Richardson v. State, 375 S.E.2d 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). · Go Syfert
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Richardson v. State, 375 S.E.2d 59 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
53 citation events (26 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: David Franklin Black v. State (gactapp, 2019-03-21)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David Franklin Black v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
See also Johnson v. State, 284 Ga. App. 147, 151-152 (2) ( 643 SE2d 556 ) (2007) (in aggravated child molestation case based solely on the testimony of the two alleged victims, a reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the case would have been different but for counsel’s failure to impeach victims); Richardson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 113, 114 ( 375 SE2d 59 ) (1988) (where evidence against defendant rested primarily on the credibility of a single witness, there was a reasonable probability that the presence of the omitted evidence would have affected the outcome).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Richardson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 113, 114 ( 375 SE2d 59 ) (1988) (trial counsel’s deficiency in failing to call alibi witnesses prejudiced the defense in case where evidence against defendant, which rested largely upon the identification testimony of one witness, was not overwhelming). 11 See Blair v. State, 273 Ga. 668, 670 (4) ( 543 SE2d 685 ) (2001); Blige v. State, 264 Ga. 166, 168 (3) ( 441 SE2d 752 ) (1994); Tanksley v. State, 248 Ga. App. 102, 105 (2) ( 545 SE2d 652 ) (2001). 12 (Punctuation omitted.) Hulett v. State, 262 Ga. 194, 195 (2) ( 415 SE2d 642 ) (1992). 13 See id.; Hend…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Bell v. State (6×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
In order to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) "that counsel's performance was deficient," i.e., that counsel's performance was not reasonable under all the circumstances, and (2) that this "deficient performance prejudiced the defense," i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." [Cit.] "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."'" Richardson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 113, 114 (375 SE2d *340 59) (1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cofield v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
Ford v. State, 255 Ga. 81, 85 (8) ( 335 SE2d 567 ) (1985); Richardson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 113, 114 ( 375 SE2d 59 ) (1988).” (Punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 199 Ga. App. 67, 69 ( 404 SE2d 139 ) (1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ponder v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
His failure “to establish either the performance or the prejudice component results in denial of his Sixth Amendment claim.” [Cit.] A reviewing court need not “address both components if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one,” [cit.], nor must the components be addressed in any particular order. [Cit.]’ [Cit.]” Richardson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 113, 114 ( 375 SE2d 59 ) (1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
In order to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) ‘that counsel’s performance was deficient,’ i.e., that counsel’s performance was not reasonable under all the circumstances, and (2) that this ‘deficient performance prejudiced the defense,’ i.e., that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ [ 466 U. S. at 687, 694 ]. ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ Ibid.” Ford v. State, 255 Ga…
discussed Cited "see" State v. Frederick Crapp (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 (III) (B) (“[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by [counsel’s] errors”).”[S]ince the evidence against [Crapp] was not overwhelming, resting largely upon the identification testimony of one witness, . . . a reasonable probability exists that the presence of [the corroborating evidence] would have affected the result.” Richardson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 113, 114 ( 375 SE2d 59 ) (1988).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Crapp (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Strickland, 466 U. S. at 696 (III) (B) (“[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by [counsel’s] errors.”). “[S]ince the evidence against [Crapp] was not overwhelming, resting largely upon the identification testimony of one witness, ... a reasonable probability exists that the presence of [the corroborating evidence] would have affected the result.” Richardson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 113, 114 ( 375 SE2d 59 ) (1988).
discussed Cited "see" Stephens v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Richardson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 113 ( 375 SE2d 59 ) (1988).
examined Cited "see" Murray v. State (4×)
Wyo. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Richardson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 113 , 375 S.E.2d 59 (1988) and Com. v. Stonehouse, 555 A.2d 772 (Pa. 1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Presley v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Richardson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 113, 114 ( 375 SE2d 59 ) (1988) (prejudice shown where alibi witnesses testified at the new trial hearing that they were with defendant at the time of the armed robbery). 7 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Gibbs v. State, 213 Ga. App. 117, 119 (3) ( 443 SE2d 708 ) (1994). 8 OCGA § 16-5-91 (a). 9 Anderson v. State, 262 Ga. 331, 332 (2) ( 418 SE2d 39 ) (1992). 10 OCGA § 5-5-24 (c). 11 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Nichols v. State, 288 Ga. App. 118, 120 (1) ( 653 SE2d 300 ) (2007). 12 (Citations omitted.) Revere v. State, 277 Ga. App. 393, 395…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Simpson v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2004 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Richardson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 113 ( 375 SE2d 59 ) (1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." McCutchen v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2003 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Richardson v. State, 189 Ga. App. 113 ( 375 SE2d 59 ) (1988).
Richardson
v.
the State
76583.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Sep 22, 1988.
375 S.E.2d 59
Reinhardt & Whitley, John R. Reinhardt, for appellant., David E. Perry, District Attorney, Diane L. Perry, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
McMurray, Pope, Benham.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published
McMurray, Presiding Judge.

Defendant appeals his conviction for armed robbery. Held:

Defendant contends that his trial counsel, who is different from his appellate counsel, rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. At the hearing on defendant’s motion for new trial which raised this issue, defendant testified that he notified trial counsel of two alibi witnesses; and that he requested trial counsel to talk to these individuals and to obtain their testimony at trial. The two alibi witnesses who were never contacted by trial counsel, testified on the motion for new trial that they were with defendant at the time of the armed robbery. Defendant’s trial counsel did not testify at the hearing on the motion for new trial.

Additionally, defendant’s trial counsel made no objection to the introduction into evidence of a State’s exhibit, a green toboggan mask seized from defendant’s home. The perpetrator of the armed robbery had been described as wearing such a mask. The seizure took place[*114] after the victim of the armed robbery identified defendant from a photograph. Thereupon, officers were dispatched to defendant’s home, where after receiving no response to their knock, they entered without the authority of a search warrant, a consent or an arrest warrant for defendant. Within defendant’s house an officer found the toboggan mask, and seized it. While the entry was ostensibly for the purpose of effecting an arrest of defendant, the absence of a warrant, consent or any issue of hot pursuit rendered the entry, search, and seizure of the mask illegal. Payton v. New York, 445 U. S. 573 (100 SC 1371, 63 LE2d 639). Evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure is not admissible. Amiss v. State, 135 Ga. App. 784 (219 SE2d 28).

“ ‘The bench mark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.’ Strickland v. Washington, [466 U. S. 668] (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). In order to prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) ‘that counsel’s performance was deficient,’ i.e., that counsel’s performance was not reasonable under all the circumstances, and (2) that this ‘deficient performance prejudiced the defense,’ i.e., that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ Id. at — ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ Ibid.

“The complaining defendant must make both showings. His failure ‘to establish either the performance or the prejudice component results in denial of his Sixth Amendment claim.’ King v. Strickland, 748 F.2d 1462, 1463 (11th Cir. 1984). A reviewing court need not ‘address both components if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one,’ Strickland v. Washington, supra at_, nor must the components be addressed in any particular order. Ibid.” Ford v. State, 255 Ga. 81, 85 (8) (335 SE2d 567).

Applying the criteria set forth above to the facts and circumstances of the case sub judice we are compelled to conclude that the performance of defendant’s trial counsel was deficient. Also, since the evidence against defendant was not overwhelming, resting largely upon the identification testimony of one witness, the victim, a reasonable probability exists that the presence of defendant’s alibi witness would have affected the result. Therefore, we conclude that the deficient performance of defendant’s trial counsel prejudiced the defense. The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for new trial.

Judgment reversed.

Pope and Benham, JJ., concur. [*115] Decided September 22, 1988 — Rehearing denied October 14, 1988. Reinhardt & Whitley, John R. Reinhardt, for appellant. David E. Perry, District Attorney, Diane L. Perry, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.