733.103
Effect of probate.
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733.103 Effect of probate.—
(1) Until admitted to probate in this state or in the state where the decedent was domiciled, the will shall be ineffective to prove title to, or the right to possession of, property of the testator.
(2) In any collateral action or proceeding relating to devised property, the probate of a will in Florida shall be conclusive of its due execution; that it was executed by a competent testator, free of fraud, duress, mistake, and undue influence; and that the will was unrevoked on the testator’s death.
History.—s. 1, ch. 74-106; s. 48, ch. 75-220; s. 17, ch. 77-87; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 79, ch. 2001-226.
Note.—Created from former s. 732.26.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 19
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1981–2025 · leading case: Schilling v. Herrera
Schilling v. Herrera (2007)
“The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that pursuant to section 733.103, Florida Statutes (1983), the plaintiffs were barred from attacking the will.”
DeWitt v. Duce (1981)
“After one journey through the federal courts, the district court on remand dismissed the cause on the ground that section 733.103(2), Florida Statutes (1977), [1] foreclosed appellants from proving the facts necessary to establish their tort claim.”
Rice v. Greene (2006)
“Rice is correct that under section 733.103, Mr. Schwartz's unprobated will was ineffective to "prove title" to the property, under section 732.”
Kowalski v. Jackson National Life Insurance (2013)
“To support this position, Wilson relies upon Florida case law and Fla. Stat. § 733.103 which provides that “[u]ntil admitted to probate in this state or in a state where the decedent was domiciled, the will shall be ineffective to prove title to, or the right to possession of,…”
Martin v. Martin (1997)
“The probate statute involved in DeWitt , section 733.103(2), Fla. Statutes (1977), which still exists in that form, provided: In any collateral action or proceeding relating to devised property, the probate of a will in Florida shall be conclusive of its due execution; that it…”
All Children's Hosp., Inc. v. Owens (2000)
“The public policy of finality concerning devised property contained in section 733.103(2), Florida Statutes (1993), and recognized by the supreme court in DeWitt , requires that any such theory of "concealed tortious interference" be carefully restricted.”
Miller v. Hayman (2000)
“" § 733.103(2), Fla. Stat. (1997); DeWitt v.”
Cavanaugh v. Cavanaugh (1989)
“In that case, not involving homestead, the supreme court held that section 733.103, Florida Statutes, barred such a collateral attack where the appellants, beneficiaries under the will, had an adequate remedy in probate with a fair opportunity to pursue it.”
Ebeling v. Voltz (1984)
“Voltz moved to dismiss their complaint on the ground that they failed to exhaust their probate remedy, thus barring them from collaterally attacking, under Section 733.103, Florida Statutes (1983).”
THELMA MULVEY v. SHEILA STEPHENS (2018)
“We have since recognized that “[t]here are 4 simply too many distinctions, both procedural and substantive, between wills and trusts, for the reasoning of DeWitt, and the purpose of section 733.103(2), as it was articulated in DeWitt, to preclude a claim for tortious…”
Wolf v. Doll (2017)
“Generally, collateral proceedings to a probate action are governed by section 733.103(2), Florida Statutes (2013).”
Evelyn G. Dewitt and Mabel M. Dewitt v. Estelle R. Duce (1981)
“On remand, the district court dismissed the cause on the ground that Fla.Stat.Ann. § 733.103(2) (West Supp.1981) forecloses plaintiffs from proving the facts necessary to prevail on the tort claim alleged.”
— 733.103(1) — 1 case
Rice v. Greene (2006)
“Rice is correct that under section 733.103, Mr. Schwartz's unprobated will was ineffective to "prove title" to the property, under section 732.”
— 733.103(2) — 14 cases
Schilling v. Herrera (2007)
“The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that pursuant to section 733.103, Florida Statutes (1983), the plaintiffs were barred from attacking the will.”
DeWitt v. Duce (1981)
“After one journey through the federal courts, the district court on remand dismissed the cause on the ground that section 733.103(2), Florida Statutes (1977), [1] foreclosed appellants from proving the facts necessary to establish their tort claim.”
Martin v. Martin (1997)
“The probate statute involved in DeWitt , section 733.103(2), Fla. Statutes (1977), which still exists in that form, provided: In any collateral action or proceeding relating to devised property, the probate of a will in Florida shall be conclusive of its due execution; that it…”
All Children's Hosp., Inc. v. Owens (2000)
“The public policy of finality concerning devised property contained in section 733.103(2), Florida Statutes (1993), and recognized by the supreme court in DeWitt , requires that any such theory of "concealed tortious interference" be carefully restricted.”
Miller v. Hayman (2000)
“" § 733.103(2), Fla. Stat. (1997); DeWitt v.”
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