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Fla. Stat. § 941.45 (2025)

Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session
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941.45 Interstate Agreement on Detainers.—The interstate compact known as the “Interstate Agreement on Detainers” is enacted into law and entered into by the state as a party, and is of full force and effect between the state and any other states joining therein in the form substantially as follows:

INTERSTATE AGREEMENT
ON DETAINERS

ARTICLE I

Policy and Purpose

The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.

ARTICLE II

Definitions

As used in this agreement:

(a) “State” means the United States of America, a state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

(b) “Sending state” means a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time he or she initiates a request for final disposition pursuant to Article III or at the time that a request for custody or availability is initiated pursuant to Article IV.

(c) “Receiving state” means the state in which trial is to be had on an indictment, information, or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article IV.

ARTICLE III

Request for Final Disposition

(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he or she shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the prisoner shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his or her imprisonment and the prisoner’s request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint; provided that, for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner.

(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of the prisoner, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.

(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform the prisoner of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him or her and shall also inform the prisoner of his or her right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint on which the detainer is based.

(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) shall operate as a request for final disposition of all untried indictments, informations, or complaints on the basis of which detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner’s request for final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by copies of the prisoner’s written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.

(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein by reason of paragraph (d), and a waiver of extradition to the receiving state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him or her, after completion of the prisoner’s term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his or her body in any court where the prisoner’s presence may be required in order to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.

(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his or her execution of the request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) shall void the request.

ARTICLE IV

Request for Custody or Availability

(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information, or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom the officer has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article V(a) upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information, or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded, and transmitted the request and provided further that there shall be a period of 30 days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon the governor’s own motion or upon motion of the prisoner.

(b) Upon receipt of the officer’s written request as provided in paragraph (a), the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.

(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance.

(d) Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which the prisoner may have to contest the legality of his or her delivery as provided in paragraph (a), but such delivery may not be opposed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.

(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (e) of Article V, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.

ARTICLE V

Offer to Deliver Temporary Custody

(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV, the appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such indictment, information, or complaint is pending against such person in order that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall accompany the written notice provided for in Article III. In the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this article or to the prisoner’s presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by the custodian.

(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:

1. Proper identification and evidence of the officer’s authority to act for the state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given, and

2. A duly certified copy of the indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.

(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment, information, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information, or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.

(d) The temporary custody referred to in this article shall be only for the purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or more untried indictments, informations, or complaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges arising out of the same transaction. Except for the prisoner’s attendance at court and while being transported to or from any place at which his or her presence may be required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution.

(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.

(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.

(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as provided in this article is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner permitted by law.

(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments, informations, or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring for, keeping, and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall govern unless the states concerned have entered into a supplementary agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies, and officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs or responsibilities therefor.

ARTICLE VI

Tolling Period and Limitations

(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in Articles III and IV, the running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.

(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.

ARTICLE VII

Designation of Officer

Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this agreement and who shall provide, within and without the state, information necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

Effectiveness and Withdrawal

This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may withdraw herefrom by enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof.

ARTICLE IX

Construction and Severability

This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this agreement shall be severable, and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any government, agency, person, or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If this agreement shall be held contrary to the constitution of any state party hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable matters.

History.—s. 1, ch. 73-287; s. 3, ch. 89-531; s. 1623, ch. 97-102.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 82 cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case: Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1988).
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Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1988). · cites it 9× “to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court.”
Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1994). · cites it 10× “[6] Vining also claims that his motion for discharge was improperly denied because he was not brought to trial on the charges within 180 days after his request for final disposition under section 941.”
Coit v. State, 440 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). · cites it 9× “Appellant's main contention is that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the information filed against him since the State did not try him on the burglary charge in accordance with the provisions of Section 941.45(3)(a), (b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1979),…”
Johnson v. State, 442 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1983). · cites it 6× “§ 941.45, Fla. Stat. (1979). The underlying policy of the IAD is to enhance the possibility of rehabilitation by resolving all outstanding charges against a convict regardless of which state has filed the charges.”
Bogue v. Fennelly, 705 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). · cites it 11× “IX, § 941.45, Fla. Stat. (1995). Based upon this rationale, the court held that the IAD imposed an obligation on the State of Florida to timely sentence the petitioner upon his request that Florida do so.”
Gaddy v. Turner, 376 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). · cites it 9× “§ 941.45, Fla. Stat. (1977). Gaddy contended that the Florida detainer had caused Georgia prison authorities to hold him in closer security than other prisoners, and had made him ineligible to be moved to a prison facility closer to his family.”
Shewan v. State, 396 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). · cites it 12× “…REMANDED. DAUKSCH, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. NOTES [1] The information was amended on September 7, 1978. [2] § 941.45, Fla. Stat. (1977).”
Monroe v. State, 978 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). · cites it 9× “Anthony Monroe, who is currently serving a 100-month sentence in a federal prison, sought a final disposition of charges pending against him in the State of Florida by filing a request for final disposition pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IADA), codified…”
State v. Minnick, 413 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). · cites it 12× “Appellant, State of Florida, takes this appeal from a final order entered under the authority of section 941.45, Florida Statutes (1979) (Interstate Agreement on Detainers), which dismissed an information charging appellee with burglary and which discharged appellee.”
State v. Roberts, 427 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). · cites it 8× “As Roberts was not brought to Florida until July 15, 1981, more than 180 days after section 941.45 was invoked, the circuit court's dismissal of the two informations was proper.”
Fuente v. State, 549 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1989). · cites it 4× “On March 4, 1986, 246 days after his request for final disposition was received by Florida authorities, Fuente filed a motion for discharge claiming that his right to be brought to trial within 180 days pursuant to section 941.45(3) had been violated. At the hearing on the…”
State v. Garza, 807 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). · cites it 6× “191 and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, section 941.45, Florida Statutes (1999) (IAD).”
Show all 82 citing cases →
— 941.45(1) — 7 cases
Johnson v. State, 442 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1983). “§ 941.45, Fla. Stat. (1979). The underlying policy of the IAD is to enhance the possibility of rehabilitation by resolving all outstanding charges against a convict regardless of which state has filed the charges.”
Gaddy v. Turner, 376 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). “§ 941.45, Fla. Stat. (1977). Gaddy contended that the Florida detainer had caused Georgia prison authorities to hold him in closer security than other prisoners, and had made him ineligible to be moved to a prison facility closer to his family.”
State v. Butler, 496 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
State v. Julian, 765 P.2d 1104 (Kan. 1988).
State v. Roberts, 427 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). “As Roberts was not brought to Florida until July 15, 1981, more than 180 days after section 941.45 was invoked, the circuit court's dismissal of the two informations was proper.”
— 941.45(3) — 17 cases
Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1994). “[6] Vining also claims that his motion for discharge was improperly denied because he was not brought to trial on the charges within 180 days after his request for final disposition under section 941.”
State v. Roberts, 427 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). “As Roberts was not brought to Florida until July 15, 1981, more than 180 days after section 941.45 was invoked, the circuit court's dismissal of the two informations was proper.”
State v. Fay, 763 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1988). “to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court.”
Parker v. State, 539 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
— 941.45(3)(2) — 1 case
Schuhart v. State, 647 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
— 941.45(3)(a) — 22 cases
Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1988). “to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court.”
Coit v. State, 440 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “Appellant's main contention is that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the information filed against him since the State did not try him on the burglary charge in accordance with the provisions of Section 941.45(3)(a), (b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1979),…”
Fuente v. State, 549 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1989). “On March 4, 1986, 246 days after his request for final disposition was received by Florida authorities, Fuente filed a motion for discharge claiming that his right to be brought to trial within 180 days pursuant to section 941.45(3) had been violated. At the hearing on the…”
Gaddy v. Turner, 376 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). “§ 941.45, Fla. Stat. (1977). Gaddy contended that the Florida detainer had caused Georgia prison authorities to hold him in closer security than other prisoners, and had made him ineligible to be moved to a prison facility closer to his family.”
Wainwright v. Evans, 403 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
— 941.45(3)(a)(b) — 1 case
Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1988). “to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court.”
— 941.45(3)(b) — 5 cases
Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1988). “to the warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court.”
Fuente v. State, 549 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 1989). “On March 4, 1986, 246 days after his request for final disposition was received by Florida authorities, Fuente filed a motion for discharge claiming that his right to be brought to trial within 180 days pursuant to section 941.45(3) had been violated. At the hearing on the…”
State v. Smiley, 529 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
State v. Edwards, 509 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
State v. Kresler, 24 Fla. Supp. 2d 105 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1987).
— 941.45(3)(c) — 2 cases
Coit v. State, 440 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “Appellant's main contention is that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the information filed against him since the State did not try him on the burglary charge in accordance with the provisions of Section 941.45(3)(a), (b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1979),…”
State v. Smiley, 529 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
— 941.45(3)(d) — 3 cases
Gaddy v. Turner, 376 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). “§ 941.45, Fla. Stat. (1977). Gaddy contended that the Florida detainer had caused Georgia prison authorities to hold him in closer security than other prisoners, and had made him ineligible to be moved to a prison facility closer to his family.”
State v. Wiggins, 425 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
State v. Kresler, 24 Fla. Supp. 2d 105 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1987).
— 941.45(3)(e) — 1 case
Dillman v. State, 411 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
— 941.45(4) — 6 cases
Shewan v. State, 396 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). “…REMANDED. DAUKSCH, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. NOTES [1] The information was amended on September 7, 1978. [2] § 941.45, Fla. Stat. (1977).”
Williams v. State, 426 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
State v. Grizzell, 399 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
State v. Minnick, 413 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). “Appellant, State of Florida, takes this appeal from a final order entered under the authority of section 941.45, Florida Statutes (1979) (Interstate Agreement on Detainers), which dismissed an information charging appellee with burglary and which discharged appellee.”
State v. Edwards, 509 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987).
— 941.45(4)(a) — 4 cases
Monroe v. State, 978 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). “Anthony Monroe, who is currently serving a 100-month sentence in a federal prison, sought a final disposition of charges pending against him in the State of Florida by filing a request for final disposition pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IADA), codified…”
State v. Ivey, 410 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
O'Connell v. State, 400 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
State v. Kresler, 24 Fla. Supp. 2d 105 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1987).
— 941.45(4)(b) — 1 case
Williams v. State, 426 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
— 941.45(4)(c) — 12 cases
Johnson v. State, 593 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1992).
Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1994). “[6] Vining also claims that his motion for discharge was improperly denied because he was not brought to trial on the charges within 180 days after his request for final disposition under section 941.”
Shewan v. State, 396 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). “…REMANDED. DAUKSCH, C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. NOTES [1] The information was amended on September 7, 1978. [2] § 941.45, Fla. Stat. (1977).”
State v. Ivey, 410 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
Toro v. State, 479 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
— 941.45(4)(e) — 6 cases
State v. Grizzell, 399 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
Williams v. State, 426 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
State v. Wiggins, 425 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
Jones v. State, 386 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
State v. Moser, 445 So. 2d 696 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
— 941.45(5) — 1 case
Maggard v. Wainwright, 411 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
— 941.45(5)(b) — 1 case
Distiso v. Wainwright, 451 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
— 941.45(5)(c) — 4 cases
Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1994). “[6] Vining also claims that his motion for discharge was improperly denied because he was not brought to trial on the charges within 180 days after his request for final disposition under section 941.”
State v. Minnick, 413 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). “Appellant, State of Florida, takes this appeal from a final order entered under the authority of section 941.45, Florida Statutes (1979) (Interstate Agreement on Detainers), which dismissed an information charging appellee with burglary and which discharged appellee.”
Maggard v. Wainwright, 411 So. 2d 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Quinn v. State, 713 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
— 941.45(5)(d) — 2 cases
Jones v. State, 386 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
State v. Minnick, 413 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). “Appellant, State of Florida, takes this appeal from a final order entered under the authority of section 941.45, Florida Statutes (1979) (Interstate Agreement on Detainers), which dismissed an information charging appellee with burglary and which discharged appellee.”
— 941.45(5)(e) — 1 case
O'Connell v. State, 400 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
— 941.45(6) — 2 cases
State v. Minnick, 413 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). “Appellant, State of Florida, takes this appeal from a final order entered under the authority of section 941.45, Florida Statutes (1979) (Interstate Agreement on Detainers), which dismissed an information charging appellee with burglary and which discharged appellee.”
State v. Smiley, 529 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
— 941.45(6)(a) — 1 case
State v. Ivey, 410 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
— 941.45(9) — 1 case
State v. Roberts, 427 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). “As Roberts was not brought to Florida until July 15, 1981, more than 180 days after section 941.45 was invoked, the circuit court's dismissal of the two informations was proper.”
— 941.45(I) — 1 case
Hunter, III v. State of Florida (Fla. 5th DCA 2025).
— 941.45(III)(a) — 2 cases
Dawes v. State, 135 So. 3d 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).
Hunter, III v. State of Florida (Fla. 5th DCA 2025).
— 941.45(III)(b) — 1 case
Hunter, III v. State of Florida (Fla. 5th DCA 2025).
— 941.45(III)(d) — 1 case
Hunter, III v. State of Florida (Fla. 5th DCA 2025).
— 941.45(IV)(a) — 1 case
Hunter, III v. State of Florida (Fla. 5th DCA 2025).
— 941.45(IV)(c) — 1 case
Hunter, III v. State of Florida (Fla. 5th DCA 2025).
— 941.45(IX) — 1 case
Dawes v. State, 135 So. 3d 420 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014).
— 941.45(a) — 1 case
Parks v. State, 43 So. 3d 858 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).
— 941.45(b) — 1 case
Coit v. State, 440 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). “Appellant's main contention is that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the information filed against him since the State did not try him on the burglary charge in accordance with the provisions of Section 941.45(3)(a), (b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1979),…”
— 941.45(d) — 1 case
Parks v. State, 43 So. 3d 858 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.

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