Moore v. Buiso, 221 S.E.2d 414 (Ga. 1975). · Go Syfert
Moore v. Buiso, 221 S.E.2d 414 (Ga. 1975). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“where a contract is contingent on the meeting of some condition, it is not enforceable by either party until the condition has been met. . . .”
26 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ex Parte Payne (ala, 1999-09-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Ex Parte Payne (2×)
Ala. · 1999 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence low
where a contract is contingent on the meeting of some condition, it is not enforceable by either party until the condition has been met. . . .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Agricommodities, Inc. v. J. D. Heiskell & Co.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
N. Garner Co. v. Ga. Palm Beach Aluminum Window Corp., 233 Ga. App. 252, 256 (2) ( 504 SE2d 70 ) (1998); Drug Line v. Sero-Immuno Diagnostics, 217 Ga. App. 530, 531 ( 458 SE2d 170 ) (1995). 8 Drug Line, supra. See also Moore v. Buiso, 235 Ga. 730, 731 (1) ( 221 SE2d 414 ) (1975) (when contingency in contract has not been met, contract lacks mutuality and is unenforceable). 9 (Citation omitted.) D.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Athens Heart Center, P.C. v. Brasstown Valley Resort, Inc.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
“Where a contract is contingent on the meeting of some condition, it is not enforceable by either party until the condition has been met.” Moore v. Buiso, 235 Ga. 730, 731 (1) ( 221 SE2d 414 ) (1975); see also Patel v. Burt Dev.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hutson v. Young
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Moore v. Buiso, 235 Ga. 730, 732 (2) ( 221 SE2d 414 ) (1975); Surman v. Blansett, supra at 186 (2).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lee v. Green Land Co., Inc.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
See Zampatti v. Tradebank Intl., 235 Ga. App. 333 , 338 (2) (b) ( 508 SE2d 750 ) (1998) (trial court vested with discretion to decide whether to consider untimely filed affidavits). 3 Harris v. Trippi, 209 Ga. 369, 372 (2) ( 72 SE2d 704 ) (1952); OCGA § 23-2-130. 4 Beller & Gould v. Lisenby, 246 Ga. 15, 17 (1) ( 268 SE2d 611 ) (1980). 5 See Whitley v. Patrick, 226 Ga. 87, 88-89 ( 172 SE2d 692 ) (1970). 6 Cashin v. Markwalter, 208 Ga. 444, 446 (3) ( 67 SE2d 226 ) (1951), overruled on other grounds, Sikes v. Sikes, 233 Ga. 97, 99 ( 209 SE2d 641 ) (1974). 7 See generally OCGA § 13-3-1; Grier v.…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Department of Human Resources v. Citibank F.S.B.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
See OCGA § 13-3-4; Moore v. Buiso, 235 Ga. 730, 731-732 ( 221 SE2d 414 ) (1975); Fulton County v. Collum Properties, 193 Ga. App. 774, 775 (1) ( 388 SE2d 916 ) (1989); Rothberg v. Charles H.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jay Pontiac GMC Truck Mitsubishi, Inc. v. Payne
Ala. · 1999 · confidence medium
The contract in question shows on its face that it is lacking in mutuality, and that such lack of mutuality can be cured only by a meeting of the condition therein expressed.”); see also Ga.Code Ann. § 13-3-4 ("A condition precedent must be performed before the contract becomes absolute and obligatory upon the other party.”); Moore v. Buiso, 235 Ga. 730, 731 , 221 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1975) ("Where a contract is contingent on the meeting of some condition, it is not enforceable by either party until the condition has been met ....”) (citing, among other cases, Wehunt, supra).
cited Cited as authority (rule) English v. Muller
Ga. · 1999 · confidence medium
Moore v. Buiso, 235 Ga. 730, 732 (2) ( 221 SE2d 414 ) (1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lake Tightsqueeze v. Chrysler First Financial Services Corporation
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Even assuming that the letter of intent was a contract, our state Supreme Court has held, “[w]here a contract is contingent on the meeting of some condition, it is not enforceable by either party until the condition has been met. . . .” Moore v. Buiso, 235 Ga. 730, 731 (1) ( 221 SE2d 414 ) (1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Simmons v. Krall
Ga. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Where a condition precedent has not been fulfilled, the purchaser is not required to go forward with the sale, see OCGA § 13-3-4, and thus the contract is not “so far completed that the vendee is to be treated as the owner” within the meaning of Phinizy, supra. See Moore v. Buiso, 235 Ga. 730, 731-732 (1) ( 221 SE2d 414 ) (1975) (reaffirming principle in Phinizy, but finding evidence that condition precedent in contract had been met).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Stone Mountain Properties, Ltd. v. Helmer
Ga. Ct. App. · 1976 · confidence medium
Bolton v. Barber, 233 Ga. 646 ( 212 SE2d 766 ); Moore v. Buiso, 235 Ga. 730, 731 (1) ( 221 SE2d 414 ).
discussed Cited "see" Phillips v. Bacon (2×)
Ga. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moore v. Buiso, 235 Ga. 730 ( 221 SE2d 414 ) (1975); Ansley v. Atlanta Suburbia Estates, 230 Ga. 630 ( 198 SE2d 319 ) (1973); Stribling v. Ailion, 223 Ga. 662 ( 152 SE2d 427 ) (1967).
discussed Cited "see" Griffith v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (2×)
Ga. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Moore v. Buiso, 235 Ga. 730 ( 221 SE2d 414 ) (1975).
Moore
v.
Buiso
30368.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Nov 24, 1975.
221 S.E.2d 414
G. Hughel Harrison, for appellant., Ralph H. Witt, for appellee.
Jordan, Gunter, Ingram, Hill.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 87%
Citer courts: Supreme Court of Alabama (2)
Jordan, Justice.

This appeal is from a directed verdict for the defendant in an action in which Annie Mary Moore sought specific performance of a written contract for the sale of land against Thomas Buiso.

The closing date of the original contract was June 18, 1971. Prior to this date, the parties entered into a written contract reciting that there was a defect in the title of the property because of a reservation of mineral interest by the United States Government, and agreeing to éxtend the closing date of their previous contract to 30 days "after the committee of the Department of the[*731] Interior shall make its report to the Honorable Phil M. Landrum, stating whether the Government will release its mineral interest, etc.” On August 5, 1971, the parties entered into another written contract agreeing to an extension of time for the closing of the sale "until 10 days following receipt of the official release and conveyance of the reserve mineral interest from the United States Government.”

A quitclaim deed from the United States Department of the Interior, releasing the mineral interest in the property, was executed on June 27, 1973. Mrs. Moore then called on Mr. Buiso to perform the contract of sale, and he refused to do so. The complaint for specific performance followed.

At the close of the evidence by the plaintiff Mrs. Moore, the motion for directed verdict by Mr. Buiso was granted.

1. It appears from the transcript that the basis for the trial judge’s grant of the motion for directed verdict was that he considered the contract lacking in mutuality and too indefinite for enforcement because of the condition in the amended contract extending the time for closing the sale.

There is no dispute in the evidence that Mr. Buiso received a quitclaim deed from the Secretary of the Interior releasing the mineral interest of the United States in the property, and that this document satisfied the condition in the contract of sale pertaining to the closing date.

The test of mutuality of a contract is to be made at the time it is to be enforced. Where a contract is contingent on the meeting of some condition, it is not enforceable by either party until the condition has been met, but when the condition has been met, the lack of mutuality is cured. Wehunt v. Pritchett, 208 Ga. 441, 443 (67 SE2d 233) (1951); West v. Downer, 218 Ga. 235, 243 (127 SE2d 359) (1962); Stribling v. Ailion, 223 Ga. 662, 663 (157 SE2d 427) (1967); Bolton v. Barber, 233 Ga. 646 (212 SE2d 766) (1975).

At the time the action for specific performance was brought, the condition precedent for the closing of the sale had been met. While the contract would have been[*732] lacking in mutuality and too uncertain to enforce at any time prior to the receipt of the deed from the Secretary of the Interior, after the happening of this event, the uncertainty and lack of mutuality had been cured.

Argued October 14, 1975 Decided November 24, 1975 Rehearing denied December 15, 1975. G. Hughel Harrison, for appellant. Ralph H. Witt, for appellee.

It was therefore improper to direct a verdict on the uncertainty and lack of mutuality of the contract.

2. Counsel for Mr. Buiso argued in support of the motion for directed verdict in the trial court, and in this court, that the evidence failed to show that the contract was fair, just, equitable, and one that in good conscience should be performed. Code § 37-805.

Mr. Buiso testified that he offered the property for sale at the contract price, and that he executed the written contract of sale. He made no contention by his pleadings or by evidence that the price was inadequate. There was extensive testimony concerning the defect in the title of the property and the actions of the parties in their efforts to remove this defect.

Under all of the evidence it was a jury question whether the price was adequate, and whether the enforcement of the contract, after the delay in obtaining the release of the mineral interest of the United States Government, was equitable.

The direction of a verdict was error.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Gunter, Ingram and Hill, JJ., who concur in the judgment only.