The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
X.B. also argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he willfully trespassed on to the school grounds. Specifically, X.B. argues that he did not "create the situation" because his mother dropped him off at school the day of the trespass. X.B. asserts that because his mother failed in her statutory responsibility to provide "sufficient support, guidance, and supervision to deter" his participation in a juvenile act, as described in section 985.02, Florida Statutes (2020), his return to school was not willful on his part. This argument fails for two reasons. First, section 810.097(1) does not cross-reference section 985.02, which sets forth the legislative intent for chapter 985 concerning Florida's juvenile justice system. See generally, E.A.R. v. State, 4 So. 3d 614, 628-32 (Fla. 2009). X.B. has given us no reason to import the legislative intent for that chapter into a criminal trespass statute.
The FCRA does not define sex and provides no indication that "sex" is limited to a binary choice based on a person's sexual organs or genetics alone. To the contrary, the Florida Constitution seems to equate sex and gender. Article I, section 2 in the Declaration of Rights defines basic rights and states, "All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law." The Legislature uses "gender" to mean "sex" in many statutes. See, e.g , § 1.01(2), Fla. Stat. (2016) ("Gender-specific language includes the other gender and neuter."); § 27.5302, Fla. Stat. (2016) (prohibiting salary discrimination among assistant public defenders "on the basis of gender or race"); § 28.34, Fla. Stat. (2016) (prohibiting salary discrimination among clerk of court employees "on the basis of gender or race"); § 985.02, Fla. Stat. (2016) (requiring "gender-specific" programs in the juvenile justice system because "[y]oung women and men" need different treatment and services); § 1000.05(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2016) (prohibiting discrimination in Florida public schools "on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, disability, or marital status"); § 1006.71, Fla. Stat. (2016…
As previously mentioned, in her reply brief A.A. conceded that the trial court had the authority to issue her a do not run order under section 985.02(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes, because the trial court already had the discretion to subject A.A. to detention care pursuant to A.A.'s September 2016 probation. But for her probation, A.A., like S.F. and N.A., maintains that the trial court would not have the authority to issue a do not run order under chapter 985.
In addition, the no early termination condition conflicts with the dual purposes of the juvenile justice system—preventing acts of delinquency and rehabilitating the juvenile. See § 985.02(3), Fla. Stat. (2017). A probationary condition that does not allow for early termination runs counter to the purpose of rehabilitation, and it does not allow for the consideration of the release of a juvenile who has "substantially complied" with the terms and conditions of his or her probation. See id. § 985.435(7).
The Florida Legislature has found "that certain juveniles have committed a sufficient number of criminal acts, including acts involving violence to persons, to represent sufficient danger to the community to warrant sentencing and placement within the adult system." § 985.02(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016). As such, section 985.565 gives the trial court the power to impose adult sanctions on juveniles charged as adults. Subsection (1)(b) lists the factors the court "shall consider" in determining whether to impose such sanctions. Subsection (4)(a)4 states that "[a]ny sentence imposing adult sanctions is presumed appropriate , and the court is not required to set forth specific findings or enumerate the criteria in this subsection as any basis for its decision to impose adult sanctions." (Emphasis added).
Although this action is not about the statutes of Florida and the Florida legislature's intent in an enactment, the statutes of Florida control the reasons for which a juvenile is subject to detention. To detain a juvenile, Section 985.02(4)(a), Florida Statutes, requires:
Chapter 985 acknowledges that “there is a need for secure placement for certain children alleged to have committed a delinquent act.” § 985.02(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). In a predisposition posture, the juvenile is presumed innocent, and the chapter limits the uses of precommitment “detention.” Postcommitment detention occurs after a juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent and after the court has committed the juvenile to a residential program. Such a juvenile is not merely alleged to have committed a delinquent act; there has been a finding of guilt. See generally §§ 985.24, et seq., Fla. Stat. (2011) (Part V of Chapter 985, discussing the permitted uses and criteria for detention which apply in a pre-commitment posture).
Although less far-reaching, the standard adopted by the Second District Court of Appeal in M.S. v. State, 927 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), suffers from the same basic flaw that is present in the standard adopted by the majority of this Court: it lacks a proper basis in the statute enacted by the Legislature. By focusing the disposition decision on the "needs of the child," the standard utilized in M.S. departs from the statute. The standard both ignores the discretion afforded by the Legislature to juvenile court judges and gives short shrift to the primary policy goal of "protect[ing] the public from acts of delinquency." § 985.02(3), Fla. Stat.
Florida's juvenile justice system is — for better or worse — a creature of statute. See §§ 985.01—.807, Fla. Stat. (2007). This arrangement imposes a unique set of limitations on the ability of the circuit judges in this state to control juvenile delinquents. While the circuit judges of this state have a panoply of inherent powers to impose restraints on recalcitrant adult criminal defendants, the power of those same judges to detain a child respondent in a juvenile proceeding conducted pursuant to chapter 985 of the Florida Statutes is strictly limited by law. R.G., 817 So.2d at 1020; see also § 985.02(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007) ("The Legislature finds that detention should be used only when less restrictive interim placement alternatives prior to adjudication and disposition are not appropriate.").
. . . A.A. conceded that the trial court had the authority to issue her a do not run order under section 985.02 . . .
. . . See § 985.02(3), Fla. Stat. (2017). . . .
. . . .” § 985.02(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . .
. . . The Sheriff responds to the plaintiffs’ legal assertion, based on Section 985.02, Florida Statutes, that . . . To detain a juvenile, Section 985.02(4)(a), Florida Statutes, requires: clear and convincing evidence . . . every one of whom — clear and convincing evidence establishes — qualifies for detention under Section 985.02 . . . Stat. § 985.02(4)(a). . . .
. . . .” § 985.02(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). . . .
. . . .” § 985.02(3), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). . . . gives short shrift to the primary policy goal of “protect[ing] the public from acts of delinquency.” § 985.02 . . . prevention,” it is the intent of the Legislature to “protect the public from acts of delinquency,” section 985.02 . . .
. . . R.G., 817 So.2d at 1020; see also § 985.02(4)(a), Fla. . . .
. . . As explained in section 985.02, titled “Legislative intent for the juvenile justice system”: (4) DETENTION . . . The other statute relied on by the State is section 985.02(3)(a), contained in the chapter’s expression . . . and strengthening the family as a whole so that children may remain in their homes of communities. § 985.02 . . .
. . . This policy is expressed in section 985.02(4), in the following terms: “The Legislature finds that detention . . .
. . . insure their care, safety, treatment, education and rehabilitation, [n.2] [n.2] For example, section 985.02 . . . (1) provides: 985.02. . . .
. . . See also § 985.02(3)(a)-(b), Fla. . . . reducing acts of delinquency, with a focus on maintaining and strengthening the family as a whole”); § 985.02 . . .
. . . For example, section 985.02(1) provides: 985.02. . . .
. . . State, 702 So.2d 488, 491 (Fla.1997) (adopting the district court’s reasoning); see also § 985.02 (emphasizing . . . Compare §§ 985.02, 985.228, Fla. Stat. (2002), with §§ 39.002, 39.053, Fla. Stat. (1995). . . .
. . . regarding dependency cases in section 39.001(1), Florida Statutes (2000); delinquency cases in section 985.02 . . .
. . . See §§ 39.002, 984.02, 985.02, Fla. Stat. (1997). . . .
. . . See §§ 985.01, 985.02, Fla. Stat. (1999). . . .
. . . Section 985.02(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), states that detention should be used only when less restrictive . . .
. . . . § 985.02(3), Fla. . . .