726.105
Transfers fraudulent as to present and future creditors.
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726.105 Transfers fraudulent as to present and future creditors.—
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) With actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or
(b) Without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:
1. Was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
2. Intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he or she would incur, debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they became due.
(2) In determining actual intent under paragraph (1)(a), consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether:
(a) The transfer or obligation was to an insider.
(b) The debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer.
(c) The transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed.
(d) Before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit.
(e) The transfer was of substantially all the debtor’s assets.
(f) The debtor absconded.
(g) The debtor removed or concealed assets.
(h) The value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred.
(i) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.
(j) The transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred.
(k) The debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
History.—s. 5, ch. 87-79; s. 937, ch. 97-102.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 323
cases (57 in the last 5 years), 1988–2026 · leading case: Bauman v. Bliese (In Re McCarn's Allstate Finance, Inc.)
Bauman v. Bliese (In Re McCarn's Allstate Finance, Inc.) (2005)
“§ 548 (a)(1); Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (l)(a). In addition, in order for the Trustee to use the provisions of the Florida fraudulent conveyance statute found in section 726.”
Wiand v. Waxenberg (2009)
“See Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (1)(a). Here, the “debtor” is Mr.”
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Old Naples Securities, Inc. (In Re Old Naples Securities, Inc.) (2006)
“00 *314 based on the claim of a fraudulent transfer pursuant to Section 544(b) and Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (l)(a). In Count XII the Trustee seeks to recover the same amount on the alternative theory of Section 544(b), and Fla.”
Kapila v. Espirito Santo Bank (In Re Bankest Capital Corp.) (2007)
“Second, the record is devoid of evidence establishing direct proof of fraud, Fla. Stat. § 726.105 ; and, the presence of badges of fraud related to actual, not constructive, fraud is questionable.”
National Auto Service Centers, Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC (2016)
“See generally §§ 726.105-.108. The act identifies three categories of such transfers: (1) transfers made "[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors, § 726.”
Welt v. Jacobson (In Re Aqua Clear Technologies, Inc.) (2007)
“Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (2); In re Paul, 217 B.”
Woodard v. Stewart (In Re Stewart) (2001)
“The Trustee has not established the existence of any transfer of the Debtor’s interest in property as required by § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code or § 726.105 of the Florida Statutes. E. Revocation of discharge.”
Wiand v. Morgan (2013)
“Under Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (1)(a), codifying actual fraud, the Receiver claims the transfers of false profits were fraudulent because Nadel (the debtor) caused the hedge funds and Traders to make the transfers to Morgan as part of a scheme with actual intent to hinder, delay, or…”
Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Hill (2001)
“r the Eleventh Circuit that is determinative of a cause pending in the federal courts and for which there appears to be no controlling precedent: Does Article X, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution exempt a Florida homestead, where the debtor acquired the homestead using…”
Oginsky v. PARAGON PROPERTIES OF COSTA RICA LLC (2011)
“Count IX: Fraudulent Transfers Plaintiffs allege that four individual Defendants, Judith Gale, Lisa Tashman, *1369 Julien Siegel, and Mariland Tashman, were the recipients of fraudulent transfers in violation of Fla. Stat. § 726.105 . (DE # 64 ¶¶ 859-65).”
Baxst v. Levenson (In Re Goldberg) (1998)
“See Fla.Stat. § 726.105 (1997). 7 . Although Levenson did not qualify as a relative of the Debtor because she was only engaged to him, many courts have broadly construed the definition of insider for purposes of fraudulent transfer actions.”
Wiand v. Cloud (2013)
“Under Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (1)(a), codifying actual fraud, the Receiver claims the transfers of false profits were fraudulent because Nadel (the debtor) caused the hedge funds to make the transfers to Cloud as part of a scheme with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud…”
— 726.105(1) — 29 cases
Kapila v. Espirito Santo Bank (In Re Bankest Capital Corp.) (2007)
“Second, the record is devoid of evidence establishing direct proof of fraud, Fla. Stat. § 726.105 ; and, the presence of badges of fraud related to actual, not constructive, fraud is questionable.”
Agritrade Lp v. Quercia (2017)
Desak v. Vanlandingham (2012)
Wiand v. Waxenberg (2009)
“See Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (1)(a). Here, the “debtor” is Mr.”
— 726.105(1)(1) — 1 case
Mejia v. Ruiz (2008)
— 726.105(1)(B) — 1 case
Welt v. Jacobson (In Re Aqua Clear Technologies, Inc.) (2007)
“Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (2); In re Paul, 217 B.”
— 726.105(1)(a) — 49 cases
Wiand v. Waxenberg (2009)
“See Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (1)(a). Here, the “debtor” is Mr.”
National Auto Service Centers, Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC (2016)
“See generally §§ 726.105-.108. The act identifies three categories of such transfers: (1) transfers made "[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors, § 726.”
— 726.105(1)(b) — 28 cases
National Auto Service Centers, Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC (2016)
“See generally §§ 726.105-.108. The act identifies three categories of such transfers: (1) transfers made "[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors, § 726.”
Wiand v. Waxenberg (2009)
“See Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (1)(a). Here, the “debtor” is Mr.”
Willis v. Red Reef, Inc. (2013)
Sackett v. Shahid (1998)
In Re Vilsack (2006)
— 726.105(1)(b)(1) — 1 case
— 726.105(2) — 35 cases
Mejia v. Ruiz (2008)
Woodard v. Stewart (In Re Stewart) (2001)
“The Trustee has not established the existence of any transfer of the Debtor’s interest in property as required by § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code or § 726.105 of the Florida Statutes. E. Revocation of discharge.”
— 726.105(2)(I) — 1 case
Welt v. Jacobson (In Re Aqua Clear Technologies, Inc.) (2007)
“Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (2); In re Paul, 217 B.”
— 726.105(2)(a) — 15 cases
In Re Paul (1997)
In Re Young (1999)
— 726.105(2)(b) — 1 case
— 726.105(2)(c) — 1 case
— 726.105(2)(d) — 2 cases
Baxst v. Levenson (In Re Goldberg) (1998)
“See Fla.Stat. § 726.105 (1997). 7 . Although Levenson did not qualify as a relative of the Debtor because she was only engaged to him, many courts have broadly construed the definition of insider for purposes of fraudulent transfer actions.”
United States v. Romano (1989)
— 726.105(2)(e) — 2 cases
Baxst v. Levenson (In Re Goldberg) (1998)
“See Fla.Stat. § 726.105 (1997). 7 . Although Levenson did not qualify as a relative of the Debtor because she was only engaged to him, many courts have broadly construed the definition of insider for purposes of fraudulent transfer actions.”
— 726.105(2)(e)(i) — 1 case
— 726.105(2)(g) — 1 case
Baxst v. Levenson (In Re Goldberg) (1998)
“See Fla.Stat. § 726.105 (1997). 7 . Although Levenson did not qualify as a relative of the Debtor because she was only engaged to him, many courts have broadly construed the definition of insider for purposes of fraudulent transfer actions.”
— 726.105(2)(h) — 1 case
— 726.105(a) — 3 cases
— 726.105(b) — 2 cases
In Re Young (1999)
— 726.105(b)(1) — 1 case
— 726.105(d) — 2 cases
In Re Paul (1997)
Kapila v. Plave (1997)
— 726.105(h) — 2 cases
In Re Paul (1997)
Kapila v. Plave (1997)
— 726.105(i) — 2 cases
In Re Paul (1997)
Kapila v. Plave (1997)
— 726.105(l)(a) — 59 cases
Bauman v. Bliese (In Re McCarn's Allstate Finance, Inc.) (2005)
“§ 548 (a)(1); Fla. Stat. § 726.105 (l)(a). In addition, in order for the Trustee to use the provisions of the Florida fraudulent conveyance statute found in section 726.”
Woodard v. Stewart (In Re Stewart) (2001)
“The Trustee has not established the existence of any transfer of the Debtor’s interest in property as required by § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code or § 726.105 of the Florida Statutes. E. Revocation of discharge.”
National Auto Service Centers, Inc. v. F/R 550, LLC (2016)
“See generally §§ 726.105-.108. The act identifies three categories of such transfers: (1) transfers made "[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud" creditors, § 726.”
Baxst v. Levenson (In Re Goldberg) (1998)
“See Fla.Stat. § 726.105 (1997). 7 . Although Levenson did not qualify as a relative of the Debtor because she was only engaged to him, many courts have broadly construed the definition of insider for purposes of fraudulent transfer actions.”
— 726.105(l)(b) — 40 cases
Kapila v. Espirito Santo Bank (In Re Bankest Capital Corp.) (2007)
“Second, the record is devoid of evidence establishing direct proof of fraud, Fla. Stat. § 726.105 ; and, the presence of badges of fraud related to actual, not constructive, fraud is questionable.”
Woodard v. Stewart (In Re Stewart) (2001)
“The Trustee has not established the existence of any transfer of the Debtor’s interest in property as required by § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code or § 726.105 of the Florida Statutes. E. Revocation of discharge.”
Baxst v. Levenson (In Re Goldberg) (1998)
“See Fla.Stat. § 726.105 (1997). 7 . Although Levenson did not qualify as a relative of the Debtor because she was only engaged to him, many courts have broadly construed the definition of insider for purposes of fraudulent transfer actions.”
— 726.105(l)(b)(l) — 1 case
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