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Florida Statute 768.1325 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research
F.S. 768.1325 Case Law from Google Scholar
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Link to State of Florida Official Statute Google Search for Amendments to 768.1325

The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title XLV
TORTS
Chapter 768
NEGLIGENCE
View Entire Chapter
F.S. 768.1325
768.1325 Cardiac Arrest Survival Act; immunity from civil liability.
(1) This section may be cited as the “Cardiac Arrest Survival Act.”
(2) As used in this section:
(a) “Perceived medical emergency” means circumstances in which the behavior of an individual leads a reasonable person to believe that the individual is experiencing a life-threatening medical condition that requires an immediate medical response regarding the heart or other cardiopulmonary functioning of the individual.
(b) “Automated external defibrillator device” means a lifesaving defibrillator device that:
1. Is commercially distributed in accordance with the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
2. Is capable of recognizing the presence or absence of ventricular fibrillation, and is capable of determining without intervention by the user of the device whether defibrillation should be performed.
3. Upon determining that defibrillation should be performed, is able to deliver an electrical shock to an individual.
(c) “Harm” means damage or loss of any and all types, including, but not limited to, physical, nonphysical, economic, noneconomic, actual, compensatory, consequential, incidental, and punitive damages or losses.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, and except as provided in subsection (4), any person who uses or attempts to use an automated external defibrillator device on a victim of a perceived medical emergency, without objection of the victim of the perceived medical emergency, is immune from civil liability for any harm resulting from the use or attempted use of such device. In addition, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, and except as provided in subsection (4), any person who acquired the device and makes it available for use, including, but not limited to, a community association organized under chapter 617, chapter 718, chapter 719, chapter 720, chapter 721, or chapter 723, is immune from such liability, if the harm was not due to the failure of such person to:
(a) Properly maintain and test the device; or
(b) Provide appropriate training in the use of the device to an employee or agent of the acquirer when the employee or agent was the person who used the device on the victim, except that such requirement of training does not apply if:
1. The device is equipped with audible, visual, or written instructions on its use, including any such visual or written instructions posted on or adjacent to the device;
2. The employee or agent was not an employee or agent who would have been reasonably expected to use the device; or
3. The period of time elapsing between the engagement of the person as an employee or agent and the occurrence of the harm, or between the acquisition of the device and the occurrence of the harm in any case in which the device was acquired after engagement of the employee or agent, was not a reasonably sufficient period in which to provide the training.
(4) Immunity under subsection (3) does not apply to a person if:
(a) The harm involved was caused by that person’s willful or criminal misconduct, gross negligence, reckless disregard or misconduct, or a conscious, flagrant indifference to the rights or safety of the victim who was harmed;
(b) The person is a licensed or certified health professional who used the automated external defibrillator device while acting within the scope of the license or certification of the professional and within the scope of the employment or agency of the professional;
(c) The person is a hospital, clinic, or other entity whose primary purpose is providing health care directly to patients, and the harm was caused by an employee or agent of the entity who used the device while acting within the scope of the employment or agency of the employee or agent;
(d) The person is an acquirer of the device who leased the device to a health care entity, or who otherwise provided the device to such entity for compensation without selling the device to the entity, and the harm was caused by an employee or agent of the entity who used the device while acting within the scope of the employment or agency of the employee or agent; or
(e) The person is the manufacturer of the device.
(5) This section does not establish any cause of action. This section does not require that an automated external defibrillator device be placed at any building or other location or require an acquirer to make available on its premises one or more employees or agents trained in the use of the device.
(6) An insurer may not require an acquirer of an automated external defibrillator device which is a community association organized under chapter 617, chapter 718, chapter 719, chapter 720, chapter 721, or chapter 723 to purchase medical malpractice liability coverage as a condition of issuing any other coverage carried by the association, and an insurer may not exclude damages resulting from the use of an automated external defibrillator device from coverage under a general liability policy issued to an association.
History.s. 1, ch. 2001-76; s. 3, ch. 2004-345; s. 3, ch. 2004-353; s. 3, ch. 2006-206; s. 2, ch. 2008-101.

F.S. 768.1325 on Google Scholar

F.S. 768.1325 on Casetext

Amendments to 768.1325


Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 768.1325
Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 768.1325.



Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

LIMONES, Sr. v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF LEE COUNTY, 161 So. 3d 384 (Fla. 2015)

. . . Finally, after it concluded that Respondent was immune from civil liability under section 768.1325(3) . . . Further, “[t]he use of [AEDs] by employees and volunteers is covered under [sections] 768.13 and 768.1325 . . . use, including, but not limited to, a community organization ... is immune from such liability.... § 768.1325 . . . Therefore, we hold that Respondent is not entitled to immunity under section 768.1325 and such section . . . We further hold Respondent is not entitled to immunity from suit under section 768.1325, Florida Statutes . . .

LIMONES, Sr. Jr. v. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF LEE COUNTY, 111 So. 3d 901 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Duty Under Sections 768.13 and 768.1325 Section 768.13, Florida Statutes (2008), is known as the “Good . . . Section 768.1325, Florida Statutes (2008), is known as the “Cardiac Arrest Survival Act.” § 768.1325( . . . See § 768.1325(3). . . . As with the immunity provision in section 768.13, section 768.1325 does not create a legal duty to render . . . In fact, section 768.1325(5) expressly declares that it “does not establish any cause of action.” . . .

L. A. FITNESS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, a d b a L. A. L. A. a d b a L. A. v. MAYER, 980 So. 2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . On the contrary, the Florida legislature has adopted the “Cardiac Arrest Survival Act” § 768.1325, Fla . . . We find these cases, as well as F.S. § 768.1325, persuasive as we hold that L.A. . . .

FLEETWOOD HOMES OF FLORIDA, INC. v. REEVES,, 833 So. 2d 857 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Stat. (2001) (duty owed by property owner to intoxicated trespasser); § 768.1325(4)(a), Fla. . . .