Cases from cite.case.law:

KEMPTON, v. MCCOMB,, 266 So. 3d 272 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . McComb after applying section 768.36, Florida Statutes (2015), to completely bar recovery by Mr. . . .

KEMPTON, v. MCCOMB,, 264 So. 3d 1180 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . Appellant was 55 percent negligent and Appellee was 45 percent negligent, the trial court applied section 768.36 . . . Appellant argues, inter alia , that the trial court erred in applying section 768.36 because the jury's . . . Section 768.36 creates an "alcohol or drug defense" that completely bars a plaintiff's recovery. . . . . § 768.36(2), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . As a result, the trial court erroneously applied section 768.36 to completely bar Appellant's recovery . . .

STEWART, v. D. DRALEAUS,, 226 So. 3d 990 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Reagle and Drale'aus’s alcohol consumption, it follows that he should be able to present his section 768.36 . . .

HARRISON v. GREGORY,, 221 So. 3d 1273 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . On this issue, section 768.36, Florida Statutes (2012), provides, in pertinent part: (2) In any civil . . .

SHELTON, v. MCQUIGGIN,, 651 F. App'x 311 (6th Cir. 2016)

. . . Laws § 768.36. . . .

M. GILBERT, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 311 F.R.D. 685 (M.D. Fla. 2015)

. . . has raised Plaintiffs intoxication as a potential bar to her recovery, pursuant to Florida Statute § 768.36 . . . Stat. § 768.36. . . . Court the effect on her lawsuit of a jury finding Plaintiff to be 50% at fault under Florida Statute § 768.36 . . . The Court notes that Florida Statute § 768.36 demands this result. . . .

METRISH, v. LANCASTER., 569 U.S. 351 (U.S. 2013)

. . . Id ., at 387 (codified as amended, § 768.36(1) (West Cum.Supp. 2013)). . . . Id ., at 387-388 (codified as amended, §§ 768.36(3)-(4)). . . .

SHEHADA, v. TAVSS,, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1358 (S.D. Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 768.36. . . .

DELANCEY, v. CARLTON ARMS OF MAGNOLIA VALLEY, LLP, a a, 104 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . On appeal, the Personal Representative raised two issues concerning the applicability of section 768.36 . . .

WALKER, v. McQUIGGAN,, 656 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2011)

. . . . § 768.36 (West 2001). . . .

STATE v. TORRES,, 60 So. 3d 560 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Carter, 496 So.2d 1009, 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); see also § 768.36(2), Fla. . . .

R. LANCASTER, v. METRISH,, 735 F. Supp. 2d 750 (E.D. Mich. 2010)

. . . . § 768.36 sets forth the consequences of a jury’s finding that a defendant is guilty of an offense and . . . M.C.L. § 768.36(3). . . . M.C.L. § 768.36(4). . . .

D. CHARRON, v. A. BIRGE,, 37 So. 3d 292 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See 768.36, Fla. Stat. (2009); Pearce v. Deschesne, 932 So.2d 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). . . .

HASKELL, v. BERGHUIS,, 695 F. Supp. 2d 574 (E.D. Mich. 2010)

. . . Regardless, pursuant to MCL 768.20a(3) [and MCL 768.36(1) ], defendant has the burden of proving his . . .

ARCHBISHOP COLEMAN F. CARROLL HIGH SCHOOL, INC. v. MAYNOLDI, 30 So. 3d 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Did the trial court correctly interpret section 768.36, Florida Statutes (2001), “alcohol or drug defense . . . Alcohol Defense — Section 768.36 As noted, the trial court struck the school’s affirmative defense raising . . . the bar of section 768.36, “alcohol or drug defense.” . . . The defendants affirmatively defended on various grounds including section 768.36. . . . That level is also the critical threshold in section 768.36, Florida Statutes, barring a recovery of . . .

J. GRIFFIS, E. v. E. WHEELER, Jr. A., 18 So. 3d 2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . motor vehicle constituted negligence, and (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that section 768.36 . . . In noting appellant’s argument that the “plaintiff’ referred to in section 768.36, Florida Statutes, . . . Sec. 768.36(3) were met. . . . Sec. 768.36 were met). Statutory interpretation cannot be stretched to an absurd result. . . . Turning to the statute at issue, section 768.36, Florida Statutes (2005), entitled “Alcohol or drug defense . . .

HETHERLY v. SAWGRASS TAVERN INC., 975 So. 2d 1266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . immunity of the forcible felony defense contrasts with the comparative alcohol defense created by section 768.36 . . . Section 768.36 is not an issue in this appeal. . See § 775.051, Fla. . . .

HANNA, v. PRICE,, 245 F. App'x 538 (6th Cir. 2007)

. . . M.C.L.A. 768.36(3). . . .

LUQUE v. ALE HOUSE MANAGEMENT, INC., 962 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . the sole cause of Luque’s accident was the unforeseeable negligence of another driver; that section 768.36 . . .

PEARCE, v. DESCHESNE,, 932 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . Section 768.36(2), Florida Statutes (2003), reads as follows: In any civil action, a plaintiff may not . . . We stress that section 768.36(2) does not purport to make trial judges the sole authority for apportioning . . .

CLARK v. ARIZONA, 548 U.S. 735 (U.S. 2006)

. . . . §768.36 (West Supp. 2006); N. M. Stat. Ann. §31-9-3 (2000); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §314 (2002); S. C. . . .

FRENCH, Jr. v. JONES,, 332 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2003)

. . . Laws § 768.36. . . . Laws § 768.36(1). . . . Laws § 768.36(3). . . .

GOUVEIA, v. F. PHILLIPS, M. D. F. III, M. D. P. A., 823 So. 2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . There is no issue in this case arising under section 768.36(2), as it has not been raised in any pleading . . . See § 768.36, Fla. . . .

JOHNIGAN, v. ELO,, 207 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Mich. 2002)

. . . . § 768.36(1); People v. Stephan, 241 MicLApp. 482, 491, 616 N.W.2d 188 (2000). . . .

FRENCH, Jr. v. JONES,, 282 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 2002)

. . . Laws § 768.36. . . . Laws § 768.36(1). . . . Laws § 768.36(3). . . .

NEELY, v. NEWTON,, 149 F.3d 1074 (10th Cir. 1998)

. . . . § 768.36; Nevada, Nev.Rev.Stat. § 174.035; New Mexico, N.M. Stat. . . .

GORTON, v. JOHNSON, L. Dr., 100 F.R.D. 801 (E.D. Mich. 1984)

. . . . § 768.36, and who in addition, allegedly have been denied adequate psychiatric treatment while incarcerated . . . M.C.L.A. § 768.36(3). ' Plaintiffs allege in this action that all persons who have been convicted and . . . psychiatrically indicated” to persons who have been determined to be “guilty but mentally ill” under M.C.L.A. § 768.36 . . .

In GOSMAN BEVERAGE COMPANY, a, 163 F. Supp. 810 (D. Md. 1958)

. . . offer to purchase was made and accepted, Suburban believed that the balance in the deposit was $1,-768.36 . . .