718.122
Unconscionability of certain leases; rebuttable presumption.
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718.122 Unconscionability of certain leases; rebuttable presumption.—
(1) A lease pertaining to use by condominium unit owners of recreational or other common facilities, irrespective of the date on which such lease was entered into, is presumptively unconscionable if all of the following elements exist:
(a) The lease was executed by persons none of whom at the time of the execution of the lease were elected by condominium unit owners, other than the developer, to represent their interests;
(b) The lease requires either the condominium association or the condominium unit owners to pay real estate taxes on the subject real property;
(c) The lease requires either the condominium association or the condominium unit owners to insure buildings or other facilities on the subject real property against fire or any other hazard;
(d) The lease requires either the condominium association or the condominium unit owners to perform some or all maintenance obligations pertaining to the subject real property or facilities located upon the subject real property;
(e) The lease requires either the condominium association or the condominium unit owners to pay rents to the lessor for a period of 21 years or more;
(f) The lease provides that failure of the lessee to make payments of rents due under the lease either creates, establishes, or permits establishment of a lien upon individual condominium units of the condominium to secure claims for rent;
(g) The lease requires an annual rental which exceeds 25 percent of the appraised value of the leased property as improved, provided that, for purposes of this paragraph, “annual rental” means the amount due during the first 12 months of the lease for all units, regardless of whether such units were in fact occupied or sold during that period, and “appraised value” means the appraised value placed upon the leased property the first tax year after the sale of a unit in the condominium;
(h) The lease provides for a periodic rental increase; and
(i) The lease or other condominium documents require that every transferee of a condominium unit must assume obligations under the lease.
(2) The Legislature expressly finds that many leases involving use of recreational or other common facilities by residents of condominiums were entered into by parties wholly representative of the interests of a condominium developer at a time when the condominium unit owners not only did not control the administration of their condominium, but also had little or no voice in such administration. Such leases often contain numerous obligations on the part of either or both a condominium association and condominium unit owners with relatively few obligations on the part of the lessor. Such leases may or may not be unconscionable in any given case. Nevertheless, the Legislature finds that a combination of certain onerous obligations and circumstances warrants the establishment of a rebuttable presumption of unconscionability of certain leases, as specified in subsection (1). The presumption may be rebutted by a lessor upon the showing of additional facts and circumstances to justify and validate what otherwise appears to be an unconscionable lease under this section. Failure of a lease to contain all the enumerated elements shall neither preclude a determination of unconscionability of the lease nor raise a presumption as to its conscionability. It is the intent of the Legislature that this section is remedial and does not create any new cause of action to invalidate any condominium lease, but shall operate as a statutory prescription on procedural matters in actions brought on one or more causes of action existing at the time of the execution of such lease.
(3) Any provision of the Florida Statutes to the contrary notwithstanding, neither the statute of limitations nor laches shall prohibit unit owners from maintaining a cause of action under the provisions of this section.
History.—s. 3, ch. 77-221; s. 11, ch. 94-350.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 18
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1979–2021 · leading case: Steinhardt v. Rudolph
Steinhardt v. Rudolph (1982)
“" § 718.122(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). One clause frequently contained in these condominium leases is, as here, a so-called escalation clause which "provides that the rental under the lease .”
Beeman v. Island Breakers (1990)
“[2] Finally, the release affected claims up to the date of execution of the release; as already explained, the cause of action with respect to escalation accrues when the escalation occurs, which in the present case was substantially after the release was executed.”
KING MOUNTAIN CONDOMINIUM ASS'N, INC. v. Gundlach (1982)
“The appellants have asserted that the trial court failed to consider and apply the rebuttable presumption of unconscionability set forth in Section 718.122, Florida Statutes (1977).”
Strathmore Riverside Villas Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Paver Development Corp. (1979)
“The appellees moved to dismiss this count because it alleged only eight of the nine elements of presumptive unconscionability set forth in Section 718.122(1), Florida Statutes (1977).”
Maison Grande Condominium Ass'n v. Dorten, Inc. (1993)
“In 1991, Maison Grande filed an action against Defendants seeking to have the rent escalation provision declared unconscionable pursuant to section 718.122, Florida Statutes (1991).”
Bennett v. Behring Corp. (1979)
“1976) wherein the Court noted that while F.S. 718.122 did not apply in an attempt to invalidate a recreation lease on the basis of unconscionability, “There is .”
Sky Lake Gardens Recreation, Inc. v. Sky Lake Gardens Nos. 1, 3, & 4, Inc. (1991)
“In other words, should some future rental escalation be unconscionable in fact, relief would be available under Steinhardt and section 718.122, Florida Statutes (1989).”
Dubowitz v. Century Village East, Inc. (1980)
“The court further requested memoranda on whether the suit should be dismissed, specifically in relation to Section 718.122 [123], Florida Statutes (1979).”
FLORIDA DISCOUNT PROP., INC. v. Windermere Condo., Inc. (2001)
“[2] Section 718.122(1)(a)-(i), Florida Statutes (1997), contains detailed guidelines for determining whether a condominium recreational lease is "presumptively unconscionable.”
Colony Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n (In Re Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n) (2011)
“1-2, 1-3), which (1) declare a ninety-nine-year recreational facilities lease unconscionable under Section 718.122, Florida Statutes, and common law; (2) sustain the appellee’s objection to claims sixteen, nineteen, twenty, and twenty-one; and (3) disallow the appellants’ claims.”
MAISON GRANDE CONDO. ASS'N v. Dorten (1993)
“In 1991, Maison Grande filed an action against Defendants seeking to have the rent escalation provision declared unconscionable pursuant to section 718.122, Florida Statutes (1991).”
Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n v. Colony Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. (In Re Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n) (2010)
“The Lease Is Presumptively Unconscionable Under Fla. Stat. § 718.122 . Section 718.122(1) provides that a lease pertaining to use by condominium unit owners of recreational facilities is presumptively unconscionable, irrespective of the date when such lease was executed, if…”
— 718.122(1) — 4 cases
Steinhardt v. Rudolph (1982)
“" § 718.122(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). One clause frequently contained in these condominium leases is, as here, a so-called escalation clause which "provides that the rental under the lease .”
Strathmore Riverside Villas Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Paver Development Corp. (1979)
“The appellees moved to dismiss this count because it alleged only eight of the nine elements of presumptive unconscionability set forth in Section 718.122(1), Florida Statutes (1977).”
Beeman v. Island Breakers (1990)
“[2] Finally, the release affected claims up to the date of execution of the release; as already explained, the cause of action with respect to escalation accrues when the escalation occurs, which in the present case was substantially after the release was executed.”
Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n v. Colony Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. (In Re Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n) (2010)
“The Lease Is Presumptively Unconscionable Under Fla. Stat. § 718.122 . Section 718.122(1) provides that a lease pertaining to use by condominium unit owners of recreational facilities is presumptively unconscionable, irrespective of the date when such lease was executed, if…”
— 718.122(1)(a) — 2 cases
Steinhardt v. Rudolph (1982)
“" § 718.122(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). One clause frequently contained in these condominium leases is, as here, a so-called escalation clause which "provides that the rental under the lease .”
FLORIDA DISCOUNT PROP., INC. v. Windermere Condo., Inc. (2001)
“[2] Section 718.122(1)(a)-(i), Florida Statutes (1997), contains detailed guidelines for determining whether a condominium recreational lease is "presumptively unconscionable.”
— 718.122(1)(b)(c)(d) — 1 case
Steinhardt v. Rudolph (1982)
“" § 718.122(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). One clause frequently contained in these condominium leases is, as here, a so-called escalation clause which "provides that the rental under the lease .”
— 718.122(1)(e)(h) — 1 case
Steinhardt v. Rudolph (1982)
“" § 718.122(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). One clause frequently contained in these condominium leases is, as here, a so-called escalation clause which "provides that the rental under the lease .”
— 718.122(1)(f) — 1 case
Steinhardt v. Rudolph (1982)
“" § 718.122(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). One clause frequently contained in these condominium leases is, as here, a so-called escalation clause which "provides that the rental under the lease .”
— 718.122(2) — 4 cases
Steinhardt v. Rudolph (1982)
“" § 718.122(1), Fla. Stat. (1981). One clause frequently contained in these condominium leases is, as here, a so-called escalation clause which "provides that the rental under the lease .”
Maison Grande Condominium Ass'n v. Dorten, Inc. (1993)
“In 1991, Maison Grande filed an action against Defendants seeking to have the rent escalation provision declared unconscionable pursuant to section 718.122, Florida Statutes (1991).”
Beeman v. Island Breakers (1990)
“[2] Finally, the release affected claims up to the date of execution of the release; as already explained, the cause of action with respect to escalation accrues when the escalation occurs, which in the present case was substantially after the release was executed.”
MAISON GRANDE CONDO. ASS'N v. Dorten (1993)
“In 1991, Maison Grande filed an action against Defendants seeking to have the rent escalation provision declared unconscionable pursuant to section 718.122, Florida Statutes (1991).”
— 718.122(2)(a) — 1 case
Basch v. Hopson (2002)
— 718.122(g) — 1 case
Colony Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n (In Re Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n) (2011)
“1-2, 1-3), which (1) declare a ninety-nine-year recreational facilities lease unconscionable under Section 718.122, Florida Statutes, and common law; (2) sustain the appellee’s objection to claims sixteen, nineteen, twenty, and twenty-one; and (3) disallow the appellants’ claims.”
— 718.122(l)(g) — 1 case
Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n v. Colony Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. (In Re Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass'n) (2010)
“The Lease Is Presumptively Unconscionable Under Fla. Stat. § 718.122 . Section 718.122(1) provides that a lease pertaining to use by condominium unit owners of recreational facilities is presumptively unconscionable, irrespective of the date when such lease was executed, if…”
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