CopyCited 9 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida | 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99459, 2008 WL 4507506
...740 (1933)). Sundance concedes it paid the prepayment fee pursuant to the Windfall Interpretation voluntarily, although it alleges it did so "under protest." ( Am. Compl. at ¶ 22). Despite the voluntary nature of its payment, Sundance contends that Section 725.04, Florida Statutes, exempts its breach of contract claim from the application of the voluntary payment doctrine. [6] Section 725.04 provides that: When a suit is instituted by a party to a contract to recover a payment made pursuant to the contract and by the terms of the contract there was no enforceable obligation to make the payment or the making of the payment was excused, the defense of voluntary payment may not be interposed by the person receiving payment to defeat recovery of the payment. Fla. Stat. § 725.04. Wells Fargo argues, however, that Section 725.04 does not apply to Sundance's prepayment of the Loan Agreement. In support of its position, Wells Fargo relies on a Florida appellate decision concluding that Section 725.04 only applies "to those situations in which the contract on its face does not call for payment, or the contract on its face excuses the payment." Hall v....
...The court specifically noted that the plaintiffs in Hall were not claiming that any payments were made "in excess of the amounts agreed to...." Id. at n. 8. Similarly, in Sanchez, upon which Wells Fargo also heavily relies, the district court determined that Section 725.04 did not apply to a plaintiffs voluntarily payment of a $6.00 late charge because the amount of the late charge and the circumstances under which it was due were expressly stated in the underlying cable service contract....
...ase that the Loan Agreement contained an enforceable obligation that Sundance pay a prepayment premium and that the parties simply disagree as to the calculation of that prepayment. Sundance, however, cites a series of cases for the proposition that Section
725.04 clearly applies to claims to recover overpayments that were unenforceable based on the parties' contract. See, e.g., Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Electronics Corp.,
249 F.Supp.2d 703, 710-12 (D.Md.2003) (holding that Section
725.04 barred application of voluntary payment defense to payment of excessive commissions); Saglio v. Chrysler First Commercial Corp.,
839 F.Supp. 830, 834-835 (M.D.Fla.1993) (applying Section
725.04 to preclude application of voluntary payment doctrine in suit to recover money improperly paid under a guaranty)....
..."a yield greater than the yield that would have been paid had the borrower made the regular payments though maturity" ( id. at ¶ 19), was not expressly referenced in the Loan Agreement and therefore was not an enforceable obligation. See Fla. Stat. § 725.04....
...roperly considered in the context of the instant motions. [6] The Loan Agreement states it is governed by Florida law, and Sundance does not appear to dispute that Florida's voluntary payment doctrine would apply to its claim absent the operation of Section 725.04....
CopyCited 7 times | Published | District Court, M.D. Florida | 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17041, 1993 WL 505449
...y learned of CFCC's alleged misconduct. As basis therefore, CFCC asserts that voluntary payments under a claim of right with knowledge of facts are unrecoverable. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Keton,
115 So.2d 547 (Fla.1959). However, Florida Statute, section
725.04 governs voluntary payments made pursuant to contracts, and provides: When a suit is instituted by a party to a contract to recover a payment made pursuant to the contract and by the terms of the contract there was no enforceable obligation to make the payment or the making of the payment was excused, the defense of voluntary payment may not be interposed *835 by the person receiving payment to defeat recovery of the payment. Fla.Stat. §
725.04 (1991) (emphasis added). The Court finds section
725.04 precludes the application of the voluntary payment defense, and thus denies CFCC's Motion for Summary Judgment as to damages....
CopyCited 1 times | Published | District Court, S.D. Florida
...infra , the Court determines that the voluntary payment doctrine does not bar Plaintiff's claims in this case because (1) the voluntary payment doctrine is not applicable unless the payor has "full knowledge of all the facts;" and/or (2) Fla. Stat. § 725.04 bars the application of the defense in this case....
...actual tax imposed on Brink's). Alternatively, and as an independent ground for denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Florida's voluntary payment doctrine, the Court finds this defense is barred in the instant case pursuant to Section 725.04, Florida Statutes which curtailed and created an exception to the voluntary payment doctrine. Specifically, Section 725.04 provides that: When a suit is instituted by a party to a contract to recover a payment made pursuant to the contract and by the terms of the contract there was no enforceable obligation to make the payment or the making of the payment was excused, the defense of voluntary payment may not be interposed by the person receiving payment to defeat recovery of the payment. Fla. Stat. § 725.04 ....
...Corp. v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. , No. 5:05CV260 OCGRJ,
2007 WL 1114045 , at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2007), the district court attempted to reconcile case law applying this statute with seemingly disparate results, holding as follows: The simple meaning of §
725.04 is that the voluntary payment doctrine cannot be used as a defense to payment in Florida where, as here, a party seeks to recover monies paid under a contract, the terms of which turn out to be unenforceable. Claims for monies paid outside the terms and scope of the contract continue to be subject to the voluntary payment doctrine. Any other interpretation would make §
725.04 meaningless and there would have been no reason for the codification of this limitation of the voluntary payment doctrine....
...5:05CV260 OCGRJ,
2007 WL 1114045 , at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2007). Further, as Judge Cohn explained in Dear v. Q Club Hotel, LLC , No. 15-60474-CIV,
2016 WL 7477734 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2016), the situation presented in this case is the type which bars the voluntary payment defense: Section
725.04 applies to claims to recover overpayments when the parties dispute payments that allegedly exceeded or did not fall under terms or categories expressed in the parties' contract. See, e.g., Sundance [ Apartments I, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. ], 581 F.Supp.2d [1215] at 1225 [ (S.D. Fla. 2008) ] (holding that §
725.04 barred application of voluntary payment defense where additional prepayment amount under defendants' interpretation of contract provision was not enforceable obligation); Sensormatic Sec. Corp. v. Sensormatic Elecs. Corp. ,
249 F.Supp.2d 703 , 710-12 (D. Md. 2003) (holding that §
725.04 barred application of voluntary payment defense to payment of excessive commissions); Saglio v. Chrysler First Commercial Corp. ,
839 F.Supp. 830 , 834-35 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (applying §
725.04 to preclude application of voluntary payment doctrine in suit to recover money improperly paid under a guaranty)....
...Dear does not dispute that Shared Costs were owed to Q Club. He instead alleges that the amounts charged as Shared Costs exceeded the costs attributable to the easement, and therefore were not an enforceable obligation under the Declaration. Based on these allegations, Section
725.04 likely will bar the application of Q Club's voluntary payment defense.
2016 WL 7477734 , at *5. The Court disagrees with Defendant's contention that Fla. Stat. §
725.04 is inapplicable because that statute only bars the defense where the contract between the parties creates no enforceable obligation and here Plaintiff was obligated under the Passport Agreement to pay the Processing Fees. 3 Rather, in this case, in the same vein as the district courts' analyses supra *1323 in Taylor, Bean & Whitaker and in Dear , §
725.04 precludes RJA from raising the voluntary defense because the Passport Agreement prohibited RJA from charging a de facto commission as a "Processing Fee," as this Court previously recognized in its Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, to Strike, and for More Definite Statement....
...See [DE 27] (Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, to Strike, and for More Definite Statement) at pp. 5-6. Hall v. Humana Hosp. Daytona Beach ,
686 So.2d 653 , 655 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), upon which Defendant relies, is fundamentally distinguishable. In Hall , the court held that §
725.04 did not prohibit the application of the voluntary payment doctrine based upon an equitable claim for money had and received (not a breach of contract claim) brought by former hospital patients to recover overcharges that they had paid on their hospital bills....
CopyPublished | District Court of Appeal of Florida | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 320, 1985 Fla. App. LEXIS 12307
...Principles of waiver and estoppel cannot be used to create or broaden coverage of an insurance policy. See Annot., Insurance Coverage — Estoppel—Waiver, 1 ALR.3d 1139 (1965). See also Annot., Health Insurer — Restitution of Payments, 79 ALR.3d 1113 (1977), and § 725.04, Fla.Stat....