The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)
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. . . . §§ 103.5(a)(1), (5), and 1003.23(b)(1), and the Executive always has discretion not to remove, see . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b). . . .
. . . days of a final order of removal, or on or before September 30, 1996, whichever comes later. 8 C.F.R § 1003.23 . . . at any time, or upon motion of the Service or the alien, reopen or reconsider any case." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1). . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.2(c), 1003.2(f), 1003.23(b)(1)(v), 1003.23(b)(3). . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.2(c)(2) ; 1003.23(b)(4)(i). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(1) ). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23 (2018) (immigration judge authority to reopen and reconsider); id. § 1003.2 (Board of Immigration . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.2(c)(1) and 1003.23(b)(3). A motion to reopen does not automatically stay removal. . . . eligibility for relief, and (3) include evidence of the changed circumstances, 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c) ; 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(2), (3). . . . To the contrary, § 1003.23(b)(1) provides that an IJ has sua sponte jurisdiction to reopen "any case . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(3) ). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1) : "A motion to reopen or to reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person . . . See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.2(c), 1003.23(b)(3). They can also grant stays of removal. . . . . §§ 1003.2(f), 1003.23(b)(1)(v). . . . The authority to reopen proceedings lies with the immigration courts and BIA. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c), 1003.23 . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.23 (immigration judge), 1003.2 (Board). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1). . . . has made a decision, unless jurisdiction is vested with the Board of Immigration Appeals." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . . limited the scope of remand, the IJ had jurisdiction to reconsider his earlier decisions under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1) (Immigration Judges); id. § 1003.2(a) (Board). . . . did not deprive the courts of jurisdiction. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d) (departure bar for the Board); id. § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b). . . . . § 1003.23(b)(1). . . . Consequently, he should file a motion to reopen under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 with the Immigration Court having . . . as we have explained, the motion would now be untimely: 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . . deportation, or exclusion proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United States." 8 C.F.R. 1003.23 . . . . § 1003.23(b)(1) (setting a ninety-day deadline for motions to reopen and prohibiting such motions from . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.2(c)(3), 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (a motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia deportation order . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(D). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(i). . . . . § 1003.23(b)(3). . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.2(c)(3), 1003.23(b)(4). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1), (b)(4)(h). . . . presents evidence that is new, material, and unavailable when the removal order was entered. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . . where the movant has made a prima facie case that reopening would otherwise be appropriate. 8 C.P.R. § 1003.23 . . . In context; this notation almost certainly references 8 C.F.R, § 1003.23(b)(1) ("[A] party may file only . . . was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23(b)(1) (same). . . . . §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), 1003.23(b)(4)(i), as discussed below, the BIA’s conclusion that Xu failed, to . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.23(b) or 1003.2(a). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b) or 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); or (2) he can invoke his statutory right to reopen proceedings . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(3). . . . See Altamirano-Lopez, 435 F.3d at 550; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)(iv). . . . As a preliminary matter, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) provides that a "motion to reopen must be filed within . . . Accordingly, Cruz-Garcia would not dictate the application of § 1003.23(b)(1) to Mendias-Mendoza’s case . . . Gonzales, 413 F.3d 462, 469 (5th Cir. 2005); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3). . . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.2(c)(3), 1003.23(b)(4). . . . to filing, a motion to reopen cannot be made by the alien or on her behalf. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d), 1003.23 . . . Id. §§ 1003.2(d), 1003.23(b)(1). . . . may be eligible for asylum, which can be raised in a motion to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3), 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1), and where Singh failed to establish materially changed circumstances in India to qualify . . . for the regulatory exception to the time limitation, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(i); Najmabadi, 597 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1), (4)(iii)(A)(l) (an order of deportation entered in absentia may only be rescinded . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4), and Feng failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii), Najera-Mejia has abandoned any such challenge. See Soadjede v. . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b). . . . . § 1003.2(a); An immigration judge’s regulatory authority is governed by § 1003.23(b), while the BIA . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). “ ‘[Exceptional circumstances’ refers to exceptional circumstances (such as battery . . . compelling circumstances) beyond the control of the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(l); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . . See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i), (e)(1); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1) (“In general. . . . deportation proceedings, when the basis of the motion is fraud in the original proceeding”);, id § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1) (reopening by the IJ at any time). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii);' 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(l) (defining exceptional circumstances as circumstances beyond . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii); Avagyan v. . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). . . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(i); see also Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 2011). . . . hot with his motion to reopen, which was properly before the IJ in the first instance, see 8 C.F.R; § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b). Lugo-Resendez v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 337, 340-41 (5th Cir. 2016). . . . ., a regulatory motion to reopen), the alien can file at any time. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . . of Federal Regulations governing regulatoiy motions to reopen, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b). . . . who were ordered removed in absentia. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii)-(iv); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3), 1003.23 . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.23(b)(3), 1003.47(c) (“Failure to file necessary documentation and comply with the requirements . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(2). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1); that bar prohibits an alien’s filing a motion to reopen invoking the IJ’s sua sponte . . . specifically allow an alien to file a motion to reopen pursuant to the IJ’s sua sponte authority. § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b) (2017). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1). She pointed to Garcia-Carias v. . . . he can invoke the court’s regulatory power to sua sponte reopen proceedings under either 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . . “The Immigration Court’s regulatory authority is governed by § 1003.23(b) while the BIA’s regulatory . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4) (“time and numerical limitations” do not apply to motions to reopen based on 8 U.S.C . . . Title 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(l)(v) states that “[ejxcept in cases involving in absen-tia orders, the filing . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(3). . . . grant or deny a motion to reopen ... is within the discretion of the Immigration Judge.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b) or 8 C.F. . . . Holder, 603 F.3d 282, 287-88 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying § 1003.23(b)(1) concerning IJ reopening); Ovalles . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1). . . . . § 1003.23(b)(3). . . . of entry of a final administrative order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1). . . . See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). . . . Motions to reopen before the IJ are governed by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23, which provides that the IJ "may upon . . . deportation, or exclusion proceedings subsequent to his or her departure from the United States.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b) (2016). . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3). . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23, and he has not demonstrated the due diligence necessary to warrant equitable . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1), and he did not demonstrate changed country conditions to qualify for the regulatory . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(3). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(h). It is beyond dispute that in the absence of equitable tolling Mr. . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1) eliminated the IJ’s jurisdiction to consider Molina’s motion. . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23(b)(1). . . . . §§ 1003.2(c)(3), 1003.23(b)(4)(i). . . . See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c), 1003.23(b). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(2), (3); accord Iturribarria v. I.N.S., 321 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 2003). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2) (a motion to reopen to rescind an in absen-tia order may be filed at any . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1) (“A motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1). . . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(i). The agency reasonably concluded that Dr. . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.23(b)(1), 1003.2(a), we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary decision. . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(B). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1), and Ayala-Perez failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (a motion to reopen in absentia proceedings based on lack of notice may be filed . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1), and Chau failed to establish any exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R. § . . . 1003.23(b)(4). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(i); Toufighi v. . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A)(2); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). . . . not subject to any time limitation, see 232 F.3d at 134; 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(i). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1); Valencia-Fragoso v. . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii), and failed to establish the due diligence required to warrant equitable tolling . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1). . . . See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall state the new facts that will be proven . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(i), (ii) (setting 180-day deadline for motions to reopen in absentia removal orders . . .
. . . . § ■ 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (providing that an in ab-sentia order may be rescinded “if the alien demonstrates . . .
. . . See 8 C.F.R, § 1003.23(b)(1), (b)(4)© (motions to reopen before the IJ need not be filed within 90 days . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1))). . . .
. . . properly construed as a request for the IJ to exercise his sua sponte authority to reopen under 8 C.F.R. 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1); id. § 1003.2(a). . . . Sua sponte reopening is not subject to the statutory-time bar for motions to reopen. 8 C.F.R, § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1) (a motion to reopen must be filed within 90 days of a final order of removal), he concedes . . . and he does not assert any exceptional circumstance exception to the filing deadline, see 8 C.F.R, § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(h); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1); Valencia-Fragoso v. . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (a motion to reopen in absentia .proceedings based on lack of notice may be filed . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(i); Avagyan v. . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b) (2016); Mosere v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 397, 400 (4th Cir. 2009). . . . motion is granted and shall be supported by affidavits and other evidentiary material.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1), it is time-barred unless relief is “based on changed country conditions arising in . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1) & (b)(4) (iii)(A) (2); 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(a)(2)(A) (1994) (notice of hearing shall be . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(A); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23 (b)(1), and Plan-carte-De Padilla failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) and 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(1), and she has not demonstrated the due diligence necessary to warrant equitable tolling . . .
. . . . §§ 1003.23(b)(l)-(2), but contends the IJ erred and abused her discretion in not construing her motion . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(B). . . . considered whether Ahir had “reasonable cause” for her failure to appear at the initial hearing, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . .
. . . . § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii) (a motion to reopen to rescind an in absentia removal order may be “filed at any . . . petitioners filed their motion more than nine years after their final orders of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23 . . .