Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 732.802 (2025)

Killer not entitled to receive property or other benefits by reason of victim’s death.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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732.802 Killer not entitled to receive property or other benefits by reason of victim’s death.—

(1) A surviving person who unlawfully and intentionally kills or participates in procuring the death of the decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under the Florida Probate Code, and the estate of the decedent passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent. Property appointed by the will of the decedent to or for the benefit of the killer passes as if the killer had predeceased the decedent.

(2) Any joint tenant who unlawfully and intentionally kills another joint tenant thereby effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the share of the decedent passes as the decedent’s property and the killer has no rights by survivorship. This provision applies to joint tenancies with right of survivorship and tenancies by the entirety in real and personal property; joint and multiple-party accounts in banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and other institutions; and any other form of co-ownership with survivorship incidents.

(3) A named beneficiary of a bond, life insurance policy, or other contractual arrangement who unlawfully and intentionally kills the principal obligee or the person upon whose life the policy is issued is not entitled to any benefit under the bond, policy, or other contractual arrangement; and it becomes payable as though the killer had predeceased the decedent.

(4) Any other acquisition of property or interest by the killer, including a life estate in homestead property, shall be treated in accordance with the principles of this section.

(5) A final judgment of conviction of murder in any degree is conclusive for purposes of this section. In the absence of a conviction of murder in any degree, the court may determine by the greater weight of the evidence whether the killing was unlawful and intentional for purposes of this section.

(6) This section does not affect the rights of any person who, before rights under this section have been adjudicated, purchases from the killer for value and without notice property which the killer would have acquired except for this section, but the killer is liable for the amount of the proceeds or the value of the property. Any insurance company, bank, or other obligor making payment according to the terms of its policy or obligation is not liable by reason of this section unless prior to payment it has received at its home office or principal address written notice of a claim under this section.

History.—s. 1, ch. 74-106; s. 113, ch. 75-220; s. 1, ch. 82-71.

Note.—Created from former s. 731.31.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 53 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1977–2023 · leading case: Prudential Ins. Co. v. Baitinger, 452 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).

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Prudential Ins. Co. v. Baitinger, 452 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). · cites it 14× “" § 732.802, Fla. Stat. (1981). [1] That statute applied only to property that would pass by intestacy or through the decedent's will.”

In Re Est. of Howard, 542 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). · cites it 17× “The sole issue presented for our review on this appeal is whether the probate court erred in striking appellant's demand for a jury trial in a probate adversary proceeding arising out of a petition to determine beneficiaries which sought to disqualify a murdering spouse under…”

Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389 (Md. 1986). · cites it 4× “§ 45-279 (1985); Fla. Stat. § 732.802 (1) (1976, Cum.Supp.”

In Re Est. of Mueller, 655 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). · cites it 4× “" § 732.802, Fla.Stat. (1981). The court stated: "[T]he statute itself is clear.”

Jennifer Swain v. Est. of Shelley A. Tyre by & through James H. Reilly as Adm'r d.b.n, c.t.a., 57 A.3d 283 (R.I. 2012). · cites it 2× “12, § 2322 (2007); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 732.802 (West 2010); Me.”

Nable v. Est. of Godfrey, 403 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). · cites it 10× “Section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1979) states: A person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not be entitled to inherit from the decedent or take any part of his estate as a devisee.”

Anderson v. Anderson, 468 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). · cites it 6× “This fact is relevant because at the time of the decedent's murder, the statute dealing with forfeiture, section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1981), stated in relevant part: "A person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not be entitled to inherit from the decedent or to…”

Congleton v. Sansom, 664 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). · cites it 6× “The judgment invokes section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1991), the so-called "slayer statute," which renders a person who unlawfully and intentionally kills another person ineligible to receive property on account of the death.”

Simpson v. Simpson, 473 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). · cites it 5× “NOTES [1] Appellant relies on section 732.802(2), Florida Statutes (1983) which provides that a tenant by the entirety who unlawfully and intentionally kills or procures the death of another tenant by the entirety effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the…”

Lopez v. Rodriguez, 574 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). · cites it 6× “Lopez also contends that the equitable principles of section 732.802 should preclude Carlos from receiving the trust proceeds.”

Capoccia v. Capoccia, 505 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). · cites it 8× “" § 732.802, Fla. Stat. (1981). It appears, however, that even before the addition of subsection (2), the equitable principle that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own wrongdoing served to defeat the claim of a murderer, as surviving spouse, to the whole of an estate…”

In Re Est. of Benson, 548 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). · cites it 3× “It was not disputed that Steven Benson, as the murderer of his mother and brother, was precluded from participating as a beneficiary of either his mother's will or his brother's intestate estate by reason of Florida's so-called "Slayer Statute," section 732.802(1), Florida…”

Show all 53 citing cases →

— 732.802(1) — 10 cases

Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389 (Md. 1986). “§ 45-279 (1985); Fla. Stat. § 732.802 (1) (1976, Cum.Supp.”

In Re Est. of Benson, 548 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). “It was not disputed that Steven Benson, as the murderer of his mother and brother, was precluded from participating as a beneficiary of either his mother's will or his brother's intestate estate by reason of Florida's so-called "Slayer Statute," section 732.802(1), Florida…”

Hess v. Hess, 758 So. 2d 1203 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

In Re Est. of Mueller, 655 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). “" § 732.802, Fla.Stat. (1981). The court stated: "[T]he statute itself is clear.”

Cohen v. Cohen, 567 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

— 732.802(2) — 6 cases

Simpson v. Simpson, 473 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). “NOTES [1] Appellant relies on section 732.802(2), Florida Statutes (1983) which provides that a tenant by the entirety who unlawfully and intentionally kills or procures the death of another tenant by the entirety effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the…”

Lopez v. Rodriguez, 574 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). “Lopez also contends that the equitable principles of section 732.802 should preclude Carlos from receiving the trust proceeds.”

In Re Est. of Mueller, 655 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). “" § 732.802, Fla.Stat. (1981). The court stated: "[T]he statute itself is clear.”

Capoccia v. Capoccia, 505 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). “" § 732.802, Fla. Stat. (1981). It appears, however, that even before the addition of subsection (2), the equitable principle that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own wrongdoing served to defeat the claim of a murderer, as surviving spouse, to the whole of an estate…”

Prudential Ins. Co. v. Baitinger, 452 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). “" § 732.802, Fla. Stat. (1981). [1] That statute applied only to property that would pass by intestacy or through the decedent's will.”

— 732.802(3) — 8 cases

Zabrani v. Riveron, 495 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).

Barber v. Parrish, 963 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

Chatman v. Currie, 606 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Marullo, 774 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. Fla. 1991).

— 732.802(4) — 3 cases

Chatman v. Currie, 606 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

Cosman v. Rodriguez, 153 So. 3d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).

— 732.802(5) — 6 cases

Congleton v. Sansom, 664 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “The judgment invokes section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1991), the so-called "slayer statute," which renders a person who unlawfully and intentionally kills another person ineligible to receive property on account of the death.”

Anderson v. Anderson, 468 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). “This fact is relevant because at the time of the decedent's murder, the statute dealing with forfeiture, section 732.802, Florida Statutes (1981), stated in relevant part: "A person convicted of the murder of a decedent shall not be entitled to inherit from the decedent or to…”

Barber v. Parrish, 963 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).

— 732.802(6) — 1 case

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