Miraglia v. Bryson, 111 S.E. 655 (Ga. 1922). · Go Syfert
Miraglia v. Bryson, 111 S.E. 655 (Ga. 1922). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
93 citation events (20 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Georgia Government Transparency & Campaign Finance Commission v. State Mutual Insurance (gactapp, 2013-03-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1924 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1924 1975 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Georgia Government Transparency & Campaign Finance Commission v. State Mutual Insurance
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
The State’s brief lists the following three enumerations of error: (1) “The trial court erred in ignoring the Commission’s own applicable five-year statute of limitations and instead applying an irrelevant ‘informant’limitations period under OCGA § 9-3-28”; (2) “The trial court erred in considering a prior ruling in an unrelated case and the Appellant’s failure to appeal from such ruling in reaching its decision”; and (3) “The trial court erred in acting without jurisdiction by intervening in a pending administrative case as appellees failed to exhaust their administrative…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance Commission v. State Mutual Insurance Co.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
As we recently explained, the doctrine of judicial estoppel will preclude a party from contending that a trial court’s order is void when the remedies and such remedies were adequate.” 5 Miraglia v. Bryson, 152 Ga. 828, 828 ( 111 SE 655 ) (1922). 6 See Long v. Long, 247 Ga. 624, 625 ( 278 Ga. 370 ) (1981); Robinson v. Kemp Motor Sales, Inc., 185 Ga. App. 492, 492 ( 364 SE2d 623 ) (1988). 7 See, e.g., Bates v. Bates, 317 Ga. App. 339, 343 ( 730 SE2d 482 ) (2012). 3 application of that doctrine is necessary to “protect the integrity of the judicial process by prohibiting parties from delib…
discussed Cited "see" Mark Gray v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
Prior to the enactment of OCGA § 17-10-1 (f), and as a matter of long-standing common law, the term-of-court rule provided as follows: “In the absence of a statute providing otherwise, . . . a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered, unless the proceeding for that purpose 5 was begun during that term.” United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55 , 67 (1) ( 35 SCt 16 , 59 LE 129) (1914); see Miraglia v. Bryson, 152 Ga. 828 ( 111 SE 655 ) (1922) (following Mayer); see also Kaiser v. State, 285 Ga. App. 63, 65 (1) ( 646 SE2d 84 ) (…
discussed Cited "see" Newton v. Newton (2×)
Ga. · 1943 · signal: see · confidence high
See, in this connection, Miraglia v. Bryson, 152 Ga. 828 (5) ( 111 S. E. 655 ); Adams v. Overland-Madison Co., 27 Ga. App. 531 (3) ( 109 S. E. 413 ); Donalson v. Bank of Jakin, 33 Ga. App. 428 (2) ( 127 S. E. 229 ); Hartman v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 47 Ga. App. 562 ( 171 S. E. 195 ). 5.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Flanders v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence low
As explained in United States v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55 ( 35 SCt 16 , 59 LE 129) (1914), the common-law rule provides that “[i]n the absence of [a] statute providing otherwise, the general principle obtains that a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered, unless the proceeding for that purpose was begun during that term.” Id. at 67 (1) (emphasis supplied); see also Miraglia v. Bryson, 152 Ga. 828 ( 111 SE 655 ) (1922) (following Mayer).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Gray v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2020 · signal: see also · confidence low
Lumber Co., 173 Ga. 602, 608 ( 160 SE 775 ) (1931) (“When the judge hears the motion in vacation on the day set, and holds up the motion for further consideration, the term of the court, as to such motion, is extended until the judge finally passes upon the motion . . . .”); Alley v. Halcombe, 96 Ga. 810, 810 ( 22 SE 901 ) (1895) (plaintiff should have moved before the expiration of the term of court); State v. 7 explained in United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55 ( 35 SCt 16 , 59 LE 129) (1914), the common-law rule provides that “[i]n the absence of [a] statute providing otherwise, the gen…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Young Construction, Inc. v. Old Hickory House 3, Inc. (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: compare · confidence low
Id.; compare Maslia v. Hamilton, 239 Ga. 52 ( 235 SE2d 485 ), wherein the court concluded that “[a] motion to set aside a judgment filed during the same court term the judgment is entered may be acted upon at a subsequent term.” These holdings are consistent with the general principle that “a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it was entered, *562 unless the proceeding for that purpose was begun during the term.” Miraglia v. Bryson, 152 Ga. 828 (2) ( 111 SE 655 ); compare Pekor v. Clark, 236 Ga. 457, 458 (1) ( 224 SE2d 30 ).
Miraglia
v.
Bryson, administrator
No. 2505.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Feb 22, 1922.
111 S.E. 655
B. S. Deaver, for plaintiff in error., G. II. Garrett, Walter DeFore, and J. G. Fstes, contra.
Hines.
Cited by 44 opinions  |  Published
Hines, J.

1. The assignment of error in the bill of exceptions being sufficient, the motion to dismiss the same is overruled.

2. The general principle obtains that a court cannot set aside or alter its final judgment after the expiration of the term at which it wa3 entered, unless the proceeding for that purpose was begun during the term. U. S. v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 67 (35 Sup. Ct. 16, 59 L. ed. 129); Alley v. Halcombe, 96 Ga. 810 (22 S. E. 901).

3. There are exceptions to the above rule:

(a) A party can malee a motion to reinstate a case, after the expiration of the term at which the order of dismissal was entered, when he can make. the same excuses for delay as must be shown in making an extraordinary motion for new trial. Austin v. Markham, 44 Ga. 161; Watkins v. Brisendine, 111 Ga. 458 (36 S. E. 807).

(b) The court at a subsequent term can correct such matters as are reviewable in writs of error coram nobis or coram vobis, for which the proceeding by motion is the modern substitute. U. S. v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55, 68 (supra).

(c) Where a plaintiff is dead when suit is dismissed, a motion by an administrator at a subsequent term of the court is the proper form of proceeding to have it reinstated, there being no administration on the estate of the plaintiff in time to make such motion during the term at which the judgment of dismissal was entered. Armstrong v. Nixon, 16 Tex. 610. This-is so because the judgment rendered under such circumstances is generally a nullity. This case falls within this exception.

4. A suit was filed on June 25, 1918, returnable to the July term, 1918, of Bibb superior court. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff died. On January 15, 1919, the judge granted an order, reciting that the plaintiff’s death hail been suggested of record, and requiring parties to be made by the next term, or the case be dismissed. Leading counsel for the plaintiff consented to this order. On April 29, 1919, the case was by order dismissed, because parties had not been made. On November 3, 1919, an administrator was appointed upon the estate of the deceased plaintiff. The administrator took his oath of office on December 18, 1919. He gave bond on October 6, 1920. On October 18, 1920. he made a motion to set aside the order dismissing this case. Held, that this court can hot say that there was such laches and unreasonable . delay as will require a reversal of the judgment of the court below, although several terms intervened between the order of dismissal and the motion to reinstate.

5. This court will not pass upon the question whether the plaintiff’s petition set out a good cause of action, and hold that the court should have denied the motion to reinstate because no such action was therein set out, as this matter was not passed upon by the court below.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur. B. S. Deaver, for plaintiff in error. G. II. Garrett, Walter DeFore, and J. G. Fstes, contra.