CopyCited 13 times | Published | Supreme Court of Florida | 38 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 812, 2013 WL 5942278, 2013 Fla. LEXIS 2422
...rocess Clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions and under the privacy provision of the Florida Constitution. Further, we hold that section
742.14, in combination with the restrictive definition of the term “commissioning couple” in section
742.13(2), also violates state and federal equal protection by denying same-sex couples the statutory protection against the automatic relinquishment of parental rights that it affords to heterosexual unmarried couples seeking to utilize the identical assistance of reproductive technology....
...nd a declaration of statutory invalidity with respect to section
742.14, the assisted reproductive technology statute. T.M.H.,
79 So.3d at 789 n. 1, 799. Section
742.14 provides that, except in the case of a “commissioning couple” — defined in section
742.13 as the intended mother and father of a child who will be conceived through assisted reproductive technology using the biological material of at least one of the intended parents — and fathers who have executed a preplanned adoption agreement, an egg or sperm donor must relinquish any claim to parental rights or obligations to the donation or the resulting child. See §§
742.13(2),
742.14, Fla....
...[[Image here]] And, [to the biological mother], if you appeal this, I hope I’m wrong. (Emphasis added.) The trial court therefore found both that the birth mother and the biological mother, as a same-sex couple, could not meet the definition of a “commissioning couple,” as the term is defined in section
742.13(2) and used in section
742.14, to be exempt from the relinquishment of parental rights, and that Florida law does not recognize the rights of a biological mother versus a birth mother....
...Concluding that the statute applies, we then turn to a discussion of T.M.H.’s constitutional challenges to the statute’s validity. In this regard, we review the constitutional protections for parenting, determine the nature of T.M.H.’s interest, and analyze whether sections
742.13(2) and
742.14 violate the state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process, privacy, and equal protection....
...Finally, we address and reject D.M.T.’s argument that T.M.H. waived any interest she may have in the child by signing a standard informed consent form in the course of the couple’s use of assisted reproductive technology to conceive a child. I. Sections
742.13 and
742.14 In the decision below, the Fifth District determined that section
742.14, the assisted reproductive technology statute, did not apply to T.M.H., the biological mother, in this situation because she is not a “donor” as that term is used in the statute....
...5 We disagree with the Fifth District as to the statutory construction analysis because we conclude that the statute does, on its face, apply to T.M.H. as the provider of the egg for the couple. Our interpretation of section
742.14 and the related provision in section
742.13 defining the term “commissioning couple,” as well as our determination of the statutes’ constitutionality, are pure questions of law, subject to de novo review....
...in it, and to accord meaning and harmony to all of its parts.’ ” Jones v. ETS of New Orleans, Inc.,
793 So.2d 912, 914-15 (Fla.2001) (quoting Acosta v. Richter,
671 So.2d 149, 153-54 (Fla.1996)). Fur *333 ther, we necessarily must read sections
742.13 and
742.14 together....
...esulting children. Only reasonable compensation directly related to the donation of eggs, sperm, and preembryos shall be permitted. §
742.14, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). The term “commissioning couple,” as used in section
742.14, is defined in section
742.13(2) as “the intended mother and father of a child who will be conceived by means of assisted reproductive technology using the eggs or sperm of at least one of the intended parents.” §
742.13(2), Fla....
...ld to jointly raise and who provided biological material to her partner with the specific intent to become a parent. II. The Constitutionality of the Statutes We begin our constitutional analysis of section
742.14, and the corresponding provision in section
742.13 defining the term “commissioning couple,” by addressing T.M.H.’s due process and privacy arguments that application of the assisted reproductive technology statute abridges her fundamental right to be a parent....
...The specific question we confront is whether the classification between heterosexual and same-sex couples drawn by the assisted reproductive technology statute bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. D.M.T. argues that defining the term “commissioning couple” in section
742.13(2), as applied in section
742.14, to include only one male and one female is related to the State’s legitimate interest in not extending rights to same-sex couples....
...(2008) (defining the term “parent” to mean “a woman who gives birth to a child or a man whose consent to the adoption of the child would be required”); §
742.11, Fla. Stat. (2008) (defining the parental status of birth mothers and non-genetic, legal fathers). That is, sections
742.13 and
742.14 do not create a statutory basis for an individual who would not otherwise have parental rights to claim those rights....
...court to determine the applicability of section
742.14 where the mother and father had entered into an agreement regarding the use of assisted reproductive technology)- Since intent, pursuant to the definition of “commissioning couple” found in section
742.13(2) and used in section
742.14, is the determinative element regarding whether two individuals seeking the assistance of reproductive technology to conceive qualify as a “commissioning couple,” it is of course relevant to the inquiry....
...ouples — and only same-sex couples— to qualify as a “commissioning couple.” Accordingly, based on the reasons we have set forth, we conclude that section
742.14, in conjunction with the restrictive definition of “commissioning couple” in section
742.13(2), violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions as applied in this case because it prohibited T.M.H., as part of a same-sex couple, from qualifying as a “commissioning couple.” III....
CopyCited 2 times | Published | Florida 2nd District Court of Appeal | 2013 WL 1978723, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 7803
...occasionally visited the child, B.O.C. did not assert any parental rights over C.D.B. until his sister’s relationship with the child was jeopardized. As the trial court in this case correctly found, A.A.B. and B.O.C. were not a “commissioning couple.” See § 742.13(2)....
...Section
742.14, provides, in pertinent part, The donor of any egg, sperm, or preem-bryo, other than the commissioning couple or a father who has executed a preplanned adoption agreement under s.63.212, shall relinquish all maternal or paternal rights and obligations with respect to the donation or the resulting children. . Section
742.13, provides the following definitions: (1) "Assisted reproductive technology” means those procreative procedures which involve the laboratory handling of human eggs or preembryos, including, but not limited to, in vitro fertilization e...
