Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...West American then filed a contribution claim against Yellow Cab to recover the settlement monies paid to its insured. Because a jury determined Yellow Cab to be one hundred percent at fault, the district court concluded that West American was not a joint tortfeasor and therefore it could not sue Yellow Cab under section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1985)....

...Marin could sue her husband because the doctrine of interspousal immunity has now been abrogated. Waite v. Waite, 618 So.2d 1360 (Fla. 1993). [3] Thus, we reject the argument that our interpretation of section 768.81(3) when coupled with the right to setoff under section 768.31(5) will lead to a double reduction in the amount of damages. This possibility may be avoided by applying the setoff contemplated by section 768.31(5) against the total damages (reduced by any comparative negligence of the plaintiff) rather than against the apportioned damages caused by a particular defendant....

...The Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act also abrogates the common law rule: "When a release ... is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury ... (a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability ... unless its terms so provice... ." § 768.31(5) Fla....

...(1977). Clearly there is no prohibition against a general release in section 768.041(1), Florida Statutes (1977). Indeed, the Uniform Act expressly authorizes discharge of all possible tortfeasors as long as the "terms" of the release "so provide." § 768.31(5)(a), Fla....

...Thus, as long as the parties express their intent to discharge all possible tortfeasors, they are free to do so. We need not decide whether a release which runs to a named tortfeasor plus all others also discharges the latter from liability for contribution. § 768.31(5)(b) Fla....

...at public importance: (A) IS A NON-SETTLING DEFENDANT IN A CASE TRIED UNDER SECTION 768.81(3) ENTITLED TO SETOFF OR REDUCTION OF HIS APPORTIONED SHARE OF THE DAMAGES, AS ASSESSED BY THE JURY, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIONS 768.041(2), 46.015(2) OR 768.31(5)(a), BASED UPON SUMS PAID BY SETTLING DEFENDANTS IN EXCESS OF THEIR APPORTIONED LIABILITY AS DETERMINED BY THE JURY? (B) DOES THE RULE AS TO SETOFF APPLY EQUALLY TO BOTH ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES? Id....

...al amount paid by the settling defendants. The trial court denied the requested setoff. On appeal, TMRMC contended that the trial court erred in denying the requested setoff. The district court of appeal held that sections 46.015(2), 768.041(2), and 768.31(5), *251 Florida Statutes (1991) (the setoff statutes), required that "the $300,000 paid in settlement by other defendants must be applied in reduction of the total damage award returned by the jury." Tallahassee Memorial Regional Medical Ctr., Inc., 634 So.2d at 658....

...ies who contributed to the accident regardless of whether they are joined as defendants. Footnote 3 of our opinion in Fabre states: Thus, we reject the argument that our interpretation of section 768.81(3) when coupled with the right to setoff under section 768.31(5) will lead to a double reduction in the amount of damages. This possibility may be avoided by applying the setoff contemplated by section 768.31(5) against the total damages (reduced by any comparative negligence of the plaintiff) rather than against the apportioned damages caused by a particular defendant....

...tage of fault by which that party contributed to the accident, Fabre, 623 So.2d at 1185, a plaintiff cannot sue one party for the noneconomic damages caused by another party. Therefore, section 768.041 does not apply to noneconomic damages. Finally, section 768.31 provides, in pertinent part: (5) RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE....

...injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater... . § 768.31, Fla. Stat. (1989) (emphasis added). Under section 768.31, settlement proceeds are set off where defendants are "liable for the same injury or the same wrongful death." Id....

...As a California court recognized in Espinoza, "[t]he payment of such a claim by one tortfeasor is not the payment of a claim for which `the others' might ever be held jointly and severally liable. Thus, there is no longer any such claim `against the others' to `reduce.'" 11 Cal. Rptr.2d at 502. Hence, section 768.31 does not apply to noneconomic damages....

...OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. WELLS, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which KOGAN, J., concurs. ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with an opinion. *255 WELLS, Justice, concurring specially. I concur with the majority's reconciliation of sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5), and 768.81(3), Florida Statutes (1991), in this case in which the parties stipulated that the settling defendants would remain on the verdict form although Fabre v....

...ANSTEAD, Justice, specially concurring. While I concur in the majority's opinion because it makes very good sense, I have some concern that the legislature has not acted to express or clarify its intent as to the continuing application of the provisions of sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2), Florida Statutes (1991), in view of the enactment of section 768.81(3), Florida Statutes (1989)....

...ce, who was found to be 85% responsible for the claimant's injury. As a practical matter, of course, this right to "contribution" is also limited, as all tort rights are, by the financial solvency of the contributing tortfeasors. Sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2) are actually parts of the legislative contribution scheme....

...Since the "problem" of a tortfeasor paying more than his fair share has been eliminated by the enactment of section 768.81(3), the "solution" to the problem by the scheme of contribution and setoff is no longer needed. The underlying purpose of the contribution scheme and sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2) is simply no longer served in such a case....

...It would be far better, however, since this is an area in which the legislature has broad discretion and authority, and has been very active, for the legislature to expressly indicate the limitations on the continuing use of the contribution scheme, including the setoff provisions of sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2)....

...9 Moreover, the jury’s answers to questions posed by the trial court in the verdict form suggests that the jury found the misrepresentation to be just one factor indicative of fault and not the sole basis of liability. The Florida Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.31(3)(a) (West Supp.1984), provides that in determining contribution among tortfeasors, the basis of allocation of liability shall be the “relative degrees of fault” attributed to each party....

...n to pay more damages than the amount for which it is responsible. Florida, like most other jurisdictions, has recognized a right of contribution on behalf of a tortfeasor who pays for the wrongdoings of additional tortfeasors. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.31 (1997); see 27 American cites In re Crash Disaster Near Cerritos, California, on August 31, 1986, 982 F.2d 1271 (9th Cir.1992), to support its argument that liability has been apportioned in a Warsaw Convention context before....

..., casts the entire burden of a loss for which several may be responsible upon only one of those at fault, and for these reasons this Court recedes from its earlier decisions to the contrary. During the pendency of this appeal, the Legislature passed Section 768.31, [*] Florida Statutes, the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, which was signed into law by the Governor on June 13, 1975, which Act took effect upon becoming law....

...onted with the problem of determining what procedure will most fully effectuate the principle that each party should pay the proportion of the total damages he has caused to the other party, and we considered several alternatives. [2] However, since Section 768.31 became effective during the pendency of this cause, the procedure adopted therein by the Florida Legislature relative to contribution among joint tortfeasors applies sub judice....

...ts. The negligence attributed to the defendants will then be apportioned on a pro rata basis without considering relative degrees of fault although the multi-party defendants will remain jointly and severally liable for the entire amount. In view of Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, the question which was certified by the trial court to the District Court of Appeal should have been answered in the negative although not for the reasons stated by the District Court of Appeal....

...BOYD, Judge (concurring specially). Because the new statute cited in the majority opinion prevails in this matter, I would not include language relative to proposed changes in judicial policy considered by the Court in this case prior to the enactment of the statute. As enacted, Section 768.31(3), Florida Statutes, provides: "(3) Pro Rata Shares....

...Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1323 (11th Cir.1988) (in banc) (Tjoflat, J. specially concurring). 4 . The district court also concluded that the medical payments by Bay County could be viewed as a settlement by a joint tortfeasor and that under Fla.Stat. § 768.31 the damages against Grigsby would be reduced by the terms of the settlement....

...S & S was vicariously liable for Rountree's negligence and AHA, in turn, stepped in to S & S's shoes as a subrogee. Our conclusion that section 768.81 applies to vicariously liable parties as well as active tortfeasors also harmonizes with Florida's contribution statute. See § 768.31(2)(e), Fla....

...284, 724 P.2d 1122 (1986), or by the doctrine of laches, which looks to the provisions of the most closely-related statute of limitations. See Wadlington v. Edwards, 92 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1957). [5] Florida's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 768.31(2)(a), Fla....

...Alan R. Dakan of High, Stack, Davis & Lazenby, Miami, for appellee. ADKINS, Justice. We have for review on direct appeal a final judgment of a trial court which passed on the constitutional validity of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...ween the $25,000 paid by the Village and its full one-third share. Since Miami Shores paid more than its pro rata share, it filed a petition for an order of contribution against the Village pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975). The Village moved to dismiss the petition on the ground, inter alia, that Section 768.31 was unconstitutional in its application to municipal corporations....

...The circuit court denied the motion and entered final judgment in favor of Miami Shores. From that final judgment the Village brings this appeal. The Village's first contention is simply that the Act does not apply to municipal corporations. Its argument revolves around the following language of Section 768.31: (2) RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION....

...ty of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the particular statute involved. After reviewing the Act under consideration here, we are persuaded that the term "persons" includes municipalities. The legislative purpose behind the enactment of Section 768.31 was to provide for a right to contribution among all joint tortfeasors in order to eliminate the unfairness of the common law rule. From a reading of the entire Act, we must conclude that the Legislature was concerned not with the status of the defendants in a tort action, but rather with their relationship as joint tortfeasors. Prior to the enactment of Section 768.31, this Court had consistently recognized that a municipal corporation could *277 be a tortfeasor....

...We must assume that the Legislature was aware of this possibility and, thus, we find it to be significant that the Legislature chose not to specifically exclude municipalities from the operation of the Act. Another indication of the legislative intent to include municipalities within the scope of Section 768.31 can be found by examining the Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Act, Section 768.28, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...Chapter 75-108, Laws of Florida. Since Section 768.28 equates municipal corporations with all other private individuals for purposes of tort liability and since that statute was passed during the legislative session immediately prior to the enactment of Section 768.31, we are persuaded that the Legislature intended to include municipal corporations when it used the term "persons" in the later enactment. For the reasons expressed, we hold that municipal corporations are subject to the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. We now turn to the Village's constitutional assault on Section 768.31. Although the Village raises six separate arguments, we find that only one requires extensive discussion. The Village contends that Section 768.31, as applied to the facts of this case, affects vested rights retroactively in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions....

...In order to understand this argument, a brief recitation of the time sequence in this case is necessary. The events which gave rise to the tort action in this case occurred on December 23, 1973, and the litigation against Miami Shores, the Village, and Federal Laboratories, Inc., was commenced on August 29, 1974. Section 768.31 became law on June 13, 1975, and was in effect prior to final judgment being entered against the three defendants. Section 768.31(7) provides: (7) PENDING CAUSES OF ACTION....

...in those cases wherein vested rights are adversely affected or destroyed or when a new obligation or duty is created or imposed, or an additional disability is established, in connection with transactions or considerations previously had or expiated. Id. at 709. Thus, the issue in this case is whether Section 768.31 affects vested rights or establishes a new obligation or duty....

...The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act does not affect any vested rights of tortfeasors or create any new obligations in respect to their tort liability. Since the common tort liability was enforceable against all or any of the joint offenders at the election of the injured party, Section 768.31, by altering the common law rule of no contribution, does not increase the liability of any of the participants in the offense....

...uct liability tortfeasors to indicate that the state would adopt Sindell as well. Florida has enacted the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, which permits contribution according to the degree of fault of each tortfeasor. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.31(3) (Supp.1981)....

...Appellant also asserts that an employer who has paid benefits to an employee under the act and whose negligence and wanton misconduct was a proximate cause of the employee's injuries is jointly and severally liable in tort to a third party tortfeasor under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...sor who was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct which contributed to the injuries. We hold that the questioned statute (Section 440.11, Florida Statutes) is constitutional, that an employer is not liable in tort to a third party tortfeasor under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, under the circumstances argued and that an active tortfeasor does not have a right to implied indemnification for damages he has paid to an injured third party from a joint tortfeasor who was guilty of willful or wanton conduct which contributed to the injuries....

...The employees sued Seaboard as a third party tortfeasor. Seaboard filed a third party claim in the actions against West Robinson seeking contribution and implied indemnity against the driver of the bus, the employer and the insurance carrier. The basis of the claim for contribution was 768.31, Florida Statutes, (the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act), the constitutionality of which was raised insofar as it failed to require liability in accordance with fault....

...440.11 is as follows: "(1) The liability of an employer prescribed in § 440.10 shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to any third party tortfeasor and to the employee, ... on account of such injury or death, ..." [2] The pertinent language of § 768.31 is as follows: "(a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them....

...dant-doctor and defendant-hospital; and erred further in instructing the jury that it could not apportion the negligence and damages as between the defendant-doctor and the defendant-hospital, is put to rest by Chapter 75-108, Laws of 1975, creating § 768.31, Fla....

...Although summons was issued against McMillan and F&C prior to submission of the second petition, the summons was improperly issued for the same reason: McMillan and F&C were not parties to the suit. Therefore the trial court did not err in denying defendants' petitions for contribution. See also Section 768.31(4)(a)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...contemplated by the contribution statute. *206 At common law, the right of contribution did not exist among joint tortfeasors. This common law restriction was abolished in Florida with the adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasor's Act. Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1985) states in pertinent part as follows: Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them. § 768.31(2)(a), Fla....

...The statute provides that the right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. § 768.31(2)(b), Fla....

...t is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement, or in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable. See § 768.31(2)(d), Fla....

...Thus, the party seeking contribution must plead and prove, among other necessary allegations, his own negligence and the negligence of the other tortfeasor. See Farmer's Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co., 8 Wis.2d 512, 99 N.W.2d 746 (1959); Alamida v. Wilson, 53 Hawaii 398, 495 P.2d 585 (1972). Section 768.31, Florida Statutes clearly requires that there be a common liability....

...da law governs whether and to what extent that award should be reduced by setoff. See Scheib v. Florida Sanitarium Benevolent Ass'n, 759 F.2d 859 (11th Cir.1985). Florida has adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. See Fla.Stat. Sec. 768.31 et seq. (1985). Section 768.31(5) provides that 15 [w]hen a release or covenant to sue or not to enforce a judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for ......

...Both the United States and the state court defendants were sued for the same wrongful death. Both suits sought to recover those damages that the Florida legislature has authorized in Fla.Stat. Sec. 768.21 (1985). The state court defendants settled out of court. Section 768.31(5) unequivocally requires that the claim against the United States be reduced by the amount of that settlement. 17 Appellee's argument that section 768.31(5) does not require a setoff is based principally on the district court's finding that the injury attributable to the United States was separate from any injury that may be attributable to the state court defendants....

...h written and audio, offers no assistance in understanding the text. In any case, we find the meaning of this statute from its text. [3] After comparative negligence, the legislature allowed joint tortfeasors to seek contribution from one another in section 768.31, Florida Statutes, but expressly excluded intentional tortfeasors from either seeking or making contribution from negligent tortfeasors....

...ruling departs from the essential requirements of law and results in irreparable harm. We agree. *168 The Florida Legislature adopted in 1975 the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, thus creating a statutory right of action for contribution. Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, provides that contribution may be had under the following circumstances: (2) RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION....

...ll of the other entities who contributed to the accident, regardless of whether they ... could have been joined as defendants." 623 So.2d at 1185. The contribution provision in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act states in pertinent part: 768.31 Contribution among tortfeasors.___ * * * * * * (3) PRO RATA SHARES.___In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability: (a) Their relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability. § 768.31(3), Fla....

...559 (M.D.Fla.1993) (order entering summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, a rape victim, in suit alleging defendant/property interests' negligent failure to warn or to *22 provide adequate protection, upon finding that the jury may not apportion fault under the "contribution among tortfeasors" law, § 768.31, among the negligent tortfeasors and the alleged rapist, an intentional tortfeasor); Kansas State Bank & Trust Co....

...from either the intentional actor or the negligent party whose negligence caused the intentional act. At the same time, the contribution statute prevents an intentional actor who pays the plaintiff from collecting against a negligent co-tortfeasor. § 768.31(2)(c), Fla....

...l parties to an action according to their relative degrees of negligence. However, the court concluded that it was precluded from doing so because of the recently enacted Uniform Contribution among Tortfeasors Act. Ch. 75-108, Laws of Fla. (creating section 768.31, Florida Statutes)....

...Instead, it held that a "plaintiff is entitled to a measurement of his full damages and the liability for these damages should be apportioned in accordance with the percentage of negligence as it relates to the total of all the defendants"; however, because of section 768.31, "[t]he negligence attributed to the defendants [is] then [to] be apportioned on a pro rata basis," and the "defendants will remain jointly and severally liable for the entire amount." 318 So.2d at 393-94....

...The rights of both the settling and non-settling joint tort-feasors would be adversely effected if we were to allow plaintiffs to privately and unilaterally apportion the proceeds of a settlement agreement containing a general release. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983), provides that when two or more persons become jointly or severably liable for the same injury, a tortfeasor who pays more than his pro rata share of the liability has a right of contribution against the other tortfeasor. In order to encourage settlements, the legislature created subsection (5) of section 768.31, which provides that a joint *1351 tort-feasor who is given a release in good faith cannot be sued for contribution....

...nt, is not the equivalent of an adjudication on the merits that will serve as a bar to continued litigation against the passive tortfeasor. [1] Our decision comports with Florida's public policy. This policy, as documented in sections 768.041(1) and 768.31(5), Florida Statutes, [2] encourages the settlement of civil actions....

...[2] Section 768.041(1), Florida Statutes (1987), states: (1) A release or covenant not to sue as to one tortfeasor for property damage to, personal injury of, or the wrongful death of any person shall not operate to release or discharge the liability of any other tortfeasor who may be liable for the same tort or death. Section 768.31(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), states: (5) RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE....

...Schreier also complains that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the cross-claim of Donald Schreier and Liberty Mutual which sought contribution. The trial court appropriately entered summary judgment in favor of Clifford B. Martin, Paul H. Martin and Allstate Insurance Company pursuant to the provisions of Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...t entered on a directed verdict is the general pronouncements regarding the direction of verdicts." "A trial court may direct a verdict against a plaintiff only if no evidence is introduced on which the jury may lawfully find for the plaintiff." Id. Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1991), the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, provides: RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE....

...the setoff statutes applied only where the liability continued to be joint and several. [2] See id. at 252-53. Justice Anstead, in his specially concurring opinion in Wells, explained the interplay between the statutory schemes: Sections 46.105(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2) are actually parts of the legislative contribution scheme....

...Since the "problem" of a tortfeasor paying more than his fair share has been eliminated by the enactment of section 768.81(3), the "solution" to the problem by the scheme of contribution and setoff is no longer needed. The underlying purpose of the contribution scheme and sections 46.015(2), 768.31(5)(a), and 768.041(2) is simply no longer served in such a case....

...release or a covenant not to sue to any person in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment. Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (2000), entitled the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, provides in pertinent part: (5) Release or covenant not to sue.-When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in goo...

...1st DCA 1975). The proffered release shows that the injured plaintiff gave complete satisfaction to appellee as well as appellant as joint tort-feasors, giving appellant the right to contribution. Woods and G.E.I.C.O. v. Withrow, 413 So.2d 1179 (Fla. 1982); § 768.31, Fla....

...Scheib pursuant to settlement agreements between Scheib and joint tortfeasors, Dr. Paul R. Garrett (Dr. Garrett) and Florida Sanitarium and Benevolent Association (Florida Hospital), should be set off under the provisions of sections 768.-041(2) and 768.31(5), Fla.Stat....

...The district court therefore entered judgment for Scheib as follows: *862 Scheib's argument that the district court erred in setting off the amounts received by her from Florida Hospital and Dr. Garrett ($476,000) pursuant to Fla.Stat. section 768.041(2) (the setoff statute) 4 and section 768.31(5) (Florida’s enactment of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act) 5 is premised upon the fact that the trial court awarded nothing to Scheib for pain, suffering, disability, loss of enjoyment of life, or any intangible element of damage....

...The court refused to set off against the husband’s jury verdict the amounts received by the wife in a settlement which exceeded her share of the jury verdict, insisting that damages for separate causes of action must be separate. The Florida courts have consistently applied the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31(5), Fla.Stat....

...corporation in partial satisfaction of the damages sued for, the court shall set off this amount from the amount of any judgment to which the plaintiff would be otherwise entitled at the time of rendering judgment and enter judgment accordingly. 5 . Section 768.31(5), Fla.Stat....

...easor, nor jointly and severally liable, with the contribution defendant), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 350 (Fla.1979); see also Restatement of Restitution § 86 at 389-90 (1937) (noting need for common liability to trigger right of contribution); accord § 768.31, Fla....

...Historically, no right of contribution has existed between joint tortfeasors. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. American District Electric Protective Co., supra . However, the right of one tortfeasor to contribution from a joint tortfeasor is now controlled by the "Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act," Fla. Stat. § 768.31, a statute enacted by the Legislature in 1975....

...though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them." At this posture of the case, there are sufficient allegations of negligence *693 against the Canal Authority to show a right of contribution in favor of Florida Power and in view of § 768.31, supra, Florida Power's third party complaint for contribution against the Canal Authority should be reinstated....

...The pathologist's insurer, Florida Patient's Compensation Fund, settled the case prior to trial and then filed suit against the surgeon/codefendant for contribution. However, the trial court dismissed it because of the Patient's Compensation Fund's failure to comply with section 768.31(4)(d)(2), Florida Statutes (1985) and we upheld that ruling in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v....

...ie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So.2d 45, 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963) (citing Seaboard Air Line Railroad v. American District Electric Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932)). Subsequently, the Florida statute on contribution among tort-feasors section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975) was enacted. This legislation was in derogation of the common law and it permitted contribution on a pro rata basis. As we have already discussed, although the Patient's Compensation Fund was entitled, as an insurer, to seek contribution under section 768.31(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1975), it was denied that statutory contribution because of a violation of the statute's payment provision....

...Here, the Patient's Compensation Fund was attempting to assert a right of contribution via the vehicle of subrogation instead of its statutory right as an insurer. However, because the pathologist's right to contribution was lost, by reason of the violation of the statute's payment provision, section 768.31(4)(d)(2), the Patient's Compensation Fund, as subrogee to the pathologist's right to statutory contribution, would have no contribution right to subrogate....

...789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977). The District Court has certified the following question for our determination: "Does the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity control over the uniform contribution among joint tortfeasors act (75-108 Laws of Florida, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes) to prevent one tortfeasor from seeking a contribution from another tortfeasor when the other tortfeasor is the spouse of the injured person who received damages from the first tortfeasor?" We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution....

...Therefore, both are affirmed. On interlocutory appeal from an order dated May 15, 1975, denying a motion for entry of an order for contribution from defendant Four Wheel Parts, St. Paul contends that the trial court erred in entering such order, citing as authority, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, and Lincenberg v....

...entered the order, May 15, 1975, the statute had not become effective, and the Lincenberg case had not yet been decided. [2] We are compelled, however, to reverse the order even though it was not improper when entered. As provided in subsection 7 of Section 768.31, supra, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, applies to "all causes of action pending on June 12, 1975, wherein the rights of contribution among joint tortfeasors is involved ..." The record demonstrates that this interlocut...

...It also involves a motive for cooperation between parties to the agreement which should be disclosed to the jury. Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.2d 385 (Fla. 1973). See Maule Industries, Inc., v. Rountree, 284 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1973); Imperial Elevator Company, Inc., v. Cohen, 311 So.2d 732 (Fla.3rd DCA 1975). [2] Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, became effective on June 12, 1975, and Lincenberg v....

...cation and/or contribution among active joint tortfeasors contrary to the law of the State of Florida." The predicate for Hester's appeal is that his third party complaint is now governed by the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. Fla. Stat. § 768.31 (1975)....

...rap could fall on him. As far as Count VI is concerned, the evidence falls far short of that necessary to demonstrate that Walker was guilty of willful and wanton misconduct. Count V merits more consideration. This was a claim for contribution under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), under which Seaboard asserted that the parties were joint tortfeasors and that by virtue of a judgment against it, Seaboard was entitled to recover half of the amount paid to Warder....

...The effective date of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was June 12, 1975. The act provided that it would apply to all causes of action pending on the effective date wherein the rights of contribution among joint tortfeasors were involved and to cases thereafter filed. Section 768.31(7)....

...Leesburg Hospital Association, Inc. v. Carter, 321 So.2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). It was not necessary that Warder have a judgment against both Seaboard and Walker for Seaboard to pursue its claim for contribution against Walker in a separate action. Section 768.31(4)(a)....

...While pointing out that Florida's new Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act did not apply to the case before it, the court observed that had it applied there was a provision in the statute which would have dictated the same conclusion the court reached without the benefit of the statute. The court referred to Section 768.31(4)(f), Florida Statutes (1977), [6] which states: The judgment of the court in determining the liability of the several defendants to the claimant for an injury or wrongful death shall be binding as among such defendants in determining their right to contribution. In view of Jackson v. Florida Weathermakers, supra , and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Curtiss, supra , as well as Section 768.31(4)(f), we hold that Seaboard's claim for contribution under Florida's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was precluded by the judgment upon directed verdict in favor of Walker entered in the Warder suit to which Seaboard was a party....

...ected the shipper's argument that the railroad's acceptance of the defectively loaded car constituted an independent intervening cause. [5] The statute has now been amended to provide for the allocation of liability based upon degrees of fault. Sec. 768.31(3)(a), Fla....

...176, 126 N.W.2d 239 (1964). At least where both tortfeasors are parties to the same action, each of them would have the opportunity to try to participate in an adversarial manner in any determination which might lead to the exoneration of the other. [7] Even though Sec. 768.31(4)(f) would not apply to Seaboard's claims under Counts II, III, and IV, the rationale of these two cases reflect another reason why a directed verdict for Walker should have been entered upon these counts....

...s of the counter-claim, they do not state causes of action. Contribution, the claim asserted in count VII, is exclusively a statutory remedy. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 559 So.2d 195, 197 (Fla.1990). Section 768.31, The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, provides: (2) Right to contribution.— (a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the *174 same injury to perso...

...plaintiff's injury. Thus, a defendant could not reduce his or her liability by pointing to wrongdoing (negligent or intentional) which occurred in a separate transaction, and he or she could not seek contribution except from a joint tortfeasor. See § 768.31(2)(a) & (c), Fla....

...Chadbourne, Inc., 338 So.2d 271 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). [9] The jury allocated 50 percent of the fault to the Department and 25 percent to each of the two inmates. [10] The common law rule has also been retained in Florida's Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors statute. Although section 768.31(2)(a) and (3) permits two or more persons jointly or severally liable to seek contribution among them based on their relative degrees of fault, contribution is denied intentional tortfeasors. § 768.31(2)(c), Fla....

...Ward, and Gold, Vann & White, P.A., alleging that, since the amount it paid in settlement exceeded Dr. Cox's pro rata share of liability, it was entitled to contribution. The trial court dismissed with prejudice this cause of action, holding that the Fund had failed to comply with section 768.31(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), [1] authorizing contribution between joint tortfeasors. The trial judge concluded that the portion of the settlement given by the Fund did not constitute payment under section 768.31(4)(d) because it was not paid in cash. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that section 768.31(4)(d)(2) "requires a party who has satisfied a claim during the pendency of an action to both (1) fully pay the claim and (2) commence an action for contribution within one year after the agreement was made." Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v....

...l court was correct in granting dismissal with prejudice." Id. [2] In early March of 1985, while the appeal was pending, the Fund paid the note. In April, 1985, the Fund instituted another action for contribution, asserting that it had complied with section 768.31(4)(d) by paying the patient and his wife cash....

...That decision is clearly not controlling since the parties in this case are considered joint tortfeasors. In this state, a joint tortfeasor has no right to contribution except that provided by statute, and an insurer cannot have a greater right than the insured through the remedy of subrogation. Section 768.31(2)(e), Florida Statutes (1985), provides *198 that a liability insurer, upon discharge of its insured, is subrogated to the insured's right of contribution....

...There are no allegations or contentions in these proceedings that the parties were not joint tortfeasors. For the reasons expressed, we approve the district court's decision. It is so ordered. EHRLICH, C.J., and McDONALD, SHAW, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 768.31(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1985), provides, in pertinent part: (d) If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has ......

...We affirm the summary judgment as to contribution, but reverse as to indemnity and the right to amend third party plaintiff's complaint. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinions expressed herein. NOTES [1] § 768.31, Fla....

...We note in passing that, because the decision in Paoli conflicts with that in Mieure v. Moore, 330 So.2d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), upholding inter-spousal immunity in the face of the Uniform Act, the question presented has been certified to the supreme court. [4] § 768.31(2)(f), Fla....

...First, virtually all third party claims involve situations in which a cause of action does not technically exist at the time the third party complaint is filed. For example, the statutory right of contribution does not exist until the tortfeasor "has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability... ." § 768.31(2)(b), Fla....

...For example, in the absence of third party practice, parties with potential subrogation rights can lose those rights while the initial litigation is pending because of the statute of limitations. By statute, a claim for contribution can be brought within one year after the payment. § 768.31(4), Fla....

...The reason for this is obvious: the Grazianos are the insiders who actually committed the fraud and the thefts. They suffered no economic losses. As intentional tortfeasors, they clearly are not entitled to contribution from these defendants for the damages that they rightfully owe to the customers. See § 768.31(2)(c), Fla....

...h the estate in the sum of $40,000, which was approved by the trial court. The release of the active tortfeasor does not of course serve also to discharge the tortfeasor vicariously liable because the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, specifically Section 768.31(5), has been interpreted to apply to all tortfeasors, whether their liability is active or derivative....

...Issen, 318 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1975) and subsequent statutory developments. In Lincenberg, the court decided that the doctrine of comparative negligence was not incompatible with the 1975 version of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), which required that fault could not be the basis for determining a defendant's contribution. The present contribution statute provides that relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for determining contribution. Section 768.31(3)(a) Florida Statutes (1979)....

...es a pure apportionment of damages. See Lincenberg at 392, n. 2. SCL further argues that the driver's settlement release which was executed by Webb and Strong for $14,000 should act as a settlement by Webb and Strong for 75% of their claim. However, Section 768.31(5)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that such a release "reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release." The plain language of the statute supports the trial judge's decision that the judgment should be reduced by $14,000, not by 75% of the total award....

...y v. Hirst, 30 Fla. 1, 11 So. 506 (1892); National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Holland, 269 So.2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972), cert. denied, 273 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1973). It is also true, as Roy states, that Florida's contribution among tortfeasors statute, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983), denies willful joint tortfeasors the right to contribution....

...Nevertheless, our Supreme Court in Shor v. Paoli, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1978), held that the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity does not prevent a tortfeasor from seeking contribution from another tortfeasor under the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors' Act (Section 768.31, Florida Statutes [1975]) even though the other tortfeasor is the spouse of the successful plaintiff....

...Florida is thus a member of the small but growing minority of jurisdictions which have adopted the doctrine that family immunity is merely a bar to the right to sue another and does not affect the status of the negligent family member as a joint-tortfeasor, which, under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979), is indispensable to liability for contribution....

...Seaboard filed a post-trial motion for contribution from Frier's and Hartford and attached to the motion the agreement entered into by Frier's, Hartford and Parker. The motion alleged that the agreement was not based upon any consideration and "... attempts to abrogate the provisions of Florida Statute 768.31 ..." The trial court granted Seaboard's motion for contribution and ordered that Frier's and Hartford pay Seaboard $75,000, plus one-half the costs and interest. Frier's and Hartford contend that the trial court erred in failing to apply Section 768.31(5)(b) and ordering contribution. Subsection 768.31(5) of Florida's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act reads as follows: "(5) Release or covenant not to sue....

...e admissible into evidence. Ward v. Ochoa, supra; Maule Industries, Inc. v. Roundtree, 284 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1973). The agreement between Parker, Frier's and Hartford is obviously a Mary Carter agreement. It is also a covenant not to enforce judgment. Section 768.31(5)(b) clearly states that when a covenant not to enforce judgment is given in good faith, "......

...At this point, the Court stated in footnote 2 that among the alternatives considered was pure apportionment whereby the plaintiff may recover judgment against codefendants only for the percentage of damages caused by the negligence of each individual defendant. However, the Court noted that the legislature had just passed section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), which provided for contribution among joint tortfeasors and interpreted the statute as retaining the "full, joint, and several liability of joint tortfeasors to the plaintiff." Thus, the Court held: The plaint...

...an entire accidental loss on one of the parties whose negligent conduct combined with the negligence of the other party to produce the loss." Id. at 436. In furtherance of the principles set forth in Hoffman, this Court, recognizing the enactment of section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), removed the common law bar against contribution between joint tortfeasors in Lincenberg v....

...The plaintiff in Lincenberg was faultless. The opinion never squarely addressed the issue of whether joint and several liability was consistent with Florida's new system of comparative negligence. Although some reference was made in dicta concerning the effect of section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), those statements were never intended *203 to mean that section 768.31 codified joint and several liability. Section 768.31 adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which sets out the scheme governing the allocation and the limits of a joint tortfeasor's contribution rights. [1] A literal reading of this statute makes it clear that only when joint and several liability is found will the statute apply. § 768.31(2)(a)....

...152, 154, 646 P.2d 579, 581 (Ct.App.) (act does not purport to determine whether a person is jointly or severally liable to a plaintiff), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982), affirmed sub nom., Taylor v. Delgarno Transportation, Inc., 100 N.M. 138, 667 P.2d 445 (1983). See also § 768.31(6), Fla....

...1st DCA 1981) (joint and several liability applies despite adoption of comparative negligence), review denied, 419 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1982), approved as modified, 438 So.2d 780 (Fla. 1983). None of these cases involved a situation where the plaintiff's fault exceeded that of the targeted joint tortfeasor. Section 768.31 does not prevent a change in the doctrine of joint and several liability or when it is to be applied....

...merica. For purposes of this opinion, both parties shall be referred to as Disney. [3] One weakness in this argument is that the social upheaval, if it occurred, took place in Hoffman v. Jones , which predated Lincenberg. The subsequent amendment to section 768.31 in which contribution was changed from a pro rata to a percentage basis, by itself, could hardly be deemed to have such momentous consequences....

...§ 33.001(b) (Vernon 1986). [5] We note that the same legislation included the creation of an Academic Task Force to study and make recommendations to the legislature concerning all aspects of tort and insurance law. [1] At the time this Court decided Lincenberg, § 768.31 mandated that contribution shares had to be allocated on a pro rata basis without consideration of the parties' relative degrees of fault. § 768.31(3)(a), Fla....

...ault. In 1976, however, the legislature amended the statute to conform more closely with the theoretical underpinnings of Hoffman. Ch. 76-186, § 1, Laws of Fla. The statute now provides that contribution is to be based on relative degrees of fault. § 768.31(3)(a), Fla....

...Upon motion by the third party defendants, the trial court granted summary judgment denying K-Mart any relief. K-Mart argues it is entitled to indemnification based on either a theory of common law indemnity or contractual indemnity, and to contribution pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...of implied warranty by a retailer who does not manufacture the product, constitutes "wrongful conduct" in this context. Therefore, K-Mart should not be barred from pursuing its indemnity rights against Chairs based on a contract theory. Contribution Section 768.31 abrogates the common-law rule that a release of one or more joint tortfeasors discharges all other joint tortfeasors....

...The retailer held strictly liable to his customer in these circumstances will be entitled to recover common law indemnity from the manufacturer of the defective product. [5] University Plaza Shopping Center, Inc. v. Stewart, 272 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1973). [6] § 768.31(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981). [7] § 768.31(5), Fla....

...or recognizing the right of the plaintiff to seek recovery on the basis of apportionment of fault while denying the right of fault allocation as between negligent defendants." Id. at 391. However, recognizing that the legislature had recently passed section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, we declined consideration of the abrogation of joint and several liability in deference to legislative attention to these issues....

...Dunn 31,984.97 Sobik 50,201.99 Claimants then executed a release in favor of Jackson and his carrier. Subsequently, Sobik's carrier filed a claim for contribution against Jackson's carrier under the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31 et seq., Florida Statutes (1977), contending that the release given Jackson was not given in good faith pursuant to Section 768.31(5) [2] and that Jackson's carrier was responsible for a pro rata share of the common liability instead of the $1,000.00 paid by Jackson to the claimants....

...ed by the commissioners to provide that a release given in good faith completely released the tortfeasor involved from all claims, including contribution claims, and that the amount of the claim would be reduced only by the amount of the settlement. Section 768.31(5) contains similar provisions....

...aith requirement is conscientiously enforced settlements may be discouraged. [5] By settlement and the release granted incident thereto a tortfeasor is relieved of all liability, including liability to another tortfeasor having a contribution claim. Section 768.31(5), supra....

...On appeal, this judgment was affirmed per curiam without opinion. First Arlington Inv. Corp. v. Ulmer, 446 So.2d 108 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). On November 15, 1984, the court entered final summary judgment against Auto-Owners because it did not obtain a release from Ulmer as required by section 768.31(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1987), and therefore could not maintain a suit for contribution against St....

...btain a complete exoneration or release of Ulmer. While unknown to the common law, the doctrine of contribution is a statutory recognition of the need for an equitable apportionment of the common liability of multiple tortfeasor to an injured party. Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1987), provides for such an apportionment by requiring each tortfeasor to pay his or her share of a settlement or judgment....

...attempt to access such documents through claiming an at-issue waiver or selective disclosure. Id., at 512 . . In Home Ins. Co. v. Advance Machine Co., the Florida appellate court determined that the mere bringing of a lawsuit pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 768.31 for contribution (among tortfeasors) toward a settlement-when such statutoiy-based action requires an allegation that the settlement was reasonable-is not enough, in itself, to constitute a waiver of attorney-client privilege as to the plai...

...to pay more damages than the amount for which it is responsible. Florida, like most other jurisdictions, has recognized a right of contribution on behalf of a tortfeasor who pays for the wrongdoings of additional tortfeasors. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.31 (1997); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886A (1982 App.) (noting that, by 1982, eighty percent of states had recognized right of contribution)....

...Finally, illustration six [2] to comment c of Section 174 reveals appellees' liability to Anderson. For purposes of contribution, neither Florida nor Georgia law required Anderson to join appellees as defendants, nor required appellant to implead appellees. Section 768.31, Fla....

...Van Buren School Dist. No. 42, 264 Ark. 810, 575 S.W.2d 445, 448 (1979). Waxman additionally argues that the comparative negligence defense was common to both himself and St. Mary's and that the jury ultimately found the plaintiff 12% negligent. Since Section 768.31(3)(a), Florida Statutes, Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (1982), provides that joint tortfeasors are responsible for their pro rata share of the entire liability, if Waxman is liable for the full $150,000, he argues that he will pay more than his pro rata share....

...contribution. In the motion for leave to amend, EAC explained that discovery since the filing of the original cross-claim revealed that EAC possessed a viable contribution claim against Roberts under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasor's Act, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...ns in their memorandum filed on May 2, 1985. As explained in the order dated March 11, 1985, this Court's decision to dismiss the crossclaims was made pursuant to the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act, as enacted in Florida, Fla.Stat. Ann. § 768.31 (West) (1975), and applied by this Court in this admiralty action....

...*985 Dionese is admittedly not on all fours with the factual situation presented by the instant case. However, in the course of that opinion, the Supreme Court enumerated several reasons why allocation in the settlement agreement is desirable, which we find persuasive herein. First of all, to encourage settlement, section 768.31(5) provides that a joint tortfeasor who is given a release in good faith cannot be sued for contribution....

...Partial abrogation of the doctrine of parent-child immunity will disrupt the unity and harmony of that interlocking network of relationships we call the family. NOTES [1] Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. [2] We do not consider this issue, but leave it to the trial court to reexamine the apportionment on remand. [3] § 768.31, Fla. Stat. (1975). [4] Ch. 76-186, § 1, Laws of Fla., amending § 768.31(3)(a), Fla....

...The Huets alleged that if they are deemed liable to the Tromps for any damages arising from the damage to or loss of use of the vehicle, they are entitled to recover from Mike Shad Ford the amount of damages that are adjudged to be due in excess of the Huets' pro rata share of liability, pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes....

...Vicki accepted the offer of settlement and executed a release in favor of the defendants. The release did not mention her mother or anyone in privity with her. Doris Woods and her insurer then moved for summary judgment on the defendants' claim for contribution, relying on subsection 768.31(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1979). Contribution among tortfeasors is governed by section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979), which codifies Florida's version of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. Subsection (2) states the conditions governing the right of contribution among tortfeasors. Subsection 768.31(2)(d) provides: *1181 A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement or i...

...On appeal the district court reversed the summary judgment. It held that there was a right to contribution against a parent as a joint tortfeasor, and that in light of the family immunity's bar on direct actions between child and parent the requirements of subsection 768.31(2)(d) had been satisfied....

...Woods raises two issues for our consideration. The first is whether there is a right of contribution against a joint tortfeasor who is the parent of the injured minor. The second is whether a tortfeasor who fails to comply with the provisions of subsection 768.31(2)(d) may obtain contribution against the parent of the injured minor....

...ontribution will not be allowed. The second issue deals with the district court's decision reversing the ruling of the trial court that contribution would not be allowed because the settlement and release did not meet the statutory requirement of subsection 768.31(2)(d)....

...Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 2; Commissioner's Comment (1955 Revision), 12 U.L.A. 87-88 (Master Ed. 1975); Note, Contribution Act Construed — Should Joint and Several Liability Have Been Considered First?, 30 U. Miami L.Rev. 747 (1976). Subsection 768.31(4) provides that the right of contribution may be enforced either by separate action or in the same action as the initial claim when two or more defendants are adjudged liable....

...ave extinguished the "full responsibility to the claimant." A tortfeasor who settles without extinguishing the entire liability, and whose payment later turns out to be less than his fair share, is not subject to actions for contributions to others. § 768.31(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1979). A tortfeasor who settles without extinguishing the liability of another tortfeasor, and whose payment later turns out to be more than his fair share, has no right of contribution against the other. Id.; § 768.31(2)(d), Fla....

...Woods were without liability insurance coverage, then there would be no right to contribution. On the *1184 other hand, if Mrs. Woods were protected by liability insurance, since the release granted respondents did not relieve her liability, she would not be liable for contribution under subsection 768.31(2)(d)....

...SUNDBERG, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON and McDONALD, JJ., concur. ALDERMAN, J., concurs in result only. BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion. BOYD, Justice, dissenting. In Shor v. Paoli, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1977), this Court held that under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979), a tortfeasor could seek contribution from another person whose negligence had contributed to the plaintiff's injuries, even though the other person was immune from a direct action by virtue of a family relationship (marriage) with the plaintiff....

...If we are to adhere to Shor and apply the Contribution Act to the parent's contributory negligence, then there can be no recovery of contribution in this case, because the settlement between the tortfeasor and the child did not "extinguish" the liability of the other contributorily negligent party, i.e., the mother. § 768.31(2)(d), Fla....

...Rehearing was ordered on the court's own motion, the court indicating that the earlier "panel opinion," 392 So.2d at 258, in Quest was in conflict with 3-M Electric Corp. Quest was certified to this Court and has been published as Joseph v. Quest , No. 60,237, ___ So.2d ___ (Fla. April 29, 1982). [2] § 768.31(2), Fla....

...First Morales argued that under section 768.50, Florida Statutes (1981), [1] he was entitled to a set-off of collateral sources of approximately $120,000 received by Scherer from Medicare and Social Security payments. Second, Morales argued that under section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1989), [2] the $100,000 which was to be paid to Scherer in accordance with the pretrial settlement agreement should be deducted from the judgment....

...practice, which is the time a malpractice action accrues for purposes of applying the statute of limitations, section 95.11(4), Florida Statutes (1989). Next, we turn to the district court's finding that Morales was not entitled to a reduction under section 768.31(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), of the $100,000 pretrial settlement paid to Scherer. Section 768.31(5)(a) provides that a release given to one of two or more tortfeasors shall reduce the claim against any other tortfeasor "to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release ..., or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater." § 768.31(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989). Schultz was a joint tortfeasor in this action. Scherer received $100,000 to dismiss Schultz. The $100,000 was paid to satisfy the claim at issue here, not a separate claim. This arrangement clearly falls within the plain meaning of section 768.31(5)(a), contrary to the district court's finding....

...of the limitation arises post judgment. The judgment against Morales was paid up to his liability and should be satisfied. Judgment for the remaining $40,000 should be entered solely against the fund. NOTES [1] This statute was repealed in 1985. [2] Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989), addresses contribution among tortfeasors....

...See Fla.App., 308 So.2d at 652-54. [4] Hanna v. Martin, 49 So.2d 585, 587 (Fla. 1950). [5] We note that the 1975 Legislature has reaffirmed the policy expressed in Section 768.041(1), Fla. Stat. (1973), by the enactment in Chapter 75-108, Laws of Florida, of a new Section 768.31(5) (a), Fla....

...Furthermore, "[t]here [was] no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally (wilfully or wantonly) caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death." Insurance Co. of North America v. Poseidon Maritime Servs., 561 So.2d 1360, 1361 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (citing § 768.31(2)(c), Fla.Stat....

...City of Jacksonville, 347 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); Hester v. Gatlin, 332 So.2d 660 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). [2] The appellees argue that they would be "prejudiced" if the release were reformed because of their inability to secure contribution from Mysorewalla and Preferred under § 768.31(5)(b), Fla....

...ants. Marjorie D. Gadarian, of Jones, Paine & Foster, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellees. DAUKSCH, Judge. This is a personal injury case wherein Appellant was the Plaintiff seeking contribution from the Appellee as a joint tortfeasor as defined in Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...rida the following determinative question passed upon by this opinion as being of great public interest: DOES THE COMMON-LAW DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY CONTROL OVER THE UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG JOINT TORTFEASORS ACT (75-108 LAWS OF FLORIDA, SECTION 768.31, FLORIDA STATUTES) TO PREVENT ONE TORTFEASOR FROM SEEKING A CONTRIBUTION FROM ANOTHER TORTFEASOR WHEN THE OTHER TORTFEASOR IS THE SPOUSE OF THE INJURED PERSON WHO RECEIVED DAMAGES FROM THE FIRST TORTFEASOR? [1] REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith....

...Jones, supra, principally because we are here deciding for the first time that the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity does not affect the right to contribution under the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors' Act (75-108 Laws of Florida, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes)....

...The legislature is presumed to be aware of relevant judicial decisions and undoubtedly was aware of the Bencomo decision when it adopted Chapter 75-108; had it intended to carve out any exception to the applicability of the contribution act it certainly could have done so, but chose not to do so. (See, for example, section 768.31(2)(g), Florida Statutes). The interpretation which this court has given the contribution act serves to promote the express legislative intent (sec. 768.31(6), Florida Statutes)....

...For these reasons and for those expressed in the majority opinion I concur in a reversal and in the certification. ALDERMAN, Judge, dissenting: The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the doctrine of interspousal immunity bars a right of contribution that would otherwise exist under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes....

...Diaco and Hochberg resolving the wrongful death action as to all parties named in Robarts' complaint. In the agreement, as consideration for the settlement, the two doctors paid Robarts $250,000 and assigned to her any right to contribution from St. Joseph's they *913 might have under section 768.31 et seq., Florida Statutes (1989), Florida's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act....

...his release. (b) Joseph F. Diaco and Bernard M. Hochberg, hereby assign and transfer to Edna H. Robarts, Personal Representative of the Estate of Gene F. Robarts, deceased, any and all rights or claims that exist in their favor in contribution under Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, and/or in indemnity against St....

...Robarts, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Gene F. Robarts, deceased, or her attorneys as to the value, if any, of the assignment of their claim against St. Joseph's Hospital, *914 Inc., or the legal viability of that assignment. The essential and pertinent parts of section 768.31 are as follows: (2) RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION....

...or the wrongful death action by means of the settlement agreement and that any additional recovery by means of the assignment would be in excess of full and fair compensation and, therefore, unconscionable; (2) that a claim for contribution based on section 768.31 is an action arising out of a tort claim and, under Florida law, is generally not assignable; and (3) that the settlement executed by Robarts and the attempted assignment to her, by their own terms, extinguished any rights Robarts might claim to contribution against St....

...nt, *915 but we disagree with his findings and conclusions that the assignment to Robarts is invalid and conveys to her no actionable rights against St. Joseph's. We find, therefore, that the trial judge erred in dismissing Robarts' complaint. Under section 768.31(2)(b), a joint tortfeasor is entitled to contribution only for the amount that he has paid which exceeds his pro rata share of the common liability. While the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, adopted by Florida as section 768.31, is silent as to the assignability of the right to contribution it creates, rights to contribution are generally recognized as being assignable....

...tween those parties. Such a plaintiff may, by way of such an assignment, ultimately recover more than what his full compensation for damages resulting from the tort alone would have been. However, that plaintiff cannot, because of the limitations of section 768.31(2)(b) and (3), recover more from a nonsettling joint tortfeasor on the assignment than the assigning tortfeasor paid in excess of his pro rata share of liability for the tort....

...Further, for such a right of contribution to exist, a nonsettling joint tortfeasor must also have been released from all liability to the injured party for the tort. Likewise, such a tortfeasor cannot be held responsible or obligated for any part of a settlement paid which is in excess of what is reasonable. Section 768.31(2)(d). Therefore, under the scheme prescribed by section 768.31, all liability for the tort claim must have been extinguished as to any joint tortfeasors against whom a right of contribution is sought to be exercised....

...That right of contribution is a right separate and apart from the tort, created by statute and, therefore, assignable. Notarian v. Plantation AMC Jeep, Inc., 567 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Finally, we must address and reject appellees' argument that the very terms of the settlement agreement itself and section 768.31(5)(b) extinguish any rights, including the assigned right of contribution, that Robarts might have had....

...and defeat the clear intent of the instrument when read as a whole. It is clear to us, for several reasons, that the language in paragraph (a) does not release St. Joseph's from Robarts' assigned claim for contribution. As we hereinbefore discussed, section 768.31(2)(d) mandates that a claim for contribution cannot exist in favor of a settling tortfeasor unless the settlement also releases the joint tortfeasors against whom the contribution is sought....

...estate. Paragraph (c) also has a concluding sentence that states: "Provided that such designation does not affect the validity of this assignment." We must also address, in analyzing appellees' final argument, an apparent incongruity that appears in section 768.31. As we have observed, section 768.31(2)(d) clearly requires that before a right of contribution arises in favor of a settling tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the liability, any joint tortfeasor who might be subject to contribution must also be released from liability for the underlying tort by the settlement agreement. Section 768.31(5), however, provides the following: (5) RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE....

...or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and, (b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor. (Emphasis supplied.) Read literally, section 768.31(5)(b) could be construed to take away the very right of contribution that section 768.31(2)(d) creates. Clearly, this was not the intent of the legislature in enacting those sections, so we must construe *917 the legislative intent and choice of words to reach a reasonable result. We, therefore, construe section 768.31(5)(b) to release from any liability for contribution only those tortfeasors who, as a signatory party to a settlement agreement, have paid something to the party injured by the tort and have received back from that injured party a release from liability....

...We hold that where a settlement is entered into by an injured party and a joint tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the liability for the tort, and the settlement gratuitously releases other joint tortfeasors, those gratuitously released joint tortfeasors are not, by reason of the wording of section 768.31(5)(b), released from the obligation of contribution created by section 768.31(2)(d) to their joint tortfeasor who has entered into, paid for and procured the settlement. Our interpretation of the appropriate interrelationship between sections 768.31(2)(d) and 768.31(5) is supported by Dean v....

...,000.00, he secured the release for himself and bought the possible right to proceed against any other joint tortfeasors for contribution. See Lincenberg v. Issen, Fla. 1975, 318 So.2d 386." 336 So.2d at 395. Also on point with our interpretation of section 768.31(5) is the Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Miller v....

...o the settlement. Colorado had adopted the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. The Millers sued the Jarrells for contribution. The Jarrells moved to dismiss the Millers' action for contribution arguing that Colorado's equivalent to Florida's section 768.31(5)(b) barred the action for contribution since the release procured by the Millers released the Jarrells as well as the Millers. The Colorado court disagreed, interpreting the Colorado equivalent of our section 768.31(5)(b) even more narrowly than we find necessary....

...Travis argued this indicated he was not included in the definition of "Defendants." In this case, the trial court's ruling was based on the language found in the settlement agreement and general release. In order for Soncoast to litigate a contribution action against Travis, Travis must be covered by the general release. See § 768.31(2)(d), Fla....

...Spaulding v. Florida Gas Company, 249 So.2d 695 (1 Fla.App. 1971). [8] Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Curtiss, 327 So.2d 82 (1 Fla.App. 1976). [9] Sunspan Eng. & Const. Co. v. Spring-Lock Scaffold Co., 310 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1975). [10] Florida Statute 768.31. [11] Florida Statute 768.31(2) (a)....

...joint tortfeasors." It did not take long for the change to come to pass. The legislature passed the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act and specified that it should apply to all causes of action pending at the time of its passage. Fla. Stat. § 768.31 (1975)....

...We found that the public policy in protecting an insurer from collusive law suits which supported such clauses was not served within the context of contribution claims against a joint tortfeasor, and held that the policy behind the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act, § 768.31, Fla....

...Paoli, 353 So.2d 825 (Fla. 1977). Distinguish Reid v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 352 So.2d 1172 (Fla. 1977). In Florida Farm Bureau v. GEICO, supra, we certified the question of whether a family exclusion clause in an automobile liability policy would control over § 768.31, where the tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought is the husband of the injured plaintiff, to the Florida Supreme Court as being a question of great public interest....

...[3] Fireman's Fund also asks the Court to dismiss the case on the grounds that: (1) the claims asserted by Twin City, Liberty Mutual, and J.C. Penney are barred under the one-year statute of limitations applicable to cases under Florida's Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Fla. Stat. § 768.31(4)(d); and (2) there can be no action for contribution when a joint tortfeasor settles but the settlement does not extinguish all liability of the non-settling joint tortfeasor....

...h employer. Section 440.11(1), Florida Statutes (1975). The legislature further provided that there is a right *608 of contribution between joint tort-feasors "when two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury." Section 768.31(2), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Marti, 408 So.2d 639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1982). We have jurisdiction based on conflict, article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and approve Wilson. In Popovich we examined the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), and upheld a judgment defendant's right to appeal alleged errors in judgments exonerating codefendants. Because section 768.31(4)(f) renders the judgment of the court as to liability among several defendants binding upon those parties in terms of contribution, this Court reasoned that a party is aggrieved upon the exoneration of a codefendant and must therefore be accorded a right to appeal....

...DHS Films, Inc., 392 So.2d 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). As a party to the action during the resolution of liability between Collom and Wilson, Holton was aggrieved by Wilson's initial exoneration by summary judgment and should have joined in Collom's appeal. Under section 768.31(4)(f), Florida Statutes (1983), if the judgment apportions liability between the parties, it is also determinative of contribution rights between the parties....

...dant Fair. The issue focused upon by the First District, in Christiani v. Popovich, 363 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), and subsequently this court, was whether the operators and Midway were entitled to appeal the judgment exonerating the Fair. Because section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975) rendered the findings of liability determinative of contribution rights, we held that the operators and Midway, who happened to have the status of judgment defendants, should be accorded the right to appeal the Fair's exoneration....

...Finally, we must make a point as to the scope of this ruling, and distinguish between contribution and indemnity. Since a claim in contribution is predicated on a finding of common liability, the resolution of liability as between the plaintiff and one of the defendants binds the other defendant. See § 768.31(4)(f), Fla....

...perform such duties (here the County) would be a joint tortfeasor, from whom a defendant (as a joint tortfeasor) could become entitled to contribution. Licenberg v. Issen, 318 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1975); Paoli v. Shor, 345 So.2d 789 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1977)....

...y states that a cross-claim "is always permissive." The reason that the cross-claim is permissive is grounded in the substantive law because the right to contribution does not accrue until "two or more persons become jointly or severally liable...." § 768.31(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1993). After the judgment has been so entered, "contribution may be enforced ... by motion notice to all parties to the action." § 768.31(4)(b), Fla.Stat....

materially identical language); see also § 768.31(5), Fla. Stat. (2012) (effect of release or covenant

Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, provides that the Act "shall

is exclusively a statutory remedy’ ” under section 768.31 of the Florida Statutes, see Motion at 22-23

right to seek contribution from Jones under section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979). We do not reach that

Lariosa, as a joint tortfeasor, pursuant to Section 768.31, Florida Statute (1975). We note that Rule

v. Widener, 159 So.2d 267 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963); § 768.31, Fla. Stat. (1989). [5] In fact, in a somewhat

protect his statutory right to contribution under section 768.31, Florida Statutes (2000), and not when a defendant

"Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act," section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983). This action arose

Florida's law on contribution is governed by Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides that:

judgment and enter judgment accordingly. [3] Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1989), reads in part:

relates to the effect, if any, of chapter 75-108 (F.S. 768.31), known as the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors

judgment accordingly ... To the same effect is Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1989), which states in

the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 768.31(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1978). See Beard v. Hambrick

Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla.1973). Fla.Stat.Ann. § 768.31 (West). At the conclusion of the trial on May

abrogated by the legislature's enactment of section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), the Uniform Contribution

share is to seek contribution. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.31(2) (West 2000). Accordingly, USF&G is not entitled

accident, seeking contribution pursuant to Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975). The court dismissed

plaintiff was not made in good faith under section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1989) so as to bar a

for contribution or for indemnity pursuant to Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975). Here again, we need

Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATFA), section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides in

alleged fraud — $7.1 million. And under Florida law § 768.31(2)(c) and (g), there is no right of contribution

to contribution from Whitehurst pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes. In the Second Amended Third

right of contribution against the parents under § 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975) based upon the allegation

remedy is in the nature of contribution. See Section 768.31, Florida Statutes. We now direct our attention

tortfeasor is entitled to contribution under F.S. 768.31 (1977) from the estate of a joint tortfeasor

contribution from the County derives solely from Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979), see South Carolina

dismiss the counterclaim on the grounds that section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1981) does not permit a

brought a claim for contribution against the mother. § 768.31, Fla.Stat. (1995). The case proceeded to trial

third-party complaints sought contribution under section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1981), if it were found

other things, that the contribution statute, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1985) (the Uniform Contribution

pursuant to Section 768.31(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1981) is without merit. Section 768.31(2)(c), Florida

Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act. § 768.31, Fla. Stat. (1997). This act provides, in pertinent

her grandparents for contribution pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989), seeking a pro rata

75-108, Laws of Florida (1975), as amended, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1977). Certain of the defendants

to entertain a motion for contribution under section 768.31(4) of Florida Statutes (1979), the Uniform

in this action and, therefore, Florida Statutes § 768.31(2)(c) is not applicable. The Court agrees with

therefore has no application to this case. Section 768.31(7), Florida Statutes, 1975. The defendants

the joint tortfeasors contribution statute, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1983). We acknowledged in

plaintiffs was not in good faith as required by section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1987), the Uniform Contribution

The Act, as adopted in Florida, appears in Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1985), pertinent portions

his pro rata share of the common liability." See § 768.31(2)(b). Fla. Stat. A party may now initiate a claim

release for itself and its insureds. Relying on section 768.31(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1979)[1], Woods and

UPCHURCH, Jr. and SHARP, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 768.31(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979). [2] See Annot., 41

the applicability of Fla.Stat. § 768.31 (1975) to this case. Section 768.31(5) addresses the release of

contribution among joint tort-feasors under section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1981), alleging that Arlie

crossclaims should not ultimately be dismissed. Under Section 768.31(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1977), Broward could

action well within the period established in Section 768.31(4)(c), which gives tortfeasors one year after

the jury may not apportion fault pursuant to Section 768.31 against Mr. Constanzo for his intentional conduct

special verdict, were, he said, "contrary to section 768.31(2)(c)." We presume it was his determination

Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1977). On motion by the

Allstate, for contribution based specifically on Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1981). Lorf moved for summary

2d 142 (Fla. 1970). Under the provisions of Section 768.31, Florida Statutes, referred to as the Uniform

contribution among joint tort-feasor statute, section 768.31, Florida Statutes. For the following reasons

judgment against it) as provided for under Section 768.31 Florida Statutes, 1976 Supp., and alternatively

among joint tort-feasors statutory provision, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975). The opinion of the

(expanding concept to non-tort cases). Similarly, section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1991), provides in part:

Gordon, 328 So.2d 206 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976); Section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1975). However, we do

among joint tortfeasors is now authorized by Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1976 Supp.), it is necessary

burden. VTN relies upon the fairly new statute, F.S. 768.31, to rescue it from its dilemma but such reliance

basis of the statute of limitations (apparently section 768.31(4)(c), Fla. Stat.) appellee filed an amended

case was whether the statute there in question [§ 768.31, Fla. Stat. (1975), the Uniform Contribution Among

Fla.Stat. Count V is a contribution claim under § 768.31, Fla. Stat., and under Florida common law. Count

may not be had for intentional wrongdoing, see § 768.31(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1987), but alleged in the contribution

his own pro rata share of the entire liability. § 768.31(2)(a) & (b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990) (emphasis

("UMC") in an action for contribution under section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1997), and equitable subrogation

pending at the time of its passage. Fla. Stat. § 768.31 (1975). Thereafter, the Supreme Court held that

Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Fla.Stat. § 768.31. Pursuant to § 768.31, contribution is available only against

issue implicates the proper application of section 768.31(4)(f), Florida Statutes (1989), which provides:

the present case. Plaintiff also relies on section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1999), which provides: When

enacted by the 1975 Legislature, and particularly § 768.31(5)(b),[1] releases them from any action seeking

claim is a distinct matter. This claim is based on § 768.31, Fla. Stat., known as the Uniform Contribution

shall be made pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 768.31(5) and shall reduce any judgment accordingly

the 1975 accident. Pursuant to 1979 Fla.Stat. § 768.31(5)(b), the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors

cross-claim against the Jacobses for contribution. See § 768.31, Fla. Stat. (1993). At issue in the contribution

of those released in the underlying suit. See § 768.31(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). Walker answered the complaint

Fund had failed to satisfy the criteria of section 768.31(4)(d)(2), Florida Statutes (1985). We affirm

third-party defendants and sought contribution under section 768.31 of the Florida Statutes. The plaintiffs' complaint

from finality of the judgment, as required by section 768.31(4)(c), Florida Statutes: If there is a judgment

several liability for joint tortfeasors and that section 768.31, Florida Statutes (2006), mandates that a court

contribution is statutory, and is found in section 768.31(2)(a), Florida Statutes: "Except as otherwise

eliminated Travelers’ claim for contribution. See § 768.31, Fla.Stat. (1989).

(The Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, § 768.31, Fla. Stat. (1975) was passed after this accident

Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Fla.Stat. § 768.31, does not exist in this case and that as to him

death. § 768.041(1). To the same effect is section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes, which provides: When

interspousal immunity did not control over section 768.31, Florida Statutes, the Uniform Contribution

the Morgans, and, by virtue of Florida Statutes § 768.31(5)(b), from any liability to Eller for contribution

the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, § 768.31, Fla. Stat. The release form which Bisaccio signed

contribution among joint tortfeasors under section 768.31, Florida Statutes, in order to obtain relief

requires further consideration of the case. Section 768.31(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), provides that

contribution against Mrs. Regalado pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes (2006), the Uniform Contribution

Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31(4)(f), Florida Statutes, which destroys inchoate

tort-feasor seeking contribution pursuant to Section 768.31(4) Florida Statutes (1977) against an alleged

Buren, 20% negligent. Thereafter, pursuant to Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), appellee U.S.F. &

Hoffman v. Jones, the legislature has adopted section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1977), the "Uniform Contribution

arguing that the one year limitation contained in section 768.31(4)(d), Florida Statutes, barred appellant's

"Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act," Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1975), should the trier

court must enter judgment accordingly. Further, section 768.31(5)(a) provides that a release or covenant not

counterclaim was for contribution pursuant to Florida Statute 768.31. J.C. alleged that if he were found liable

“pro rata share of the entire liability” under section 768.31(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997). On remand,

in 1975. See ch. 75-108, Laws of Fla. (creating § 768.31, Fla. Stat. (1975)).4 *795The law in Florida also

law rule. *1348 As adopted by Florida (Fla.Stat. § 768.31), the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act

does not comport with the intended scope of section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes. This section provides

cert. denied 345 So.2d 428 (Fla.1977); also see § 768.31(2)(b), Florida Statutes. But as indicated, the

dealing with a different section of the statute, section 768.31(4)(d)(2), instead of section 768.-54(2)(b)

liable for the same tort or death. In addition, section 768.31(5) provides: RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SUE

Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1979). We applied this rule

to settle, thus frustrating the purpose of section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes (1987). GLICKSTEIN and

judgment that the cause was time-barred under Section 768.-31(4)(d)2, Florida Statutes (1979). Affirmed.

Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1976). Defendant Dyson was

rata share of the common liability.” Fla. Stat. § 768.31(e). The Act describes the tortfeasor’s right to

and his professional association pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989). Insofar as pertinent

Gelfand Roofing, Inc., 453 So.2d 1365 (Fla.1984). Section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989), Florida’s Contribution

claim for contribution was properly dismissed. § 768.-31(5)(b), Fla.Stat. (1977); Seaboard Coast Line Railroad

limited to joint tortfeasors. Florida Statute § 768.31(5) states: (5) Release or covenant not to sue

denied, 337 So.2d 809 (1976). See also Fla.Stat. § 768.31. On remand, the trial court should enter judgments

when coupled with the right to setoff under section 768.31(5) will lead to a double reduction in the amount

Blue Martini pursuant to Florida Statutes, section 768.31; (2) Miami-Dade County is entitled to indemnification

Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31. Subsection (2)(a) of the act provides for

denial of a statutory right to contribution. Section 768.31(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1981), adequately

So.2d at 621. Lee seeks contribution under Section 768.31(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), contending

third-party action for contribution pursuant to section 768.31, Florida Statutes, against the truck owner

to settle, thus frustrating the purpose of section 768.31(5), Florida Statutes 1987.”). It may be the

Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, section 768.31, Florida Statutes, adopted by the Florida legislature