Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 934.02 (2025)

Definitions.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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934.02 Definitions.—As used in this chapter:

(1) “Wire communication” means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception including the use of such connection in a switching station furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission of intrastate, interstate, or foreign communications or communications affecting intrastate, interstate, or foreign commerce.

(2) “Oral communication” means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any electronic communication.

(3) “Intercept” means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.

(4) “Electronic, mechanical, or other device” means any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, electronic, or oral communication other than:

(a) Any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment, or facility, or any component thereof:

1. Furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of wire or electronic communication service in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by such subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of such service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or

2. Being used by a provider of wire or electronic communications service in the ordinary course of its business or by an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of her or his duties.

(b) A hearing aid or similar device being used to correct subnormal hearing to not better than normal.

(5) “Person” means any employee or agent of the State of Florida or political subdivision thereof, of the United States, or of any other state or political subdivision thereof, and any individual, partnership, association, joint stock company, trust, or corporation.

(6) “Investigative or law enforcement officer” means any officer of the State of Florida or political subdivision thereof, of the United States, or of any other state or political subdivision thereof, who is empowered by law to conduct on behalf of the Government investigations of, or to make arrests for, offenses enumerated in this chapter or similar federal offenses, any attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of such offenses, or any other attorney representing the State of Florida or political subdivision thereof in any civil, regulatory, disciplinary, or forfeiture action relating to, based upon, or derived from such offenses.

(7) “Contents,” when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.

(8) “Judge of competent jurisdiction” means justice of the Supreme Court, judge of a district court of appeal, circuit judge, or judge of any court of record having felony jurisdiction of the State of Florida, irrespective of the geographic location or jurisdiction where the judge presides.

(9) “Aggrieved person” means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was directed.

(10) “Law enforcement agency” means an agency of the State of Florida or a political subdivision thereof or of the United States if the primary responsibility of the agency is the prevention and detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, traffic, or highway laws of this state and if its agents and officers are empowered by law to conduct criminal investigations and to make arrests.

(11) “Communication common carrier” shall have the same meaning which is given the term “common carrier” in 47 U.S.C. s. 153(10).

(12) “Electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system that affects intrastate, interstate, or foreign commerce, but does not include:

(a) Any wire or oral communication;

(b) Any communication made through a tone-only paging device;

(c) Any communication from an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or an object; or

(d) Electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial institution in a communications system used for the electronic storage and transfer of funds.

(13) “User” means any person or entity who:

(a) Uses an electronic communication service, and

(b) Is duly authorized by the provider of such service to engage in such use.

(14) “Electronic communications system” means any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical, or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of wire or electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of such communications.

(15) “Electronic communication service” means any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.

(16) “Readily accessible to the general public” means, with respect to a radio communication, that such communication is not:

(a) Scrambled or encrypted;

(b) Transmitted using modulation techniques whose essential parameters have been withheld from the public with the intention of preserving the privacy of such communication;

(d) Transmitted over a communications system provided by a common carrier, unless the communication is a tone-only paging system communication; or

(e) Transmitted on frequencies allocated under part 25; subpart D, subpart E, or subpart F of part 74; or part 94 of the Rules of the Federal Communications Commission, unless, in the case of a communication transmitted on a frequency allocated under part 74 that is not exclusively allocated to broadcast auxiliary services, the communication is a two-way voice communication by radio.

(17) “Electronic storage” means:

(a) Any temporary intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof.

(b) Any storage of a wire or electronic communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of such communication.

(18) “Aural transfer” means a transfer containing the human voice at any point between and including the point of origin and the point of reception.

(19) “Remote computing service” means the provision to the public of computer storage or processing services by means of an electronic communications system.

(20) “Pen register” means a device or process that records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, but such information does not include the contents of any communication. The term does not include any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing or recording as an incident to billing or for communication services provided by such provider, and does not include any device or process used by a provider or customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business.

(21) “Trap and trace device” means a device or process that captures the incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication, but such information does not include the contents of any communication.

(22) “State” means any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any other possession or territory of the United States.

(23) “Subpoena” means any administrative subpoena authorized by federal or Florida law, federal or Florida grand jury subpoena, or any criminal investigative subpoena as authorized by Florida statute which may be utilized on behalf of the government by an investigative or law enforcement officer.

(24) “Foreign intelligence information” means information, whether or not concerning a United States person, as that term is defined in 50 U.S.C. s. 1801, which relates to:

(a) The ability of the United States to protect against actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;

(b) Sabotage or international terrorism by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;

(c) Clandestine intelligence activities by an intelligence service, a network of a foreign power, or an agent of a foreign power; or

(d) With respect to a foreign power or foreign territory, the national defense or security of the United States or the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.

(25) “Protected computer” means:

(a) A computer for the exclusive use of a financial institution or governmental entity;

(b) A computer that is not for the exclusive use of a financial institution or governmental entity, but that is used by or for a financial institution or governmental entity and with respect to which unlawful conduct can affect the use by or for the financial institution or governmental entity; or

(c) A computer that is used in interstate or foreign commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States.

(26) “Computer trespasser” means a person who accesses a protected computer without authorization and thus does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to any communication transmitted to, through, or from the protected computer. The term does not include a person known by the owner or operator of the protected computer to have an existing contractual relationship with the owner or operator of the protected computer for access to all or part of the protected computer.

History.—s. 2, ch. 69-17; s. 1, ch. 72-294; s. 1, ch. 74-249; s. 1, ch. 80-27; s. 1, ch. 88-184; s. 1, ch. 89-269; s. 1581, ch. 97-102; s. 8, ch. 2000-369; s. 1, ch. 2002-72; s. 125, ch. 2010-5.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 106 cases (24 in the last 5 years), 1973–2026 · leading case: Richard R. Mcdade v. State of Florida, 154 So. 3d 292 (Fla. 2014).

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Richard R. Mcdade v. State of Florida, 154 So. 3d 292 (Fla. 2014). · cites it 9× “§ 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). The recordings were made surreptitiously.”

State v. Jackson, 650 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1995). · cites it 11× “Emphasizing the broadcast nature of beeper messages and reasoning that wire communications are those actually transmitted by wire, we rejected the argument that such messages constituted wire communications under section 934.02(1). We distinguish Dorsey because the Florida…”

State v. Tsavaris, 394 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981). · cites it 7× “Therein, this Court held that the recording should be suppressed based upon the premise that the extortionary threat was an oral communication within the definition of section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (1975).”

Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). · cites it 2× “, Fla. Stat. § 934.02 (2); Ohio Rev.Code Ann.”

Minotty v. Baudo, 42 So. 3d 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). · cites it 6× “As the Florida statute is patterned after the federal statute and contains essentially the same language, we conclude that silent video surveillance is not covered by section 934.02 or 934.10. As in Larios, FEI/doctors have pointed to no authority holding that silent video…”

Dept. of Agric. v. Edwards, 654 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). · cites it 9× “" § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (1993); State v. Smith, 641 So.”

State v. Nova, 361 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1978). · cites it 6× “The word "intercept" is defined in Section 934.02(3): "Intercept" means the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device; .”

James Eric McDonough v. Katherine Fernandez-Rundle, 862 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2017). · cites it 4× “Fla. Stat. § 934.02 (2016) (emphasis added).”

Guilder v. State, 899 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). · cites it 5× “When section 934.02(2)(d) was amended to provide that it was lawful to intercept a wire or oral communication when all of the parties to the communication have given prior consent to such interception, the legislature still referred only to interceptions, not recordings.”

Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). · cites it 7× “Section 934.02(1) defines "wire communication" as: any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between *628 the point of origin and the point of reception…”

State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1985). · cites it 4× “06 and the question of whether an extortionary threat delivered personally to the victim in his home was an "oral communication" as defined in section 934.02(2). We answered that it was an "oral communication;" held that pursuant to section 943.”

Jackson v. State, 18 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. 2009). · cites it 2× “§ 17-30-15(2) (2005); cf § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). Under both the Fourth Amendment and the Florida wiretapping act, a speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy and our society must recognize that the expectation is reasonable for the oral conversation…”

Show all 106 citing cases →

— 934.02(1) — 10 cases

Koch v. Kimball, 710 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).

Chandler v. State, 366 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).

State v. Williams, 443 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1983).

State v. Jackson, 650 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1995). “Emphasizing the broadcast nature of beeper messages and reasoning that wire communications are those actually transmitted by wire, we rejected the argument that such messages constituted wire communications under section 934.02(1). We distinguish Dorsey because the Florida…”

Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). “Section 934.02(1) defines "wire communication" as: any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between *628 the point of origin and the point of reception…”

— 934.02(12) — 5 cases

O'Brien v. O'Brien, 899 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

Figueroa v. State, 870 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

Jackson v. State, 636 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994).

— 934.02(12)(c) — 3 cases

Goldstein v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (S.D. Fla. 2021).

W.W. v. Orlando Health, Inc. (M.D. Fla. 2025).

— 934.02(18) — 1 case

Maddie Joy Langlois v. State of Florida (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).

— 934.02(2) — 48 cases

Richard R. Mcdade v. State of Florida, 154 So. 3d 292 (Fla. 2014). “§ 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2010). The recordings were made surreptitiously.”

Jackson v. State, 18 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. 2009). “§ 17-30-15(2) (2005); cf § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). Under both the Fourth Amendment and the Florida wiretapping act, a speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy and our society must recognize that the expectation is reasonable for the oral conversation…”

State v. Walls, 356 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1978).

State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1985). “06 and the question of whether an extortionary threat delivered personally to the victim in his home was an "oral communication" as defined in section 934.02(2). We answered that it was an "oral communication;" held that pursuant to section 943.”

Dept. of Agric. v. Edwards, 654 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “" § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (1993); State v. Smith, 641 So.”

— 934.02(2)(d) — 2 cases

State v. Tsavaris, 394 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981). “Therein, this Court held that the recording should be suppressed based upon the premise that the extortionary threat was an oral communication within the definition of section 934.02(2), Florida Statutes (1975).”

Guilder v. State, 899 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). “When section 934.02(2)(d) was amended to provide that it was lawful to intercept a wire or oral communication when all of the parties to the communication have given prior consent to such interception, the legislature still referred only to interceptions, not recordings.”

— 934.02(20) — 7 cases

Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1989).

Delgado v. State, 948 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 2006).

Figueroa v. State, 870 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

Tracey v. State, 69 So. 3d 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

— 934.02(21) — 3 cases

Tracey v. State, 69 So. 3d 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).

Jose Estache v. The State of Florida (Fla. 3d DCA 2022).

— 934.02(3) — 27 cases

Minotty v. Baudo, 42 So. 3d 824 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). “As the Florida statute is patterned after the federal statute and contains essentially the same language, we conclude that silent video surveillance is not covered by section 934.02 or 934.10. As in Larios, FEI/doctors have pointed to no authority holding that silent video…”

Dept. of Agric. v. Edwards, 654 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). “" § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (1993); State v. Smith, 641 So.”

O'Brien v. O'Brien, 899 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

— 934.02(4) — 2 cases

State v. Tsavaris, 382 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).

State v. Rosa, 37 Fla. Supp. 2d 157 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1988).

— 934.02(4)(a) — 3 cases

State v. Nova, 361 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1978). “The word "intercept" is defined in Section 934.02(3): "Intercept" means the aural acquisition of the contents of any wire or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device; .”

State v. Keaton, 371 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1979).

Stalley v. ADS All. Data Sys., Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (M.D. Fla. 2014).

— 934.02(5) — 6 cases

Cohen Bros., LLC. v. Me Corp., Sa, 872 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004).

Dep't of Prof. Reg. v. Rentfast, 467 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

McDade v. State, 114 So. 3d 465 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

South Broward Hosp. Dist. D/B/A Mem'l Healthcare Sys. v. Joseph Kaplan & Donald Solomon (Fla. 4th DCA 2024).

Mack v. Lee Mem'l Health Sys. (M.D. Fla. 2025).

— 934.02(6) — 2 cases

Ward v. State, 965 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

State v. Hershkowitz, 714 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

— 934.02(7) — 5 cases

Figueroa v. State, 870 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

State v. Tsavaris, 382 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).

P.J. v. State, 453 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

Goldstein v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (S.D. Fla. 2021).

— 934.02(8) — 1 case

United States v. Louis B. Pacheco & John N. Fountain, Jr., 489 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1974).

— 934.02(9) — 6 cases

State v. News-Press Pub. Co., 338 So. 2d 1313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976).

State v. Eber, 502 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

State v. Jones, 562 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).

Brugmann v. State, 117 So. 3d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.