Fowler v. State, 172 S.E.2d 447 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970). · Go Syfert
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Fowler v. State, 172 S.E.2d 447 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
133 citation events across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Felix v. State (gactapp, 1999-12-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1970 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1970 1998 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 32 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Felix v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tart v. Commonwealth (2×)
Va. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
The magistrate knew only that at some point within seventy-two hours prior to the informant's report to the police the informant allegedly saw cocaine in the possession of a person in the motel room. *225 When the allegation is that an event occurred at one point in a period of time, the issue of probable cause becomes time sensitive from the first point in time that the event could have occurred. "[A] prime element in the concept of probable cause is the time of the occurrence of the facts relied upon." Fowler v. State, 121 Ga.App. 22, 23 , 172 S.E.2d 447, 448 (1970). "[I]t is manifest that t…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lewis v. State
Ga. · 1985 · confidence medium
Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ) (1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Little v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
In Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ), we held that “it should appear from the facts that the occur *513 rence should be so near in point of time to the making of the affidavit and the execution of the search warrant as to create a reasonable belief that the same conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed at the time of the issuance of the warrant.” The search warrant here does not fail in that regard.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Luck (2×)
Ga. · 1984 · confidence medium
In Johnston , this court quoted the following language from Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ) (1970), the leading “staleness” case: “[I]t was not necessary that the precise date of the occurrence be given but it should appear from the facts that the occurrence should be so near in point of time to the making of the affidavit and the execution of the search warrant as to create a reasonable belief that the same conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed at the time of the issuance of the warrant.” (Emphasis supplied) (compare the majority’s restatement o…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Luck v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
Keller v. State, 162 Ga. App. 100 ( 290 SE2d 204 ) (1982); Bachelor v. State, 143 Ga. App. 442 ( 238 SE2d 579 ) (1977). “[I]t is not necessary that ‘the precise date of the occurrence be given but it should appear from the facts that the occurrence should be so near in point of time to the making of the affidavit and the execution of the search warrant as to create a reasonable belief that the same conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed at the time of the issuance of the warrant.’ Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ).” Lewis v. State, 126 Ga. App. 123, 1…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tabb v. State
Ga. · 1982 · confidence medium
Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ) (1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bowens v. State
Ga. · 1982 · confidence medium
He thus could make an independent determination that the evidence was “ ‘so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time.’ ” Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 24 ( 172 SE2d 447 ) (1970), quoting from Sgro v. United States, 287 U. S. 206, 210 (53 SC 138, 77 LE 260) (1932).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Simpson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
It is not necessary that the precise date of the act be given “but it should appear from the facts that the occurrence should be so near in point of time to the making of the affidavit and the execution of the search warrant as to create a reasonable belief that the same conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed at the time of the issuance of the warrant.” Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ) (1970).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kouder v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
The occurrence should be so near in point of time to the making of the affidavit and execution of the search warrant "as to create a reasonable belief that the same conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed at the time of the issuance of the warrant.” Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wrenn v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
Specifically, the agent swore in the affidavit that he "put under observation” appellant’s residence and had observed "what appeared to be non-tax paid whiskey” six days earlier. "[I]t was not necessary that the precise date of the occurrence be given but it should appear from the facts that the occurrence should be so near in point of time to the making of the affidavit and the execution of the search warrant as to create a reasonable belief that the same conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed at the time of the issuance of the warrant.” Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. McDonald
Ga. Ct. App. · 1977 · confidence medium
"Absent any statement in the affidavit as to the time of the occurrence in question, the magistrate could not make an independent determination as to whether probable cause still existed for the issuance of the search warrant.” Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 24 ( 172 SE2d 447 ). 2.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Clark
Ga. Ct. App. · 1977 · confidence medium
Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ); Sgro v. United States, 287 U. S. 206, 210 (53 SC 138, 77 LE 260).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Walker v. State (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 1975 · confidence medium
Johnston v. State, 227 Ga. 387, 390 ( 181 SE2d 42 ); Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ); Lewis v. State, 126 Ga. App. 123 (2b) (190 SE2d 123); Butler v. State, 127 Ga. App. 539 (1) ( 194 SE2d 261 ).” Covington v. State, 129 Ga. App. 150 ( 199 SE2d 348 ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bush v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1975 · confidence medium
Maxwell v. State, 127 Ga. App. 168 ( 193 SE2d 14 ); Windsor v. State, 122 Ga. App. 767 ( 178 SE2d 751 ); Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Baker v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1974 · confidence medium
Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ). 2.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Driscoll v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1973 · confidence medium
As the informant saw these illegal *704 acts and reported them to the affiant within 48 hours, the information cannot be said to be stale. "[P]robable cause relates to current and not stale information.” Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 24 ( 172 SE2d 447 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Covington v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1973 · confidence medium
Johnston v. State, 227 Ga. 387, 390 ( 181 SE2d 42 ); Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ); Lewis v. State, 126 Ga. App. 123 (2b) ( 190 SE2d 123 ); Butler v. State, 127 Ga. App. 539 (1) ( 194 SE2d 261 ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bell v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1973 · confidence medium
Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22 *428 ( 172 SE2d 447 ); Sgro v. United States, 287 U. S. 206, 210 (53 SC 138, 77 LE 260, 85 ALR 108 ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Latten v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1972 · confidence medium
Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ); Windsor v. State, 122 Ga. App. 767, 768 ( 178 SE2d 751 ); Gilliam v. State, 124 Ga. App. 843 ( 186 SE2d 360 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McMiken v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1972 · confidence medium
This court has repeatedly held that a "prime element in the concept of probable cause is the time of the occurrence of the facts relied upon.” Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ); Windsor v. State, 122 Ga. App. 767, 768 ( 178 SE2d 751 ); Gilliam v. State, 124 Ga. App. 843 ( 186 SE2d 290 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lewis v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1972 · confidence medium
Although the date the affiant saw the alleged stolen goods is not affirmatively shown, it is not necessary that "the precise date of the occurrence be given but it should appear from the facts that the occurrence should be so near in point of time to the making of the affidavit and the execution of the search warrant as to create a reasonable belief that the same conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed at the time of the issuance of the warrant.” Fow *128 ler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnston v. State
Ga. · 1971 · confidence medium
"A 'prime element in the concept of probable cause is the time of the occurrence of the facts relied upon.’ Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ).” Windsor v. State, 122 Ga. App. 767 ( 178 SE2d 751 ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Windsor v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1970 · confidence medium
A "prime element in the concept of probable cause is the time of the occurrence of the facts relied upon.” Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22, 23 ( 172 SE2d 447 ).
examined Cited "see" Hockman v. State (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22 ( 172 SE2d 447 ).
discussed Cited "see" Betha v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22 ( 172 SE2d 447 ) (1970).
discussed Cited "see" McGuire v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22 ( 172 SE2d 447 ); Windsor v. State, 122 Ga. App. 767 ( 178 SE2d 751 ); Bell v. State, 128 Ga. App. 426 ( 196 SE2d 894 ).
discussed Cited "see" Logan v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22 ( 172 SE2d 447 ); Terry v. State, 123 Ga. App. 746 ( 182 SE2d 513 ); Gilliam v. State, 124 Ga. App. 843 ( 186 SE2d 290 ); McMiken v. State, 127 Ga. App. 66 ( 192 SE2d 716 ).
discussed Cited "see" Fowler v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22 ( 172 SE2d 447 ) and Hornsby v. State, 124 Ga. App. 724 ( 185 SE2d 623 ).
discussed Cited "see" Maxwell v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1972 · signal: see · confidence high
See in this connection Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22 ( 172 SE2d 447 ); Windsor v. State, 122 Ga. App. 767 ( 178 SE2d 751 ).
discussed Cited "see" Gilliam v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1971 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22 ( 172 SE2d 447 ); Windsor v. State, 122 Ga. App. 767 ( 178 SE2d 751 ); Flournoy v. State, 123 Ga. App. 658 ( 182 SE2d 159 ); Terry v. State, 123 Ga. App. 746 ( 182 SE2d 513 ).
discussed Cited "see" Bostwick v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1971 · signal: see · confidence high
See, in this connection, Fowler v. State, 121 Ga. App. 22 ( 172 SE2d 447 ); Windsor v. State, 122 Ga. App. 767 ( 178 SE2d 751 ); but see Johnston v. State, 227 Ga. 387, 390 ( 181 SE2d 42 ).
Fowler
v.
the State
44828.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Jan 16, 1970.
172 S.E.2d 447
Demy C. Galis, for appellant., Thomas W. Ridgway, District Attorney, for appellee.
Quillian, Hall, Pannell.
Cited by 61 opinions  |  Published
Quillian, Judge.

The affidavit submitted to the magistrate as the basis for issuing the search warrant reads as follows: “The facts tending to establish affiant’s reason for belief and probable cause for belief are as follows: information received by the affiant from a reliable informer that has given reliable information in the past 4 years that has resulted in the arrest and conviction of several subjects. Informer advised that he personally observed marihuana plants growing in a flower box at the above location and fully described said plants to the affiant and said affiant, being familiar with marihuana plants[*23] and marihuana from past experience. Affiant also has received other information in the past that marihuana, narcotic and dangerous drugs are located on the above premises.” The defendant contends that the warrant was invalid on its face for several reasons among which is that it was impossible for the magistrate to make an independent judgment as to whether or not the information was current or stale. This objection is meritorious and in our view dispositive of the case.

While there are no Georgia cases precisely on this point, research of foreign authority indicates unanimity in the decisions that a prime element in the concept of probable cause is the time of the occurrence of the facts relied upon. Anno., 100 ALR2d 525. As was held in Welchance v. State, 173 Tenn. 26, 28 (114 SW2d 781), in order to justify the issuance of a search warrant “it is essential that the date on which the alleged offense was committed be stated in the affidavit in order that the magistrate may determine whether probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant.” The rationale behind this approach is succinctly set forth in Bentley v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 122, 125 (38 SW2d 963), where the court recognized that if an affidavit be deemed sufficient without any recitation of the time when the alleged facts happened: “then the conduct of the citizen throughout the entire period of his past life would furnish grounds for continuous and repeated searches of his premises, if, perchance, he had been guilty during that period of harboring on his premises contraband articles which it was lawful to discover by a search warrant, if properly obtained.” The court proceeded to point out that it was not necessary that the precise date of the occurrence be given but it should appear from the facts that the occurrence should be so near in point of time to the making of the affidavit and the execution of the search warrant as to create a reasonable belief that the same conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed at the time of the issuance of the warrant.

The U. S. Constitution expresses the universal mandate that a search warrant may issue only upon probable cause. Fourth Amendment (Code § 1-804). Georgia also has the requirement that a search warrant be issued under oath or affirmation and[*24] state facts sufficient to show probable cause that a crime is being committed or has been committed. Code Ann. § 27-303 (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 567, 568). See Marshall v. State, 113 Ga. App. 143 (147 SE2d 666). See also Article I, Section 1, Paragraph XVI of the Georgia Constitution (Code Ann. § 2-116).

The need for timeliness is recognized in Code Ann. § 27-306 (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 567, 569) which declares warrants not executed within 10 days from the time of issuance shall be void. In Sgro v. U. S., 287 U S. 206, 210 (53 SC 138, 77 LE 260, 85 ALR 108), the Supreme Court recognized a similar statutory provision as indicating legislative - intent, as well as constitutional demand, that probable cause relates to current and not stale information. The court pointed out: “While the statute does not fix the time within which proof of probable cause must be taken by the judge or commissioner, it is manifest that the proof must be of facts so closely related to the time of the issue of the warrant as to justify a finding of probable cause at that time.”

From our sister States various decisions have been based on the validity of such terms as “recently,” “within” a named period, “during” a named period, and “on many occasions.” • However, we make no intimation as to what specific language need be used to meet this prerequisite, since in this case no reference whatsoever was made with regard to the time the information was obtained or related to the affiant. Absent any statement in the affidavit as to the time of the occurrence in question, the magistrate could not make an independent determination as to whether probable cause still existed for the issuance of the search warrant. See Sgro v. U. S., 287 U. S. 206, supra; Rosencranz v. U. S., 356 F2d 310, 315; Neal v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 718 (292 SW 314); Bruce v. Commonwealth, (Ky.) 418 SW2d 645; People v. Musk, 231 Mich. 187 (203 NW 865). See in this connection Burns v. State, 119 Ga. App. 678, 683 (168 SE2d 786). Hence, the search warrant was invalid and the trial judge erred in overruling the defendant’s motion to suppress.

Judgment reversed.

Hall, P. J., and Pannell, J., concur.