The 2023 Florida Statutes
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As previously noted, appellant was charged with violating Section 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1981), which grants the DBR authority to revoke or suspend a beverage license when it finds that either the licensee or its agents have violated the laws of this state on the licensed premises. Lash, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Business Regulation, 411 So.2d 276, 278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). The DBR here based its conclusion of law that appellant had violated certain sections of Chapter 849 primarily on two grounds: First, it concluded that the three yellow envelopes, as well as the tally sheets found in the Quick Print bags, confiscated by Officer Tompkins, constituted "prima facie" evidence of gambling under Section 849.05, Florida Statutes; and second, the fact that some of the evidence found by Officer Tompkins was located either in plain view or in areas on the premises under the exclusive control of the appellant's officers and employees was evidence of simple negligence on the part of appellant's officers in the supervision of its premises. The DBR cites Lash, supra, for the proposition that a finding of simple negligence will suffice in support of the imposition of an… "The gist of the charge upon which the petitioner was tried was the setting up and keeping of a gambling device at which a game of chance was played for money. By the weight of authority, the term `gambling device', as the term is generally employed in penal statutes or ordinances, means the tangible means, instrument, contrivance, or thing at or by which money may be lost or won, as distinguished from the game itself, and includes only such instruments or contrivances as are intended for the purpose of gaming, or such as are used to determine the result of the contest on which the wager is laid. See 24 Am.Jur. pp. 420, 424, Gaming and Prize Contests, Sections 31, 36. Such is the obvious meaning of `gambling device' as the term is used in our own statutes and decisions. See Sections 849.01, 849.05, 849.14- 849.16, 901.19, Fla. Stat. 1941, F.S.A.; Kirk v. Morrison, 108 Fla. 144, 146 So. 215; Pasternack v. Bennett, 138 Fla. 663, 190 So. 56. The manifest purpose and intent of a statute or ordinance forbidding the setting up and keeping of a gambling device at which games of chance are played for money is to prohibit not the gaming or gambling itself but the maintenance and… It is not incumbent on the state to prove the agency and this may be inferred from the actions of the defendant. Foote v. State, supra. The conclusion of the trial judge sitting as a trier of fact that these defendants were acting as the agents of another in the operation of a gambling house was substantiated by the following evidence: (A) The defendants were engaged in hiding the implements commonly used in games of chance which the officers found upon the premises. See also section 849.05, Fla. Stat., F.S.A. (B) The defendants requested the arresting officers to get rid of the implements of gambling thus to cover up the operation. (C) The defendants remained after the breaking up of the game for the purpose of disposing of equipment. Cf. Lopez v. State, Fla. 1953, 66 So.2d 807.The gist of the charge upon which the petitioner was tried was the setting up and keeping of a gambling device at which a game of chance was played for money. By the weight of authority, the term "gambling device," as the term is generally employed in penal statutes or ordinances, means the tangible means, instrument, contrivance, or thing at or by which money may be lost or won, as distinguished from the game itself, and includes only such instruments or contrivances as are intended for the purpose of gaming, or such as are used to determine the result of the contest on which the wager is laid. See 24 Am. Jur. pp. 420, 424, Gaming and Prize Contests, Section 31, 36. Such is the obvious meaning of "gambling device" as the term is used in our own statutes and decisions. See Sections 849.01, 849.05, 849.14- 849.16, 901.19, Fla. Stat. 1941, F.S.A.; Kirk v. Morrison, 108 Fla. 144, 146 So. 215; Pasternack v. Bennett, 138 Fla. 663, 190 So. 56. The manifest purpose and intent of a statute or ordinance forbidding the setting up and keeping of a gambling device at which games of chance are played for money is to prohibit not the gaming or gambling itself but the maintenance and… . . . that the number of hours of overtime to be credited to the plaintiffs are as follows: John Desmond-849.05 . . .
. . . 2,421.30 (27) STULL, STULL & BRODY Disbursement: $ 3,168.85 (28) STUURMANS & KELLY Disbursement: $ 849.05 . . .
. . . bags, confiscated by Officer Tompkins, constituted “prima facie” evidence of gambling under Section 849.05 . . . Likewise, the evidence supportive of counts 3 and 4 of the show cause order, relating to Section 849.05 . . .
. . . See Sections 849.01, 849.05, 849.14-849.16, 901. 19, Fla.Stat.1941, F.S.A.; Kirk v. . . .
. . . See also section 849.05, Fla.Stat., F.S.A. . . .
. . . See Sections 849.01, 849.05, 849.14-849.16, 901.19, Fla. Stat. 1941, F.S.A.; Kirk v. . . .
. . . Several withdrawals were made thereafter and on May 11, 1936, by a final withdrawal of $849.05 the account . . .