Johnson v. State, 242 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. 1978). · Go Syfert
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Johnson v. State, 242 S.E.2d 53 (Ga. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
101 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 12 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Abney v. State (gactapp, 1984-03-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Abney v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
Appellant was essentially convicted on the charge of criminal trespass and sentenced to pay restitution, all without a full-blown trial and the safeguards attendant thereto. “ ‘The revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply. . . .’ ” Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 526, 527 ( 242 SE2d 53 ) (1978), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480 (92 SC 2593, 33 LE2d 484) (1972).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Mingo v. State (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
As stated by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 526, 527 ( 242 SE2d 53 ), in affirming Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 124 ( 235 SE2d 550 ), that court adopted the language of the Supreme Court of the United States in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480 (92 SC 2593, 33 LE2d 484) which is as follows: “The revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations...
discussed Cited "see" Lewis v. Sims (2×)
Ga. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 526 ( 242 SE2d 53 ) (1978); Mingo v. State, 155 Ga. App. 284, 286-287 (2) ( 270 SE2d 700 ) (1980); Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 124 ( 235 SE2d 550 ) (1977).
discussed Cited "see" Partee v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 124 ( 235 SE2d 550 ), affd. 240 Ga. 526 ( 242 SE2d 53 ), upholding the revocation of defendant’s probation based on evidence produced at the earlier trial of a burglary offense of which defendant was acquitted.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Perry v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 526 ( 242 SE2d 53 ) (1978); Teague v. State, 169 Ga. App. 285 (1) ( 312 SE2d 818 ) (1983).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ross v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 526, 527 ( 242 SE2d 53 ), affirming s.c. 142 Ga. App. 124 ( 235 SE2d 550 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Treadwell v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 526, 527 ( 242 SE2d 53 ), affirming s.c., 142 Ga. App. 124 ( 235 SE2d 550 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Caldwell v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 526, 527 ( 242 SE2d 53 ), affirming s.c., 142 Ga. App. 124 ( 235 SE2d 550 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Seldon v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 526, 527 ( 242 SE2d 53 ), affirming s.c., 142 Ga. App. 124 ( 235 SE2d 550 ).
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Brinson (4×)
Ga. · 1981 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 124 ( 235 SE2d 550 ) (1977), affd. s.c. 240 Ga. 526 ( 242 SE2d 53 ) (1977).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Henderson v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 526 ( 242 SE2d 53 ), affirming s.c. 142 Ga. App. 124 ( 235 SE2d 550 ).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Green v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Johnson v. State, 240 Ga. 526, 527 ( 242 SE2d 53 ), affirming s.c., 142 Ga. App. 124 ( 235 SE2d 550 ).
Johnson
v.
the State
32550.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jan 19, 1978.
242 S.E.2d 53
Jack H. Affleck, Jr., for appellant., Harry N. Gordon, District Attorney, B. Thomas Cook, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, William H. Lumpkin, for appellee.
Jordan, Marshall.
Cited by 49 opinions  |  Published
Jordan, Justice.

The question presented on this certiorari to the Court of Appeals is whether the principles of collateral estoppel and double jeopardy preclude the use of a crime, for which the probationer has been acquitted by a jury, as a ground for revocation of probation. See Johnson v. State, 142 Ga. App. 124 (235 SE2d 550) (1977).

The petitioner, while serving a four-year sentence[*527] imposed on July 16, 1973, was indicted in April, 1976, charging him with the crime of burglary. Subsequent thereto, and prior to the trial, a petition for revocation of the previous probated sentence based on the indictment was filed. On June 28, 1976, the petitioner was tried before a jury on the charge of burglary and acquitted.

Both parties stipulated that the evidence produced on the trial under the burglary indictment would be the same evidence upon which the judge would conduct the probation revocation hearing. After such hearing on July 1, 1976, the trial court entered an order revoking the balance of the petitioner’s probation.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals the petitioner contended that the trial court erred by revoking the probation and committed reversible error by subjecting the petitioner to double jeopardy in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions. The Court of Appeals in a six-three opinion affirmed the judgment of the trial judge revoking the petitioner’s probation.

We granted certiorari, this being a case of first impression in Georgia based on this factual situation.

Both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinions in the Court of Appeals fully discuss the applicable authority. The case was well briefed in that court and in this court. We have concluded that the result reached by the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals was correct and we affirm.

We adopt the language of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 480 (1972), cited by the Court of Appeals, which states: "The revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations. . . Revocation deprives an individual, not of the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only of the conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions.”

Before a jury is authorized to convict, evidence must be presented which will establish guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Even when this is done a jury has the power to acquit. This quantum of evidence is not necessary to justify the revocation of a sentence of[*528] probation.

Argued September 12, 1977 Decided January 19, 1978. Jack H. Affleck, Jr., for appellant. Harry N. Gordon, District Attorney, B. Thomas Cook, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, William H. Lumpkin, for appellee.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Marshall, J., who is disqualified.