733.707
Order of payment of expenses and obligations.
Find cases:
SyfertCases citing this section
FL-LEGleg.state.fl.us
JustiaFla. Statutes
CornellLII Search
CasesGoogle Scholar
733.707 Order of payment of expenses and obligations.—
(1) The personal representative shall pay the expenses of the administration and obligations of the decedent’s estate in the following order:
(a) Class 1.—Costs, expenses of administration, and compensation of personal representatives and their attorneys fees and attorneys fees awarded under s. 733.106(3).
(b) Class 2.—Reasonable funeral, interment, and grave marker expenses, whether paid by a guardian, the personal representative, or any other person, not to exceed the aggregate of $6,000.
(c) Class 3.—Debts and taxes with preference under federal law, claims pursuant to ss. 409.9101 and 414.28, and claims in favor of the state for unpaid court costs, fees, or fines.
(d) Class 4.—Reasonable and necessary medical and hospital expenses of the last 60 days of the last illness of the decedent, including compensation of persons attending the decedent.
(e) Class 5.—Family allowance.
(f) Class 6.—Arrearage from court-ordered child support.
(g) Class 7.—Debts acquired after death by the continuation of the decedent’s business, in accordance with s. 733.612(22), but only to the extent of the assets of that business.
(h) Class 8.—All other claims, including those founded on judgments or decrees rendered against the decedent during the decedent’s lifetime, and any excess over the sums allowed in paragraphs (b) and (d).
(2) After paying any preceding class, if the estate is insufficient to pay all of the next succeeding class, the creditors of the latter class shall be paid ratably in proportion to their respective claims.
(3) Any portion of a trust with respect to which a decedent who is the grantor has at the decedent’s death a right of revocation, as defined in paragraph (e), either alone or in conjunction with any other person, is liable for the expenses of the administration and obligations of the decedent’s estate to the extent the decedent’s estate is insufficient to pay them as provided in ss. 733.607(2) and 736.05053.
(a) For purposes of this subsection, any trusts established as part of, and all payments from, either an employee annuity described in s. 403 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, an Individual Retirement Account, as described in s. 408 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, a Keogh (HR-10) Plan, or a retirement or other plan established by a corporation which is qualified under s. 401 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, shall not be considered a trust over which the decedent has a right of revocation.
(b) For purposes of this subsection, any trust described in s. 664 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, shall not be considered a trust over which the decedent has a right of revocation.
(c) This subsection shall not impair any rights an individual has under a qualified domestic relations order as that term is defined in s. 414(p) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
(d) For purposes of this subsection, property held or received by a trust to the extent that the property would not have been subject to claims against the decedent’s estate if it had been paid directly to a trust created under the decedent’s will or other than to the decedent’s estate, or assets received from any trust other than a trust described in this subsection, shall not be deemed assets of the trust available to the decedent’s estate.
(e) For purposes of this subsection, a “right of revocation” is a power retained by the decedent, held in any capacity, to:
1. Amend or revoke the trust and revest the principal of the trust in the decedent; or
2. Withdraw or appoint the principal of the trust to or for the decedent’s benefit.
History.—s. 1, ch. 74-106; s. 86, ch. 75-220; s. 35, ch. 77-87; s. 7, ch. 85-79; s. 69, ch. 87-226; s. 20, ch. 93-208; s. 11, ch. 93-257; s. 10, ch. 95-401; s. 1018, ch. 97-102; s. 3, ch. 97-240; s. 150, ch. 2001-226; s. 2, ch. 2010-122; s. 17, ch. 2012-100.
Note.—Created from former s. 733.20.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 47
cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1978–2025 · leading case: Shuck v. Bank of America, NA
Shuck v. Bank of America, NA (2003)
“A dismissal without prejudice will make clear that the widow's ability to seek relief against the decedent's revocable trust under section 733.707 for such enforceable claims against the decedent's estate as she may now have or hereafter acquire will not be precluded by the…”
Koile v. State (2006)
“See § 733.707(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005) (setting forth order of payment of estate’s obligations and including funeral expenses up to ,000 “whether paid by a guardian, the personal representative, or any other person”); § 738.”
Teague v. Estate of Hoskins (1998)
“§ 733.707, Fla. Stat. (1995). Teague claims that under this statutory scheme, her attorney's fee award is a Class 1 priority because it constituted an expense of administering the estate.”
Tobin v. Damian (1999)
“Neither party has cited nor has this court found case law or precedent defining the term "enforceable claim" as provided in section 733.707, Florida Statutes. We hold that an enforceable claim is a timely filed claim against the estate where no objection has been made by the…”
Via v. Putnam (1995)
“…case are the decedent's five children and his stepson. [3] This class is denominated class 8 in the current statute. § 733.707, Fla. Stat. (1993).”
Thompson v. Hodson (2002)
“Here there is simply no allegation of malfeasance, misfeasance, or anything approaching a breach of the personal representative's obligation either to the beneficiaries of the estate or to creditors. B.”
Estate of Grillo (1981)
“After obtaining the cost judgment against the estate, General Motors Corporation filed a motion in the probate division to have the judgment considered a Class 1 priority under Section 733.707, Florida Statutes (1979).”
Estate of Read v. ADK PROPERTIES (2000)
“We reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of South Port Square and direct the trial court to dismiss this action unless South Port Square can show on remand that it has obtained an enforceable claim or that the contractual obligation was a debt of the Trust, or unless the…”
Carvel v. Godley (2006)
“Section 733.707(3), Florida Statutes, mandates payment of estate expenses by a revocable trust when the estate's funds are insufficient: Any portion of a trust with respect to which a decedent who is the grantor has at the decedent's death a right of revocation, as defined in…”
Becklund v. Fleming (2003)
“In the proceedings in the trial court and in the briefs filed in this court, the parties have proceeded on the assumption that the Trust is a revocable trust of the type described in section 733.707(3), Florida Statutes (1993).”
In Re Estate of Wiggins (1999)
“The ,000 awarded to the estate was distributed pursuant to the Florida Probate Code, section 733.707, Florida Statutes (1997), as follows: ,330.”
In Re Estate of Tensfeldt (2003)
“Although the children seek to describe their claim as a creditor's claim that would take precedence over the elective share, see § 733.707, Fla. Stat. (2000), the Florida Supreme Court has held otherwise.”
— 733.707(1) — 4 cases
Teague v. Estate of Hoskins (1998)
“§ 733.707, Fla. Stat. (1995). Teague claims that under this statutory scheme, her attorney's fee award is a Class 1 priority because it constituted an expense of administering the estate.”
Teague v. Estate of Hoskins (1996)
LAURITSEN v. Wallace (2011)
Copeland v. Buswell (2009)
— 733.707(1)(a) — 3 cases
Estate of Grillo (1981)
“After obtaining the cost judgment against the estate, General Motors Corporation filed a motion in the probate division to have the judgment considered a Class 1 priority under Section 733.707, Florida Statutes (1979).”
Teague v. Estate of Hoskins (1998)
“§ 733.707, Fla. Stat. (1995). Teague claims that under this statutory scheme, her attorney's fee award is a Class 1 priority because it constituted an expense of administering the estate.”
Marcus v. DeWitt (1981)
— 733.707(1)(b) — 2 cases
Koile v. State (2006)
“See § 733.707(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005) (setting forth order of payment of estate’s obligations and including funeral expenses up to ,000 “whether paid by a guardian, the personal representative, or any other person”); § 738.”
Koile v. State (2006)
— 733.707(1)(d) — 2 cases
In Re Estate of Wiggins (1999)
“The ,000 awarded to the estate was distributed pursuant to the Florida Probate Code, section 733.707, Florida Statutes (1997), as follows: ,330.”
Grant, Grant v. Kunke Pr (2024)
— 733.707(1)(h) — 2 cases
Teague v. Estate of Hoskins (1998)
“§ 733.707, Fla. Stat. (1995). Teague claims that under this statutory scheme, her attorney's fee award is a Class 1 priority because it constituted an expense of administering the estate.”
Grant, Grant v. Kunke Pr (2024)
— 733.707(2) — 2 cases
Nahar v. Nahar (1991)
Carlton v. Carlton (1991)
— 733.707(3) — 17 cases
Shuck v. Bank of America, NA (2003)
“A dismissal without prejudice will make clear that the widow's ability to seek relief against the decedent's revocable trust under section 733.707 for such enforceable claims against the decedent's estate as she may now have or hereafter acquire will not be precluded by the…”
Tobin v. Damian (1999)
“Neither party has cited nor has this court found case law or precedent defining the term "enforceable claim" as provided in section 733.707, Florida Statutes. We hold that an enforceable claim is a timely filed claim against the estate where no objection has been made by the…”
Carvel v. Godley (2006)
“Section 733.707(3), Florida Statutes, mandates payment of estate expenses by a revocable trust when the estate's funds are insufficient: Any portion of a trust with respect to which a decedent who is the grantor has at the decedent's death a right of revocation, as defined in…”
Becklund v. Fleming (2003)
“In the proceedings in the trial court and in the briefs filed in this court, the parties have proceeded on the assumption that the Trust is a revocable trust of the type described in section 733.707(3), Florida Statutes (1993).”
Estate of Read v. ADK PROPERTIES (2000)
“We reverse the summary judgment entered in favor of South Port Square and direct the trial court to dismiss this action unless South Port Square can show on remand that it has obtained an enforceable claim or that the contractual obligation was a debt of the Trust, or unless the…”
— 733.707(l)(a) — 1 case
Copeland v. Buswell (2009)
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.