovered by R & M pursuant to the final judgment indeed exc...

explained: The overall purpose of section 713.29 and attorneys' fee statutes in general

...ns used in the design. Upon remand, the trial court should enter a judgment in favor of appellant for breach of contract and hold a hearing on damages. Consequently, appellee will no longer be the prevailing party entitled to attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1987) because appellant will obtain a money judgment for services under the contract even though it failed to establish a mechanic’s lien....

...f in a third party claim involved in the proceedings below. The trial court granted the plaintiff an attorney fee which award defendant claims was erroneous. We agree and reverse. An attorney fee is allowed in an action to enforce a lien pursuant to Section 713.29, F.S., to the prevailing party....

...Defendants, in turn, moved for attorney’s fees under three separate grounds. First, Defendants moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to the prevailing party fee provision in the subcontracts. Second, Defendants moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2017), which provides for prevailing party fees in any action brought to enforce a claim against a bond....

...proposal because the amount offered by Contractor—$0—was not 25% more than the amount recovered by Subcontractor. 6  Finally, regarding Defendants’ request for prevailing party attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2017), the successor judge concluded that although Subcontractor did not prevail on its claims to enforce against the payment bonds, “[i]t would be inequitable to award attorney’s fees to the Defendants on the li...

...receive attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442 is reviewed de novo.’” (quoting Pratt v. Weiss, 161 So. 3d 1268, 1271 (Fla. 2015))); Newman v. Guerra, 208 So. 3d 314, 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (stating, in the context of a fee award under section 713.29, Florida Statutes, that “[a] party’s entitlement to an award of attorneys’ fees under a statute or a procedural rule is a legal question subject to de novo review”). 1....

...it sought in the litigation”). Under these circumstances, we hold the successor judge abused its broad discretion in determining Defendants were not the prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorney’s fees under the subcontracts. 2. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes Defendants next argue the successor judge erred in declining to award attorney’s fees to the two sureties, Philadelphia and Suretec, under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2017). We agree. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2017), governs the award of attorney’s fees in actions to enforce a claim against a bond and states: In any action brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under this part, the pr...

...to recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial and appeal or for arbitration, in an amount to be determined by the court, which fee must be taxed as part of the prevailing party’s costs, as allowed in equitable actions. § 713.29, Fla. Stat. (2017). In determining which party prevailed for purposes of an award of attorney’s fees under section 713.29, courts apply the “significant issues” test set forth in Moritz. See Newman, 208 So. 3d at 317. In applying the “significant issues” test to section 713.29 attorney’s fees, courts have held that when a defendant successfully resists enforcement of a lien yet is nevertheless found liable in damages in the same case, the defendant is not considered the prevailing party for purposes of section 713.29 attorney’s fees....

...only claims asserted against them. Moreover, the sureties were not otherwise found liable to Subcontractor for damages, unlike Contractor and Project Owner, and thus the sureties were the prevailing party for purposes of entitlement to attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2017)....

...4th DCA 1987) (holding that although the plaintiff contractor obtained a money judgment against the owner, the contractor did not prevail on its claim against the surety to enforce its lien against the bond and therefore the surety was entitled to prevailing party attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes); M & P Concrete Prods., Inc....

...gment for damages against the owner was not likewise against the surety” and “[s]o the surety was the prevailing party under the lien statute”). Accordingly, we hold the successor judge erred in denying the sureties attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2017). 3....

...cessor judge to: (1) enter an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to all Defendants pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2021), to Contractor and Project Owner pursuant to the subcontracts, and to Philadelphia and Suretec pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2017); and (2) conduct further proceedings to determine the reasonable amounts of attorney’s fees and costs to award Defendants. Reversed and remanded. GROSS and GERBER, JJ., concur....

...The judge rejected appellant’s argument and ordered appellant to pay appellees’ costs in the amount of $796 and an attorney’s fee of $3,000. In arguing that appellees do not qualify as the “prevailing party” within the meaning of that term in the contract, appellant substantially relies upon case law interpreting section 713.29, Florida Statutes, which provides for attorney fee awards to “prevailing parties” in mechanics’ lien cases. In those cases, the courts declared that in order to be a prevailing party for purposes of an attorney’s fee award under section 713.29, a party must have been awarded an amount greater than was earlier offered in settlement....

...Taylor-Made Enterprises, Inc., 344 So.2d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The instant appeal does not involve the Mechanics’ Lien law, which is codified in chapter 713, Florida Statutes. *699 We decline to extend the definition of “prevailing party” as applied in the context of section 713.29 to that term as it was used in the contract in question here....

...At 1179. Due to the similarity of the situation involved in this case to the above-cited mechanics’ lien cases, we certify the following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: IS THE DEFINITION IMPOSED UPON THE TERM “PREVAILING PARTY” AS USED IN SECTION 713.29, FLORIDA STATUTES, IN C.U....

...onable time, not less than ten days, before beginning of the hearing or trial to determine the amount or extent of liability. This rule shall not apply to actions or matters related to dissolution of marriage, alimony, nonsupport or child custody. . Section 713.29 provides: Attorney’s fees....

...Damages from the broken lines could have been inferred and an issue of fact remains as to whether the break was inevitable and the time period in which the lines remained unrepaired. V.ATTORNEY’S FEES Both parties have requested an award of attorneys’ fees as a prevailing party pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2000)....

...avor of Hightower in the amount of $5,375.10 and for such other relief as is warranted by this opinion. In closing, we note that Hightower has filed a motion with this court seeking an award of appellate attorney's fees pursuant to the provisions of section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes on its claim for foreclosure of a construction lien....

...arty on significant issues in the case. Therefore, we reverse the final order awarding attorney's fees and costs to Yates and remand to the trial court with instructions to enter an order determining that neither party was the prevailing party under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2017), and to deny both requests for attorney's fees in this case....

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal in a mechanics lien case. The only point under which the appellant has shown reversible error is as to its entitlement to attorney fees under Section 713.29, Fla.Stat.1971, F.S.A....

...Consistent with the terms of their construction contract, the dispute was submitted to arbitration which resulted in an award to Collier of $135,060. Collier then moved the trial court to confirm the award and successfully sought attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...es. Ch. 90-109, § 14, Laws of Fla. (1990). The revised version of the statute, however, became effective subsequent to the initiation of Collier's action to enforce its lien. Thus, Collier's and the trial court's reliance upon it was misplaced. [1] Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1989), in effect when Collier commenced its action, did not contemplate legal fees arising from matters resolved through arbitration....

...NOTES [1] Because the legislature was silent regarding the retroactive or prospective application of this statute, we abide by the general rule that a statute is presumed to have a prospective application. Walker & LaBerge, Inc. v. Halligan, 344 So.2d 239, 241 (Fla. 1977). [2] Section 713.29 Attorney's fees....

discharge of the lien in this matter,” pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2019). The trial court

...Whitlock further argues that it is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs because it is the prevailing party under Florida law on the construction lien claim, and it is mandatory that the “prevailing party” is granted attorneys’ fees pursuant under Florida Statute § 713.29....

...The Court will first address the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs. *993 a. Attorneys’Fees and Costs Whitlock contends that it is entitled to attorneys’ fees because it is the prevailing party in the mechanics’ lien claim. To obtain attorneys’ fees and costs in a mechanics’ lien claim, section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes provides that: [T]he prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as part of his costs, as allowed in equitable actions. Fla.Stat. § 713.29 (1995)....

...The offering party has the burden to show that the offer was in fact made, and made in good faith. Id. The purpose of this rule is to encourage settlement of disputes before the parties resort to litigation and discouraging dilatory or obstructive tactics. Id. at 1179 . Under section 713.29, the Bankruptcy Court must factually determine whether a bona fide settlement offer was made and unequivocally refused....

PER CURIAM. The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in denying appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees filed pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Rhodes, 395 So.2d 632 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Monde Investments No. 2, Inc. v. R.D., Taylor-Made Enterprises, Inc., 344 So.2d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). As the prevailing party in this litigation, WALDEN is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to § 713.29, Florida Statutes, and Article VIII of the contract....

...We affirm in part and reverse in part. Here, the record reflects that Sun-house, the contractor, was the prevailing party on the lien claim. Accordingly, we affirm that part of the trial court’s order finding that Sunhouse is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Environmental Eng’r Inc., 522 So.2d 967 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Java v. Atlas Inc. Gen. Contractors, 500 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). . However, we reverse the trial court’s order to the extent that it awards Sunhouse attorneys’ fees on an unrelated action. Under the plain language of section 713.29, courts may award fees only in an action brought to enforce a lien....

Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400 and section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2016). We deny both motions

...s had. Section 627.428 is part of a section of the Florida Statutes entitled “Insurance Rates and Contracts” and does not apply to proceedings on mechanic’s liens, which are addressed by a separate section of the Florida Statutes, Chapter 713. Section 713.29 expressly provides that “[i]n any action brought to enforce a lien under part I, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, to be determined by the court,...

...s owing under the contract. See id. As a consequence of the net judgment in favor of the contractor, the trial court denied the owner’s claim for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the prevailing party fee provision in the mechanic’s lien statute, section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes....

...contractor a net judgment for amounts owing under the contract. See id. As a consequence of the net judgment in favor of the contractor, the trial court denied the owner's claim for attorneys' fees pursuant to the prevailing party fee provision in the mechanic's lien statute, section 713.29 of the Florida Statutes....

...This Court agrees with Plaintiff; the Rule expressly grants courts the authority to award attorneys' fees, not ALJs. Cf. Snell v. Mott's Contracting Services, Inc. , 141 So.3d 605 , 609 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2014) (holding that arbitrator could not award attorneys' fees under Florida Statute 713.29 because it only permitted courts to award fees)....

...Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (Supp. Ill 1985), Miscott appealed the bankruptcy court’s final judgment. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court, but remanded the question of Walden’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees under Fla.Stat. § 713.29 (1985)....

...Grove, Inc., 472 So.2d 1177 (Fla.1985), remanded with instructions for the bankruptcy court to determine Walden’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees. On remand, the bankruptcy court is required to do more than simply determine the amount of attorneys’ fees. Under Fla.Stat. § 713.29 (1985), the bankruptcy court must decide whether Walden made a bona fide settlement offer and whether Miscott unequivocally refused that offer....

had contracted as alleged by plaintiff, (6) that § 713.29 relating to attorney fees is unconstitutional

...a mechanic’s lien. The sole point on appeal is whether a party defendant who through litigation successfully resists a claim to enforce a mechanic’s lien against his property interest is entitled to recover his reasonable attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1983)....

...Sanfilippo v. Larry Giacin Tile Co., Inc., 390 So.2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Falovitch v. Gunn and Gunn Construction Co., 348 So.2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); H.D. McPherson, Inc. v. Metro Electric of Orlando, Inc., 253 So.2d 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); see § 713.29, Fla.Stat....

BASKIN, Judge. This interlocutory appeal requires us to decide whether in an action involving discharge of a mechanic’s lien and a counterclaim to enforce the mechanic’s lien a third-party defendant is entitled to recover attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979)....

...After the original parties to the lawsuit settled their claims, the trial court awarded fees and costs to The Austin Company [Austin], the third-party defendant, in an amount to be determined at a later date. We hold that the trial court erred in awarding Austin fees and costs from Allied Glass Corporation [Allied] under section 713.29....

...ess, malicious prosecution, indemnity, and declaratory relief. The trial court struck Austin's claims, except for the malicious prosecution count which remains pending. When the trial court granted Austin’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979), Allied filed this interlocutory appeal. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979) provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, to be determined by the...

...72-25588 in this Court are hereby cancelled and the Clerk of this Court shall duly note the same among the Public Records of Dade County, Florida.” The sole point on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiff an attorney’s fee as provided for in Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...inasmuch as a viable issue of law has been presented by the Plaintiff as to that Defendant, even though adversely ruled upon herein. Edward J. DeBartolo, Inc.’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees is DENIED inasmuch as it is sought pursuant to Fla.Stat. Section 713.29 in an action to enforce a lien under The Florida Mechanics Lien Act....

...Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in dismissing the amended count I of appellant’s counterclaim and, based on that dismissal, discharging appellant’s mechanic’s lien and setting aside the lis pendens. Both parties have filed motions for attorney’s fees in this appeal, pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1983). Since appellant is the prevailing party in this appeal, we construe section 713.29 to provide that it should be awarded attorney’s fees for this appeal, regardless of the final outcome of the mechanic’s lien foreclosure below....

...4th DCA 1988); Royal Ambassador Condominium Ass’n v. East Coast Supply Corp., 495 So.2d 932 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Additionally, Business Men’s is entitled to the award of attorney’s fees pursuant to rule 9.400, Rules of Appellate Procedure, and section 713.29, Florida Statutes....

$35,000 reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975). Appellant Vaughan

determining that McKinley prevailed pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1997), the trial court entered

...ce and hearing and without stipulation of the parties. Otherwise, we affirm the final judgment. We remand without prejudice to appellee, as prevailing party in this litigation, to promptly file a motion to assess attorney’s fees in accordance with Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...e allows the court to consider an analysis of the limited amount of the recovery. See, e.g., Shipwatch Dev. Corp. v. Salmon, 646 So. 2d 838, 839 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (“As the prevailing party, [the contractor] is entitled to attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1991)....

...or for extra work. The Court allowed the owners, as the prevailing parties, an attorney fee in the sum of $7,000.00. The contractor assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to allow it an attorney’s fee incident to its materialman’s suit. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes, provides that the prevailing party in a materi-alman’s lien foreclosure action shall be entitled to allowance of a reasonable attorney fee....

...ent to their successful resistance to and defeat of the contractor’s lien foreclosure action. See Jackson v. Hatch, Fla.App., 288 So.2d 564, 566. The owners, who had overpaid the contractor, were the prevailing parties within the clear language of Section 713.29, Florida Statutes....

...term “enforcing” is “not apt unless one is seeking specific perfor- mance”). Cf. Nelson’s Inc. v. Halifax Const. Co., 305 So. 2d 840, 841 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (reversing award of attorney’s fees under Fla. Stat. § 713.29, which provides fees to failing parties in actions USCA11 Case: 21-13789 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 01/12/2023 Page: 8 of 37 8 Opinion of the Court 21-13789 “to enforc...

Constr. Co., 339 So.2d 689 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); § 713.29, Fla.Stat. (1989).

...She recovered a judgment against the other contracting party but judgment was entered against her in favor of the four additional defendants on the various claims against them. The four additional defendants, represented by the same counsel, moved for attorney’s fees under both section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1999) (providing reasonable fees to prevailing party in action to enforce lien or claim against a bond), and section 57.106, and the county court granted them, but its fee judgment does not state pursuant to which st...

...Stat., include 4 those necessary to defeat intertwined claims and counterclaims that would otherwise defeat enforcement of the lien. Peacock Constr. Co. v. Gould, 351 So. 2d 394, 396 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (allowing attorney’s fees under section 713.29 for successful enforcement of lien, including the defeat of a counterclaim that the lien was fraudulently brought to cancel enforcement of the lien). Nevertheless, High Road can “at any time, and any number of times” fil...

...He had been under the impression that the court would set the fee in the case and that the firm would accept whatever amount the court set. He further stated that he had expended approximately 30 hours on the case. There is no other evidence in the record as to any fee agreement between Mr. Kiernan and appellee. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979), provides that the prevailing party in an action to enforce a lien is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees to be determined by the court....

...We reverse on the issue of attorney’s fees, and affirm the remainder of the judgment. So far as is pertinent here, the appellant contractor sued the appellee owners seeking to foreclose a construction lien. This was the only claim by the contractor carrying with it an entitlement to attorney’s fees. See § 713.29, Fla....

...3d DCA 1991); see also Casa Linda Tile & Marble Installers, Inc. v. Highlands Place 1981, Ltd., 642 So.2d 766 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). The trial court concluded, however, that neither side had prevailed and that neither side would be entitled to attorney’s fees. We respectfully disagree on that point. Section 713.29 provides, “In any action brought to enforce a [construction] lien ......

...ration that operates to defeat an otherwise valid lien.” Id. § 713.31(2)(b). We find no error in the rejection of the claim of fraudulent lien. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for an award of attorney’s fees to the owners under section 713.29, Florida Statutes....

...3d DCA 1987) (measure of damages for breach of contract to furnish services is the profit nonbreaching party would have earned during the remainder of the term if the contract had not been breached). He is further entitled to attorneys fees, as requested in his counterclaim. § 713.29, Fla....

mechanic’s lien. The award was pursuant to Section 713.29, Florida Statutes. We have considered each

...ntiff but denied plaintiffs request for a mechanic’s lien. The Fifth District reversed the denial of the mechanic’s lien, and the trial court entered a final judgment imposing a mechanic’s lien. Id. The plaintiff sought attorneys’ fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2003)....

PER CURIAM. Jack Brier General Contractor, Inc., the successful plaintiff below, appeals an order of the circuit court awarding it attorneys’ fees pursuant to section 713.29, Fla....

...Gesco held only that the liability for costs of the surety on the bond and the principal, a lending institution, including attorney’s fees, was limited to $100.00, as provided in section 713.24. [16] Symons Corporation, as the prevailing party against the owner, Tartan Lavers Delray, Inc., under section 713.29, is entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees for the services of its attorney for trial and this appeal....

...rendered for the satisfaction of the lien for which such claim of lien was recorded, and costs not to exceed $100.” The prevailing party in a mechanic’s lien action is entitled to attorney’s fees, to be taxed as part of his costs, pursuant to Section 713.29....

...al security” to cover prospective attorney’s fees would have the effect of insuring plaintiff’s attorney’s fees without providing such insurance for defendants, although either party may eventually prevail and be entitled to fees pursuant to Section 713.29....

...e is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The petitioners’ motion for attorney’s fees on appeal is denied without prejudice to refile the motion in circuit court, should petitioners finally prevail in this action. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes....

...By these consolidated appeals, we are called upon to review the propriety of a final judgment awarding damages to the plaintiff in the trial court for work performed pursuant to a construction contract and also a post final judgment which awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees, allegedly pursuant to § 713.29, Fla.Stat....

...fees. Where no lien is found to exist in an action to foreclose a mechanic’s, workman’s, or materialman’s lien under Ch. 713, Fla. Stat., but a money judgment is entered for the lienor, the court may not award the lienor attorney’s fees. Ch. 713.29, Fla....

...-one sales in the amount of $15,808.99. We affirm the award with respect to the materials delivered by Coastal, but reverse the award with respect to the materials picked up by Moore. Both parties have moved for appellate attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...1985), the nonacceptance of the settlement offer precludes an award of attorney's fees to Coastal. We therefore grant the motion for rehearing and strike the appellate attorney's fee award to Coastal. FECP requests an award of attorney's fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1987), arguing that FECP prevailed, in part, on the appeal....

...3d DCA 1978), provides support for FECP's position, the Tomorrow's Choice definition of "prevailing party" has been overruled sub silentio by Mainlands Construction Co. v. Wen-Dic Construction Co., 482 So.2d 1369, 1370 (Fla. 1986). We therefore adhere to our denial of section 713.29 attorney's fees to FECP....

...The settlement agreement required Pena-Alum to release *463 and discharge all claims and liens it had against the owner. Pena-Alum did so, filing a satisfaction of the claim of lien, the release document, and a voluntary dismissal of its lawsuit. The owner sought attorney’s fees against Pena-Alum under section 713.29, Florida Statutes, which provides that “[i]n any action brought to enforce a lien ......

...587 , 397 A.2d 396 (1978); Gaston v. Avansino, 39 Nev. 128 , 154 P. 85 (1915); Anno. 97 ALR 780 and cases cited therein. Compare, Miller Electric Company of Miami, Inc. v. Sweeny, 199 So.2d 734 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). No error was made in the award of attorney fees. See: Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977)....

PER CURIAM. We affirm the trial court’s judgment for damages and costs but reverse the award for attorney’s fees. The statutes relied upon to award the fees, section 713.345 and section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1995), are not applicable to this action. Section 713.345 is a criminal statute that makes no provision for attorney’s fees. Section 713.29 authorizes the award of attorney’s fees in an action to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim on a bond....

...The court also denied the relief which the Javas sought based on their counterclaim for breach of contract. In the last paragraph of its final judgment, the trial court stated that “[e]ach party hereto shall pay and be responsible for their own attorney’s fees and costs.” Both parties rely on section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977), which provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien under Part 1, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, to be determined...

...ll be taxed as a part of his costs, as allowed in equitable actions. This court held in Winnie v. Buckhalter, 362 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), that a party who successfully resists a mechanic’s lien action is entitled to attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1975). In Snaidman v. Harrell, 432 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), we addressed the issue of what effect, if any, the 1977 amendments to section 713.29, Florida Statutes, had on the award of attorney’s fees in mechanic’s lien actions....

...So.2d at 811 . Despite this new language, we observed in Snaidman , that there was “no reason to depart from the precedent in Winnie v. Buckhalter ... and the cases it follows.” Id. In addition, we found no “basis in the statutory language [of section 713.29] for concluding that the prevailing party in the foreclosure action should be denied recovery of attorney’s fees simply because that party did not also prevail in his breach of contract action against the contractor.” Id....

...2009), the Florida Supreme Court mentioned both the “significant issues” test and the “any significant issue” test, without addressing the subtle difference between the two tests: The rule of Prosperi is that in determining “prevailing party” under section 713.29, the trial court should look to which party prevailed on the “significant issues,” as recognized in our case of Moritz that had been decided the previous year. Together, Prosperi and its predecessor Moritz require...

SMITH, Judge. Walter N. Vance, III, Inc. (Vance) appeals an order denying its motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1989) for legal representation performed in arbitration proceedings....

...McMerit Construction Co., 556 So.2d 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). We have not overlooked appellant’s contention that the policy arguments underlying the award of fees in the cited cases should apply equally in this case. However, as the trial court found, section 713.29 cannot be compared with sections 627.428 and 627.756. Fees are not awardable under former section 713.29 unless a party prevails in an action to enforce a mechanic’s lien....

...anic’s lien” and is not entitled to have his attorney’s fees paid by the opposing party. Zac Smith & Co. v. Moonspinner *99 Condominium Association, Inc., 534 So.2d 739, 742-3 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). AFFIRMED. SHIVERS and KAHN, JJ., concur. . Section 713.29 was amended effective January 1, 1991 to include payment for services during arbitration. The underlying action in this case was instituted prior to January 1, 1991 and the trial court correctly determined that the amended section 713.29 did not control.

...rties for the prevailing party to be awarded costs, expenses, and a reasonable attorney fee to be set by the court. Affirmed. CAMPBELL, C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur. In their briefs, the parties indicate the statute which applies to the motion is section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1985), which provides: Attorney’s fees....

...importance. We therefore have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We rephrase the certified question as follows: Where a lienor obtains a judgment against a property owner in an action to enforce a construction lien brought pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2005), are trial courts required to apply the "significant issues" test articulated in Prosperi v....

...e of awarding attorneys' fees? We answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative and hold that trial courts are required to apply the "significant issues" test of Prosperi to evaluate entitlement to prevailing party attorneys' fees under section 713.29, even when the lienor obtains a judgment on the lien....

...After setting off that figure against the agreed lien amount of $12,725, the net result was a judgment for $1,525 in favor of Gale Industries. Thereafter, each party concluded that it was the "prevailing party" and filed cross-motions to tax attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2005)....

...The Tryteks recovered $11,200 on their counterclaim. Gale only offered a discount of from $320 to $3200. Therefore, this Court finds that the Tryteks prevailed on the "significant issue" of this case and are the prevailing parties entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to § 713.29, F.S....

...Code, Inc., 626 So.2d 1360 (Fla.1993), modified the "prevailing party" rule by applying the "significant issues" test. However, it concluded that the "significant issues" test of Prosperi applies only where the contractor is unsuccessful in its lien foreclosure action. The Fifth District concluded that under section 713.29, a contractor who obtains any monetary judgment pursuant to a construction lien claim would ordinarily be the prevailing party, and in this case, the contractor did receive a judgment of $1,525....

...the trial court's determination of prevailing party should be affirmed. Both parties assert that one or the other must be the prevailing party. The main issue in this case is what factors enter into a determination of "prevailing party" pursuant to section 713.29....

...State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830, 832 (Fla.1993). In this case, entitlement to attorneys' fees is based on statute. We thus start with the language of the lien statute that concerns the award of attorneys' fees in an action to enforce a lien. Section 713.29 was first enacted by the Legislature in 1963. Ch. 63-135, § 1, Laws of Fla. Section 713.29 states: In any action brought to enforce a lien or to enforce a claim against a bond under this part, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney for trial and appeal or for arbi...

...(Emphases added.) Although the Legislature expressly defined several terms within the Construction Lien Law in a section entitled "Definitions," it did not define the term "prevailing party," see § 713.01, Fla. Stat. (2005), nor does a definition appear in section 713.29....

...airness and equity in actions brought pursuant to the lien law. The notion that equitable principles should apply in determining "prevailing party" attorneys' fees has been utilized in this Court's opinions deciding attorneys' fees in the context of section 713.29....

...Grove, Inc., 472 So.2d 1177 (Fla.1985), the Court examined a case in which a litigant had offered an amount to settle that was equal to the amount recovered. This Court found that "in order to be a prevailing party entitled to the award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 713.29, a litigant must have recovered an amount exceeding that which was earlier offered in settlement of the claim." Id. at 1179. This Court explained that it based its decision on the purported policy underlying section 713.29: The award of attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing party in a mechanic's lien action serves to encourage settlement of disputes before resorting to litigation....

...e the claim, allows the plaintiff a free throw of the dice in an attempt to squeeze the last penny out of the claim. Id. at 1178-79 (emphasis added). Our decision in C.U. Associates explicitly stands for the proposition that the underlying policy of section 713.29 is to "encourage settlement of disputes before resorting to litigation." *371 However, the case also implicitly espouses equitable principles by preventing a plaintiff who has recovered a judgment from unjustly being awarded attorneys'...

...eded the amount of the judgment. Subsequently, this Court decided Prosperi, which is also based on basic principles of fairness and an interest in discouraging needless litigation. The rule of Prosperi is that in determining "prevailing party" under section 713.29, the trial court should look to which party prevailed on the "significant issues," as recognized in our case of Moritz that had been decided the previous year....

...The trial court denied both parties' claims for fees, and on appeal the district court affirmed, certifying the following question: "Does the test of Moritz v. Hoyt for determining who is the prevailing party for the purposes of awarding attorney's fees apply to fees awarded under section 713.29, Florida Statutes?" 626 So.2d at 1361. [7] In concluding that the "significant issues" test adopted in Moritz was applicable to claims under section 713.29, this Court discussed what appellate courts had termed the "net judgment rule," which in essence precluded an owner from recovering attorneys' fees under section 713.29 *372 where a claimant fails to foreclose a mechanic's lien but obtains a judgment on other non-lien claims that exceeds any claim of the owner....

...ost on the only issue litigated and received a judgment on its recorded lien of $12,725 in the amount of only $1,525. We are concerned that fees may have driven the litigation and prevented the parties from resolving the case. The overall purpose of section 713.29 and attorneys' fee statutes in general is to discourage rather than encourage needless litigation....

...(2008) ("Except as provided in this section, all mediation communications shall be confidential. A mediation participant shall not disclose a mediation communication to a person other than another mediation participant or a participant's counsel."). Our conclusion is consistent with our precedent and section 713.29....

...[12] Moreover, this conclusion is consistent with our decision in C.U. Associates, where we held that on remand the trial court could find that neither party was the "prevailing party" entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. 472 So.2d at 1179. Finally, our decision does not conflict with section 713.29, which requires only that the "prevailing party is entitled to recover" a reasonable attorneys' fee....

...QUINCE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, and CANADY, JJ., concur. POLSTON, J., did not participate. NOTES [1] The question that was certified by the Fifth District states: When a lienor obtains a judgment against a property owner in an action to enforce a construction lien brought pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2005), does the trial court have the discretion to apply the "significant issues" test articulated in Prosperi v....

...[7] The district court also certified the following question: Is an owner who prevails on a complaint by a contractor or sub-contractor to enforce a mechanic's lien under Part I, Chapter 713, Florida Statutes (1989), entitled to attorney's fees under 713.29, even though, in the same suit, the contractor prevailed against the owner on a claim for money damages for breach of the contract, both claims arising out of the same transaction? Prosperi, 626 So.2d at 1361....

...urt decisions. [10] Trytek's breach of contract counterclaim is a compulsory counterclaim because both the lien claim and the breach of contract counterclaim arose from the same transaction or occurrence. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.170(a). Thus, although section 713.29 applies only to lien claims, Trytek's judgment on its counterclaim could be considered in the trial court's determination of the prevailing party because the counterclaim is considered as part of the lien claim....

...Robertson and Kristin Davis of the Robertson Firm, Gainesville, for Appellee. BENTON, C.J. Max and Alicia Sheppard appeal the trial court's order requiring them to pay costs and attorneys' fees to M & R Plumbing, Inc. (M & R) on the purported authority of section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2008)....

...4th DCA 1999)). When the trial court entered final judgment on the verdict in favor of M & R, it expressly reserved jurisdiction to consider an award of attorneys' fees and costs. [3] All parties filed motions seeking attorneys' fees, both sides relying on section 713.29, Florida Statutes (2008), which provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien... under this part, the prevailing party is entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of her or his attorney.... § 713.29, Fla. Stat. (2008). The trial court ruled that M & R was entitled to attorneys' fees under section 713.29 on the lien foreclosure count....

...nly from either a statutory basis or an agreement between the parties." Trytek *953 v. Gale Indus., Inc., 3 So.3d 1194, 1198 (Fla.2009) (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830, 832 (Fla. 1993)). Here the trial court concluded that section 713.29 provided statutory authority for an award of attorneys' fees, premised on a ruling that M & R had prevailed on its lien foreclosure claim....

...'s verdict—they had prevailed on the construction lien foreclosure claim, entitling the Sheppards to recover fees, as prevailing parties. In the absence of proof of a valid contract, finding M & R entitled to an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 713.29 was error....

...1st DCA 1993) ("[I]f there has been no agreement as to essential terms, an enforceable contract does not exist.... Failure to sufficiently determine quality, quantity, or price may preclude the finding of an enforceable agreement."). The trial court erred in determining M & R was entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under section 713.29, because, without a valid contract, there was no lien for M & R to foreclose....

...While we agree the Sheppards must now be deemed the prevailing parties on the lien foreclosure count, entry of the money judgment in favor of M & R on the quantum meruit count made M & R, not the Sheppards, the prevailing party in the litigation, viewing the entire "action brought" as a whole. § 713.29, Fla....

...rney’s fees as a prevailing party under section 627.428, Florida Statutes (1985). See Greenough v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 449 So.2d 1001 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); cf. C.U. Assocs., Inc. v. R.B. Grove, Inc., 472 So.2d 1177 (Fla.1985) (construing section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1981))....

denying attorney’s fees pursuant to Fla.Stat. § 713.29, F.S.A. The Third District Court of Appeal said

...issue during arbitration, and they did not present witnesses or any other evidence to support their respective positions. . Clearly, if Greco is deemed the prevailing party on his lien claim, he will be entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. See § 713.29, Fla....

...The trial court ultimately denied Shear recovery upon a finding that no contract existed between the parties. Because Shear had not prevailed on the mechanic’s lien claim, the trial court ordered Shear to pay the defendant attorney’s fees of $36,067.02 pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1989)....

prevailing party in a lien enforcement action. § 713.29 Fla.Stat., F.S.A.1 Here the action to enforce

attorney’s fee of $4,575 against the Gleasons under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1981). The Glea-sons sought

attorney’s fees and costs to Marocco pursuant to section 713.29, Florida Statutes; (6) the trial court erred

motion for attorney’s fees. That was error. Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977) requires an award

PER CURIAM. We affirm the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to appellee. As the prevailing party in the mechanic’s lien action brought under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1992), appellee is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees....

HURLEY, Judge. R.J. Pavlik appeals from an order awarding him attorney’s fees pursuant to *639 Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1983), 1 as the prevailing party in a mechanics’ lien foreclosure action....

...The trial court awarded $6,500, the amount Mr. Pavlik was obligated to pay his attorney pursuant to their fee agreement. On appeal, Mr. Pavlik contends that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the award to $6,500. He claims he is entitled to recover a “reasonable fee” under section 713.29 and unrebut-ted expert testimony at the fee hearing indicated that a reasonable fee for the services performed by his attorney would range between $11,000 and $13,000....

...Pavlik presented expert testimony indicating that a reasonable fee for services rendered by his attorney was about twice the amount due under his agreement with counsel. Since we have concluded that Bosem governs by analogy, we hold that an evaluation of “reasonable” attorney’s fees under section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1983), must not be determined solely by the terms of the fee arrangement between a party and his counsel....

...n adequate because he misjudged the complexity of the case and underestimated the time likely to be consumed. Such a result would defeat the purposes underlying statutory authorization of attorney fee awards; we therefore decline to. adopt a view of section 713.29 under which the term' “reasonable” might be dictated by pre-existing fee arrangements between a party and his counsel. Accordingly, we reverse the order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED. GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion. DELL, J., dissents without opinion. . Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1983), provides: Attorney’s fees....

...attorney’s fee. The firm expected to be paid by appellee if not awarded a fee by the court. Appellee had no interest in the fee award, and the firm would not share that award with appellee. Appellee’s claim for attorney’s fee is predicated on Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1979), which provides: In any action brought to enforce a lien under part I, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney for trial and appeal, to be determined...

...The award of attorney’s fees is in derogation of the common law, and statutes allowing for the award of such fees should be strictly construed. Sunbeam Enterprises, Inc. v. Upthegrove, 316 So.2d 34 (Fla.1975); Jackson v. Hatch, 288 So.2d 564 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Cases construing section 713.29 have limited the allowance of attorney’s fees to solely that aspect of an action which relates to the cause of action to enforce the lien....

...ree is $500 or less. Such owners, subcontractors, laborers and material men shall be deemed to be “insureds” or “beneficiaries” for the purposes of this section. The trial judge apparently based the award of an attorney fee in this case upon section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977), which concerns attorney fees in cases of lien enforcement....

...dered. Cf. Sarasota County v. Barg, 302 So.2d 737 (Fla.1974). *729 We must reject the argument that an action on a payment bond, substituted as security in place of the real property improved, is equivalent to other actions to enforce a lien so that section 713.29 would govern....

...4th DCA 1980), the Fourth District receded from its previous opinion in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Howell & King, Inc., 336 So.2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert. denied, 341 So.2d 1086 (Fla.1976). The Fourth District now holds that section 627.756 prevails over section 713.29 in regard to the computation of attorney fees in cases involving payment bonds....

...garding types of insurance, insurers or as to “a particular matter” prevail over all other such provisions. In regard to the instant point on appeal, section 627.756(2), Florida Statutes (1977), deals with a “particular matter” as opposed to section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977), which concerns attorney fees in cases involving enforcement of a lien....

...ions to reconsider the allowance of attorney fees to Superior in conformity with section 627.756(2), Florida Statutes (1977). AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED with directions. DAUKSCH, C.J., and FRANK D. UP-CHURCH, Jr., J., concur. . Section 713.29, Florida Statutes (1977), provided: In any action brought to enforce a hen under part I of this chapter, the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover a reasonable fee for the services of his attorney, to be determined by the court, which shall be taxed as part of his costs, (emphasis added)....

mean appellant is entitled to a fee under Section 713.-29. It is only the victor in the lien action who

would be recoverable unless it is provided by § 713.29, Florida Statutes: “In any action brought to enforce