Cases from cite.case.law:

DOMINO S PIZZA, LLC, v. WIEDERHOLD, E., 248 So. 3d 212 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (2012) ; Sutton v. Ashcraft, 671 So.2d 301, 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). . . .

WOUDHUIZEN v. L. SMITH,, 241 So. 3d 216 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . final judgment asking the trial court to set off certain collateral source payments pursuant to section 768.76 . . . Specifically, they argue that section 768.76 does not require a party to present evidence matching the . . . Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2010), provides: (1) In any action to which this part applies in which . . . According to the plain language of the statute, section 768.76 only requires evidence of a plaintiff's . . . of such award by the total of all amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant." § 768.76 . . .

HUMANA MEDICAL PLAN, INC. v. WESTERN HERITAGE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 880 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2018)

. . . . § 768.76(4) (“A provider of collateral sources that has a right of subrogation or reimbursement , that . . . App. 1990) (explaining that “Section 768.76(1) does not require a contractual right” for an insurer to . . .

BIOHEALTH MEDICAL LABORATORY, INC. a PB LLC, a v. CIGNA HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, a a, 706 F. App'x 521 (11th Cir. 2017)

. . . . § 768.76(2)(a)(3) (defining a collateral source as, among other things, “[a]ny contract or agreement . . . Stat. § 768.76(2)(a)(3). . . .

J. RASINSKI, v. P. MCCOY,, 227 So. 3d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2013), provides, in pertinent part: (1) In any action to which this . . . We find that this payment constitutes a collateral source under section 768.76(1) because McCoy does . . . See § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. . . .

HUMANA MEDICAL PLAN, INC. v. REALE,, 180 So. 3d 195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . under Florida subrogation law, including Florida’s collateral sources of indemnity statute, section 768.76 . . . Pursuant to the formula in section 768.76(4), Florida Statutes, for calculating the amount of recovery . . . The Plain Language of Section 768.76 • The court below found: section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012) . . . Section,. 768.76(4) provides a .formula for calculating the amount to be reimbursed when a collateral . . . The Reales completely ignore-., section 768.76(2)(a)(l) and argue that section 768.76(2)(b) does not . . . that portion of the majority’s opinion holding that the Florida collateral source statute, section 768.76 . . . Section 768.76(2)(b) defines “collateral sources,” those subject to the provisions of the statute, as . . . The exclusion in section 768.76(2) applies ■ to the MAO-paid benefits at issue in the present case, and . . . The Reales asserted that Florida’s collateral sources statute, section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012 . . . Conclusion I concur with the majority’s determination that section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012), is . . .

JOERG, Jr. v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., 176 So. 3d 1247 (Fla. 2015)

. . . .” § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . are no reductions “for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists.” § 768.76 . . . Additionally, this Court has determined that section 768.76 does not allow reductions for future medical . . . The district court noted that section 768.76, Florida Statutes, which statutorily amended the damages . . . Leasing, 872 So.2d at 960 (“Section 768.76 excludes Medicare benefits as a collateral source because . . .

HURTADO v. DESOUZA,, 166 So. 3d 831 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Johnson, 872 So.2d 956, 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing § 768.76, Fla. Stat. (1997)). . . . Both parties focus on section 768.76(2)(a)l. in support of their respective positions. . . . Using the plain meaning of the statute, unemployment benefits do not fall within sections 768.76(2)(a . . . The purpose of section 768.76 is “[t]o prevent double recovery by the claimant.” . . . Castellano, 764 So.2d 889, 891 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (citing § 768.76, Fla. Stat. (1997)). . . .

JACKSON, v. ST. JUDE MEDICAL NEUROMODULATION DIVISION,, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1343 (M.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . Plaintiff moved to remand, explaining she could only recover $22,446.95 in damages under Florida Statute § 768.76 . . . The cornerstone of the courts’ jurisdictional decisions in Stramiello and Henry was Florida Statute § 768.76 . . . Stat. § 768.76. . . . But, the instant case does present a situation in which a future set off is at issue under § 768.76. . . .

GUENTHER v. NOVARTIS PHARMACEUTICAL CORPORATION,, 990 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (M.D. Fla. 2014)

. . . Florida Statute 768.76, titled “Collateral Sources of Indemnity,” provides in pertinent part In any action . . . Stat. § 768.76, Novartis was required to show that the entity providing these benefits to her had no . . . Stat. § 768.76 to reduce Guenther’s award of actual medical expenses by $93,430.74. . . . Stat. § 768.76 and should therefore be set off against damages awards. Goble v. . . .

SMITH, v. GEICO CASUALTY COMPANY,, 127 So. 3d 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . However, the Florida Legislature modified the portion of the rule related to damages by enacting section 768.76 . . . source are to be offset against the damage awarded to an injured party by verdict or settlement. § 768.76 . . .

B. VANDENBRINK, v. VONESCHEN, a, 542 F. App'x 728 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . the Medical Payments Coverage (MPC) portion of the policy as allowed under Florida Sources Statute 768.76 . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. JOERG, Jr., 188 So. 3d 852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . The supreme court noted that the then-existing predecessor to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2007) . . . The court’s analysis focused on the emphasized language of section 768.76(1), which states: In any action . . . We have not overlooked the Medicare exclusion in section 768.76(2)(b), which- provides: “Notwithstanding . . . The’absence of symmetry means section 768.76(2)(b) has no application in the present case, which involves . . . Westlund, 624 So.2d 1148, 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (even if section 768.76 is applicable, "future earned . . .

FOREST, v. SUTHERLAND,, 110 So. 3d 525 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Section 768.76(1) provides that any collateral source reduction of damages shall be offset to the extent . . . to any collateral source benefit which the claimant is receiving as a result of her or his injury. § 768.76 . . . award of damages is reduced according to the amount of PIP benefits paid to the plaintiff, section 768.76 . . . On remand, and in accordance with McKenna and section 768.76, Florida Statutes, the lower court shall . . .

NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. W. DARRAGH,, 95 So. 3d 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . decision to allow testimony of the full amount of Dar-ragh’s past medical bills pursuant to section 768.76 . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. SWINDOLL,, 89 So. 3d 246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . 627.736(3),” but are instead “a collateral source to which the general collateral source statute [section 768.76 . . . Id. at 292-93; see also Caruso, 880 So.2d at 544 (stating that, “under section 768.76(1), the court reduces . . .

J. RUSSO, v. LORENZO, a, 67 So. 3d 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2009), requires that the damages awarded to compensate a claimant for . . . provided by employers or by any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability. § 768.76 . . .

NATIONWIDE MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. W. HARRELL,, 53 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (2007); Sheffield v. Superior Ins. . . . which must be set off against an award of compensatory damages following trial pursuant to section 768.76 . . .

COLEMAN, v. BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF ALABAMA, INC., 53 So. 3d 1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . appellant asserted appellee had not met the pre-subrogation notice requirements outlined in subsections 768.76 . . . both parties concede the first prong has been met because the underlying state statute, subsections 768.76 . . . Specifically, section 768.76(2)(a) defines “collateral sources” as: ... any payments made to the claimant . . . to file suit against a tortfeasor, and failure to promptly comply waives the right of subrogation. § 768.76 . . . Accordingly, the savings clause of ERISA exempts section 768.76, Florida Statutes, from express preemption . . .

CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, v. J. ASHE,, 50 So. 3d 645 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . legislature had enacted statutes addressing automobile insurance and tort recovery, sections 627.7372 and 768.76 . . . Section 627.7372 was repealed in 1993 and partially incorporated in section 768.76. . . . unconvincing since they both involved insurers and the possibility of subrogation as set out in section 768.76 . . .

PACKAGING CORPORATION OF AMERICA, v. A. DeRYCKE, C., 49 So. 3d 286 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 768.76, Fla. . . . Section 768.76 provides, in part, as follows: (1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability . . . found that the additional monies were life insurance policy proceeds excluded from setoff under section 768.76 . . .

CITIZENS PROPERTY INSURANCE CORPORATION, v. T. HAMILTON L., 43 So. 3d 746 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . motorist from recovering “damages for which personal injury protection benefits are paid or payable”); § 768.76 . . .

INGENIX, v. HAM, M. D. M. M. D. M. D. P. A. HMA, M. M. D. LLC,, 35 So. 3d 949 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . required to reimburse UnitedHealthcare a reduced amount according to the formula set out in section 768.76 . . . We must decide whether section 768.76(4) applies to limit United-Healthcare’s reimbursement out of the . . . ’s reimbursement under section 768.76(4). . . . motorist carrier is not a tortfeasor under section 768.76(4). . . . This case presents the exact scenario section 768.76(4) was designed to address. In Osler v. . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES- REPORT NO. In No. In No. In No. In No. s In No. In No. In No. In No., 35 So. 3d 666 (Fla. 2010)

. . . See F.S. 768.76, 1986 supplement, concerning particular collateral source deductions by the court. 2. . . .

REED v. NATIONAL COUNCIL OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, INC., 706 F. Supp. 2d 180 (D.N.H. 2010)

. . . . § 768.76). . . .

DESPOINTES D. v. FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION,, 2 So. 3d 360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . judgment entered in favor of Intermatic, Inc., on the issue of collateral source payments under section 768.76 . . . Section 768.76(1) provides that “there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation . . .

JONES, v. MARTIN ELECTRONICS, INC., 932 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 2006)

. . . See § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . Section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes states that “the court shall reduce the amount of [damage] award . . .

USAA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, v. McDERMOTT, 929 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . The court reached a similar result under section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (1993), for future payments . . . Moreover, both sections 627.736(3) and 768.76(1) are statutes altering rights of parties in a typical . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, 922 So. 2d 979 (Fla. 2006)

. . . , reduction for collateral source payments should be made by the court, not the jury, pursuant to § 768.76 . . . See § 768.76, Fla. . . .

BRAVO a v. UNITED STATES M. D., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (S.D. Fla. 2005)

. . . Rudnick, 761 So.2d 289 (Fla.2000)(interpreting § 768.76, Fla. Stat.) . . . .

SCHONAU, v. GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a, 903 So. 2d 285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . Larsen, 639 So.2d 1038, 1041-42 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (addressing section 768.76, Florida Statutes [collateral . . .

GOBLE, v. E. FROHMAN,, 901 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 2005)

. . . District Court of Appeal certified the following question as one of great public importance: UNDER SECTION 768.76 . . . We approve the district court’s decision affirming the trial court’s setoff under section 768.76 of contractual . . . The trial court granted Froh-man’s motion for setoff under section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1999). . . . Section 768.76 defines collateral sources as “payments made” on a claimant’s behalf. . . . The trial court, therefore, properly applied section 768.76 to reduce Goble’s damages by the amount of . . . Section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes abrogated the common law collateral source rule and replaced it . . . See § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (1999); see also Coop. Leasing, Inc. v. . . . Therefore, today an injured party pursuant to section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes may recover only . . . “collateral sources” that are to be set off against an award of compensatory damages under section 768.76 . . .

POLLO OPERATIONS, INC. v. G. TRIPP,, 906 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)

. . . . §§ 768.76(1) and (2)(b) excludes Medicare benefits from being considered a collateral source, not for . . . court under state law could not have reduced her jury award by the amount paid by Medicare due to §§ 768.76 . . .

WENDELL, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE,, 881 So. 2d 1178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . lawsuits concerning motor vehicle accidents, PIP setoffs are governed by section 627.736(3), not section 768.76 . . .

M. CARUSO, v. BAUMLE,, 880 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 2004)

. . . Section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2001), entitled “Collateral sources of indemnity,” provides: (1) . . . Thus, in contrast to the procedure under section 768.76(1), in which the court offsets the collateral . . . As noted, section 768.71(3) provides that any conflicting statute governs over section 768.76. . . . Therefore, in lawsuits concerning motor vehicle accidents, section 627.736(3), not section 768.76(1), . . . (In fact, after trial, the plaintiffs specifically argued that section 768.76(1) applied.) . . . : section 627.736, which governs setoffs for PIP benefits in automobile accident cases, and section 768.76 . . . Standard Jury Instruction 6.13(a) is the jury instruction that is derived from section 768.76(1), which . . .

NORMAN, v. FARROW,, 880 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2004)

. . . Therefore, she was entitled to bring suit. .A similar statute is section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes . . .

COOPERATIVE LEASING, INC. a v. L. JOHNSON,, 872 So. 2d 956 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Frohman, 848 So.2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that under section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1999) . . . Johnson contends that sections 768.76(1) .and 768.76(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), preclude the trial . . . (2)(b) and therefore cannot be set off from her recovery under section 768.76(1). . . . Section 768.76 excludes Medicare benefits as a collateral source because the federal government has a . . . This would result in a windfall that is contrary to the legislative policy evidenced by section 768.76 . . .

GARCIA, v. M. ARRAGA,, 872 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Subsection (2) of Section 768.76 defines the term “collateral sources.” . . . . § 768.76(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . The court applied Section 768.76(1) in lieu of Section 627.736(3). . . . and Section 768.76. . . . Section 768.76 was enacted to harmonize, not nullify, existing laws. . . .

THYSSENKRUPP ELEVATOR CORPORATION, v. LASKY,, 868 So. 2d 547 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . difference is either inadmissible as ‘damages’ suffered by plaintiff or that a setoff is required by section 768.76 . . . of setoff, we might agree with plaintiffs motion for rehearing that some cases interpreting section 768.76 . . . Section 768.76(1) provides: “In any action to which this part applies ... the court shall reduce the . . . shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists.” § 768.76 . . . difference is either inadmissible as “damages” suffered by plaintiff or that a setoff is required by section 768.76 . . .

K. OSLER, v. COLLINS,, 870 So. 2d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Florida PIP statute does not apply, Hastings is a collateral source provider as defined in section 768.76 . . . Because the policy contains a right of reimbursement, section 768.76(4) controls. . . . Instead of proceeding under section 768.76(4), quoted above, the court apparently applied section 768.76 . . . The difference between section 768.76(1) and 768.76(4) is that the former adjusts the claimant’s damages . . . That is the procedure for reduction of the award under section 768.76(1), but it was not the correct . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INS. CO. v. GULLEDGE, 850 So. 2d 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . Section 768.76(2)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (1997) provides in part: (1) In any action to which this part . . .

MURPHY a v. CENTLIVRE R., 850 So. 2d 600 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . On December 20, 2000, Hersh served a notice of intent to claim damages pursuant to section 768.76(6), . . .

GOBLE, v. E. FROHMAN,, 848 So. 2d 406 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . The common-law rule has been altered in this state by section 768.76. Id. . . . The Rollins court did not construe section 768.76. . . . Thus, section 768.76 would not apply in D’Angelo. . . . See §§ 641.31(8), 768.76(4), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . See §§ 641.31(8), 768.76(4), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . .

E. MATLIN, v. R. LANGKOW, 65 F. App'x 373 (3d Cir. 2003)

. . . . § 768.76, to reduce the jury’s award. . . . Ann. § 768.76(1) (emphasis added). . . . Id. § 768.76(2) (emphasis added). . . . The 1993 amendment also added subsections 768.76(5)-(9), none of which is relevant in this case. . . . Id. § 768.76(7) (emphasis added). . . . .

TRAN, v. G. FRAGNOLI,, 834 So. 2d 939 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . , he filed a motion in his Pinellas County suit, seeking equitable distribution pursuant to section 768.76 . . .

W. HUGHES, Jr. v. ENTERPRISE LEASING COMPANY,, 831 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2000), requires the trial court to reduce an award for damages by . . .

M. CARUSO, a v. BAUMLE,, 835 So. 2d 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . For example, sections 627.7372 and 768.76 are both entitled “Collateral Sources of Indemnity.” . . . Citing to both sections 627.736(3) and 768.76(1) in Allstate Insurance Co. v. . . . This suggests that section 768.76 replaced the repealed section 627.7372. . . . This is incorrect as section 768.76 existed prior to the repeal of section 627.7372. . . . There was merely a minor amendment to section 768.76(1) in 1993. Ch.93-245, § 1, Laws of Fla. . . .

CENTEX- RODGERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a a v. HERRERA, M. D., 816 So. 2d 1206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . . § 768.76, there existed a common law right of equitable subrogation for the disability insurance payments . . . Section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes does not imbue a wrongful tortfea-sor with the benefit of a plaintiffs . . . See § 768.76 Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .

TERRI VAN WINKLE, P. A. v. JOHNSTON, 813 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . paid to the Johnstons can be considered a collateral source for the purpose of a setoff under section 768.76 . . . inconclusive as to whether these benefits meet the definition of a collateral source provided in section 768.76 . . . collateral source for which AMEX had a reimbursement right that precluded any setoff under section 768.76 . . . In my judgment, the clear language of section 768.76(1) precludes a setoff. See Bruner v. . . . Section 768.76(1) authorizes a setoff against any award of damages for all collateral sources paid the . . . We also reject Van Winkle’s argument that the setoff is required under section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes . . . Without addressing the issue of whether a set-off under section 768.76 is appropriate in a legal malpractice . . . Section 768.76(2)(a)2. defines, in pertinent part, “collateral sources” as “any payments made to the . . . of earnings, therefore Van Winkle has not demonstrated entitlement to a setoff pursuant to section 768.76 . . .

SHEFFIELD, v. SUPERIOR INSURANCE COMPANY,, 800 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2001)

. . . See Gormley, 587 So.2d at 457; § 768.76, Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . See § 768.76, Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . See § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .

BLIGE, v. M V GEECHEE GIRL, In, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1349 (S.D. Ga. 2001)

. . . . § 768.76, exempting Medicare payments from consideration as collateral sources, such that evidence . . .

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. SCOTT,, 773 So. 2d 1290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)

. . . See § 768.76(1), Fla.Stat. . . . See §§ 627.736(3), Fla.Stat., 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. . . .

McKENNA, v. I. CARLSON a k a I., 771 So. 2d 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Carlson also argued that under subsection 768.76(1), the setoff for PIP benefits should be reduced by . . . McKenna argued subsection 768.76(1) did not apply to PIP benefits. . . . This reduction was predicated upon section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes, the general collateral source . . . Subsection 768.76(1) does not govern PIP setoffs but rather controls other collateral source payments . . . See, e.g., Rudnick (medpay benefits are a collateral source governed by section 768.76). . . .

BUDGET RENT- A- CAR SYSTEMS, INC. v. CASTELLANO, a, 764 So. 2d 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . . § 768.76, Fla. Stat. (1997); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v. . . . insurance benefits available to the claimant, whether purchased by her or him or provided by others. § 768.76 . . .

CENTEX- RODGERS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a a v. HERRERA,, 761 So. 2d 1215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . The trial judge also reduced the award, however, by a setoff under section 768.76(1) for sums paid under . . . Section 768.76(1) provides: “In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted . . . shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists.” § 768.76 . . . Nothing in section 768.76 requires the subrogation or reimbursement right to be contractual rather than . . .

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. H. RUDNICK,, 761 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 2000)

. . . 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), over the interpretation given to the term “otherwise available” in section 768.76 . . . Specifically, the district courts are in conflict on the question of whether under section 768.76(1) . . . Section 768.76(1) requires the court to reduce the amount of the plaintiffs award by the total of all . . . In King, the First District Court interpreted the “otherwise available” language of section 768.76(1) . . . In contrast, the Fourth District in White, interpreted the phrase “otherwise available” in section 768.76 . . .

ROLLINS, v. PIZZARELLI,, 761 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 2000)

. . . 93-245, § 3 at 2439, Laws of Fla., and the general collateral source statute is now found in section 768.76 . . .

NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, v. D. BLACKMON,, 754 So. 2d 840 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . award by an amount “which encompasses benefits relating to future damages, ... pursuant to section 768.76 . . .

BUDGET RENT- A- CAR SYSTEMS, INC. v. CASTELLANO, a, 737 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . . § 768.76, Fla. Stat. (1997); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v. . . . insurance benefits available to the claimant, whether purchased by her or him or provided by others. § 768.76 . . .

C. KING f k a C. v. D. BURCH Co. d b a A Co., 724 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . reduction, which encompasses benefits relating to future damages, was properly made pursuant to section 768.76 . . . The controlling statute is thus section 768.76, which generally provides for a reduction of the award . . . Indeed, the application of section 768.76 in this context is confirmed by the express reference therein . . . Section 768.76(1) provides that, when damages are awarded and there are collateral sources of indemnity . . . Furthermore, we view the “otherwise available” language in section 768.76(1) as somewhat broader than . . .

MATIYOSUS v. KEATEN, 717 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . See § 768.76 F.S. (1986 Supp.), concerning particular collateral source deductions by the court. 2. 6.13b . . .

PROVIDENT LIFE AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. LEWIS a N. A. f k a, 709 So. 2d 587 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . Provident to intervene in the action, Provident filed a motion for reimbursement, pursuant to section 768.76 . . . Section 768.76(4) provides in pertinent part: A provider of collateral sources that has a right of subrogation . . . On appeal, in affirming the denial of the requested set-off, this court noted that section 768.76 indicated . . .

HUMANA MEDICAL PLAN, INC. v. VALDEZ,, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (M.D. Fla. 1998)

. . . Prior to settlement and pursuant to Section 768.76, Florida Statutes, Defendant, via its counsel, gave . . . Section 417.528, conflict with Section 768.76. . . . However, a review of Section 768.76 shows that a federal pre-emption analysis is unnecessary because . . . Further, Section 768.76 expressly states in relevant part: Notwithstanding any other provision of this . . . According to Defendant, it relied on Plaintiffs representation that Section 768.76 was applicable in . . .

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. H. RUDNICK,, 706 So. 2d 389 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . In support of its argument, Allstate cites to sections 627.727(1), 627.736(3), and 768.76(1), Florida . . . Finally, section 768.76(1), pertaining to collateral sources of indemnity, contains the following In . . . Previous decisions of this court construing sections 627.736(3) and 768.76(1), compel the conclusion . . . .2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), this court concluded that benefits “otherwise available” under section 768.76 . . .

In XYZ OPTIONS, INC. L. DIONNE, v. FIRST ALABAMA BANK XYZ Co., 217 B.R. 912 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998)

. . . Why fifty-five thousand seven hundred sixty-eight dollars and seventy-six cents ($55,-768.76) of surplus . . .

M. BARBERENA v. GONZALEZ, 706 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . contend that the trial court erred by granting the defendants’ motion for set-off, pursuant to section 768.76 . . . Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that section 768.76 is inapplicable to this cause of action because . . . Instead, the defendants maintain that section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1993), controls and provides . . . The First District explained that section 768.76. is a general provision that authorizes the court to . . . The First District concluded that in automobile cases, section 768.76 must yield to the more specific . . .

PIZZARELLI a v. ROLLINS, 704 So. 2d 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . In that ease, the court was asked to decide whether section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1987), the general . . . There, appellant, who believed section 768.76 controlled, challenged the trial court’s refusal to award . . . We went even further to find that even if section 768.76 was applicable, its language that “the court . . . While this court was correct in White, when it held that between sections 768.76 and 627.7372, the latter . . .

STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS- CIVIL CASES, COLLATERAL SOURCE RULE, 700 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1997)

. . . See § 768.76, F.S. (1986 Supp.), concerning particular collateral source deductions by the court. 2. . . . , reduction for collateral source payments should be made by the court, not the jury, pursuant to § 768.76 . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO. v. U. S. A. DIAGNOSTICS, INC., 696 So. 2d 1334 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . policy of insurance, indemnity agreement, or any other collateral source as defined in Florida Statutes 768.76 . . .

F. HORTON, M. D. E. M. D. v. M. CHANNING C. a BREAM, M. D. P. A. v. M. CHANNING C. a F. HORTON, M. D. v. M. CHANNING C. a, 698 So. 2d 865 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . determine that appellants are not entitled to a collateral source reduction for these amounts under section 768.76 . . .

PARKER v. HOPPOCK, J P d b a s s, 695 So. 2d 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . See, e.g., § 768.76(2)(a)l, Fla. Stat. (1995). . . .

OLSON, v. N. COLE CONSTRUCTION, INC. a E. H. Co. a d b a, 681 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . . § 768.76(2)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (Supp.1988); see Wells, 659 So.2d at 254. . . .

TRAVELERS, v. BOYLES,, 679 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . first statute under which the Boyles argue that Travelers is not entitled to reimbursement is section 768.76 . . . which “liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded.” § 768.76 . . .

HUMANA HEALTH PLANS, v. LAWTON,, 675 So. 2d 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . subsection (9) and was amended to provide that reimbursement should be made in accordance with subsection 768.76 . . . Under subsection 768.76(4), a provider of collateral sources having a right of subrogation has the right . . .

SUTTON, v. ASHCRAFT,, 671 So. 2d 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . Three subsections of § 768.76 are arguably relevant to this issue: 768.76 Collateral sources of indemnity . . . Sutton argues that his position is reinforced by the language of subsection (8) of section 768.76, but . . . The answer to this problem may be found by examining the setoff provision in section 768.76(1). . . . .” § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (1993) (emphasis added). . . . for the med pay, it appears this is not within the definition of a collateral source as defined in 768.76 . . .

R. COHEN, D. O. R. D. O. P. A. CNA v. S. RICHTER,, 667 So. 2d 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . See § 768.76, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

GODALES, a v. Y. H. INVESTMENTS INC., 667 So. 2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)

. . . . § 768.76(1) Fla.Stat. (1993); Calloway v. . . .

STATE BOARD OF REGENTS, v. S. LARSON,, 664 So. 2d 317 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . Pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes, the trial court must hold a post-trial hearing on the issue . . .

WELLS, v. TALLAHASSEE MEMORIAL REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., 659 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1995)

. . . See § 768.76, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .

PETERSON J. Co- A. J. v. MORTON F. PLANT HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, INC. a C. R. N. H. C. N. M., 656 So. 2d 501 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . evidence describing the amounts of these benefits may have shifted to the jury a function that section 768.76 . . .

E. KIRKLAND v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 655 So. 2d 106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . The court granted Allstate’s post-trial motion pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1993), and . . . Section 768.76 is found in part II of chapter 768 and is a general provision that authorizes the court . . . Because section 627.7372, not section 768.76, governs in this ease, we must reverse the trial court’s . . . for future medical expenses; reverse the offset for collateral source payments allowed under section 768.76 . . . Section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (1993) states: In any action to which this part applies in which . . .

DEMPSEY, a By DEMPSEY v. UNITED STATES, 32 F.3d 1490 (11th Cir. 1994)

. . . . § 768.76 (West Supp.1994), we leave review of that issue, one of first impression in this circuit, . . .

B. MAGSIPOC, B. v. LARSEN, 639 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . The issue in this case, which is one of first impression in this state, is whether or not section 768.76 . . . Based on these findings the court applied section 768.76(4), Florida Statutes (1991), and prorated a . . . Section 768.76 provides: Collateral Sources of Indemnity (1) In any action to which this part applies . . . The issue, as we see it, is whether the Florida Legislature, by promulgating section 768.76, intended . . . The trial judge assumed these findings required proration, pursuant to section 768.76. . . .

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a v. EGAN P., 626 So. 2d 1076 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . Similarly, section 768.76(2)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1989), defines collateral sources as “any payments . . .

E. BRUNER C. v. CATERPILLAR, INC. f k a, 627 So. 2d 46 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . A collateral source offset pursuant to section 768.76(1) is not allowed due to the statutory subrogation . . . right which pertains under section 440.39(2), as section 768.76 does not imbue a wrongful tortfeasor . . . of the issues raised by appellants and in the holding that appellee has no entitlement under section 768.76 . . . Section 768.76(1) permits a tortfea-sor an offset in the amount of any collateral source of indemnity . . .

WHITE, v. WESTLUND, 624 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . He claims he was entitled to such a setoff pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1987). . . . Appellees respond in the alternative that: (1) section 627.7372, Florida Statutes, not section 768.76 . . . Section 768.76 is contained in Part III of Chapter 768, which governs damages in negligence actions. . . . Section 768.76, titled “Collateral sources of indemnity,” provides that it applies to any action “to . . . In all other cases, reduction for collateral source payments should be made ... pursuant to § 768.76, . . .

CRONIN, v. WASHINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Jr. CRONIN, v. WASHINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Jr., 980 F.2d 663 (11th Cir. 1993)

. . . . § 768.76 requires that a damage award be reduced to account for certain collateral sources of recovery . . . Fla.Stat. § 768.76 provides in pertinent part: (1) In any action to which this part applies in which . . .

T. KARSTEN v. KAISER FOUNDATION HEALTH PLAN OF MID- ATLANTIC STATES, INC., 808 F. Supp. 1253 (E.D. Va. 1992)

. . . See, e.g., Fla.Stat. ch. 768.76(1) (1991); Mass.Ann.Laws ch. 231, § 60G (Law.Co-op.1992); Mich.Comp.Laws . . .

GORMLEY, v. GTE PRODUCTS CORPORATION,, 587 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1991)

. . . See §§ 627.7372, 768.50, Fla.Stat. (1985); § 768.76, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1986). . . . See §§ 627.7372, 768.50, Fla.Stat. (1985); § 768.76, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1986). . . .

SWAMY, M. D. v. HODGES,, 583 So. 2d 1095 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . While this statutory section has been amended and transferred to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1986 . . .

CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a a v. CARNER, H. a a d b a, 579 So. 2d 248 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . unconvincing since they both involved insurers and the possibility of subro-gation as set out in section 768.76 . . .

SHESSEL, v. H. MURPHY, Jr., 920 F.2d 784 (11th Cir. 1991)

. . . In 1986, the Florida legislature passed the following law: Florida Statute 768.76 Collateral Sources . . . Fla.Stat. § 768.76(1) (emphasis added). . . .

J. MEASOM, v. RAINBOW CONNECTION PRESCHOOL, INC., 568 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . Measom appeals claiming that Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1989) does not authorize the court to . . . Section 768.76(1) provides that “there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a right . . . it is true that Measom’s insurance carrier did not have a contractual right of subrogation, Section 768.76 . . .

CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE, v. E. DYESS,, 569 So. 2d 1293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . Section 768.76(1) would permit the injured party to receive the damages from the tortfeasor and Section . . . 768.76(4) would permit reimbursement to the paying health care provider from the injured party. . . . Bimonte, 143 So.2d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). . § 768.76, Fla.Stat. (1986 Supp.). . . .

E. TAVORMINA, v. G. TIMMENY,, 561 So. 2d 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . See §§ 768.71, 768.76, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .

PENSACOLA JUNIOR COLLEGE, v. MONTGOMERY,, 539 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . We also agree with PJC that section 768.76, the collateral source rule, does not apply in the instant . . . Moreover, section 768.76 was created under chapter 86-160, Laws of Florida, which, in sections 49 and . . . 50, provided that the entirety of part III of chapter 768 — which includes section 768.76— applies only . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS CIVIL CASES, 522 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1988)

. . . Proposed SJI 6.13a implements the provisions of Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). . . . See § 768.76, Fla.Stat. (1986 Supp.), concerning particular collateral source deductions by the court . . . , reduction for collateral source payments should be made by the court, not the jury, pursuant to § 768.76 . . .

AMERICAN MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, v. DECKER, Jr. VINCO PLASTERING DRYWALL, v. P. MAHAN, M. D. W. P. M. D. P. A. UNDERWRITERS ADJUSTING CO. THE FAMILY MART, v. SCHNEIDER, M. D. A. M. D. P. A. d b a FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION, v. HUMANA OF FLORIDA, INC. d b a M. D. A. M. D. P. A. J., 518 So. 2d 315 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . legislature repealed section 768.50, see Ch. 86-160, § 68, Laws of Florida, and replaced it with section 768.76 . . . Ch. 86-160, § 55, Laws of Fla., codified at § 768.76, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1986). . . .

JEFFERSON ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING CO. v. THE UNITED STATES, 69 Ct. Cl. 150 (Ct. Cl. 1930)

. . . December 13, 1928, the commissioner allowed the second claim filed March 25, 1925, for $768.76 and on . . .