Miller v. State, 516 S.E.2d 838 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). · Go Syfert
Search
Miller v. State, 516 S.E.2d 838 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
25 citation events (21 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: State v. Monique Domenge-Delhoyo (gactapp, 2016-07-15)
Treatment trajectory · 2000 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2000 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Monique Domenge-Delhoyo
Ga. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Hough v. State, 279 Ga. 711, 716 (2) ( 620 SE2d 380 ) (2005). “[T]he state 2 has the burden of demonstrating compliance with the implied consent notice requirements.” (Citations omitted.) Miller v. State, 238 Ga. App. 61, 62 (1) ( 516 SE2d 838 ) (1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The State v. Domenge-Delhoyo (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Hough v. State, 279 Ga. 711, 716 (2) ( 620 SE2d 380 ) (2005). “[T]he state 2 has the burden of demonstrating compliance with the implied consent notice requirements.” (Citations omitted.) Miller v. State, 238 Ga. App. 61, 62 (1) ( 516 SE2d 838 ) (1999).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Epps v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
As reviewing court, we must accept the factual and credibility determinations and inferences drawn by the trier of fact, even if we disagree with them, as long as there is evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings”) (footnote omitted). 3 (Citation omitted.) Miller v. State, 238 Ga. App. 61, 62 (1) ( 516 SE2d 838 ) (1999). 4 Baird v. State, 260 Ga. App. 661, 664 (2) ( 580 SE2d 650 ) (2003). 5 Supra. 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 289 Ga. App. 702 ( 658 SE2d 124 ) (2008). 9 Id. at 703-704 . 10 (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 704 . 11 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Id. 12 Compare Jones v. S…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baird v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Blackburn, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 Shockley v. State, 256 Ga. App. 892 ( 570 SE2d 67 ) (2002). 2 (Emphasis supplied.) 3 249 Ga. App. 433 ( 548 SE2d 129 ) (2001). 4 Id. at 434 (2). 5 Id. at 434-435 . 6 See OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1). 7 State v. Kachwalla, 274 Ga. 886, 887 ( 561 SE2d 403 ) (2002). 8 253 Ga. App. 71 ( 558 SE2d 51 ) (2001). 9 Id. at 76 (2) (a). 10 Nation v. State, 252 Ga. App. 620, 624 (4) ( 556 SE2d 196 ) (2001). 11 Although proof of a traffic violation is not necessary to show driving impairment, we note that the jury acquitted Baird of failure to maintain lane. 12 254…
discussed Cited "see" Jones v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Miller v. State, 238 Ga. App. 61, 62 (1) ( 516 SE2d 838 ) (1999); see also OCGA §§ 40-5-67.1 (b); 40-6-392 (a). *354 At the hearing on Jones’ motion to suppress, Officer Johnson testified that he read Jones the implied consent notice from his State-issued implied consent card and informed Jones of his implied consent rights.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Howell v. State (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Miller v. State , 238 Ga.App. 61 , 516 S.E.2d 838 (1999).
Miller
v.
the State
A99A0544.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Apr 28, 1999.
516 S.E.2d 838
Head, Mullís, Thomas & Webb, Jerry L. Webb, Jr., for appellant., G. Charming Ruskell, Solicitor, for appellee.
Johnson, McMurray, Andrews.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published
Johnson, Chief Judge.

Michael Miller was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent he was a less safe driver, OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1), and driving with an unlawful blood alcohol level, OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5). He was tried before a judge sitting without a jury. The judge found Miller not guilty of DUI to the extent he was a less safe[*62] driver, but guilty of DUI with an unlawful blood alcohol level. Miller appeals.

1. Miller asserts the court erred in admitting evidence of his breath test results. The assertion is correct because the state failed to meet its burden of proving Miller was fully informed of his implied consent rights.

When the state seeks to prove a DUI violation by evidence of a chemical test, the state has the burden of demonstrating compliance with the implied consent notice requirements. State v. Causey, 215 Ga. App. 85, 86 (449 SE2d 639) (1994). Unless the state meets its burden of showing that an officer fully informed the arrested person of his right to a chemical test independent of the state-administered test, the results of the state’s test are inadmissible. State v. Hassett, 216 Ga. App. 114, 115 (453 SE2d 508) (1995).

In the instant case, the only witness at Miller’s trial was the deputy sheriff who arrested him. The deputy testified that Miller was stopped at a roadblock and was arrested after failing field sobriety tests. The deputy testified that after the arrest he read Miller his implied consent rights as set forth on a card issued to him by his department. Miller then consented to a breath test, which showed a .112 blood alcohol level. The deputy, however, did not testify as to exactly what rights he informed Miller of or as to the actual contents of the card. The card itself was never introduced into evidence.

Consequently, the state’s only evidence concerning the implied consent warning was the deputy’s conclusory statement that he read a warning contained on a card. Given the absence of any further evidence specifying the substance of the warning allegedly given, the state failed to meet its burden of proving compliance with the implied consent notice requirements. The trial court therefore should have granted Miller’s motion to suppress the breath test results. See State v. Peters, 211 Ga. App. 755, 756-757 (440 SE2d 515) (1994). The court’s ruling to the contrary was error and is reversed.

Exclusion of the breath test results means that there is no competent evidence that Miller operated his motor vehicle when his blood alcohol level was at least .10 grams as required to support a conviction under OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5). Accordingly, Miller’s conviction must be reversed due to insufficient evidence. See Holcomb v. State, 217 Ga. App. 482, 483 (1) (458 SE2d 159) (1995).

2. Because of our holding in Division 1, we need not address Miller’s remaining enumerations of error.

Judgment reversed.

McMurray, P. J, and Andrews, J., concur. [*63] Decided April 28, 1999 Reconsideration denied May 12, 1999 — Cert. applied for. Head, Mullís, Thomas & Webb, Jerry L. Webb, Jr., for appellant. G. Charming Ruskell, Solicitor, for appellee.