Dye v. State, 341 S.E.2d 314 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Dye v. State, 341 S.E.2d 314 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
56 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Jolly v. Zarella (gactapp, 2001-10-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jolly v. Zarella
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Altman v. State, 229 Ga. App. 769, 770 (3) ( 495 SE2d 106 ) (1997) (motion made two questions later); Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (1986) (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McIntosh v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Eldridge and Barnes, JJ, concur. 1 Barber v. State, 235 Ga. App. 170 ( 509 SE2d 93 ) (1998). 2 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 3 Salters v. State, 244 Ga. App. 219, 220 (1) ( 535 SE2d 278 ) (2000). 4 Agony v. State, 226 Ga. App. 330, 332 (3) ( 486 SE2d 625 ) (1997). 5 Burritt v. Media Marketing Svcs., 242 Ga. App. 92, 93 ( 527 SE2d 890 ) (2000). 6 Robbins v. State, 243 Ga. App. 21, 24-25 (5) ( 532 SE2d 127 ) (2000). 7 Crumpton v. State, 244 Ga. App. 57, 59 ( 534 SE2d 809 ) (2000). 8 Arnold v. State, 166 Ga. App. 313, 317 ( 304 SE2d 118 ) (1983). 9 Dye v. St…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jorden v. Johnson
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
See generally Thaxton v. State, 260 Ga. 141, 143 (5) ( 390 SE2d 841 ); Anderson v. State, 199 Ga. App. 559 (2) ( 405 SE2d 558 ) (several questions later); Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (two questions later); Kent v. Hunt & Assoc., 165 Ga. App. 169, 171 (8) ( 299 SE2d 123 ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Brewer v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
(Cits.)’ Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (1986).” Peoples v. State, 184 Ga. App. 439 (2), 440, supra. 5.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harvey v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (1986); Garner v. State, 180 Ga. App. 146, 147 (1) ( 348 SE2d 690 ) (1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gentry v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
“A motion for mistrial not made at the time the testimony objected to is given is not timely and will be considered as waived because of the delay in making it.” Thaxton v. State, 260 Ga. 141, 143 (5) ( 390 SE2d 841 ); accord Anderson v. State, 199 Ga. App. 559 (2) ( 405 SE2d 558 ); Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (waiver though motion made two questions later after jury removed).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tucker v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
There was no error. “[A] motion for mistrial which is not made at the time the questions objected to are answered is not timely and will be considered as waived because of the delay in making it. [Cits.]” Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chandler v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Given the eyewitness testimony of Dismuke, along with the defendant’s own statements and those of Gates, the error was harmless because it is highly probable it did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. 1 Johnson v. State, 238 Ga. 59, 60-61 ( 230 SE2d 869 ) (1976); Worley v. State, 201 Ga. App. 704, 707 ( 411 SE2d 760 ) (1991); Baptiste v. State, 190 Ga. App. 451, 452-453 ( 379 SE2d 165 ) (1989); Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alexander v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Assuming arguendo appellant made a timely objection on the grounds of juror misconduct (but compare Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 )), and that the facts before us normally would trigger a presumption of prejudice (Lockridge v. State, 260 Ga. 528, 529 ( 397 SE2d 695 )), rather than involving inconsequential irregularities by merely providing an “irregularity without opportunity for injury” by possession of a Georgia map not admitted at trial (Smith v. State, 218 Ga. 216, 223 (2 (c) (3)) ( 126 SE2d 789 )), it remains to be determined whether in the case at bar reversal i…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Richardson v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
(Cits.)’ Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (1986); [Cits.]” McCounly v. State, 191 Ga. App. 266, 269 (5) ( 381 SE2d 552 ) (1989). 2.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hollis v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ). 5.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCounly v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
Later, reflected by 14 pages in the transcript, defendant moved for a mistrial, contending that the statement placed his character in issue. “[A] motion for mistrial which is not made at the time the questions objected to are answered is not timely and will be considered as waived because of the delay in making it. [Cits.]” Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (1986); Boscaino v. State, 186 Ga. App. 133, 134 (3) ( 366 SE2d 789 ) (1988); Whittington v. State, 184 Ga. App. 282, 285 (3) ( 361 SE2d 211 ) (1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dixson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
The trial court denied the motion for mistrial, and appellant took the position that he did not want the court to give curative instructions. “ ‘The grant or denial of a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be grounds for reversal on appeal unless a mistrial is mandated to ensure a fair trial. [Cit.]’ ” Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Giddens v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
Only later was the motion for mistrial voiced. “[A] motion for mistrial which is not made at the time the questions objected to are answered is not timely and will be considered as waived because of the delay in making it. [Cits.]” Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (1986); Boscaino v. State, 186 Ga. App. 133, 134 (3) ( 366 SE2d 789 ) (1988); Whittington v. State, 184 Ga. App. 282, 285 (3) ( 361 SE2d 211 ) (1987). 3.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Boscaino v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
The motion was not made until long after the witness had been excused. “[A] motion for mistrial which is not made at the time the questions objected to are answered is not timely and will be considered as waived because of the delay in making it. [Cits.]” Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peoples v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
Moreover, “a motion for mistrial which is not made at the time the questions objected to are answered is not timely and will be considered as waived because of the delay in making it. [Cits.]” Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sanders v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
There is no evidence for you to consider in that regard.” Defendant was dissatisfied and preserved his right to challenge the denial. “ ‘The grant or denial of a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be grounds for reversal on appeal unless a mistrial is mandated to ensure a fair trial. [Cit.]’ [Cits.]” Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Garner v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
Although appellant’s counsel stated at the outset of re-cross-examination that, at the conclusion, he would “have another motion” of some unspecified type, it is the law of this State that a motion for mistrial “which is not made at the time the questions objected to are answered is not timely and will be considered as waived because of the delay in making it. [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Satterfield v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: compare · confidence medium
Compare, e.g., Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ) (1986) (finding waiver where prosecutor asked multiple questions on allegedly improper subject before defense counsel moved for mistrial).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Anderson v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: compare · confidence medium
“A motion for mistrial not made at the time the testimony objected to is given is not timely and will be considered as waived because of the delay in making it.” Thaxton v. State, 260 Ga. 141, 143 (5) ( 390 SE2d 841 ); compare Dye v. State, 177 Ga. App. 824, 825 ( 341 SE2d 314 ). 3.
Dye
v.
the State
71401.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Feb 14, 1986.
341 S.E.2d 314
Alvin Button, for appellant., Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Joseph J. Drolet, Deborah W. Espy, Andrew A. Weathers, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Pope, Deen, Beasley.
Cited by 28 opinions  |  Published
Pope, Judge.

Michael R. Dye appeals from his convictions of armed robbery and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, enumerating as sole error the denial of his motion for mistrial.

Appellant was identified by the victim as the driver of a vehicle who, armed with a shotgun and accompanied by another man, robbed the victim as he was walking down the street alone. When appellant was apprehended one hour later, still driving the vehicle, the co-de[*825] fendant’s wife and child were sitting in the back seat; a shotgun was found on the driver’s side of the car and a handgun was on the front passenger’s side. At trial during cross-examination the assistant district attorney asked appellant if he had seen a statement made by the co-defendant’s wife, and if he would like to see it. This statement was not offered in evidence, but the trial court allowed appellant to read it. The prosecutor then asked appellant if he agreed with what was in the statement and he replied that he did not agree, “except for the last part.” When the State questioned appellant, “You disagree with the fact that you had the gun?,” and after he said “Yes, sir,” defense counsel objected and the court sustained the objection “to the extent that commenting on evidence not in the record and asking [appellant] to comment on that or disagree with that is really not probative of anything. . . .” Appellant did not move to strike the testimony and was then asked, “Did you in fact come back from the Crystal Palace with one gun in your back pants pocket?,” to which he responded, “No sir, I sure didn’t.” He was next asked if he “in fact [came] back with the other one wrapped around your shoulder, underneath your coat?,” again responding negatively.

After two further questions defense counsel requested that the jury be removed and moved for mistrial, contending that this line of questioning was a prejudicial attempt by the State to do by indirection what it could not do directly. Following a lengthy colloquy the trial court denied the motion, noting that since the trial was bifurcated and only the armed robbery charge was then in issue, whether appellant had the gun on his person outside the car was not really relevant; and as he had already admitted being in the car with the firearm in his immediate possession and control, this was sufficient for the State to carry its burden of proof, so there were no grounds for mistrial. Appellant argues that the continuing use of inadmissible evidence over objection nevertheless warrants reversal.

We do not find appellant’s argument persuasive. First, a motion for mistrial which is not made at the time the questions objected to are answered is not timely and will be considered as waived because of the delay in making it. Garner v. State, 174 Ga. App. 628 (2) (330 SE2d 750) (1985), and cases cited; Bennett v. State, 165 Ga. App. 600 (3) (302 SE2d 367) (1983). Second, under the circumstances of this case it is highly probable that even if the testimony was erroneously admitted, since it was not relevant to the issue being tried it did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. See Daniels v. State, 252 Ga. 30 (2) (310 SE2d 904) (1984); Pierce v. State, 176 Ga. App. 795 (2) (338 SE2d 40) (1985); Rhine v. State, 176 Ga. App. 171 (1) (355 SE2d 422) (1985). “The grant or denial of a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be grounds for reversal on appeal unless a mistrial is mandated to ensure a fair trial. [Cit.]” Norwood v. State, [*826] 252 Ga. 292, 294 (313 SE2d 98) (1984); Everett v. State, 253 Ga. 359 (4) (320 SE2d 535) (1984). We find no ground for reversal.

Decided February 14, 1986. Alvin Button, for appellant. Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Joseph J. Drolet, Deborah W. Espy, Andrew A. Weathers, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

Deen, P. J., and Beasley, J., concur.