The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . ." § 893.101(2). . . . which case the standard jury instructions require a finding of knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. § 893.101 . . .
. . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla.Stat. . . .
. . . . § 893.101. . . .
. . . See Ch. 2002-258, § 1, at 1848, Laws of Fla; § 893.101(2), Fla. . . .
. . . . § 893.101, the Florida Supreme Court had held that the mens rea element of the precursor crime for . . . Stat. § 893.101(2002) ). . . . Section 893.101 did not, however, eliminate knowledge of the presence of the substance as an element . . . Stat. § 893.101(2) (establishing affirmative defense of lack of knowledge of illicit nature). . . . Stat. § 893.101(2) ; Adkins, 96 So.3d at 422. . . .
. . . . § 893.101. Allen correctly concedes that our precedent clearly holds that a conviction under Fla. . . .
. . . . § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . See § 893.101, Fla. . . .
. . . . § 893.101, Fla. Stat. (2002); ch. 2002-258,- § 1, at 1848,’Laws of Fla.; Knight v. . . .
. . . §893.101 (2) and (3), Fla. . . . § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. . . . § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla, Stat. . . . § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. . . .
. . . And § 893.101 of the Florida Statutes provides that “knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled . . . Id. § 893.101(2). . . .
. . . State, 808 So.2d 166, 171 (Fla. 2002), superseded on other grounds by § 893.101, Fla. . . .
. . . based on his prior drug convictions under Florida Statutes § 893.13, as modified by Florida Statutes § 893.101 . . . Stat. § 893.101(2). . . .
. . . question than that presented here, which was whether an affirmative defense defined by Florida Statute § 893.101 . . .
. . . Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 416 (Fla. 2012) (“[Section 893.101] of the Florida Statutes] expressly eliminates . . .
. . . . § 893.101(2). . . .
. . . . § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . substance or 2) knew of the presence of the substance, but did not know of its. ■■ illicit nature. § 893.101 . . . the substance or 2) knew of the presence of the substance, but did not know of its illicit nature. § 893.101 . . . the substance or 2) knew of the presence of the substance, but did not know of its illicit nature. § 893.101 . . . substance or 2) knew of the presence of the 'substance, but did not know of its illicit nature. § ■893.101 . . .
. . . Knight, 107 So.3d at 453 n. 5; see also, § 893.101, Fla. . . .
. . . . § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 893.101(2), Fla. . . .
. . . . § 893.101(2). Subsequently, this Court has determined that a prior conviction under Fla. . . .
. . . . § 893.101, was not a "drug trafficking crime,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), and therefore was . . .
. . . . § 893.101(2). . . .
. . . . § 893.101(1)-(2); see State v. . . . Stat. § 893.101(2). Williams argues that his prior cocaine convictions under Fla. . . . Stat. § 893.101, was not a “drug trafficking crime,” as defined 18' U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), and therefore . . . Stat. § 893.101, does not qualify as a drug trafficking aggravated felony under the categorical approach . . .
. . . . § 893.101(1)-(2). . . . Stat. § 893.101, was not a "drug trafficking crime,” as defined 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), and therefore . . .
. . . . • Florida Statute § 893.101 clarifies § 893.13(l)(a)(l) by indicating that knowledge of the illicit . . . STAT. § 893.101. . . .
. . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . See § 893.101, Fla. Stat. (2014). . . . Section 893.101, Florida Statutes, is created to read: 893.101 Legislative findings and intent.— (1) . . .
. . . . § 893.101, which eliminated knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance as an element . . . possession with intent to sell or deliver cannabis, in violation of § 893.13(l)(a)(2), as amended by § 893.101 . . .
. . . . § 893.101(l)-(2). . . .
. . . However, in response to these decisions, the Florida Legislature in 2002 enacted Florida Statute § 893.101 . . . Section 893.101 “thus expressly eliminates knowledge of the illicit nature of the controlled substance . . . Paez Sarmientos argues that a conviction under § 893.13(l)(a)(l), as modified by § 893.101, does not . . . Ann. § 893.101. . Adkins, 96 So.3d at 416. In State v. . . . substance” from an element of the Florida crime to an affirmative defense through Florida Statute § 893.101 . . .
. . . See § 893.101, Fla. Stat. (2011); Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 25.7. . . .
. . . . § 893.101, is an aggravated felony as a matter of law. . . . Stat. § 893.101, significantly changing the nature of the offense: (1) The Legislature finds that the . . . Stat. § 893.101, categorically qualifies as an aggravated felony. . . . Stat. § 893.101 effectively creates a separate offense under Fla. . . . Stat. § 893.101, qualifies as a drug trafficking aggravated felony. Mr. . . .
. . . Adkins, 96 So.3d 412, 415 (Fla.2012) (discussing section 893.101, which was adopted in response to Scott . . .
. . . State, - So.3d - (Fla. 3d DCA 2013); see also § 893.101(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2006); People v. . . .
. . . . § 893.101 is facially unconstitutional, and both of Leaks’s prior convictions pursuant to that Florida . . . Stat. § 893.101 convictions within the five-year framework set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 851(e). . . .
. . . affirmative defense is raised, and because the instructions have been in place since 2007, after section 893.101 . . . The Legislature enacted section 893.101 in 2002 to explicitly provide that knowledge of the illicit nature . . . Section 893.101 provides as follows: (1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scott v. . . . is raised, the jury shall be instructed on the permissive presumption provided in this subsection. § 893.101 . . . From my perspective, our decision in Adkins upheld the constitutionality of section 893.101, but did . . . majority of the Court held that the guilty knowledge element, in light of the express language in section 893.101 . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . Appellant, Eddie Rutledge, asks this court to declare sections 893.101 and 893.13, Florida Statutes ( . . . Rutledge’s initial brief, this argument was resolved by the Florida Supreme Court’s holding that sections 893.101 . . .
. . . As to appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2008), we . . .
. . . possession of drug paraphernalia should be reversed, because a lack of a mens rea requirement in section 893.101 . . .
. . . On appeal, she challenges the constitutionality of section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2009), based on . . . 1348 (11th Cir.2012), and the Florida Supreme Court expressly upheld the constitutionality of section 893.101 . . .
. . . . § 893.101, amending the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. . . . Stat. § 893.101. . Id. § 893.13(l)(a), (6)(a). . Id. § 893.13(l)-(2). . 684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996). . . . . Stat. § 893.101 (citations omitted). . State v. Adkins, No. . . . did not assert lack of knowledge of cocaine's illicit nature as an affirmative defense, as Section 893.101 . . .
. . . reversed because Section 893.135, Florida Statutes (2009), is facially unconstitutional in that Section 893.101 . . .
. . . trafficking amount of amphetamine, and (3) section 893.13, Florida Statutes, as amended by section 893.101 . . . Finally, we reject Fonseca’s challenge to the constitutionality of sections 893.13 and 893.101. . . .
. . . court’s denial of his motions to suppress statements and physical evidence, and he argues that section 893.101 . . .
. . . . § 893.101(1)-(2), Fla. . . .
. . . Second, he argues that section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), is facially unconstitutional. . . . We also reject the defendant’s argument that statutory provisions in sections 893.101(2) and (3), Florida . . .
. . . In response to this Court’s decisions, the Legislature enacted a statute now codified in section 893.101 . . . Section 893.101 provides in full: (1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scott v. . . . The State asserts that section 893.13, as modified by section 893.101, is facially constitutional and . . . Finally, we explain our conclusion that sections 893.13 and 893.101 do not violate due process. . . . Sections 893.13 and 893.101 do not trigger the concern raised in Lambert and Giorgetti. . . . a controlled substance inadvertently, establishing the affirmative defense available under section 893.101 . . . rise to a permissive presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of the substance.” § 893.101 . . . on the permissive presumption that they knew of the illicit nature of the substance in question. § 893.101 . . . (codified at § 893.101(2), Fla. Stat. (2002)). . . . the accused may — but is not required to — assert the affirmative defense enumerated under section 893.101 . . .
. . . State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .
. . . s facial constitutional challenge to section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2003), as amended by section 893.101 . . . nature of the substance was an element of these drug offenses, the Florida legislature enacted section 893.101 . . . . 893.101 Legislative findings and intent.— (1) The Legislature finds that the cases of Scott v. . . . Wright, rejected facial challenges to the constitutionality of section 893.13, as amended by section .893.101 . . . Thus, if this Court concluded in Taylor that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, did not violate . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367, 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by 893.101, Florida . . . Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1308 (M.D.Fla.2011), in which the federal court held that section 893.101 . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .
. . . State, 77 So.Sd 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .
. . . State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .
. . . .2d 1289, 1297-1300 (M.D.Fla.2011), held that section 893.13, Florida Statutes, as amended by section 893.101 . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding “section 89.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .
. . . State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101. . . .
. . . The possession statute was amended by the enactment of section 893.101, Florida Statutes, on May 13, . . . instead, lack of knowledge of the illicit nature of the substance became an affirmative defense. § 893.101 . . . a constitutional challenge to the amendment of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2001), by section 893.101 . . .
. . . State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 991, 996 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (‘We hold that section 893.101 did not remove scienter from . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . See §§ 893.101, .13, Fla. Stat. (2010); Brown v. State, 8 So.3d 464 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). . . .
. . . So.3d 722 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, Florida Statutes, as amended by section 893.101 . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . grams or less of cannabis, and for possession of drug paraphernalia, should be vacated because section 893.101 . . . To the contrary, this case is an illustration of the logic and propriety of section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . State, 76 So.3d 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla.2011) and hold that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101 . . .
. . . We disagree and uphold the constitutionality of section 893.13 and conclude that section 893.101 does . . . We first note that this court has already held that section 893.101, Florida Statutes, is constitutional . . . In our view, section 893.101 did not remove the guilty knowledge element from these offenses, thereby . . . The legislature superseded this fourth element with the enactment of section 893.101. Miller v. . . . Section 893.101 recognizes that “actual or constructive possession” must be found for the presumption . . .
. . . Shelton holds that section 893.101, Florida Statutes, which provides that knowledge of the illicit nature . . .
. . . State, 929 So.2d 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006), that section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida . . . We reject his primary contention for reversal that section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2003), which overruled . . .
. . . In response to those two decisions, the Florida Legislature in 2002 enacted section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . State, 929 So.2d 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (rejecting claim of unconstitutionality of section 893.101, Florida . . .
. . . 6)(a) is unconstitutional because the mens rea requirement in the statute was eliminated by section 893.101 . . . illicit nature of a controlled substance is an affirmative defense to the offenses of this chapter. § 893.101 . . . among other reasons, the decision misperceives the operation of the affirmative defense in section 893.101 . . . his innocence by proving a lack of knowledge, see Wright, 920 So.2d at 25 (explaining that section 893.101 . . . a defense to a true strict liability crime, the availability of the affirmative defense in section 893.101 . . .
. . . . § 893.101. . . . Stat. § 893.101. . . . Stat. §§ 893.101, 893.13. B. . . . Stat. § 893.101(2). . . . Stat. § 893.101. . . .
. . . the three elements of trafficking in cocaine for offenses occurring after the enactment of section 893.101 . . . In 2002, the Legislature enacted section 893.101, Florida Statutes, eliminating knowledge of a controlled . . . See § 893.101(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . . as an element of trafficking, when the appellant’s offense occurred after the enactment of section 893.101 . . . from an instruction on trafficking in cocaine, and noting that, "for offenses occurring after section 893.101 . . .
. . . Section 893.101(2) states that the “[ljack of knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance . . . rise to a permissive presumption that the possessor knew of the illicit nature of the substance.” § 893.101 . . . This court explained the genesis of section 893.101 as follows: In 2002, the Florida Legislature enacted . . . section 893.101, Florida Statutes, which expressly provides that knowledge of the illicit nature of . . . Section 893.101, Florida Statutes, thus makes possession of a controlled substance a general intent crime . . .
. . . more than one issue raised in Harris, see 932 So.2d at 552, the only one identified is whether section 893.101 . . . and Burnette, the due process argument being made by the appellants in both cases was that section 893.101 . . . That case merely holds that the failure of section 893.101 to require “knowledge of the unlawful nature . . . 3.800(b)(2) in which he argued that his sentences are unconstitutional because, by virtue of section 893.101 . . . Appellant presents this same argument on appeal, and he also argues for the first time that section 893.101 . . . denying Appellant’s rule 3.800(b)(2) motion and the opinion in Harris rejected the argument that section 893.101 . . .
. . . State, 13 So.3d 77, 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (citing § 893.101(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2006)); Links v. . . .
. . . State, 808 So.2d 166 (Fla.2002), the Florida legislature clearly expressed its intent in section 893.101 . . .
. . . In 2002, the Florida Legislature enacted section 893.101, Florida Statutes, which expressly provides . . . Section 893.101, Florida Statutes, thus makes possession of a controlled substance a general intent crime . . .
. . . State, 928 So.2d 1254, 1256 n. 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (noting the 2002 enactment of section 893.101(2), . . .
. . . . § 893.101(1)-(2), Fla. . . . Legislature eliminated this fourth element as a requirement for a conviction for trafficking in cannabis. § 893.101 . . .
. . . Section 893.101(2) provides, in pertinent part, that “knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled . . . Section 893.101 became effective May 13, 2002. See Whitehurst v. . . . Because the date of Jose A.’s alleged offense was February 27, 2006, section 893.101 is applicable to . . . defense to the offenses of [chapter 893].” § 893.101(2). . . . However, section 893.101 addresses only the fourth element of the instruction concerning knowledge of . . .
. . . State, 901 So.2d 788, 792 n. 1 (Fla.2005) (citing § 893.101, Fla. . . .
. . . State, 808 So.2d 166, 170-71 (Fla.2002), superseded on other grounds by § 893.101, Fla. . . .
. . . use of "and” in oral instructions but "or” in written instructions), superseded on other grounds by § 893.101 . . .
. . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (S), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . . Give if applicable. § 893.101(2) and (3), Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . and the court, over the defendants’ objection, decided to omit the third element, based on section 893.101 . . . In section 893.101(2), the legislature found that "knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance . . .
. . . State, 684 So.2d 736 (Fla.1996), in section 893.101, went only to the element of knowledge of the illicit . . . The precise holding of Garcia is limited to cases tried before the effective date of section 893.101, . . .
. . . and the court, over the defendants’ objection, decided to omit the third element, based on section 893.101 . . . In section 893.101(2), the legislature found that “knowledge of the illicit nature of a controlled substance . . .
. . . State, 64 So.2d 915, 916 (Fla.1953)), superseded on other grounds by statute, § 893.101, Fla. . . .