The 2024 Florida Statutes
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. . . . § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. . . . Collateral sources include payments made pursuant to a health insurance policy, § 768.76(2)(a) l, and . . . pursuant to any contract to pay for hospital or healthcare services, § 768.76(2)(a) 3. . . .
. . . . § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (2012) ; Sutton v. Ashcraft, 671 So.2d 301, 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). . . .
. . . final judgment asking the trial court to set off certain collateral source payments pursuant to section 768.76 . . . Specifically, they argue that section 768.76 does not require a party to present evidence matching the . . . Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2010), provides: (1) In any action to which this part applies in which . . . According to the plain language of the statute, section 768.76 only requires evidence of a plaintiff's . . . of such award by the total of all amounts which have been paid for the benefit of the claimant." § 768.76 . . .
. . . . § 768.76(4) (“A provider of collateral sources that has a right of subrogation or reimbursement , that . . . App. 1990) (explaining that “Section 768.76(1) does not require a contractual right” for an insurer to . . .
. . . . § 768.76(2)(a)(3) (defining a collateral source as, among other things, “[a]ny contract or agreement . . . Stat. § 768.76(2)(a)(3). . . .
. . . Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2013), provides, in pertinent part: (1) In any action to which this . . . We find that this payment constitutes a collateral source under section 768.76(1) because McCoy does . . . See § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . under Florida subrogation law, including Florida’s collateral sources of indemnity statute, section 768.76 . . . Pursuant to the formula in section 768.76(4), Florida Statutes, for calculating the amount of recovery . . . The Plain Language of Section 768.76 • The court below found: section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012) . . . Section,. 768.76(4) provides a .formula for calculating the amount to be reimbursed when a collateral . . . The Reales completely ignore-., section 768.76(2)(a)(l) and argue that section 768.76(2)(b) does not . . . that portion of the majority’s opinion holding that the Florida collateral source statute, section 768.76 . . . Section 768.76(2)(b) defines “collateral sources,” those subject to the provisions of the statute, as . . . The exclusion in section 768.76(2) applies ■ to the MAO-paid benefits at issue in the present case, and . . . The Reales asserted that Florida’s collateral sources statute, section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012 . . . Conclusion I concur with the majority’s determination that section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2012), is . . .
. . . .” § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . are no reductions “for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists.” § 768.76 . . . Additionally, this Court has determined that section 768.76 does not allow reductions for future medical . . . The district court noted that section 768.76, Florida Statutes, which statutorily amended the damages . . . Leasing, 872 So.2d at 960 (“Section 768.76 excludes Medicare benefits as a collateral source because . . .
. . . Johnson, 872 So.2d 956, 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing § 768.76, Fla. Stat. (1997)). . . . Both parties focus on section 768.76(2)(a)l. in support of their respective positions. . . . Using the plain meaning of the statute, unemployment benefits do not fall within sections 768.76(2)(a . . . The purpose of section 768.76 is “[t]o prevent double recovery by the claimant.” . . . Castellano, 764 So.2d 889, 891 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (citing § 768.76, Fla. Stat. (1997)). . . .
. . . Plaintiff moved to remand, explaining she could only recover $22,446.95 in damages under Florida Statute § 768.76 . . . The cornerstone of the courts’ jurisdictional decisions in Stramiello and Henry was Florida Statute § 768.76 . . . Stat. § 768.76. . . . But, the instant case does present a situation in which a future set off is at issue under § 768.76. . . .
. . . Florida Statute 768.76, titled “Collateral Sources of Indemnity,” provides in pertinent part In any action . . . Stat. § 768.76, Novartis was required to show that the entity providing these benefits to her had no . . . Stat. § 768.76 to reduce Guenther’s award of actual medical expenses by $93,430.74. . . . Stat. § 768.76 and should therefore be set off against damages awards. Goble v. . . .
. . . However, the Florida Legislature modified the portion of the rule related to damages by enacting section 768.76 . . . source are to be offset against the damage awarded to an injured party by verdict or settlement. § 768.76 . . .
. . . the Medical Payments Coverage (MPC) portion of the policy as allowed under Florida Sources Statute 768.76 . . .
. . . The supreme court noted that the then-existing predecessor to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2007) . . . The court’s analysis focused on the emphasized language of section 768.76(1), which states: In any action . . . We have not overlooked the Medicare exclusion in section 768.76(2)(b), which- provides: “Notwithstanding . . . The’absence of symmetry means section 768.76(2)(b) has no application in the present case, which involves . . . Westlund, 624 So.2d 1148, 1153 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (even if section 768.76 is applicable, "future earned . . .
. . . Section 768.76(1) provides that any collateral source reduction of damages shall be offset to the extent . . . to any collateral source benefit which the claimant is receiving as a result of her or his injury. § 768.76 . . . award of damages is reduced according to the amount of PIP benefits paid to the plaintiff, section 768.76 . . . On remand, and in accordance with McKenna and section 768.76, Florida Statutes, the lower court shall . . .
. . . decision to allow testimony of the full amount of Dar-ragh’s past medical bills pursuant to section 768.76 . . .
. . . 627.736(3),” but are instead “a collateral source to which the general collateral source statute [section 768.76 . . . Id. at 292-93; see also Caruso, 880 So.2d at 544 (stating that, “under section 768.76(1), the court reduces . . .
. . . Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (2009), requires that the damages awarded to compensate a claimant for . . . provided by employers or by any other system intended to provide wages during a period of disability. § 768.76 . . .
. . . See § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (2007); Sheffield v. Superior Ins. . . . which must be set off against an award of compensatory damages following trial pursuant to section 768.76 . . .
. . . appellant asserted appellee had not met the pre-subrogation notice requirements outlined in subsections 768.76 . . . both parties concede the first prong has been met because the underlying state statute, subsections 768.76 . . . Specifically, section 768.76(2)(a) defines “collateral sources” as: ... any payments made to the claimant . . . to file suit against a tortfeasor, and failure to promptly comply waives the right of subrogation. § 768.76 . . . Accordingly, the savings clause of ERISA exempts section 768.76, Florida Statutes, from express preemption . . .
. . . legislature had enacted statutes addressing automobile insurance and tort recovery, sections 627.7372 and 768.76 . . . Section 627.7372 was repealed in 1993 and partially incorporated in section 768.76. . . . unconvincing since they both involved insurers and the possibility of subrogation as set out in section 768.76 . . .
. . . See § 768.76, Fla. . . . Section 768.76 provides, in part, as follows: (1) In any action to which this part applies in which liability . . . found that the additional monies were life insurance policy proceeds excluded from setoff under section 768.76 . . .
. . . motorist from recovering “damages for which personal injury protection benefits are paid or payable”); § 768.76 . . .
. . . required to reimburse UnitedHealthcare a reduced amount according to the formula set out in section 768.76 . . . We must decide whether section 768.76(4) applies to limit United-Healthcare’s reimbursement out of the . . . ’s reimbursement under section 768.76(4). . . . motorist carrier is not a tortfeasor under section 768.76(4). . . . This case presents the exact scenario section 768.76(4) was designed to address. In Osler v. . . .
. . . See F.S. 768.76, 1986 supplement, concerning particular collateral source deductions by the court. 2. . . .
. . . . § 768.76). . . .
. . . judgment entered in favor of Intermatic, Inc., on the issue of collateral source payments under section 768.76 . . . Section 768.76(1) provides that “there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation . . .
. . . See § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . Section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes states that “the court shall reduce the amount of [damage] award . . .
. . . The court reached a similar result under section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (1993), for future payments . . . Moreover, both sections 627.736(3) and 768.76(1) are statutes altering rights of parties in a typical . . .
. . . , reduction for collateral source payments should be made by the court, not the jury, pursuant to § 768.76 . . . See § 768.76, Fla. . . .
. . . Rudnick, 761 So.2d 289 (Fla.2000)(interpreting § 768.76, Fla. Stat.) . . . .
. . . Larsen, 639 So.2d 1038, 1041-42 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (addressing section 768.76, Florida Statutes [collateral . . .
. . . District Court of Appeal certified the following question as one of great public importance: UNDER SECTION 768.76 . . . We approve the district court’s decision affirming the trial court’s setoff under section 768.76 of contractual . . . The trial court granted Froh-man’s motion for setoff under section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1999). . . . Section 768.76 defines collateral sources as “payments made” on a claimant’s behalf. . . . The trial court, therefore, properly applied section 768.76 to reduce Goble’s damages by the amount of . . . Section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes abrogated the common law collateral source rule and replaced it . . . See § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (1999); see also Coop. Leasing, Inc. v. . . . Therefore, today an injured party pursuant to section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes may recover only . . . “collateral sources” that are to be set off against an award of compensatory damages under section 768.76 . . .
. . . . §§ 768.76(1) and (2)(b) excludes Medicare benefits from being considered a collateral source, not for . . . court under state law could not have reduced her jury award by the amount paid by Medicare due to §§ 768.76 . . .
. . . lawsuits concerning motor vehicle accidents, PIP setoffs are governed by section 627.736(3), not section 768.76 . . .
. . . Section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2001), entitled “Collateral sources of indemnity,” provides: (1) . . . Thus, in contrast to the procedure under section 768.76(1), in which the court offsets the collateral . . . As noted, section 768.71(3) provides that any conflicting statute governs over section 768.76. . . . Therefore, in lawsuits concerning motor vehicle accidents, section 627.736(3), not section 768.76(1), . . . (In fact, after trial, the plaintiffs specifically argued that section 768.76(1) applied.) . . . : section 627.736, which governs setoffs for PIP benefits in automobile accident cases, and section 768.76 . . . Standard Jury Instruction 6.13(a) is the jury instruction that is derived from section 768.76(1), which . . .
. . . Therefore, she was entitled to bring suit. .A similar statute is section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes . . .
. . . Frohman, 848 So.2d 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (holding that under section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1999) . . . Johnson contends that sections 768.76(1) .and 768.76(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), preclude the trial . . . (2)(b) and therefore cannot be set off from her recovery under section 768.76(1). . . . Section 768.76 excludes Medicare benefits as a collateral source because the federal government has a . . . This would result in a windfall that is contrary to the legislative policy evidenced by section 768.76 . . .
. . . Subsection (2) of Section 768.76 defines the term “collateral sources.” . . . . § 768.76(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002). . . . The court applied Section 768.76(1) in lieu of Section 627.736(3). . . . and Section 768.76. . . . Section 768.76 was enacted to harmonize, not nullify, existing laws. . . .
. . . difference is either inadmissible as ‘damages’ suffered by plaintiff or that a setoff is required by section 768.76 . . . of setoff, we might agree with plaintiffs motion for rehearing that some cases interpreting section 768.76 . . . Section 768.76(1) provides: “In any action to which this part applies ... the court shall reduce the . . . shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists.” § 768.76 . . . difference is either inadmissible as “damages” suffered by plaintiff or that a setoff is required by section 768.76 . . .
. . . Florida PIP statute does not apply, Hastings is a collateral source provider as defined in section 768.76 . . . Because the policy contains a right of reimbursement, section 768.76(4) controls. . . . Instead of proceeding under section 768.76(4), quoted above, the court apparently applied section 768.76 . . . The difference between section 768.76(1) and 768.76(4) is that the former adjusts the claimant’s damages . . . That is the procedure for reduction of the award under section 768.76(1), but it was not the correct . . .
. . . Section 768.76(2)(a)(l), Florida Statutes (1997) provides in part: (1) In any action to which this part . . .
. . . On December 20, 2000, Hersh served a notice of intent to claim damages pursuant to section 768.76(6), . . .
. . . The common-law rule has been altered in this state by section 768.76. Id. . . . The Rollins court did not construe section 768.76. . . . Thus, section 768.76 would not apply in D’Angelo. . . . See §§ 641.31(8), 768.76(4), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . See §§ 641.31(8), 768.76(4), Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . .
. . . . § 768.76, to reduce the jury’s award. . . . Ann. § 768.76(1) (emphasis added). . . . Id. § 768.76(2) (emphasis added). . . . The 1993 amendment also added subsections 768.76(5)-(9), none of which is relevant in this case. . . . Id. § 768.76(7) (emphasis added). . . . .
. . . , he filed a motion in his Pinellas County suit, seeking equitable distribution pursuant to section 768.76 . . .
. . . Section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (2000), requires the trial court to reduce an award for damages by . . .
. . . For example, sections 627.7372 and 768.76 are both entitled “Collateral Sources of Indemnity.” . . . Citing to both sections 627.736(3) and 768.76(1) in Allstate Insurance Co. v. . . . This suggests that section 768.76 replaced the repealed section 627.7372. . . . This is incorrect as section 768.76 existed prior to the repeal of section 627.7372. . . . There was merely a minor amendment to section 768.76(1) in 1993. Ch.93-245, § 1, Laws of Fla. . . .
. . . . § 768.76, there existed a common law right of equitable subrogation for the disability insurance payments . . . Section 768.76 of the Florida Statutes does not imbue a wrongful tortfea-sor with the benefit of a plaintiffs . . . See § 768.76 Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .
. . . paid to the Johnstons can be considered a collateral source for the purpose of a setoff under section 768.76 . . . inconclusive as to whether these benefits meet the definition of a collateral source provided in section 768.76 . . . collateral source for which AMEX had a reimbursement right that precluded any setoff under section 768.76 . . . In my judgment, the clear language of section 768.76(1) precludes a setoff. See Bruner v. . . . Section 768.76(1) authorizes a setoff against any award of damages for all collateral sources paid the . . . We also reject Van Winkle’s argument that the setoff is required under section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes . . . Without addressing the issue of whether a set-off under section 768.76 is appropriate in a legal malpractice . . . Section 768.76(2)(a)2. defines, in pertinent part, “collateral sources” as “any payments made to the . . . of earnings, therefore Van Winkle has not demonstrated entitlement to a setoff pursuant to section 768.76 . . .
. . . See Gormley, 587 So.2d at 457; § 768.76, Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . See § 768.76, Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . See § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . .
. . . . § 768.76, exempting Medicare payments from consideration as collateral sources, such that evidence . . .
. . . See § 768.76(1), Fla.Stat. . . . See §§ 627.736(3), Fla.Stat., 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . Carlson also argued that under subsection 768.76(1), the setoff for PIP benefits should be reduced by . . . McKenna argued subsection 768.76(1) did not apply to PIP benefits. . . . This reduction was predicated upon section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes, the general collateral source . . . Subsection 768.76(1) does not govern PIP setoffs but rather controls other collateral source payments . . . See, e.g., Rudnick (medpay benefits are a collateral source governed by section 768.76). . . .
. . . . § 768.76, Fla. Stat. (1997); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v. . . . insurance benefits available to the claimant, whether purchased by her or him or provided by others. § 768.76 . . .
. . . The trial judge also reduced the award, however, by a setoff under section 768.76(1) for sums paid under . . . Section 768.76(1) provides: “In any action to which this part applies in which liability is admitted . . . shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a subrogation or reimbursement right exists.” § 768.76 . . . Nothing in section 768.76 requires the subrogation or reimbursement right to be contractual rather than . . .
. . . 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), over the interpretation given to the term “otherwise available” in section 768.76 . . . Specifically, the district courts are in conflict on the question of whether under section 768.76(1) . . . Section 768.76(1) requires the court to reduce the amount of the plaintiffs award by the total of all . . . In King, the First District Court interpreted the “otherwise available” language of section 768.76(1) . . . In contrast, the Fourth District in White, interpreted the phrase “otherwise available” in section 768.76 . . .
. . . 93-245, § 3 at 2439, Laws of Fla., and the general collateral source statute is now found in section 768.76 . . .
. . . award by an amount “which encompasses benefits relating to future damages, ... pursuant to section 768.76 . . .
. . . . § 768.76, Fla. Stat. (1997); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v. . . . insurance benefits available to the claimant, whether purchased by her or him or provided by others. § 768.76 . . .
. . . reduction, which encompasses benefits relating to future damages, was properly made pursuant to section 768.76 . . . The controlling statute is thus section 768.76, which generally provides for a reduction of the award . . . Indeed, the application of section 768.76 in this context is confirmed by the express reference therein . . . Section 768.76(1) provides that, when damages are awarded and there are collateral sources of indemnity . . . Furthermore, we view the “otherwise available” language in section 768.76(1) as somewhat broader than . . .
. . . See § 768.76 F.S. (1986 Supp.), concerning particular collateral source deductions by the court. 2. 6.13b . . .
. . . Provident to intervene in the action, Provident filed a motion for reimbursement, pursuant to section 768.76 . . . Section 768.76(4) provides in pertinent part: A provider of collateral sources that has a right of subrogation . . . On appeal, in affirming the denial of the requested set-off, this court noted that section 768.76 indicated . . .
. . . Prior to settlement and pursuant to Section 768.76, Florida Statutes, Defendant, via its counsel, gave . . . Section 417.528, conflict with Section 768.76. . . . However, a review of Section 768.76 shows that a federal pre-emption analysis is unnecessary because . . . Further, Section 768.76 expressly states in relevant part: Notwithstanding any other provision of this . . . According to Defendant, it relied on Plaintiffs representation that Section 768.76 was applicable in . . .
. . . In support of its argument, Allstate cites to sections 627.727(1), 627.736(3), and 768.76(1), Florida . . . Finally, section 768.76(1), pertaining to collateral sources of indemnity, contains the following In . . . Previous decisions of this court construing sections 627.736(3) and 768.76(1), compel the conclusion . . . .2d 1148 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), this court concluded that benefits “otherwise available” under section 768.76 . . .
. . . Why fifty-five thousand seven hundred sixty-eight dollars and seventy-six cents ($55,-768.76) of surplus . . .
. . . contend that the trial court erred by granting the defendants’ motion for set-off, pursuant to section 768.76 . . . Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that section 768.76 is inapplicable to this cause of action because . . . Instead, the defendants maintain that section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1993), controls and provides . . . The First District explained that section 768.76. is a general provision that authorizes the court to . . . The First District concluded that in automobile cases, section 768.76 must yield to the more specific . . .
. . . In that ease, the court was asked to decide whether section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1987), the general . . . There, appellant, who believed section 768.76 controlled, challenged the trial court’s refusal to award . . . We went even further to find that even if section 768.76 was applicable, its language that “the court . . . While this court was correct in White, when it held that between sections 768.76 and 627.7372, the latter . . .
. . . See § 768.76, F.S. (1986 Supp.), concerning particular collateral source deductions by the court. 2. . . . , reduction for collateral source payments should be made by the court, not the jury, pursuant to § 768.76 . . .
. . . policy of insurance, indemnity agreement, or any other collateral source as defined in Florida Statutes 768.76 . . .
. . . determine that appellants are not entitled to a collateral source reduction for these amounts under section 768.76 . . .
. . . See, e.g., § 768.76(2)(a)l, Fla. Stat. (1995). . . .
. . . . § 768.76(2)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (Supp.1988); see Wells, 659 So.2d at 254. . . .
. . . first statute under which the Boyles argue that Travelers is not entitled to reimbursement is section 768.76 . . . which “liability is admitted or is determined by the trier of fact and in which damages are awarded.” § 768.76 . . .
. . . subsection (9) and was amended to provide that reimbursement should be made in accordance with subsection 768.76 . . . Under subsection 768.76(4), a provider of collateral sources having a right of subrogation has the right . . .
. . . Three subsections of § 768.76 are arguably relevant to this issue: 768.76 Collateral sources of indemnity . . . Sutton argues that his position is reinforced by the language of subsection (8) of section 768.76, but . . . The answer to this problem may be found by examining the setoff provision in section 768.76(1). . . . .” § 768.76(1), Fla. Stat. (1993) (emphasis added). . . . for the med pay, it appears this is not within the definition of a collateral source as defined in 768.76 . . .
. . . See § 768.76, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . . § 768.76(1) Fla.Stat. (1993); Calloway v. . . .
. . . Pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes, the trial court must hold a post-trial hearing on the issue . . .
. . . See § 768.76, Fla.Stat. (1991). . . .
. . . evidence describing the amounts of these benefits may have shifted to the jury a function that section 768.76 . . .
. . . The court granted Allstate’s post-trial motion pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1993), and . . . Section 768.76 is found in part II of chapter 768 and is a general provision that authorizes the court . . . Because section 627.7372, not section 768.76, governs in this ease, we must reverse the trial court’s . . . for future medical expenses; reverse the offset for collateral source payments allowed under section 768.76 . . . Section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (1993) states: In any action to which this part applies in which . . .
. . . . § 768.76 (West Supp.1994), we leave review of that issue, one of first impression in this circuit, . . .
. . . The issue in this case, which is one of first impression in this state, is whether or not section 768.76 . . . Based on these findings the court applied section 768.76(4), Florida Statutes (1991), and prorated a . . . Section 768.76 provides: Collateral Sources of Indemnity (1) In any action to which this part applies . . . The issue, as we see it, is whether the Florida Legislature, by promulgating section 768.76, intended . . . The trial judge assumed these findings required proration, pursuant to section 768.76. . . .
. . . Similarly, section 768.76(2)(a)4, Florida Statutes (1989), defines collateral sources as “any payments . . .
. . . A collateral source offset pursuant to section 768.76(1) is not allowed due to the statutory subrogation . . . right which pertains under section 440.39(2), as section 768.76 does not imbue a wrongful tortfeasor . . . of the issues raised by appellants and in the holding that appellee has no entitlement under section 768.76 . . . Section 768.76(1) permits a tortfea-sor an offset in the amount of any collateral source of indemnity . . .
. . . He claims he was entitled to such a setoff pursuant to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1987). . . . Appellees respond in the alternative that: (1) section 627.7372, Florida Statutes, not section 768.76 . . . Section 768.76 is contained in Part III of Chapter 768, which governs damages in negligence actions. . . . Section 768.76, titled “Collateral sources of indemnity,” provides that it applies to any action “to . . . In all other cases, reduction for collateral source payments should be made ... pursuant to § 768.76, . . .
. . . . § 768.76 requires that a damage award be reduced to account for certain collateral sources of recovery . . . Fla.Stat. § 768.76 provides in pertinent part: (1) In any action to which this part applies in which . . .
. . . See, e.g., Fla.Stat. ch. 768.76(1) (1991); Mass.Ann.Laws ch. 231, § 60G (Law.Co-op.1992); Mich.Comp.Laws . . .
. . . See §§ 627.7372, 768.50, Fla.Stat. (1985); § 768.76, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1986). . . . See §§ 627.7372, 768.50, Fla.Stat. (1985); § 768.76, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1986). . . .
. . . While this statutory section has been amended and transferred to section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1986 . . .
. . . unconvincing since they both involved insurers and the possibility of subro-gation as set out in section 768.76 . . .
. . . In 1986, the Florida legislature passed the following law: Florida Statute 768.76 Collateral Sources . . . Fla.Stat. § 768.76(1) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . Measom appeals claiming that Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1989) does not authorize the court to . . . Section 768.76(1) provides that “there shall be no reduction for collateral sources for which a right . . . it is true that Measom’s insurance carrier did not have a contractual right of subrogation, Section 768.76 . . .
. . . Section 768.76(1) would permit the injured party to receive the damages from the tortfeasor and Section . . . 768.76(4) would permit reimbursement to the paying health care provider from the injured party. . . . Bimonte, 143 So.2d 709 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). . § 768.76, Fla.Stat. (1986 Supp.). . . .
. . . See §§ 768.71, 768.76, Fla.Stat. (1987). . . .
. . . We also agree with PJC that section 768.76, the collateral source rule, does not apply in the instant . . . Moreover, section 768.76 was created under chapter 86-160, Laws of Florida, which, in sections 49 and . . . 50, provided that the entirety of part III of chapter 768 — which includes section 768.76— applies only . . .
. . . Proposed SJI 6.13a implements the provisions of Section 768.76, Florida Statutes (1986 Supp.). . . . See § 768.76, Fla.Stat. (1986 Supp.), concerning particular collateral source deductions by the court . . . , reduction for collateral source payments should be made by the court, not the jury, pursuant to § 768.76 . . .
. . . legislature repealed section 768.50, see Ch. 86-160, § 68, Laws of Florida, and replaced it with section 768.76 . . . Ch. 86-160, § 55, Laws of Fla., codified at § 768.76, Fla.Stat. (Supp.1986). . . .
. . . December 13, 1928, the commissioner allowed the second claim filed March 25, 1925, for $768.76 and on . . .