Long v. State, 22 Ga. 40 (Ga. 1857). · Go Syfert
Search
Long v. State, 22 Ga. 40 (Ga. 1857). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Spencer v. State (gactapp, 1986-09-25)
Top citers, strongest first. 2 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Spencer v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
While it has long been held that a defendant’s confession must be admitted in its entirety, see Long v. State, 22 Ga. 40, 42 (1857); Baker v. State, 127 Ga. App. 99, 101 ( 192 SE2d 558 ) (1972), we conclude that appellant waived the right to have the exculpatory portions of her statement introduced in this case by failing either to object to the admission of the inculpatory portion on this ground or to request that the exculpatory portion of the statement be admitted as well.
cited Cited "see" Dobbs v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Long v. State, 22 Ga. 40 (1857); see Simpson v. State, 213 Ga. App. 143, 145 (2) ( 444 SE2d 115 ) (1994).
Samuel Long, in error
v.
The State of Georgia, in error
No. 8.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Mar 15, 1857.
22 Ga. 40
Bailey, for plaintiff in error., Sol. Gen. Lyon, represented by Hammond, for defendant in error.
Benning.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published

By the Court.

Benning J.

delivering the opinion.

[1.] “ In the proof of confessions, as in the case of admissions, in civil cases, the whole of what the prisoner said on the subject at the time of making the confession, should be taken together.” 1. Green. Ev., § 218.

Therefore, the question which the counsel of the accused asked the witness, Whittle, was a legal question; consequently, it was a question which the Court should not have rejected.

But the Court did reject it, and the rejection was made one of the grounds of the motion for a new trial. And we think that the ground was a good one. The new trial Act of 1854, says that it shall be obligatory on the Superior Courts to grant new trials in alljcases in which “ any evidence may be illegally withheld from the juryand that, if the Superi- or Courts fail to grant a new trial in such cases, this Court shall grant one., diets of 1853-4, 46.

For the rejection of this question, therefore, this Court is forced to say, that there must be ,a new trial.

[2.] If the object of the question put to Collier, was to impeach Rose’s testimony, the question was not the proper one; that[*43] would have been a question relating to Rose’s general character.

If the object was to lay a foundation for the conclusion, that the accused won the horse from Rose, the question was not one that could lay such a foundation, draw what answer it might, from the witness. Proof that Rose was a gambler, would not, of itself, have authorized the jury to infer that the accused won the horse from him at some game.

We think, therefore, that the Court was right in rejecting the question put to Collier.

And, if the Court was right in doing that, the Court was of course, right in overruling the motion for a continuance; the only object of that motion being, to procure testimony to prove that Rose was a gambler.

Judgment reversed.