Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 810.07 (2025)

Prima facie evidence of intent.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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810.07 Prima facie evidence of intent.—

(1) In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense.

(2) In a trial on the charge of attempted burglary, proof of the attempt to enter such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without the consent of the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of attempting to enter with intent to commit an offense.

History.—s. 5, ch. 4405, 1895; GS 3287; RGS 5121; CGL 7222; s. 1, ch. 70-29; s. 33, ch. 74-383; s. 44, ch. 87-243.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 108 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1954–2025 · leading case: State v. Waters, 436 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1983).

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State v. Waters, 436 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1983). · cites it 15× “The state also argued that section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), could be relied upon to establish proof of the requisite criminal intent.”

Rozier v. State, 402 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). · cites it 13× “Section 810.07, Florida Statutes, enacted in 1975, provides: Prima facie evidence of intent In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof shall be prima…”

Toole v. State, 472 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 1985). · cites it 4× “We reiterate that beyond allegation and proof of unauthorized entry or remaining in a structure or conveyance, the essential element to be alleged and proven on a charge of burglary is the intent to commit an offense, not the intent to commit a specified offense, therein.”

Stand. Jury Inst. in Cr. Cases No. 2006-2, 962 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2007). · cites it 4× “§ 810.07 Fla. Stat. You may infer that (defendant) had the intent to commit a crime inside a [structure] [conveyance] if the [entering] [attempted entering] of the [structure] [conveyance] was done stealthily and without the consent of the owner or occupant.”

Graham v. State, 472 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1985). · cites it 9× “Over objection, the trial judge instructed the jury based on the burglary presumption of intent statute, section 810.07, which provides: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the…”

State v. Fields, 390 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). · cites it 5× “However, it does not address Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), wherein the Legislature said that proof of stealthful entry without consent of the owner or occupant "shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense.”

Tai a. Pham v. State, 70 So. 3d 485 (Fla. 2011). · cites it 2× “…(2005). 8 . § 787.01(l)(a)2, § 775.087(1), § 775.087(2)(a)l„ Fla. Stat. (2005). 9 .§ 810.02(l)(b), § 810.02(2)09, § 810.07, Fla. Stat. (2005).”

Rodney L. Long Jr. v. State of Florida, 188 So. 3d 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). · cites it 15× “” § 810.07, Fla. Stat. (2015). Things seem to go awry when courts try to follow the standard jury instruction for burglary, which since 1981 has expected the trial court to name a specific offense within the intent element of burglary.”

Bennett v. State, 438 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). · cites it 6× “The defendant in Waters was convicted, and the state argued on appeal that it did not need to plead intent to commit a specific offense and that whether it did or did not so plead, section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981), [2] could be used to prove the requisite criminal intent.”

Waters v. State, 401 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). · cites it 5× “Is the statutory rebuttable presumption contained in Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979) sufficient to prove a prima facie case of intent to commit the specific offense of theft? Accordingly, the judgment and sentence is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court…”

Booker v. State, 397 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1981). · cites it 2× “In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure at any time stealthily and without the consent of the owner is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense.”

State v. Hicks, 421 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1982). · cites it 2× “" We note that section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), which existed prior to the 1975 revision, provides that the state can establish a prima facie case of burglary by showing that a defendant stealthily, and without the consent of the owner, entered a structure.”

Show all 108 citing cases →

— 810.07(1) — 30 cases

Couzo v. State, 830 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).

Jackson v. State, 140 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

L.A.H. v. State, 197 So. 3d 1265 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016).

Joseph v. State, 965 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Rodney L. Long Jr. v. State of Florida, 188 So. 3d 116 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). “” § 810.07, Fla. Stat. (2015). Things seem to go awry when courts try to follow the standard jury instruction for burglary, which since 1981 has expected the trial court to name a specific offense within the intent element of burglary.”

— 810.07(2) — 10 cases

State v. K.N., 66 So. 3d 380 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011).

Davis v. State, 730 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).

Irvin v. State, 590 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).

Baker v. State, 622 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).

J.A.S. v. State, 952 So. 2d 638 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

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