Perdue v. Bradshaw, 18 Ga. 287 (Ga. 1855). · Go Syfert
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Perdue v. Bradshaw, 18 Ga. 287 (Ga. 1855). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
9 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: TAYLOR, EXR. v. THE DEVEREUX FOUNDATION, INC. (And Vice Versa) (ga, 2023-03-15)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) TAYLOR, EXR. v. THE DEVEREUX FOUNDATION, INC. (And Vice Versa) (2×)
Ga. · 2023 · confidence medium
This power applies to “all judgments, whether interlocutory or final.” Perdue v. Bradshaw, 18 Ga. 287, 288 (1855) (“The Common Law rule is, that all judgments, whether interlocutory or final, shall be entered of record, of the day of the month and year when signed.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Tanner v. Wilson
Ga. Ct. App. · 1938 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Perdue v. Bradshaw, 18 Ga. 287 , where it was held that the common-law rule, providing that “when a verdict has been obtained at common law, and an appeal entered without judgment signed upon the said verdict, judgment shall not afterwards be signed further back than the time of disposing of said appeal,” should be “so far modified as to allow a nunc pro tunc judgment; but not to prejudice the intermediate rights of third persons.” In Tanner v. Wilson, 184 Ga. 628 (supra), where G.
A. J. Perdue, by his next friend, &c. in error
v.
John Bradshaw, in error
No. 31.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jul 15, 1855.
18 Ga. 287
C. W. Miller ; Smith. & Pou, for plaintiff in error., Blandford & Crawford ; S. Hall, for defendant in error;
Lumpkin.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published

By the Court.

Lumpkin, J.

delivering the opinion.

[1.] The Common Law rule is, that all judgments, whether interlocutory or final, shall be entered of record, of the day of the month and year when signed ; and shall not have relation to any other day. Still, the discretion is given to the Court or Judge to order a judgment to be entered núnc pro tunc. Indeed, it is not only competent to do this, but it seems to be almost a matter of course.

By the 66th Common Law rule of practice, adopted by the Judges of the Superior Courts in this State, it is provided that “ in all and every case, when a verdict has been obtained at Common Law andanappeal entered without judgment signed upon the said verdict, judgment shall not afterwards be signed further back than the time of disposing of said appeal.” (2 Kelly, 479.)

Feeling itself compelled by this rule, the Circuit Court refused permission to sign a nunc pro tunc judgment in this case.

This rule of practice was adopted, no doubt, to protect thn rights of third persons, which may have accrued between the rendition of the first and the final verdict. But the same ject can be secured, without prescribing an arbitrary rule, which seems to trench not only upon the Common Law, but the rights of the parties. True, by his laches, the plaintiff is. placed in a condition where the Court is entitled to grant him relief upon terms. But the punishment ought to be proportioned to the offence, and should not be vindictive. Acting[*289] upon this principle, our judgment is, that the nunc pro tuncorder should have been allowed, accompanied, however, with-the proviso, that the same should not prejudice third persons-who had acquired rights intermediate the first and second verdicts.