Cases from cite.case.law:

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 257 So. 3d 925 (Fla. 2018)

. . . . § 810.07 , Fla. Stat. . . .

K. T. a v. STATE, 245 So. 3d 1004 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . . § 810.07(2) (2016) ; Irvin v. State, 590 So.2d 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). . . .

R. MURRAY, v. STATE, 237 So. 3d 1156 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 810.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) ; Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 13.1. . . .

IN RE STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT, 217 So. 3d 965 (Fla. 2017)

. . . . § 810.07 Fla. Stat. . . .

D. REED, D. v. STATE, 208 So. 3d 1231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the stealthy-entry inference set forth in section 810.07 . . . In accordance with section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes, evidence in a burglary trial that the defendant . . . Before the trial judge may instruct the jury on the section 810.07 inference, the State “must present . . .

M. W. a v. STATE, 201 So. 3d 729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . .” § 810.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2015). . . . the early hours of the morning are sufficient to impair the statutory presumption created by section 810.07 . . .

L. A. H. v. STATE, 197 So. 3d 1265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . The trial court was referring to the statutory presumption in section 810.07(1). . . . .” § 810.07(1); see also J.J.D., 973 So.2d at 1255 (stating that there was no evidence that the juvenile . . . “entered in a stealthy manner and thus triggered the presumption of intent under section 810.07(1)”) . . .

L. LONG Jr. v. STATE, 188 So. 3d 116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . In L.S., we said that the state may rely on section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1983), the burglary presumption . . . This principle is also evident from the very existence of section 810.07 of the Florida Statutes, which . . . owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense.” § 810.07 . . . See § 810.07(1), Fla. . . . straightforward requirement of the statute itself and the establishment of a prima facie case under section 810.07 . . .

M. PARISI, v. STATE, 186 So. 3d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Furthermore, to prove intent, the State could rely on the statutory presumption of section 810.07(1); . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 176 So. 3d 938 (Fla. 2015)

. . . . § 810.07 Fla. Stat. . . .

J. JACKSON, v. STATE, 140 So. 3d 1067 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . was shown by his prior violent interactions with Woodard; rather, she argued consistent with section 810.07 . . . owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with the intent to commit an offense.” § 810.07 . . .

RIVERS, v. STATE, 124 So. 3d 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . See § 810.07(1); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 13.1. . . .

WOLF, v. STATE, 117 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 810.07, Fla. Stat. . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 109 So. 3d 721 (Fla. 2013)

. . . . § 810.07 Fla. Stat. . . .

T. A. W. v. STATE D. B. W. v., 113 So. 3d 879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See § 810.07(1). . . .

JAMES, v. STATE, 89 So. 3d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . See § 810.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2010); L.S. v. State, 464 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 1985). . . .

TORRES, v. STATE, 82 So. 3d 1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides, “In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of . . . owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense.” § 810.07 . . .

LANZO, v. STATE, 73 So. 3d 817 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . , the State requested that the jury be instructed on the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07 . . . To utilize the presumption set forth in section 810.07, the State must present evidence of the owner . . . ’s argument that intent could be inferred based upon the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07 . . . similarly insufficient evidence to support the employment of the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07 . . .

STATE v. K. N. a, 66 So. 3d 380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 810.07(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .

TAI A. PHAM, v. STATE, 70 So. 3d 485 (Fla. 2011)

. . . .§ 810.02(l)(b), § 810.02(2)09, § 810.07, Fla. Stat. (2005). . . .

UNITED STATES v. CLARK, a. k. a., 379 F. App'x 855 (11th Cir. 2010)

. . . . § 810.07. . . . One definition for the term “stealthily,” as used in § 810.07, is “ ‘[a]ny secret, sly or clandestine . . . Stat. § 810.07. See Rodnguez-Lopez, 363 F.3d at 1137. . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 986 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 2008)

. . . . § 810.07 Fla. Stat. . . .

J. J. D. v. STATE, 973 So. 2d 1254 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . that J.J.D. entered in a stealthy manner and thus triggered the presumption of intent under section 810.07 . . .

JOSEPH, v. STATE, 965 So. 2d 357 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . occupant thereof shall be prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense”) (quoting § 810.07 . . . In that case, absent section 810.07, the state could not take the case to a jury in the face of the Standard . . .

GRAHAM, v. STATE, 964 So. 2d 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Cf § 810.07(1), Fla. Stat. . . .

In STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- REPORT NO., 962 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2007)

. . . . § 810.07 Fla. Stat. . . .

KERR, v. STATE, 954 So. 2d 692 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . .§ 810.07(1), Fla. . . .

J. A. S. v. STATE, 952 So. 2d 638 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007)

. . . Section 810.07(2) provides: “In a trial on the charge of attempted burglary, proof of the attempt to . . .

L. WASHINGTON, v. STATE, 933 So. 2d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

. . . . §§ 810.02(1) and (3); 810.07, Fla. Stat. (2001). .See Washington v. . . .

SCAROLA, v. STATE, 889 So. 2d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . . §§ 810.02(1),(3); 810.07, Fla. Stat. (2002). . § 812.014(1),(2)(c), Fla. . . .

J. M. a v. STATE, 884 So. 2d 481 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (2002), establishes that proof of stealthy entry is prima facie evidence . . .

R. T. a v. STATE, 879 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . Dawson, 681 So.2d 1206, 1207 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); see also § 810.07(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). . . .

PERRY, Jr. v. STATE, 892 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . . §§ 810.02(1), (2)(b); 810.07, Fla. Stat. . § 812.014(1), (2)(c)5, Fla. Stat. (1999). . . . .

OWENS, v. STATE, 866 So. 2d 129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)

. . . . §§ 810.02(1) and (3), and 810.07, Fla. Slat. (1997). . § 812.014(1) and (3)(a), Fla. . . .

JOHNSON, v. STATE, 858 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . See § 810.07, Fla. . . . structure or conveyance at any time stealthily and without consent of the owner or occupant thereof’); § 810.07 . . .

STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES- SUBMISSION, 850 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 2003)

. . . . § 810.07, FlaStat. . . .

S. D. a v. STATE, 837 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)

. . . The state’s case, however, is aided by the statutory presumption contained in section 810.07(1) which . . .

COUZO, v. STATE, 830 So. 2d 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . Under section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (2001), in burglary cases, “proof of the entering of such structure . . .

A. POLK, v. STATE, 825 So. 2d 478 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . . §§ 810.02(1), 810.02(2)(a), 810.07, 775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). . . . .

JOHNEKINS, v. STATE, 823 So. 2d 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . common sense and Florida law, such an entry is done with the purpose of committing a crime inside: 810.07 . . . the owner or occupant thereof is prima facie evidence of entering with intent to commit an offense. 810.07 . . .

E. JONES, v. STATE, 806 So. 2d 590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

. . . . §§ 810.02(1) & (2), 810.07, Fla. Stat. (1996). . § 812.014(1) & (2)(c), Fla. . . .

M. S. a v. STATE, 774 So. 2d 777 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . Pursuant to section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (1999), this was prima facie evidence of his entering . . .

ADCOCK- LADD, v. SECRETARY OF TREASURY, 227 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 2000)

. . . On July 27, 1999, the government issued a Treasury draft to Adcock-Ladd in the sum of $320,-810.07, which . . .

GEORGE, v. STATE, 756 So. 2d 271 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)

. . . See § 810.07(2), Fla. Stat. (1999) ANTOON, C.J., THOMPSON and SAWAYA, JJ., concur. . . .

MACK, v. STATE, 739 So. 2d 746 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . See § 810.07(2), Fla.Stat. (1997); L.S. v. State, 464 So.2d 1196 (Fla.1985). . . .

DAVIS, v. STATE, 730 So. 2d 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)

. . . See § 810.07(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .

CALLOWAY, v. STATE, 718 So. 2d 268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)

. . . . §§ 810.02(1) and (4); 810.07, Fla. Stat. (1997). . § 775.084, Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .

ANDERSON, v. STATE, 698 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . (See section 810.07, Florida Statutes, which is a part of the jury instructions on burglary) and the . . .

KARP, v. STATE, 698 So. 2d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)

. . . According to section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (1993) , this evidence was sufficient prima facie evidence . . .

WILLIAMS, v. K. SINGLETARY,, 78 F.3d 1510 (11th Cir. 1996)

. . . . §§ 810.02 and 810.07 (convicted). . . .

THOMAS, v. STATE, 655 So. 2d 163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)

. . . the early hours of the morning are sufficient to impair the statutory presumption created by section 810.07 . . . Pui’suant to section 810.07, proof of entering stealthily and without consent is prima facie evidence . . .

D. HAMILTON, v. STATE, 645 So. 2d 555 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)

. . . Instead, "it is an evidentiary tool [under section 810.07] with which to establish prima facie proof . . .

S. BAKER, v. STATE, 636 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. 1994)

. . . . § 810.07 Fla.Stat. (1989). . . .

STATE v. THOMAS,, 622 So. 2d 174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . State, 464 So.2d 1195 (Fla.1985); § 810.07, Fla. Stat. (1991). . . .

WILLIAMS, v. L. DUGGER,, 827 F. Supp. 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1993)

. . . 777.04(1), 777.04(4), and 794.011(4)(a); and (4) Burglary with an assault contrary to §§ 810.02 and 810.07 . . .

S. BAKER, v. STATE, 622 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)

. . . Thus, section 810.07(1), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that “proof of the entering of such structure . . . 1991) (in prosecution for attempted burglary of a conveyance, stealth instruction was proper under § 810.07 . . .

P. DUNCAN, v. STATE, 606 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)

. . . A subsequent section, 810.07(1), provides that: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering . . . Furthermore, in a prosecution for burglary the state may rely on section 810.07 as prima facie evidence . . . That pronouncement is no longer effective since the legislature amended section 810.07 by adding subsection . . . required in the charging document and that the proof of intent may be facilitated by resort to section 810.07 . . . In that case, absent section 810.07, the state could not take the case to a jury in the face of the Standard . . .

IRVIN, v. STATE, 590 So. 2d 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . At trial the State relied on section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1989), which provides in part, “In a trial . . . Id. § 810.07(2). . . .

V. H. E. J. v. STATE, 583 So. 2d 429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)

. . . Waters, 436 So.2d 66 (Fla.1983); Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1989). . . .

ARROYO, v. STATE, 564 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)

. . . Further, section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1989), provides that proof of stealthy entry is prima facie . . .

FLORIDA, Jr. v. STATE, 522 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)

. . . Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1985) states: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering . . .

R. TAYLOR, v. STATE, 512 So. 2d 304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . Appellant was charged with one count of armed burglary of a structure, in violation of section 810.07 . . .

E. HOUSE, v. STATE, 511 So. 2d 724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)

. . . burglary of a structure with presumption of intent, a third degree felony according to sections 810.02 and 810.07 . . .

GOLDEN, v. STATE, 497 So. 2d 914 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . 466 (it was error for the court to instruct the jury on the burglary presumption of intent statute, § 810.07 . . . Waters, 436 So.2d at 70 (section 810.07 does not apply to attempted burglary), the error was corrected . . .

JONES, v. STATE, 492 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)

. . . A prima facie case of burglary was made out under Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1983), which provides . . .

STATE v. SMITH,, 484 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1986)

. . . the element of intent in a burglary prosecution by use of the presumption of intent statute section 810.07 . . .

TOOLE, v. STATE, 472 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 1985)

. . . In L.S., we said that the state may rely on section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1983), the burglary presumption . . . As indicated earlier, section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), is fully consistent with this approach . . .

GRAHAM, v. STATE, 472 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1985)

. . . the establishment of a prima facie case of burglary under the presumption of intent statute, section 810.07 . . . As a part of our answer to the certified question, we stated: In this case, however, section 810.07 is . . . We therefore decline to expand the scope of section 810.07 beyond the clearly expressed legislative intent . . . Proof of the elements set out in section 810.07 is sufficient to establish prima facie evidence of such . . . In a prosecution for burglary, the state may rely on section 810.07 as prima facie evidence of intent . . .

MILLER, a k a v. STATE, 467 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)

. . . on stealthy entry because the state is prohibited from relying on the presumption created by section 810.07 . . .

L. S. a v. STATE, 464 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 1985)

. . . the element of intent in a burglary prosecution by use of the presumption of intent statute, section 810.07 . . . Section 810.07 provides: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure . . . defendant did intend to commit the specified offense and must do so without the benefit of section 810.07 . . . intend to commit a specific offense after the breaking and entering, it may avail itself of section 810.07 . . .

WILLIAMS, Jr. v. STATE, 461 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . . §§ 810.02(1); 810.02(3) & 810.07, Fla.Stat. (1983). . § 812.014(l)(a)(b), Fla.Stat. (1983). . . . .

RODRIGUEZ, v. STATE, 460 So. 2d 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . Schraader’s home; and (b) the court erred in deriving that intent from section 810.07, Florida Statutes . . .

BERRY, v. STATE, 458 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . decision merely permitted the state to allege a violation of the burglary statute in the language of § 810.07 . . .

GRAHAM, v. STATE, 453 So. 2d 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . jury to find proof of intent to commit theft, based on the statutory presumption set forth in section 810.07 . . . Appeal in the negative, holding that it was improper to rely on the statutory presumption of section 810.07 . . . statutory presumption may be used where there is proof of an entry: In this case, however, section 810.07 . . . INVOLVED, IS IT PROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO RELY UPON THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION SET FORTH IN SECTION 810.07 . . .

FREDERICK, v. STATE, 451 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . this case is whether or not the state can rely on the burglary presumptive intent statute, section 810.07 . . . intend to commit a specific offense after the breaking and entering, it may avail itself of section 810.07 . . . Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981), provides: Prima facie evidence of intent. — In a trial on the . . .

T. L. J. a v. STATE, 449 So. 2d 1008 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . with intending to commit a specific offense, it may not rely upon the presumption afforded by section 810.07 . . . intend to commit a specific offense after the breaking and entering, it may avail itself of section 810.07 . . . further appears that by seeking a bill of particulars, a defendant may be able to circumvent section 810.07 . . .

L. S. a v. STATE, 446 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)

. . . prove intent at all, erroneously relying on proof of the presumption of intent as provided in section 810.07 . . . It then addressed the issue of whether proof of the factual elements set out in section 810.07 would . . . intend to commit a specific offense after the breaking and entering, it may avail itself of section 810.07 . . . Section 810.07 provides: Prima facie evidence of intent. — In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof . . .

STATE v. CLARK,, 442 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1983)

. . . stealthily without the occupant’s consent with intent to commit some offense, contrary to Sections 810.07 . . . by the conventional method first and then as an alternative charge set out the elements of section 810.07 . . . State, 402 So.2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), which held that section 810.07 does not establish a substantive . . . Waters, 436 So.2d 66 (Fla.1983), we held that the elements in section 810.07 do not constitute the crime . . . However, we held in Waters and Rozier that section 810.07 should not be used as an allegational alternative . . .

BENNETT, v. STATE, 438 So. 2d 1034 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . need to plead intent to commit a specific offense and that whether it did or did not so plead, section 810.07 . . . The court also held that the statutory language of section 810.07 allows the state, during the course . . . Second, if the state does not allege that the accused intended to commit a specific offense, section 810.07 . . . Furthermore, when the state does so charge, the proof must be established without the benefit of section 810.07 . . . Since section 810.07 only applies when no specific offense is alleged in an information charging burglary . . .

STATE v. GONZALEZ, STATE v. CRUZ,, 438 So. 2d 948 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . Stat. 810.02(3) and Fla.Stat. 810.07.” . . . Gonzalez filed a motion to declare Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), unconstitutional. . . .

BROWN, v. STATE, 436 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . theft and/or did enter stealthily and without the owner’s consent pursuant to Florida Statutes Section 810.07 . . . a prima facie case of burglary by relying exclusively on the evidentiary presumption set forth in § 810.07 . . . So.2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), the State contends that the eviden-tiary presumption set forth in § 810.07 . . . Nor can we extend the words and meaning of section 810.07 to make it applicable to allegations in the . . . Is the statutory rebuttable presumption contained in section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979) sufficient . . .

STATE v. WATERS,, 436 So. 2d 66 (Fla. 1983)

. . . The state also argued that section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), could be relied upon to establish . . . Is the statutory rebuttable presumption contained in section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), sufficient . . . The second certified question pertains to the operation and effect of section 810.07, Florida Statutes . . . The predecessor of section 810.07 was first enacted in 1895. Ch. 4405, § 5, Laws of Fla. (1895). . . . Section 810.07 only comes into operation as an alternative means of proving the element of intent. . . .

STATE v. ROZIER, STATE v. YOUNG,, 436 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1983)

. . . These cases have to do with the construction and application of sections 810.02 and 810.07, Florida Statutes . . . The main question on appeal was whether allegations of the elements of section 810.07 were a sufficient . . . Proof of the elements of section 810.07 does not, however, prove the crime but only constitutes prima . . . Thus proof of the section 810.07 elements is a sufficient evidentiary basis for a finding of the intent . . . Section 810.07 provides: In a trial on the charge of burglary, proof of the entering of such structure . . .

ELLIS, v. STATE, 425 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)

. . . This latter allegation was obviously suggested by section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1981). . . .

STATE v. HICKS,, 421 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1982)

. . . We note that section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), which existed prior to the 1975 revision, provides . . .

VAN TEAMER, v. STATE, 417 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . He argues that a jury instruction based on section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979) should not have been . . . it asked for and received, over the defendant’s objection, the standard instruction based on section 810.07 . . . COBB and COWART, JJ., concur. . § 810.02, Fla.Stat. (1979). . § 810.07, Fla.Stat. (1979) provides: In . . .

BROWN, v. STATE, 417 So. 2d 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . Since § 810.07, Fla.Stat., relied upon by the state in drafting the instant information, creates only . . .

STATE v. CLARK,, 416 So. 2d 13 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . stealthily without the occupant’s consent with intent to commit some offense, contrary to Sections 810.07 . . . State, 402 So.2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), defendant argued that § 810.07, Fla.Stat. is not a substantive . . . to comply with the “general to particular” rule of pleading and yet give force and effect to Section 810.07 . . .

B. D. A v. STATE, 412 So. 2d 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)

. . . we determine whether an allegation of stealth and lack of consent of the owner pursuant to Section 810.07 . . .

KRATHY, v. STATE, 406 So. 2d 53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . This case is unaffected by the “presumption statute,” Section 810.07, which creates a prima facie inference . . .

ROZIER, v. STATE, 402 So. 2d 539 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . Section 810.07, Florida Statutes, enacted in 1975, provides: Prima facie evidence of intent In a trial . . . a dwelling “with intent to commit an offense therein contrary to Florida Statutes 810.-02(1)(3) and 810.07 . . . Fourth District Court of Appeal did not agree with the contention of the State, saying that section 810.07 . . . Section 810.07, Florida Statutes, was apparently an attempt by the legislature to help the State with . . . Nor can we extend the words and meaning of section 810.07 to make it applicable to allegations in the . . .

BELVIN, v. STATE, 402 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979). See Kersey v. State, 73 Fla. 832, 74 So. 983 (1917); M. . . .

WATERS, v. STATE, 401 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . the state has the choice of alleging the specific offense or of alleging its reliance upon Section 810.07 . . . to commit a specific offense and as to the effect of the evidentiary presumption created by Section 810.07 . . . Is the statutory rebuttable presumption contained in Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979) sufficient . . . state not alleged an intent to commit a specific offense and instead alleged reliance upon Section 810.07 . . .

PHILLIPS, v. STATE, 396 So. 2d 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)

. . . Fields, 390 So.2d 128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); § 810.07, Fla.Stat. (1977). . . .

BOOKER, v. STATE, 397 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1981)

. . . . § 810.07, Fla.Stat. (1977). . . .

STATE v. L. FIELDS, Jr., 390 So. 2d 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . However, it does not address Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), wherein the Legislature said that . . . to comply with the “general to particular” rule of pleading and yet give force and effect to Section 810.07 . . . As indicated earlier, Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), is fully consistent with this approach . . .

LEE, v. STATE, 385 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . GERTRUDE WATERS, with intent to commit an offense therein, contrary to Florida Statutes 810.02(1)(3) and 810.07 . . . foregoing requirements because of the reference therein to several statutory sections, 810.02(1), (3) and 810.07 . . . Section 810.07 has to do with proof of intent: “In a trial of the charge of burglary, proof of the entering . . .

In J. D. Z. a, 382 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)

. . . The State relies upon Section 810.07, Florida Statutes (1979), which provides: In a trial on the charge . . .

BOUDREAU v. BORG- WARNER ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, a, 616 F.2d 1077 (9th Cir. 1980)

. . . financed items had been sold out of trust and submitted an inventory worksheet to Boudreau showing $810.07 . . .

E. DODSON, v. STATE, 300 So. 2d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974)

. . . See Section 810.07, Florida Statutes. McNULTY, Acting C. J., and BOARD-MAN and GRIMES, JJ., concur. . . .