Evans v. State, 366 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · Go Syfert
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Evans v. State, 366 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“there being what can at the least be termed slight evidence of access, power, and intention to exercise control or dominion over the cocaine in the house, the question of fact regarding constructive possession remains within the domain of the trier of fact.”
21 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Gilbert Alexander Hill v. State (gactapp, 2021-06-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Gilbert Alexander Hill v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
there being what can at the least be termed slight evidence of access, power, and intention to exercise control or dominion over the cocaine in the house, the question of fact regarding constructive possession remains within the domain of the trier of fact.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael Troupe v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
See OCGA § 42-8-34.1 (b) (a court may not 12 “revoke any part of any probated or suspended sentence unless the defendant admits the violation as alleged or unless the evidence produced at the revocation hearing establishes by a preponderance of the evidence the violation or violations alleged”); Evans v. State, 185 Ga. App. 805, 805 ( 355 SE2d 165 ) (1988) (applying same evidentiary standard in first offender termination and resentencing case as that standard used in other probation revocation proceedings).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Garcia-Maldonado v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
So long as there is “slight evidence of access, power, and intention to exercise control or dominion over the [contraband], the question of fact regarding [joint] constructive possession remains within the domain of the trier of fact.” Evans v. State, 185 Ga. App. 805, 806 ( 366 SE2d 165 ) (1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Augustin Garcia-Maldonado v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
So long as there is “slight evidence of access, power, and intention to exercise control or dominion over the [contraband], the question of fact regarding [joint] constructive possession remains within the domain of the trier of fact.” Evans v. State, 185 Ga. App. 805, 806 ( 366 SE2d 165 ) (1988). 1 The General Assembly amended subsection (e) of OCGA § 16-13-31, effective July 1, 2013, see Ga. L. 2013, p. 222, § 4/HB 349, to omit the word “knowingly,” but that amendment does not apply in the present case because the underlying offense occurred in 2008.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael Benjamin Clark, Jr v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
As long as there is “slight evidence of access, power, and intention to exercise control or dominion over the [contraband], the question of fact regarding constructive possession remains within the domain of the trier of fact.” Evans v. State, 185 Ga. App. 805, 806 ( 366 SE2d 165 ) (1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clark v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
As long as there is “slight evidence of access, power, and intention to exercise control or dominion over the [contraband], the question of fact regarding constructive possession remains within the domain of the trier of fact.” Evans v. State, 185 Ga. App. 805, 806 ( 366 SE2d 165 ) (1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stokes v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Moreover, if there is “slight evidence of access, power, and intention to exercise control or dominion over the cocaine ... the question of fact regarding constructive possession remains within the domain of the trier of fact.” Evans v. State, 185 Ga. App. 805, 806 ( 366 SE2d 165 ) (1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ritchea Stokes v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Moreover, if there is “slight evidence of access, power, and intention to exercise control or dominion over the cocaine . . . the question of fact regarding constructive possession remains within the domain of the trier of fact.” (Punctuation added) Evans v. State, 185 Ga. App. 805, 806 ( 366 SE2d 165 ) (1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wright v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Miller and Ellington, JJ., concur. 1 OCGA§ 42-8-34.1 (b); Reece v. State, 257 Ga. App. 137, 139 (1) (b) ( 570 SE2d 424 ) (2002). 2 Evans v. State, 185 Ga. App. 805, 806 ( 366 SE2d 165 ) (1988); OCGA § 42-8-60 et seq. 3 (Citations omitted.) Evans, supra, 185 Ga. App. at 806 . 4 OCGA § 16-11-131 (b) (defining felony of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon); Reece, supra, 257 Ga. App. at 138-139 (1) (a), (b) (affirming probation revocation for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon when a shotgun was found under felon’s bed and a handgun under his mattress). 5 Simpson v. State,…
EVANS
v.
State
75618.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Jan 26, 1988.
366 S.E.2d 165
Gregory Homer, for appellant., G. Theron Finlayson, District Attorney, David E. White, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Beasley.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 82%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Georgia (1)
Beasley, Judge.

Defendant was granted an appeal from the adjudication of guilt and sentence, for violating the Controlled Substances Act, which resulted from the court’s finding that defendant had subsequently violated the terms of probation earlier imposed on his guilty pleas under the first offender statute. OCGA § 42-8-60. His sole enumeration of error addresses the sufficiency of the evidence of the probation violation.

On April 17, 1987, some two years into the five-year probation, police officers with a warrant searched defendant’s residence. The[*806] house consisted of two apartments which are separate in that one can only go from one to another by using the outside doors. One apartment was occupied by defendant and his family and the other was used by defendant’s brother and father. Electric cords ran from one to the other and defendant’s kitchen had only a hot plate while the other had a stove. Defendant stated to an arresting officer that he paid the utility bills for the entire house and his children ate in the other kitchen. Contraband drugs, which were the basis for ending probation, were found in the commode, the kitchen and the bedroom of defendant’s brother’s apartment. The contraband was contained in “corner bags,” which were described by the searching officers as the corners of plastic bags secured by wire wrapping, a common packaging for illicit drugs. Plastic bags from which the corners had been removed were found in defendant’s apartment: in the living room wood stove, on the kitchen floor, and in the kitchen trash.

Decided January 26, 1988 Rehearing denied February 12, 1988 Gregory Homer, for appellant. G. Theron Finlayson, District Attorney, David E. White, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.

Defendant contends that there was no evidence that he had access to his brother’s apartment or that, even if he did, that he had the power and intention to exercise control over the contraband so as to be in constructive possession of it. See Granger v. State, 142 Ga. App. 612 (236 SE2d 762) (1977); Blount v. State, 181 Ga. App. 330, 332-33 (2 & 3) (352 SE2d 220) (1986). There being what can at the least be termed slight evidence of access, power, and intention to exercise control or dominion over the cocaine in the house, the question of fact regarding constructive possession remains within the domain of the trier of fact. Callahan v. State, 179 Ga. App. 556, 565 (6) (347 SE2d 269) (1986); Ramsay v. State, 175 Ga. App. 97, 99 (7) (332 SE2d 390) (1985). As in probation revocation proceedings, only slight evidence is necessary to support a termination of probation under the first offender statute. Anderson v. State, 177 Ga. App. 130, 132 (3) (338 SE2d 716) (1985). Applying that test, there was sufficient evidence connecting defendant with possession of cocaine to authorize the trial court, determining the facts, to abort the first offender treatment. See Causey v. State, 148 Ga. App. 755 (252 SE2d 664) (1979).

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur.