Schwartz v. Black, 409 S.E.2d 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). · Go Syfert
Schwartz v. Black, 409 S.E.2d 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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See OCGA § 38-3-60 et seq.; cf. Schwartz v. Black, 200 Ga. App. 735, 736 ( 409 SE2d 681 ) (1991) (where administrative agency’s authority to adopt rules and regulations is derived from statute, rules of statutory interpretation apply to their construction). 4 of the common law, they “must be strictly construed in favor of the property owner and against the materialman.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bibler Masonry Contractors v. J.
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Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191 ( 587 SE2d 24 ) (2003) (Fundamental rules of statutory construction “require us to construe a statute according to its terms, to give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and to avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage”) (citations omitted); Schwartz v. Black, 200 Ga. App. 735, 736 ( 409 SE2d 681 ) (1991) (looking to rules of statutory interpretation in construing administrative rules and regulations).
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Co., 277 Ga. 189, 191 ( 587 SE2d 24 ) (2003) (Fundamental rules of statutory construction “require us to construe a statute according to its terms, to give words their plain and ordinary meaning, and to avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage”) (citations omitted); Schwartz v. Black, 200 Ga. App. 735, 736 ( 409 SE2d 681 ) (1991) (looking to rules of statutory interpretation in construing administrative rules and regulations).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walker v. Department of Transportation
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Comm. v. Alltel Ga. Communications Corp., 230 Ga. App. 563, 567 ( 497 SE2d 50 ) (1998). 15 Pfeiffer v. Dept. of Transp., 250 Ga. App. 643, 646-647 (2) ( 551 SE2d 58 ) (2001). 16 Schwartz v. Black, 200 Ga. App. 735, 736 ( 409 SE2d 681 ) (1991). 17 Dept. of Community Health v. Satilla Health Svcs., 266 Ga. App. 880, 887 (1) (c) ( 598 SE2d 514 ) (2004). 18 OCGA§ 50-13-19 (h) (2). 19 OCGA§ 32-6-70 (a). 20 OCGA § 50-13-19 (h) (3). 21 Outdoor Advertising Assn. of Ga. v. Dept. of Transp., 186 Ga. App. 550, 555 (5) ( 367 SE2d 827 ) (1988). 22 OCGA§ 50-13-2 (6) (D). 23 Ga. Oilmen’s Assn. v. Dept.…
cited Cited as authority (rule) FIRST UNION NAT. BANK OF GA v. Collins
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Schwartz v. Black, 200 Ga. App. 735, 736 ( 409 SE2d 681 ) (1991).
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Schwartz v. Black, 200 Ga. App. 735, 736 ( 409 SE2d 681 ) (1991).
SCHWARTZ Et Al.
v.
BLACK Et Al.
A91A0430.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Jul 16, 1991.
409 S.E.2d 681
William Q. Bird, P.C., William Q. Bird, Edward R. Still, for appellants., Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, James T. McDonald, Jr., for appellees.
Carley, Banke, Beasley.
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published
Carley, Judge.

The sole issue presented for resolution in the instant appeal concerns a policy of automobile insurance issued pursuant to the Georgia Automobile Insurance Plan (Plan). The trial court held that a policy issued pursuant to the Plan can provide a maximum bodily injury liability limit of $100,000 per person. It is from that order that the instant appeal is taken.

It is generally true that “ ‘[insurance is a matter of contract and it is contract law . . . that is ultimately controlling. [Cit.]’ [Cit.]” MAG Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gatewood, 186 Ga. App. 169,173 (1) (367 SE2d 63) (1988). However, “ ‘[t]he rights of participants in the assigned risk plan for automobile liability insurance are controlled primarily by [OCGA § 40-9-100] and regulations promulgated in implementation thereof.’ [Cit.]” Employers Commercial Union Cos. v. Waldrop, 124 Ga. App. 746, 749 (2) (186 SE2d 134) (1971). “Accordingly, if there be any conflict in [general contract and insurance law] and the specific requirements of the assigned risk plan, the latter requirements are controlling as to an application under the assigned risk plan and a policy of liability insurance issued pursuant thereto.” State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Reese, 116 Ga. App. 59, 60 (1) (156 SE2d 529) (1967). “[insurance coverage under the assigned risk plan is not the subject[*736] of normal negotiations between contracting parties, but is made effective by operation of law to serve the best interests of the general public. [Cit.]” Rondale Bus Svc. v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, 189 Ga. App. 869, 871 (1) (377 SE2d 726) (1989). Accordingly, the first issue to be resolved is whether the Plan specifies a maximum bodily injury liability limit of only $100,000 per person, for, if it does, then that maximum limit as specified in the Plan is controlling.

“Where an agency or commission is granted the authority and power to adopt. . . rules and regulations within the scope of the legislative enactment, such rules and regulations have the same force and effect as that of a statute. [Cit.]” Panfel v. Boyd, 187 Ga. App. 639, 643 (2b) (371 SE2d 222) (1988). “Accordingly, [in construing the administrative rules and regulations implementing the Plan] we may look to various rules of statutory interpretation. ...” Cross v. Balkcom, 102 Ga. App. 81, 83 (115 SE2d 783) (1960), rev’d on other grounds, 216 Ga. 530 (118 SE2d 185) (1961). See also American Med. Intl. v. Charter Lake Hosp., 186 Ga. App. 204, 207 (2) (366 SE2d 795) (1988). Among those rules of statutory construction is the following: “ ‘Where a particular expression in one part of a statute is not so extensive or large in its import as other expressions in the same statute, it must yield to the larger and more extensive expression, where the latter embodies the real intent of the legislature. . . .’ [Cit.]” Board of Trustees &c. of Atlanta v. Christy, 246 Ga. 553, 555 (1) (272 SE2d 288) (1980). Another rule of statutory construction is that which provides that “ ‘[w]here there is in the same statute a specific provision, and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include matters embraced in the former, the particular provision must control, and the general provision must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular provision.’ . . . ‘The rule of construction applicable to all writings ... is this: that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals, when used in connection with them.’ [Cit.]” Mayor &c. of Savannah v. Savannah Elec. &c. Co., 205 Ga. 429, 436-437 (54 SE2d 260) (1949).

Application of these and other pertinent rules of statutory construction to the administrative rules and regulations implementing the Plan demonstrates that the trial court correctly ruled that a policy issued pursuant to the Plan can provide a maximum bodily injury liability limit of $100,000 per person. Any other provisions which may arguably relate generally to the issue of the limit of such coverage must yield to Section 10 (A) (2) (c) (1) of the Plan, which provides specifically that “[a]n insured assigned under the Plan may, at his option, also purchase additional coverage to be written in the same policy as liability coverage for liability limits . . . up to $100,000/ 300,000 Bodily Injury. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Since the Plan it[*737] self provides a maximum bodily injury liability limit of $100,000, reliance upon principles of general contract and insurance law to assert a greater limit in the instant case is unavailing. “[I]f there be any conflict in [general contract or insurance law] and the specific requirements of the assigned risk plan, the latter requirements are controlling as to an application under the assigned risk plan and a policy of liability insurance issued pursuant thereto.” State Farm &c. Ins. Co. v. Reese, supra at 60 (1).

Decided July 16, 1991 Reconsideration denied July 30, 1991 William Q. Bird, P.C., William Q. Bird, Edward R. Still, for appellants. Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, James T. McDonald, Jr., for appellees.

Judgment affirmed.

Banke, P. J., and Beasley, J., concur.