The 2023 Florida Statutes
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Appellant relies on Young v. Sands, Inc., 122 So.2d 618 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960), which was, according to the opinion, the first time section 849.26 had been construed by a Florida appellate court. There, a casino attempted to collect $1,600 it lent a patron. Id. at 619. The money was paid to the patron via a check made out to cash. Id. As an affirmative defense, the patron invoked section 849.26 and argued that “the check was given for money advanced for the purpose of gambling at a casino ... and that [the casino] had knowledge of that intent.” Id. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for the casino. Id.Following the voluntary dismissal, Holzman moved for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (1993). Basically, Holzman argued that because foreign gambling debts have consistently been held to violate both the state's public policy and section 849.26, Carnival's complaint failed to present a justiciable issue of law or fact and was therefore frivolous. Ultimately, the trial court agreed and entered an order granting Holzman's motion for attorney's fees.On the merits, however, we are compelled to reverse the attorney's fee award. Section 849.26, Florida Statutes (1993) provides, insofar as pertinent here, that "[a]ll promises, agreements, . . . or other contracts . . . for the repayment of money lent . . . for the purpose of being . . . wagered, are void and of no effect. . . ." (Emphasis added). It is this statute which prevents Carnival from collecting the gambling debt from Arviv. Because the statute declares any such agreement "void and of no effect," the statute invalidates the nonseverable provision for attorney's fees. See § 849.26, Fla. Stat. (1993); Blosser v. AADCO Enterprises, Inc., 526 So.2d 126, 127 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); see also Schaal v. Race, 135 So.2d 252, 257 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961). The attorney's fee award is therefore reversed.In interpreting Section 849.26, "Florida courts have consistently held that gambling obligations, even if valid in the state in which they were undertaken, are unenforceable in Florida as contrary to law and public policy." Barquin v. Flores, 459 So.2d 436, 436-37 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). See § 849.26, Fla. Stat. (1991); Carp v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 211 So.2d 240, 241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), writ discharged as improvidently issued, 219 So.2d 427 (Fla. 1969); Dorado Beach Hotel Corp. v. Jernigan, 202 So.2d 830, 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967), appeal dismissed, 209 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1968); Young v. Sands, Inc., 122 So.2d 618, 619 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960). These authorities compel reversal of the judgment obtained below.Foreign casino gambling obligations, although valid where created, are unenforceable in Florida. We interpret Florida Statute Section 849.26 as exempting transactions expressly authorized by Florida law, not by foreign law.There is no disagreement between the parties as to the nature of the debt underlying the judgment. The appellant sued Hacker to collect for credit which it had extended to him for gambling at appellant's casino in Nevada. The appellee does not question either personal or subject matter jurisdiction of the Nevada court which entered the judgment. Citing section 849.26, Florida Statutes (1985) which makes void any agreement for the repayment of money advanced for the purpose of betting on gambling (except for any gambling transaction expressly authorized by law), the trial court held that Florida courts may not be compelled to enforce a foreign judgment which is contrary to this state's public policy against gambling.Section 849.26 states:Florida courts have consistently held that gambling obligations, even if valid in the state in which they were undertaken, are unenforceable in Florida as contrary to law and public policy. See Dorado Beach Hotel Corp. v. Jernigan, 202 So.2d 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1967), appeal dismissed, 209 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1968); Young v. Sands, Inc., 122 So.2d 618 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960); § 849.26, Fla. Stat. (1977). Thus, we find no error in the trial court's dismissal of Barquin's complaint, even though the gambling proceeds he sought to recover derived from a Puerto Rican lottery ticket lawfully purchased by a Puerto Rican resident in Puerto Rico.In the present case, unlike DeVeau, the statute does not seek to prohibit access to wagering establishments to all felons, but rather only to those who have been convicted of bookmaking, a crime directly related to an activity, i.e., gambling, which is heavily regulated by the state in the exercise of its power to legislate for the health, safety, welfare, and morals of its citizens. In Florida the legislature has authorized pari-mutuel wagering on certain types of racing and on jai alai. This authorization, however, did not change the public policy of the state in regard to gambling and the operation of gambling houses, that is, that such activities are subversive of the public morals and the suppression of them is a lawful exercise of the recognized authority of the state. Valdez v. State (1940), 142 Fla. 123, 194 So. 388. The public policy of the state as expressed by the legislature in 849.24(3)-(6) requires the exclusion from all race tracks in the state of any person who has been convicted of bookmaking. In a like manner, akin to the DeVeau scheme to rid the waterfront of the undesirable criminal element, Florida has legislated against gambling as, for example, by… It has declared that it is the public policy of the State that gambling contracts relating to bookmaking are void, Fla. Stat. § 849.26, F.S.A. This is so even though the gambling contracts are valid in the State where they are executed. See Young v. Sands, Inc., Fla.App. 1960, 122 So.2d 618.. . . It determined that section 849.26, Florida Statutes (2013), precluded such a suit. . . . They argued, among other grounds, that the complaint was barred by section 849.26, Florida Statutes ( . . . Section 849.26, Florida Statutes (2013), provides: [1.] . . . . § 849.26, Fla. Stat. (2013) (numbering added). . . . Furthermore, appellees’ motion to dismiss based on section 849.26 raised an affirmative defense. . . .
. . . . § 849.26 states that: All promises, agreements, notes, bills, bonds or other contracts, mortgages or . . .
. . . . § 849.26 (2005) unequivocally provides that any type of gambling debt that is not expressly authorized . . . Stat. § 849.26, gambling is no longer against the public policy of Florida. . . .
. . . . § 849.26 (2004). . . . This strong public policy has been codified in Florida Statute § 849.26, which provides that: All promises . . . Stat. § 849.26 and is therefore unenforceable as a matter of state law. . . .
. . . Stat. eh. 849.26. . . . “In interpreting Section 849.26, Florida courts have consistently held that gambling obligations, even . . . Stat. ch. 849.26 (1991) states, All promises, agreements, notes, bills, bonds, or other contracts, mortgages . . . Stat. ch. 849.26 (1991). . Id. . Froug v. . . .
. . . gambling obligations, although valid where created, are unenforceable in Florida pursuant to section 849.26 . . . foreign gambling debts have consistently been held to violate both the state’s public policy and section 849.26 . . . as in the instant ease, argued that the public policy of Florida has changed since the time section 849.26 . . .
. . . In the Froug case the circuit court ruled that section 849.26, Florida Statutes, did not bar the collection . . . Because the interpretation of section 849.26 was the dispositive issue in both cases, the trial court . . . that, notwithstanding Florida’s change in public policy with respect to a statewide lottery, section 849.26 . . . See § 849.26, Fla.Stat. (1993); Blosser v. . . . Arviv contends that in view of the existence of section 849.26, Florida Statutes, and earlier case law . . .
. . . We interpret Florida Statute Section 849.26 as exempting transactions expressly authorized by Florida . . .
. . . In defending the suit, Froug relied on Florida Statutes, Section 849.26 (1991), which states: All promises . . . incurred casino gambling debts in Florida courts, or whether such a recovery is barred because of Section 849.26 . . . In interpreting Section 849.26, “Florida courts have consistently held that gambling obligations, even . . . See § 849.26, Fla.Stat. (1991); Carp v. . . . that the majority of American jurisdictions follow a protective policy, similar to that of Section 849.26 . . .
. . . of whether this claim, as opposed to the gross negligence-innkeeper liability theory, is barred by § 849.26 . . . claims that the agreement sued upon was void as a gambling contract rendered unenforceable by section 849.26 . . . Reversed and remanded with directions. .Section 849.26 states: All promises, agreements, notes, bills . . .
. . . Sands, Inc., 122 So.2d 618 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960); § 849.26, Fla.Stat. (1977). . . .
. . . . §849.26; Young v. . . .
. . . Moreover it is the public policy of the state as expressed in Florida Statute 849.26, F.S.A., that gambling . . .
. . . . § 849.26, F.S.A. . . .
. . . Sections 849.26 and 849.27 Florida Statutes provide that any gambling transaction to be excluded from . . .
. . . summary final judgment for defendant on the grounds that the debt was uncollectable by virtue of Section 849.26 . . .
. . . This conclusion is buttressed by the provisions of §§849.26 and 849.27, which provide that any gambling . . .
. . . The affirmative defense is based on § 849.26, Fla.Stat., F.S.A., which provides as follows: “Gambling . . .