Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 901.151 (2025)

Stop and Frisk Law.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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901.151 Stop and Frisk Law.—

(1) This section may be known and cited as the “Florida Stop and Frisk Law.”

(2) Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws of this state or the criminal ordinances of any municipality or county, the officer may temporarily detain such person for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person temporarily detained and the circumstances surrounding the person’s presence abroad which led the officer to believe that the person had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense.

(3) No person shall be temporarily detained under the provisions of subsection (2) longer than is reasonably necessary to effect the purposes of that subsection. Such temporary detention shall not extend beyond the place where it was first effected or the immediate vicinity thereof.

(4) If at any time after the onset of the temporary detention authorized by subsection (2), probable cause for arrest of person shall appear, the person shall be arrested. If, after an inquiry into the circumstances which prompted the temporary detention, no probable cause for the arrest of the person shall appear, the person shall be released.

(5) Whenever any law enforcement officer authorized to detain temporarily any person under the provisions of subsection (2) has probable cause to believe that any person whom the officer has temporarily detained, or is about to detain temporarily, is armed with a dangerous weapon and therefore offers a threat to the safety of the officer or any other person, the officer may search such person so temporarily detained only to the extent necessary to disclose, and for the purpose of disclosing, the presence of such weapon. If such a search discloses such a weapon or any evidence of a criminal offense it may be seized.

(6) No evidence seized by a law enforcement officer in any search under this section shall be admissible against any person in any court of this state or political subdivision thereof unless the search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the provisions of subsections (2)-(5).

History.—ss. 1, 2, ch. 69-73; s. 1459, ch. 97-102.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 651 cases (14 in the last 5 years), 1971–2025 · leading case: Johnny L. Marshall v. Sec'y, Florida Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2016).

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Johnny L. Marshall v. Sec'y, Florida Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2016). · cites it 13× “15 Marshall also argues that his detention and transportation to the Pizza Hut was illegal under Florida’s “Stop and Frisk Law,” Fla. Stat. § 901.151 , and that McKinley’s failure to 11 Case: 13-13775 Date Filed: 07/12/2016 Page: 12 of 43 We assess Marshall’s argument in the…”

Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188 (Fla. 2010). · cites it 12× “(citing § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991)). [3] While mere suspicion is *196 insufficient to support an investigatory stop, a stop will not violate a citizen's rights where it is based on "a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”

State v. Lundy, 334 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). · cites it 15× “The defendant was however "lawfully detained" under Fla. Stat. § 901.151 (1975), which allows law enforcement officers to detain temporarily any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation…”

State v. Webb, 398 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1981). · cites it 5× “In determining legislative intent, we must give due weight and effect to the title of *825 section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1977), which was placed at the beginning of the section by the legislature itself.”

State v. Cruse, 121 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). · cites it 15× “The Florida Supreme Court has clarified that when the term “probable cause” is used in section 901.151, the term means reasonable belief or suspicion, and does not rise to the level of justification required for an arrest.”

Johnson v. State, 785 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). · cites it 7× “1868 ; § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2000). Both Terry and section 901.”

Golphin v. State, 945 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 2006). · cites it 4× “(citing § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991)). [3] The third level is an arrest, which must be supported by probable cause that a crime has been or is being committed.”

Dewberry v. State, 905 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). · cites it 6× “§ 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2003). The meaning of "probable cause" in this statute is not the same as the stricter "probable cause" standard to justify a search warrant or an arrest.”

Walker v. State, 514 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987). · cites it 7× “Walker argues that the pipe, cocaine and statement made immediately after his arrest should have been suppressed. We agree.”

Hernandez v. State, 784 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). · cites it 8× “The trial court heard evidence on the defendant's motion to suppress, and denied the motion.”

State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1995). · cites it 5× “151, Florida Statutes (1991): Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws of this state .”

State v. Hetland, 366 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). · cites it 4× “We mention these matters not to diminish the impact of our decision in this case, but to suggest procedures which will lighten the burden of troubling questions for both law enforcement personnel and the courts.”

Show all 651 citing cases →

— 901.151(1) — 6 cases

State v. Wise, 603 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).

Frazier v. State, 789 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

Thompson v. State, 405 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).

State v. Hunter, 615 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).

D.L.J. v. State, 932 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

— 901.151(2) — 163 cases

Johnson v. State, 785 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). “1868 ; § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (2000). Both Terry and section 901.”

Slydell v. State, 792 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

Golphin v. State, 945 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. 2006). “(citing § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991)). [3] The third level is an arrest, which must be supported by probable cause that a crime has been or is being committed.”

Hunter v. State, 660 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1995).

Hernandez v. State, 784 So. 2d 1124 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). “The trial court heard evidence on the defendant's motion to suppress, and denied the motion.”

— 901.151(3) — 13 cases

Thames v. State, 592 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

Tennyson v. State, 469 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

State v. Varnedoe, 443 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983).

Jahquell Davis v. State, 253 So. 3d 1234 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018).

Kollmer v. State, 977 So. 2d 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

— 901.151(4) — 9 cases

Hochstetler v. State, 400 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).

Robinson v. State, 976 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

State v. Bowen, 444 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

State v. F.T.H., 579 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).

D.H. v. State, 121 So. 3d 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

— 901.151(5) — 110 cases

Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188 (Fla. 2010). “(citing § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1991)). [3] While mere suspicion is *196 insufficient to support an investigatory stop, a stop will not violate a citizen's rights where it is based on "a well-founded, articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”

Dewberry v. State, 905 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). “§ 901.151(5), Fla. Stat. (2003). The meaning of "probable cause" in this statute is not the same as the stricter "probable cause" standard to justify a search warrant or an arrest.”

Campuzano v. State, 771 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

State v. Cruse, 121 So. 3d 91 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). “The Florida Supreme Court has clarified that when the term “probable cause” is used in section 901.151, the term means reasonable belief or suspicion, and does not rise to the level of justification required for an arrest.”

Doctor v. State, 573 So. 2d 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).

— 901.151(6) — 8 cases

D.B.P. v. State, 31 So. 3d 883 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).

Shaw v. State, 611 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

McKinney v. Wainwright, 458 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

State v. Pruitt, 967 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

— 901.151(B) — 1 case

State v. Hannah, 98 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

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