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Florida Statute 768.13 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 768.13 Case Law from Google Scholar
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The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLV
TORTS
Chapter 768
NEGLIGENCE
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 768.13
768.13 Good Samaritan Act; immunity from civil liability.
(1) This act shall be known and cited as the “Good Samaritan Act.”
(2)(a) Any person, including those licensed to practice medicine, who gratuitously and in good faith renders emergency care or treatment either in direct response to emergency situations related to and arising out of a public health emergency declared pursuant to s. 381.00315, a state of emergency which has been declared pursuant to s. 252.36 or at the scene of an emergency outside of a hospital, doctor’s office, or other place having proper medical equipment, without objection of the injured victim or victims thereof, shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of such care or treatment or as a result of any act or failure to act in providing or arranging further medical treatment where the person acts as an ordinary reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.
(b)1. Any health care provider, including a hospital licensed under chapter 395, providing emergency services pursuant to obligations imposed by 42 U.S.C. s. 1395dd, s. 395.1041, s. 395.401, or s. 401.45 shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of such medical care or treatment unless such damages result from providing, or failing to provide, medical care or treatment under circumstances demonstrating a reckless disregard for the consequences so as to affect the life or health of another.
2. The immunity provided by this paragraph applies to damages as a result of any act or omission of providing medical care or treatment, including diagnosis:
a. Which occurs prior to the time the patient is stabilized and is capable of receiving medical treatment as a nonemergency patient, unless surgery is required as a result of the emergency within a reasonable time after the patient is stabilized, in which case the immunity provided by this paragraph applies to any act or omission of providing medical care or treatment which occurs prior to the stabilization of the patient following the surgery.
b. Which is related to the original medical emergency.
3. For purposes of this paragraph, “reckless disregard” as it applies to a given health care provider rendering emergency medical services shall be such conduct that a health care provider knew or should have known, at the time such services were rendered, created an unreasonable risk of injury so as to affect the life or health of another, and such risk was substantially greater than that which is necessary to make the conduct negligent.
4. Every emergency care facility granted immunity under this paragraph shall accept and treat all emergency care patients within the operational capacity of such facility without regard to ability to pay, including patients transferred from another emergency care facility or other health care provider pursuant to Pub. L. No. 99-272, s. 9121. The failure of an emergency care facility to comply with this subparagraph constitutes grounds for the department to initiate disciplinary action against the facility pursuant to chapter 395.
(c)1. Any health care practitioner as defined in s. 456.001(4) who is in a hospital attending to a patient of his or her practice or for business or personal reasons unrelated to direct patient care, and who voluntarily responds to provide care or treatment to a patient with whom at that time the practitioner does not have a then-existing health care patient-practitioner relationship, and when such care or treatment is necessitated by a sudden or unexpected situation or by an occurrence that demands immediate medical attention, shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omission relative to that care or treatment, unless that care or treatment is proven to amount to conduct that is willful and wanton and would likely result in injury so as to affect the life or health of another.
2. The immunity provided by this paragraph does not apply to damages as a result of any act or omission of providing medical care or treatment unrelated to the original situation that demanded immediate medical attention.
3. For purposes of this paragraph, the Legislature’s intent is to encourage health care practitioners to provide necessary emergency care to all persons without fear of litigation as described in this paragraph.
(d) Any person whose acts or omissions are not otherwise covered by this section and who participates in emergency response activities under the direction of or in connection with a community emergency response team, local emergency management agencies, the Division of Emergency Management, or the Federal Emergency Management Agency is not liable for any civil damages as a result of care, treatment, or services provided gratuitously in such capacity and resulting from any act or failure to act in such capacity in providing or arranging further care, treatment, or services, if such person acts as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.
(3) Any person, including those licensed to practice veterinary medicine, who gratuitously and in good faith renders emergency care or treatment to an injured animal at the scene of an emergency on or adjacent to a roadway shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of such care or treatment or as a result of any act or failure to act in providing or arranging further medical treatment where the person acts as an ordinary reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.
History.ss. 1, 2, ch. 65-313; s. 1, ch. 78-334; s. 62, ch. 86-160; s. 46, ch. 88-1; s. 4, ch. 88-173; s. 42, ch. 88-277; s. 1, ch. 89-71; s. 37, ch. 91-110; s. 33, ch. 93-211; s. 3, ch. 97-34; s. 1164, ch. 97-102; s. 2, ch. 2001-76; s. 3, ch. 2002-269; s. 65, ch. 2003-416; s. 1, ch. 2004-45; s. 441, ch. 2011-142.

F.S. 768.13 on Google Scholar

F.S. 768.13 on Casetext

Amendments to 768.13


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 768.13
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 768.13.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

CANTORE, v. WEST BOCA MEDICAL CENTER, INC., 242 So. 3d 1032 (Fla. 2018)

. . . trial court erred in entering a directed verdict in favor of WBMC and MCH on the application of section 768.13 . . . nonemergency patient" at the times relevant to the Cantores' allegations of medical malpractice. § 768.13 . . .

CANTORE, v. WEST BOCA MEDICAL CENTER, INC., 254 So. 3d 256 (Fla. 2018)

. . . trial court erred in entering a directed verdict in favor of WBMC and MCH on the application of section 768.13 . . . nonemergency patient" at the times relevant to the Cantores' allegations of medical malpractice. § 768.13 . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES- REPORT NO., 236 So. 3d 919 (Fla. 2018)

. . . MODEL FORM OF VERDICT FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT; ISSUES AS TO BOTH APPLICABILITY OF F.S. 768.13 . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES- REPORT NO., 191 So. 3d 380 (Fla. 2016)

. . . Committee will propose a new instruction 402.16 that is consistent with the current version of section 768.13 . . . PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 15, 2003 INTRODUCTORY COMMENT Instruction 402.16 addresses the provisions of F.S. 768.13 . . . Based upon the definition of “reckless disregard” in F.S. 768.13(2)(b)3., the committee has concluded . . . “Reckless disregard,” as defined and used in the context of F.S. 768.13(2)(b), does not appear to have . . .

WEAVER, E. v. C. MYERS, M. D. LLC d b a d b a a k a d b a, 170 So. 3d 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . governs "Premises liability for transitory foreign substances in a business establishment;” section 768.13 . . .

LIMONES, Sr. v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF LEE COUNTY, 161 So. 3d 384 (Fla. 2015)

. . . Further, “[t]he use of [AEDs] by employees and volunteers is covered under [sections] 768.13 and 768.1325 . . . Although section 1006.165 references both the Good Samaritan Act, section 768.13, and the Cardiac Arrest . . .

EXPOSITO, v. PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF MIAMI- DADE COUNTY,, 141 So. 3d 663 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . doctors could not be personally liable under section 768.26(9); that the lawsuit was barred by section 768.13 . . .

LIMONES, Sr. Jr. v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF LEE COUNTY, 111 So. 3d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Duty Under Sections 768.13 and 768.1325 Section 768.13, Florida Statutes (2008), is known as the “Good . . . Samaritan Act.” § 768.13(1). . . . See § 768.13(2)(a). . . . This immunity extends to both acts and omissions and includes diagnosis. § 768.13(2)(b)2. . . . As with the immunity provision in section 768.13, section 768.1325 does not create a legal duty to render . . .

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA BOARD OF TRUSTEES, v. STONE, A. STONE,, 92 So. 3d 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . (creating section 768.13(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes). . . . (creating section 768.13(2)(b)2., Florida Statutes). . . . (amending section 768.13(2)(b)1. and 2., Florida Statutes). . . . (making only minor grammatical changes to section 768.13(2)(b)2.a., Florida Statutes). . . . (amending section 768.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes, only). . . . .

PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF MIAMI- DADE COUNTY, v. ROLLE,, 88 So. 3d 191 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . on the pleadings, asserting it was immune from liability under Florida’s Good Samaritan Act, section 768.13 . . . The Trust next asserts it is immune from suit under Florida’s Good Samaritan Act, section 768.13, Florida . . . demonstrating a reckless disregard for the consequences so as to affect the life or health of another.” § 768.13 . . . Section 768.13(2)(c)3 states that the legislative intent of the immunity provision of the Act "is to . . .

COX, v. ST. JOSEPHS HOSPITAL,, 71 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 2011)

. . . Because the claim was against the emergency room doctor, pursuant to section 768.13(2)(b)(l), Florida . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES- REPORT NO. In No. In No. In No. In No. s In No. In No. In No. In No., 35 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 2010)

. . . Based upon the definition of “reckless disregard” in F.S. 768.13(2)(b)3, the committee has concluded . . . “Reckless disregard,” as defined and used in the context of F.S. 768.13(2)(b), does not appear to have . . . Model form of verdict for emergency medical treatment; issue as to the applicability of F.S. 768.13(2 . . . Model form of verdict for emergency medical treatment; issues as to both applicability of F.S. 768.13 . . . MODEL FORM OF VERDICT FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT; ISSUE AS TO THE APPLICABILITY OF F.S. 768.13(2 . . .

A. HARRIS, E. v. H. SOHA, Jr. M. D. P. A., 15 So. 3d 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Harris argues that the trial court erred in finding that section 768.13(2)(c)(l), Florida Statutes (2004 . . . The trial court found that the Good Samaritan Act, section 768.13(2)(c)(l), Florida Statutes (2004), . . . Harris argues that section 768.13(2)(c)(l), Florida Statutes, was inapplicable because Dr. . . . Thus, the trial court did not err in finding section 768.13(2)(c)(l), Florida Statutes, was applicable . . . Harris argues that the trial court erred in finding that the Good Samaritan Act, section 768.13(2)(c) . . .

ST. JOSEPH S HOSPITAL, v. COX M. D. L. L. C. v., 14 So. 3d 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . The case was submitted to the jury under section 768.13(2)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (2000), which provides . . .

L. A. FITNESS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, a d b a L. A. L. A. a d b a L. A. v. MAYER, 980 So. 2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Given the current state of Florida’s Good Samaritan Act, F.S. 768.13, we have some public policy concerns . . .

M. QUARANTELLO, v. T. LEROY,, 977 So. 2d 648 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . Stat. (2007) (using the phrase, “shall not thereby become liable for injury or damage”); § 768.13, Fla . . .

T. TURNER, a R. TURNER, R. v. UNITED STATES, 514 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2008)

. . . . § 768.13 (“GSA”). . . . Stat. § 768.13(2)(b)1. . . . Stat. § 768.13(2)(b)l (2000). . . . Stat. § 768.13(2)(b)l (2005). . . . Stat. § 768.13(2)(b)4. . . .

CHRISTENSEN, v. C. COOPER, M. D., 972 So. 2d 207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . their answer, Appellees filed affirmative defenses to raise the immunity provisions of the Act, section 768.13 . . . The 1998 version of the Act, applicable here, provides in pertinent part: 768.13. . . . rendered, would be likely to result in injury so as to affect the life or health of another,.... § 768.13 . . .

CAMPBELL, v. KESSLER, D., 848 So. 2d 369 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . The same language in the Good Samaritan Act, § 768.13(2)(a), has been recognized as offering no protection . . .

JACKSON COUNTY HOSPITAL CORPORATION d b a v. ALDRICH Co- E. Jr. v. Co- E. Jr., 835 So. 2d 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Bay first argues that the reckless disregard standard set forth in section 768.13(2)(b)l., Florida Statutes . . . In addition to this argument, Bay contends that unless section 768.13(2)(b)l. is construed to extend . . . Bay’s contract nurse anesthetist is not a member of any of the classes clearly enumerated in section 768.13 . . . The time constraints imposed by coexisting emergencies. § 768.13(b)3., Fla. Stat. (1997). . . . The only individual whose conduct was in question regarding section 768.13(2)(b)1., was that of Dr. . . . However, I would find that, under the facts of this case, section 768.13(2)(b)l., Florida Statutes, applied . . . activities were directed toward a particular activity or person and as that term was used in section 768.13 . . . It is even more unsound, in my view, to suggest that sec. 768.13(2)(b)l. was intended to provide greater . . . rendered, would be likely to result in injury so as to affect the life or health of another .... ” § 768.13 . . . The question of whether a health care provider acted with reckless disregard as defined by section 768.13 . . .

KNOX v. ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM SUNBELT, INC., 817 So. 2d 961 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . In pertinent part, the motion to dismiss alleged that: pursuant to Section 768.13, Florida Statutes, . . . demonstrating a reckless disregard for the consequences so as to affect the life or health of another. § 768.13 . . .

NORTH MIAMI MEDICAL CENTER d b a v. PREZEAU, a, 793 So. 2d 1142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . . § 768.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . As such, we do not reach the merits of the cross-appeal. . § 768.13, Fla. Slat. (2000). . . .

GARCIA, v. RANDLE- EASTERN AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC. ET AL., 710 So. 2d 74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . . § 768.13, Fla. Stat. (1991). Garcia seeks reversal of that judgment. . . . Garcia as defined in section 768.13(b)(3). . . . Garcia’s death taking into account the factors set forth in section 768.13(3). . . .

STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS- CIVIL CASES- NOS. AND, 658 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1995)

. . . MI 9.2; Emergency Medical Treatment; Jury Issue as to Applicability of § 768.13(2)(b); Model Verdict . . . proposed MI 9 instructions are offered in response to the legislature’s amendment in 1988 to section 768.13 . . . MI 9.1 EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT NO JURY ISSUE AS TO APPLICABILITY OF § 768.13(2)(b) a. . . . “Reckless disregard,” as defined and used in the context of section 768.13(2)(b), does not appear to . . . MI 9.2 EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT JURY ISSUE AS TO APPLICABILITY OF § 768.13(2)(b) a.Issues regarding . . .

MIELE, v. PRUDENTIAL- BACHE SECURITIES, INC., 656 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1995)

. . . By the passage of section 768.13, Florida Statutes (1991), the legislature expressed the public policy . . .

AUSTER v. GERTRUDE AND PHILIP STRAX BREAST CANCER DETECTION INSTITUTE, INC. M. D., 649 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . See, e.g., § 768.13(2)(b), Fla.Stat. . . .

MALDONADO, v. EMSA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, 645 So. 2d 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . EMSA contends that the Good Samaritan Act, § 768.13, Fla.Stat. (1989), applies to this case. . . . See § 768.13(2)(b) 1; .13(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

LANE, E. v. CALHOUN- LIBERTY COUNTY HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION INC. L. M. D. A. M. D., 846 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D. Fla. 1994)

. . . Stat.Ann § 768.13(2)(a) and (b). . . . Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.13(2)(b)(l), which the Hospital cites as relevant here, states part: Any hospital . . .

B. FRAWLEY, III, v. CITY OF LAKE WORTH, 603 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . judgment on the holding that it had civil liability immunity under the Good Samaritan Act, section 768.13 . . . Samaritan,” entitling the Village to immunity from liability under the Good Samaritan Act, section 768.13 . . . Accordingly, the trial court found that the police officer qualified under section 768.13(2)(a) as one . . .

BOTTE, v. M. POMEROY, d b a St., 497 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . affirmative defenses of comparative negligence and immunity under the Florida Good Samaritan Act, Section 768.13 . . .

PARIKH, M. D. v. CUNNINGHAM,, 493 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1986)

. . . cited as the “Florida Medical Consent Law.” (2) In any medical treatment activity not covered by s. 768.13 . . .

CLARK, v. LUMBERMANS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 465 So. 2d 552 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . Cf., Section 768.13, Florida Statutes (1981), the "Good Samaritan Act,” with commercial transactions . . .

BOTTE, v. B. POMEROY, d b a St. Co., 438 So. 2d 544 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . See Section 768.13, Florida Statutes (1981). . . .

GIALLANZA, v. L. SANDS, 316 So. 2d 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)

. . . Sec. 768.13, F.S. As aptly observed, in 30 Fla. Jur., Summary Judgment, sec. 10: “. . . . . .

BOROUGH OF FORD CITY, PENNSYLVANIA, v. UNITED STATES, 213 F. Supp. 248 (W.D. Pa. 1963)

. . . Fifth Ave. 772.12 Eighth Street Outlets: Eighth St. and Third Ave. 767.88 Eighth St. and Fourth Ave. 768.13 . . .