Cases from cite.case.law:

FIEL v. F. HOFFMAN, H. Jr. E. P. A., 169 So. 3d 1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Ultimately, the court determined that based upon section 732.802, Florida Statutes (2012), the Slayer . . . that the Slayer Statute did not prohibit the children of the murderer from inheriting, ruling: Section 732.802 . . . Disagreeing with this outcome, the Legislature later expanded the statute by enacting section 732.802 . . . decedent to or for the benefit of the killer passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent. § 732.802 . . . Currie, 606 So.2d 454, 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (“We hold as a matter of law that section 732.802 does . . .

COSMAN, v. RODRIGUEZ,, 153 So. 3d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . murder precluded his claim to surviving spouse status by operation of the “slayer statute,” section 732.802 . . . In reaching this conclusion, the circuit court failed to apply section 732.802, which states in pertinent . . . wrongful death of a decedent under Florida’s wrongful death law is an “interest” that, pursuant to section 732.802 . . .

CARLTON FIELDS, P. A. v. J. LoCASCIO,, 59 So. 3d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . . § 732.802, Fla. Stat. (2001). . . .

J. LoCASCIO, v. SHARPE,, 23 So. 3d 1209 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . LoCascio: (1) Under the “slayer statute,” section 732.802 Florida Statutes (2001), Edward S. . . . The Son bases this argument on the phrase in subsection 732.802(1), that “the estate of the decedent . . .

In ESTATE OF SHEFNER, Jr. v. SHEFNER- HOLDEN, 2 So. 3d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Linda and Susan challenged the will’s validity, alleging undue influence, and that section 732.802, Florida . . .

A. JULIA, v. A. RUSSO, J., 984 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . alleges, appellant is not entitled to all of the funds pursuant to Florida’s Slayer Statute, section 732.802 . . . Section 732.802(2), Florida Statutes (2005), provides: (2) Any joint tenant who unlawfully and intentionally . . .

M. BARBER, v. G. PARRISH,, 963 So. 2d 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . trial court’s adjudication of Appellant’s guilt of first-degree murder was final pursuant to section 732.802 . . . court’s determination of whether Appellant should be denied entitlement to the proceeds under section 732.802 . . . contractual arrangement; and it becomes payable as though the killer had predeceased the decedent. § 732.802 . . . Appellee moved for summary judgment pursuant to section 732.802(5), Florida Statutes (2003), which states . . . The Third District Court of Appeal examined the legislative intent behind section 732.802 and determined . . .

DONIGAN, v. NEVINS,, 785 So. 2d 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . . § 732.802(1), Fla.Stat. (1999). . . .

HESS, v. HESS,, 758 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . The court reasoned that under the probate code, only section 732.802(1), Florida Statutes (1999), provides . . .

CONGLETON, C. v. SANSOM, I., 664 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . The judgment invokes section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1991), the so-called “slayer statute,” which . . . Fla.1956), since enactment of chapter 82—71, at 186, Laws of Florida (1982) on April 2, 1982, section 732.802 . . . determine by the greater weight of the evidence whether the killing was unlawful and intentional.” § 732.802 . . . The trial court found: On the issue of civil homicide as outlined in Florida Statute 732.802, the Florida . . .

BARKER, Jr. v. JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 888 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Fla. 1995)

. . . Therefore, the fact that vesting occurred at Stacey Barker’s death (subject to divesting if Section 732.802 . . .

STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL AFFAIRS, v. RAINS a k a a k a a k a s d b a, 654 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . D2518 [567 So.2d 1015 (1990)] and F.S. 732.802(1) BILLIE JEAN RAINS no longer has any legal interest . . .

K. CLAY, n k a K. v. PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,, 617 So. 2d 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . The insurer denied the claim, pointing to section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1985). . . .

CHATMAN, Jr. v. W. M. CURRIE E. C. A., 606 So. 2d 454 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . We hold as a matter of law that section 732.802 does not apply to an innocent contingent beneficiary’ . . . Subsection 732.802(3) applies to a “named beneficiary of a ... life insurance policy ... who unlawfully . . . and intentionally kills ... the person upon whose life the policy is issued_” Subsection 732.802(3) . . . Subsection 732.802(4) states that “[a]ny other acquisition of [an] interest by the killer ... shall be . . . Section 732.802 is inapplicable under the facts of this case, and there was no breach of contract. . . . The “interest” referred to in section 732.802(4) obviously is not intended to cover this situation. . . .

PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY AMERICA, v. MARULLO, A. A., 774 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Fla. 1991)

. . . asking the undersigned to determine the recipient of the policy’s proceeds in light of Florida Statute § 732.802 . . . Florida Statute § 732.802(3) prohibits the beneficiary of a life insurance policy from recovering any . . . Section § 732.802(3) provides: A named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy, or other contractual . . .

LOPEZ, v. RODRIGUEZ N. A., 574 So. 2d 249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Citing section 732.802(2), Florida Statutes (1989), Lopez contends- that Clemente's act of killing Isabel . . . Section 732.802(2) provides that a “joint tenant who unlawfully and intentionally kills another joint . . . Moreover, the rules of statutory construction preclude this court from rewriting section 732.802(2) to . . . Lopez also contends that the equitable principles of section 732.802 should preclude Carlos from receiving . . . Because section 732.802(2) is inapplicable to the circumstance before us, and the complaint does not . . .

COHEN v. COHEN,, 567 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . Cohen, no longer had any legal interest in the testator’s estate pursuant to the provisions of Section 732.802 . . . be irreparably harmed if the Probate Court Judge were to proceed in a manner consistent with Section 732.802 . . .

In ESTATE OF H. BENSON, In ESTATE OF R. BENSON, KENDALL, v. STARNES, W. W., 548 So. 2d 775 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . s will or his brother’s intestate estate by reason of Florida’s so-called “Slayer Statute,” section 732.802 . . . The pertinent part of our Slayer Statute, section 732.802(1), provides as follows: A surviving person . . .

LYNN, v. PHILADELPHIA AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE CO. Co., 543 So. 2d 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . The trial court found, pursuant to the prohibitions of section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1987), that . . .

In ESTATE OF A. HOWARD, HOWARD, v. M. BAUMER, A. G., 542 So. 2d 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . of a petition to determine beneficiaries which sought to disqualify a murdering spouse under Section 732.802 . . . Section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1985) provides in relevant part: (1) A surviving person who unlawfully . . . Howard was barred by Section 732.802 from receiving any benefits under the will or Florida Probate Code . . . Section 732.802, commonly known as the “Probate Murder Statute” originated in the 1933 Florida Probate . . . An adversary proceeding under Section 732.802 is not a damages action asserting breach of contract. . . .

M. BAUMER, A. v. G. HOWARD,, 542 So. 2d 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . whether Peggy Howard had unlawfully and intentionally killed her husband, thus disqualifying her under 732.802 . . . unlawfully and intentionally killed the decedent and that she was therefore disqualified under Section 732.802 . . . The trial court found in its final order on the petition to determine beneficiaries that Section 732.802 . . . beneficiaries, in which order the probate court disqualified the widow as a murdering spouse under Section 732.802 . . .

DODD, v. AIG LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY M., 534 So. 2d 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . arguments made by appellant on this issue, including her assertion of the applicability of Section 732.802 . . .

BURKETT, v. STATE, 518 So. 2d 1363 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . 452 So.2d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), the court found that a “final judgment of conviction” under section 732.802 . . .

J. CAPOCCIA, Jr. J. Sr. v. CAPOCCIA,, 505 So. 2d 624 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . Section 732.802(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), pertinent here, provides: “Any joint tenant who unlawfully . . . As the court noted in Baiting-er, the prior statute (now subsection (1) of Section 732.802) merely precluded . . . killer from receiving benefits “from the decedent or to take any part of his estate as a devisee.” § 732.802 . . . cover all forms of ownership with sur-vivorship incidents — was codified with the enactment of Section 732.802 . . . See § 732.802(6), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1982). . . .

ZABRANI, v. J. RIVERON, 495 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . Section 732.802(3), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that, if a named beneficiary of a life insurance . . .

SIMPSON, v. SIMPSON,, 473 So. 2d 299 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . Appellant relies on section 732.802(2), Florida Statutes (1983) which provides that a tenant by the entirety . . . Appellant also relies on section 732.802(5) for her contention that even in the absence of a conviction . . . of murder, section 732.802(2) will apply so long as the killing is proved, by the greater weight of . . . 848 (Fla.1951), also relied upon by appellant, states the common law principle codified by section 732.802 . . .

M. ANDERSON, v. K. ANDERSON,, 468 So. 2d 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . relevant because at the time of the decedent’s murder, the statute dealing with forfeiture, section 732.802 . . . weight of the evidence whether the killing was unlawful and intentional for purposes of this section. § 732.802 . . . Appellant argues strenuously that the newly amended section 732.802 can be applied retroactively to the . . .

In ESTATE OF M. BRUMAGE, BRUMAGE, v. A. KIVI,, 460 So. 2d 989 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . finding that Roland was entitled to the probate assets of the estate under the provisions of section 732.802 . . . not entitled to the nonprobate assets because those assets do not fall within the purview of section 732.802 . . .

NUNEZ, a v. GONZALEZ, E., 456 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . Although subsections (3) and (5) of section 732.802, Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), appear to bear directly . . .

PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, INC. v. M. BAITINGER, Jr. G., 452 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . Under section 732.802(3), Florida Statutes (1983), a named beneficiary of a life insurance policy who . . . The court, therefore, must have relied upon the statutory provision in section 732.802(5) that: A final . . . In determining the legislative intent behind section 732.802, it is extremely helpful to compare the . . . See § 732.802(2) (concerning sur-vivorship interests in property held in joint tenancy or tenancy by . . . (concerning interests created by contractual arrangements, such as insurance policies and bonds); § 732.802 . . .

In ESTATE OF FAIRWEATHER, a k a A. McPHEE, v. M. FAIRWEATHER, K. E. B., 444 So. 2d 464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . The trial court found that by operation of section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1981), the decedent’s entire . . . Section 732.802 provides: Murderer A person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not be entitled . . .

W. NABLE, v. ESTATE OF GODFREY,, 403 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . who wrongfully caused another’s death from receiving any benefit from such death long before Section 732.802 . . . In the absence of section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1979), the courts could use the same principle to . . . Section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1979) states: A person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall . . . The wording of Section 732.802 is plain, concise, and unambiguous. . . . Those cases, therefore, were not governed by section 732.802, Florida Statutes. In Peeples v. . . . complainant seeking to work a forfeiture under then section 731.31, Florida Statutes, currently section 732.802 . . .

IN RE ESTATE OF RALPH HABER, 1 Fla. Supp. 2d 39 (Hillsborough Cty. Cir. Ct. 1981)

. . . Haber’s heirs have filed separate defenses asserting (1) the Murderer’s Statute, Chapter 731.31 — now 732.802 . . .

DiPROSPERO, v. SHELBY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF SHELBY, OHIO, DiPROSPERO L. a v. DOYLE, E. FUER, v. DOYLE, 400 So. 2d 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . Appellants contend that this determination was legally wrong based upon Section 732.802, Florida Statutes . . . arguments are made on appeal as to whether the trial court properly applied the policy stated in Section 732.802 . . .

In ESTATE YANOWSKY, In ESTATE YANOWSKY,, 384 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . Section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1977), provides: A person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall . . .

In ESTATE L. NUNNELLEY, V. NUNNELLEY, v. L. SLOAN, 343 So. 2d 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

. . . Section 732.802, Florida Statutes. . . .