The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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The legislature has expressed a policy of strictly controlling the detention of juveniles, and the detention of juveniles is governed entirely by statute. See S.B. v. Parkins, 10 So.3d 207, 208 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); B.M. v. Dobuler, 979 So.2d 308, 312, 318 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Section 985.24( 3)(d), Florida Statutes (2022), which was numbered 985.24( 2)(d), Florida Statutes (2021), at the time A.T. was decided, prohibits placement of a child alleged to be delinquent in secure or supervised release detention care due to a lack of more appropriate facilities. See B.S. v. State, 134 So.3d 1126, 1126 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (holding that once the child was committed to DCF after being declared incompetent, the trial court lost authority to direct where and when she should be placed by DCF and that it was error under section 985.24( 2)(d), Florida Statutes (2013), to order her to be held in secure detention pending placement). Section 985.24( 3)(d) squarely addresses the situation in this proceeding-N.N.R. is alleged to be delinquent and the trial court has placed her in secure detention because there are no more appropriate facilities available. By… The Court denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits. Section 985.24(3), Florida Statutes (2021), prohibits secure detention care for a child alleged to be dependent under chapter 39. This language indicates that secure detention care cannot be used as a remedy in a dependency case. This is not a dependency case, but a delinquency proceeding involving a juvenile who purportedly has been adjudicated as a dependent child already.The Court denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the merits. Section 985.24(3), Florida Statutes (2021), prohibits secure detention care for a child alleged to be dependent under chapter 39. This language indicates that secure detention care cannot be used as a remedy in a dependency case. This is not a dependency case, but a delinquency proceeding involving a juvenile who purportedly has been adjudicated as a dependent child already.The trial court erred in two respects. First, indirect criminal contempt is the procedure a trial court must use to enforce violations of a juvenile pretrial diversion program or conditions of pretrial release. See §§ 985.345(1)(b); 985.24(1)(d)2., Fla. Stat. (2017); T.N. v. Portesy , 932 So.2d 267, 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Second, "a prosecution for indirect criminal contempt is to follow the procedural due process set forth in [Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure] rule 8.150 and section 985.037." K.M. v. State , 962 So.2d 969, 970 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) ; see also G.C. v. State, 901 So.2d 1021, 1021 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). The trial court did not follow those procedures thereby resulting in a failure to provide Petitioner with due process. Accordingly, we determined and ordered that Petitioner was entitled to be immediately released from custody. The order of detention is quashed.Section 985.24 provides that all detention care determinations must be based on certain findings enumerated in the statute and may not be based on other expressly prohibited findings. The enumerated legitimate finding applicable to B.R.'s case is that the juvenile “[p]resents a substantial risk of not appearing at a subsequent hearing.” § 985.24(1)(a). Based on that finding, the relevant period at issue in the instant case is the time between B.R.'s adjudicatory hearing and her disposition. As such, the applicable statute is section 985.26(3), which provides in part that “a child may not be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care for more than [fifteen] days following the entry of an order of adjudication.” Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that B.R. could be held in secure detention for fifteen days following her adjudication.Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, correctly contending that once she was committed, the trial court lost the authority to direct when and where the child should be placed by DCF and that it was error to order her to be held in secure detention pending placement. See§ 985.24( 2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2013) (providing that “[a] child alleged to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law may not be placed into secure, nonsecure, or home detention care ... [d]ue to a lack of more appropriate facilities”); Dep't of Children & Families v. B.N., 979 So.2d 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding that the trial court's order requiring DCF to take immediate custody of the juvenile, who was adjudicated incompetent to proceed, for secure placement violated separation of powers); Dep't of Children & Families v. M.H., 830 So.2d 849 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. V.L., 583 So.2d 765 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (holding that the requirement that the child be placed within ten days could not be upheld because HRS did not have the funding to comply). We note that Respondent, State of Florida, has filed a Response that agrees with… Petitioner has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, correctly contending that once she was committed, the trial court lost the authority to direct when and where the child should be placed by DCF and that it was error to order her to be held in secure detention pending placement. See § 985.24( 2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2013) (providing that "[a] child alleged to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law may not be placed into secure, nonsecure, or home detention care . . . [d]ue to a lack of more appropriate facilities"); Dep't of Children & Families v. B.N., 979 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding that the trial court's order requiring DCF to take immediate custody of the juvenile, who was adjudicated incompetent to proceed, for secure placement violated separation of powers); Dep't of Children & Families v. M.H., 830 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. V.L., 583 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (holding that the requirement that the child be placed within ten days could not be upheld because HRS did not have the funding to comply). We note that Respondent, State of Florida, has filed a Response that agrees… At the hearing, the State correctly noted that section 985.24(1)(d) permits the use of secure detention in some circumstances to punish contempt of court. The court, however, did not initiate indirect contempt proceedings under section 985.037(4), Florida Statutes (2012). Further, a first contempt offense could be punished by up to five days in secure detention only. § 985.037(2), Fla. Stat. (2012).In his petition before this court, J.L.B. argues that the assessment of additional points for these factors constituted impermissible double scoring for circumstances already taken into account by the RAI. See D.G. v. Miles, 872 So.2d 343, 344 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The petitioner's argument is well taken, and the State concedes as much. The circuit judge's view was that adding points for the type of prior commitment—high risk—was not tantamount to scoring extra points for criminal history. However, there is nothing in the statute governing juvenile pretrial detention, section 985.24, Florida Statutes (2011), nor in the case law that would justify such a fine distinction. For example, in D.G., 872 So.2d at 344, this court granted the juvenile's petition because the court assessed two aggravating points for violation of probation even though the juvenile had already been assessed one point for a prior offense with adjudication withheld. In T.B. v. State, 897 So.2d 530, 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), the Fourth District found that it was improper to add an extra point as an aggravating factor for the juvenile's “significant prior record” because prior record was accounted for in… Chapter 985 acknowledges that “there is a need for secure placement for certain children alleged to have committed a delinquent act.” § 985.02(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis added). In a predisposition posture, the juvenile is presumed innocent, and the chapter limits the uses of precommitment “detention.” Postcommitment detention occurs after a juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent and after the court has committed the juvenile to a residential program. Such a juvenile is not merely alleged to have committed a delinquent act; there has been a finding of guilt. See generally §§ 985.24, et seq., Fla. Stat. (2011) (Part V of Chapter 985, discussing the permitted uses and criteria for detention which apply in a pre-commitment posture).. . . See §§ 985.345(1)(b); 985.24(1)(d)2., Fla. Stat. (2017); T.N. v. . . .
. . . Section 985.24 provides that all detention care determinations must be based on certain findings enumerated . . . case is that the juvenile “[pjresents a substantial risk of not appearing at a subsequent hearing.” § 985.24 . . .
. . . At the hearing, the State correctly noted that section 985.24(l)(d) permits the use of secure detention . . .
. . . However, there is nothing in the statute governing juvenile pretrial detention, section 985.24, Florida . . .
. . . See generally §§ 985.24, et seq., Fla. . . .
. . . Section 985.24, Florida Statutes, provides that a child may be detained only for the specific reasons . . . circuit court is strictly prohibited from ordering detention because of a lack of a better alternative. § 985.24 . . .
. . . Section 985.24(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2009), prohibits detaining a child to permit administrative access . . .
. . . Stat. (2007) (examinations and evaluations); §§ 985.24-.275, Fla. . . .
. . . Section 985.24(2)(d), Florida Statutes, provides that a juvenile alleged to have committed a delinquent . . .
. . . Section 985.24 of the Florida Statutes, entitled “Use of detention; prohibitions,” clearly and unambiguously . . . See § 985.24(1)(a)-(e), Fla. Stat. (2007). Absent a statutory exception, see § 985.255(2), Fla. . . . Soud, 639 So.2d 25, 26-27 (Fla.1994) (“[AJbsent the findings required by subsection (1) [of section 985.24 . . . Stat. (1993) with § 985.24(1), Fla. Stat. (2007); § 985.245(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . .
. . . Section 985.24 provides that a child may be detained only for the specific reasons given in the statute . . . Section 985.24(2) prohibits the use of detention to allow a parent to avoid responsibility, to facilitate . . . And section 985.24(4) directs that the Department of Juvenile Justice shall “continue to identify alternatives . . .
. . . Section 985.24(1)(a), Florida Statutes, does provide that a finding that a child presents “a substantial . . .