CopyPublished | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal
...ant to chapter
714, Florida Statutes (2022), the Uniform Commercial Real Estate
Receivership Act (UCRERA). Because the trial court failed to conduct an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether there was a need for the
receivership under subsections 714.06(1)(b) or (c), we reverse and
remand with instructions.
I.
In March 2021, White Hawk entered into a contract to purchase
twenty-three residential properties from Zahav for $3.26 million.
Delivery of those properties was to occur sixty days from the date of the
contract....
...roperties
pursuant to UCRERA, Florida common law, and "other relevant
statutes." Specifically, the motion stated that the receivership was
required "in order to preserve nonexempt property pending appeal or for
equitable ground [sic]. Fla. Stat. [§]714.061(1)(b) and (c)." White Hawk
argued that a receivership was necessary to preserve the subject
properties due to (1) protracted litigation as a result of the notice of
2
appeal filed by Zahav and (2) mism...
...that except as otherwise provided in the statute "the court may issue an
order under this chapter only after notice and opportunity for a hearing
appropriate under the circumstances." (Emphasis added.)3 The trial
court's discretion to appoint a receiver is set forth under section
714.06(1). Section 714.06(1)(a) deals with the appointment of a receiver
before judgment, while section 714.06(1)(b) addresses the appointment of
a receiver after judgment—relevant here. White Hawk also sought the
appointment of a receiver in its motion based upon equitable grounds
under section 714.06(1)(c), subject to the applicable factors of subsection
(b) for postjudgment proceedings.
Subsections 714.06(1)(b)-(c) provide in pertinent part:
(1) The court may appoint a receiver:
....
(b) After judgment:
2 Prior to the enactment of UCRERA, "the substantive and
procedural aspects of receiverships in Florida were governed by a
combination of decisional law and reference to Fla....
...dges and
Practitioners, Fla. Bar Journal, Jan./Feb. 2022, at 18. Both sides have
cited to this article in their briefs.
3 Despite Zahav's contentions to the contrary, Zahav was properly
noticed that White Hawk sought a receivership pursuant to section
714.06(1)(b) and (c), as the statute was specifically noted in the Motion
for Appointment of Receiver referenced on the Notice of Hearing Via
Zoom.
6
1....
...4th DCA 1976) (reversing an order appointing receiver in
part because "no testimony was taken supporting the appointment of a
receiver"). While these cases are resourceful, they fall in the category of
receiverships entered "before judgment," which is not the case before us.4
See § 714.06(1)(a).
Not surprisingly, White Hawk responds that Zahav's cases predate
UCRERA and thus have no application here. Instead, White Hawk
directs our attention to the text of the statute and argues that neither
subsection 714.06(1)(b) nor (c) require that the trial court hold an
evidentiary hearing, much less rely upon any competent evidence to
support the appointment of a receiver....
...the
judgment into effect" or "preserve nonexempt real property pending
appeal," the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion for
appointment of receiver without conducting an evidentiary hearing and
making the requisite findings. See § 714.06(1)(b)-(c). Moreover, the trial
court erred in appointing a receiver pursuant to section 714.06(1)(a)—
pertaining to "before judgment" cases....
