Byrd v. State, 419 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). · Go Syfert
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Byrd v. State, 419 S.E.2d 111 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
18 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In Re SS (gactapp, 2006-10-05)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re SS
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Bell v. State, 263 Ga.App. 894, 896 , 589 S.E.2d 653 (2003); Smith v. State, 228 Ga.App. 144, 146 (3), 491 S.E.2d 194 (1997); Byrd v. State, 204 Ga.App. 252, 253 (1), 419 S.E.2d 111 (1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In the Interest of S. S.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Bell v. State, 263 Ga. App. 894, 896 ( 589 SE2d 653 ) (2003); Smith v. State, 228 Ga. App. 144, 146 (3) ( 491 SE2d 194 ) (1997); Byrd v. State, 204 Ga. App. 252, 253 (1) ( 419 SE2d 111 ) (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Steele v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Accordingly, we find that Byrd’s right to confront and cross-examine J.B. was protected in spite of the child’s unresponsiveness on cross-examination as to the merits of the case brought against him.” Byrd v. State, 204 Ga.App. 252, 253 , 419 S.E.2d 111, 112 (1992)(quoting Bright v. State, 197 Ga.App. 784, 785 , 400 S.E.2d 18 (1990)); accord, Hines v. State, 248 Ga.App. 752 , 548 S.E.2d 642 (2001); Smith v. State, 228 Ga.App. 144 , 491 S.E.2d 194 (1997).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Byrd v. State, 204 Ga. App. 252 (1), 253, supra. 4.
discussed Cited "see" Bell v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Smith v. State, 228 Ga. App. 144, 146-147 (3) ( 491 SE2d 194 ) (1997). 4 (Punctuation omitted.) Smith, supra at 147 (3), citing Byrd v. State, 204 Ga. App. 252 (1) ( 419 SE2d 111 ) (1992). 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Smith, supra at 146 (3).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Blandburg v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Byrd v. State, 204 Ga. App. 252 ( 419 SE2d 111 ) (1992). 2.
Byrd
v.
the State
A92A0653.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
May 15, 1992.
419 S.E.2d 111
Clyde M. Urquhart, for appellant., W. Glenn Thomas, Jr., District Attorney, Christopher A. Frazier, Charles K. Higgins, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Johnson, Carley, Pope.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published
Johnson, Judge.

A jury convicted Charles Ray Byrd of molesting his four-year-old niece, J. B. He appeals.

1. Byrd contends that the trial court erred in allowing the hearsay statements of J. B. to her parents and a caseworker to be admitted as evidence.

At the trial of the case sub judice, the court permitted J. B.’s parents and a caseworker to testify as to statements made to them by J. B. regarding incidents of sexual abuse inflicted upon her by Byrd. The trial court allowed such hearsay testimony after determining that J. B. was available to testify, in accordance with OCGA § 24-3-16 (the Child Hearsay Statute) and OCGA § 24-9-5. J. B. took the stand, answered preliminary questions, but refused to answer any questions pertaining to the substance of the charges levied against Byrd.

Byrd contends on appeal that the inability of J. B. to testify in[*253] response to questions relating to the charges against him rendered her legally unavailable. Furthermore, he contends that the child’s “unavailability” precluded him from thoroughly cross-examining her as to the veracity of the hearsay statements made against his interests by her parents and the caseworker which resulted in a violation of his Sixth Amendment Right to confrontation. His contentions are without merit.

Decided May 15, 1992. Clyde M. Urquhart, for appellant. W. Glenn Thomas, Jr., District Attorney, Christopher A. Fra [*254] zier, Charles K. Higgins, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

[*253] The instant case is controlled by the opinion in Bright v. State, 197 Ga. App. 784, 785 (400 SE2d 18) (1990). In Bright supra, this court stated: “So long as the witness is made available for confrontation and cross-examination, the defendant’s rights are protected, even if the witness is uncommunicative or unresponsive. The thrust of the child witness statute is to allow the jury, which must be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, to judge the credibility of a child’s accusations. If a child, who has reported child molestation to an adult permitted to testify to the out-of-court statement at trial, is incapable of reiterating the accusation at trial or is unresponsive or evasive during cross-examination, the jury must decide the child’s credibility . . . The manner in which the witness responds to cross-examination is, itself, evidence as to credibility.” Bright, supra. “A witness’ responsiveness or unresponsiveness, evasiveness or directness . . . are all factors which can be assessed by the jury and may raise a reasonable doubt. [Cit.]” Jones v. State, 200 Ga. App. 103 (407 SE2d 85) (1991). Accordingly, we find that Byrd’s right to confront and cross-examine J. B. was protected in spite of the child’s unresponsiveness on cross-examination as to the merits of the case brought against him.

2. Byrd further contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.

At the trial of the instant case, evidence was presented indicating that Byrd placed paper inside J. B.’s vagina and rubbed his penis on parts of her body. Additional evidence was produced of two similar transactions in which Byrd touched the vagina of another niece, an adolescent.

It is apparent from the record that sufficient evidence was produced at trial such that a rational trier of fact could have found Byrd guilty of child molestation beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Therefore, the jury’s verdict shall not be disturbed.

Judgment affirmed.

Carley, P. J., and Pope, J., concur.