Hall v. Ault, 242 S.E.2d 101 (Ga. 1978). · Go Syfert
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Hall v. Ault, 242 S.E.2d 101 (Ga. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
109 citation events (24 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Capote v. State (ga, 2024-10-31)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Capote v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2024 · confidence medium
Whether Georgia courts have correctly interpreted that statutory text in civil cases is not the subject of this concurrence. 30 County, 231 Ga. 695, 695 ( 203 SE2d 860 ) (1974) (in a civil case, referencing the “clearly erroneous” language from Code § 81A-152 and then applying some version of an any-evidence standard); Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978) (in reviewing an administrative proceeding, construing the clearly-erroneous standard of review in the predecessor to OCGA § 45-20-9 (m)14 as equivalent to an any-evidence standard and relying in part on Brook Forest t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Satilla Riverwatch Alliance, Inc. v. David Dove, Interim Director, Environmental Protection Division, Georgia Dept. of Natural Resources
Ga. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
But, OCGA § 50-13-19 (h) specifically provides that [t]he court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact [but] . . . [t]he court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings . . . are: . . . (5) 14 [c]learly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record[.] OCGA § 50-13-19 (h). “[T]he statute prevents a de novo determination of the evidentiary questions leaving only a determination of whether …
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Arnold Ragas
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pruitt Corp. v. Georgia Department of Community Health
Ga. · 2008 · confidence medium
“Thus, the statute prevents a de novo determination of the eviden-tiary questions leaving only a determination of whether the facts found by the [agency] are supported by ‘any evidence.’ ” Hall v. Ault, *161 240 Ga. 585, 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Georgia Department of Human Resources v. Odom
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
This statute “prevents a de novo determination of evidentiary questions” and authorizes “only a determination of whether the facts found by the board are supported by ‘any evidence.’” Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Professional Standards Commission v. Smith
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
The superior court’s review of evidentiary issues is limited to determining whether factual findings are supported by “any evidence.” Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Reheis v. Drexel Chemical Co.
Ga. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
The superior court’s review of evidentiary issues is limited to determining whether factual findings are supported by “any evidence.” Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Department of Corrections v. Glisson
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978); Stanley v. Dept. of Human Resources, 146 Ga. App. 450, 451 (1) ( 246 SE2d 459 ) (1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Reheis v. AZS CORP.
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
The superior court’s review of evidentiary issues is limited to determining whether factual findings are supported by “any evidence.” Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) City of Atlanta Government v. Smith
Ga. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
I would agree with Justice Hunt’s dissent on this point in the Levitas case and with the dissent of Justice Hall in Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 587-588 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sawyer v. Reheis
Ga. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
The “clearly erroneous” standard of review to be applied by the superior court “prevents a de novo determination of evidentiary questions leaving only a determination of whether the facts found by the [ALJ] are supported by ‘any evidence.’ ” Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Emory University v. Levitas (2×)
Ga. · 1991 · confidence medium
Hall in his dissenting opinion in Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 587 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Georgia Power Co. v. Georgia Public Service Commission (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
“This language ‘prevents a de novo determination of evidentiary questions leaving only a determination whether the facts found by the board are supported by “any evidence.” ’ Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978).” Georgia State Indemnification Comm. v. Lyons, 256 Ga. 311, 312 ( 348 SE2d 642 ) (1986); Lasseter, supra at 232 ; Bulloch Academy v. Cornett, 184 Ga. App. 42 ( 360 SE2d 615 ) (1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Georgia State Indemnification Commission v. Lyons (2×)
Ga. · 1986 · confidence medium
This language "prevents a de novo determination of evidentiary questions leaving only a determination whether the facts found by the board are supported by `any evidence.'" Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lyons v. Georgia State Indemnification Commission
Ga. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ); Georgia Dept. of Human Resources v. Holland, 133 Ga. App. 616, 617 (1) ( 211 SE2d 635 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cynthia B. Gorin v. Elton S. Osborne, Jr., M.D.
11th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
In Hall v. Ault, the Georgia Supreme Court held that this "statute prevents a de novo determination of evidentiary questions, leaving only a determination of whether the facts found by the board are supported by ‘any evidence'.” 242 S.E.2d at 102 (emphasis supplied).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Roberts v. Georgia Real Estate Commission
Ga. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
See Flowers v. Ga. Real Estate Commission, 141 Ga. App. 105 ( 232 SE2d 586 ); Ga. Real Estate Commission v. Hooks, 139 Ga. App. 34, 35 ( 227 SE2d 864 ); Ga. Real Estate Commission v. Horne, 141 Ga. App. 226 ( 233 SE2d 16 ); Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ). 3.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stanley v. Department of Human Resources
Ga. Ct. App. · 1978 · confidence medium
Code Ann. § 40-2207.l(m), which sets forth the procedure for hearings and judicial review of decisions of the State Personnel Board, "prevents a de novo determination of evidentiary questions leaving only a determination of whether the facts found by the board are supported by 'any evidence.’ ” Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585, 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978).
discussed Cited "see" Georgia Real Estate Commission v. Syfan (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978).
discussed Cited "see" Cardell v. Jackson (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585 ( 242 SE2d 101 ), in regard to the evidentiary standard of review on appeal. 2.
discussed Cited "see" Courts v. Economic Opportunity Authority for Savannah-Chatham County Area, Inc. (2×)
S.D. Ga. · 1978 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hall v. Ault, 240 Ga. 585 , 242 S.E.2d 101 construing the standards established in Ga. Code Ann. § 40-2207.1 (m) which state that “The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the board ás to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.” The decision in Hall affirmed the ruling in 143 Ga.App. 158 , 237 S.E.2d 653 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Thebaut v. Georgia Board of Dentistry (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare In the Matter of Daw, 910 P2d 752 , 754-755 (Idaho 1996) (private repri mand following adjudicatory hearing is judicially reviewable even though not specifically provided in rules). 240 Ga. 585 , 586 ( 242 SE2d 101 ) (1978).
HALL
v.
AULT Et Al.
32899.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jan 24, 1978.
242 S.E.2d 101
Elizabeth Coleman Stroup, Richard K. Greenstein, Steven Gottlieb, for appellant., Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, G. Stephen Parker, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
Nichols, Hall.
Cited by 49 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

Nichols, Chief Justice.

Appellant was employed by the Department of Corrections as a security guard at a halfway house. The department prescribed a dress code for such employees which forbade the wearing of blue jeans on duty. Appellant was warned several times of violations of the dress code. After continued violations, he was discharged for insubordination. He appealed to the State Personnel Board and, after hearing, the board found in favor of the department. The Fulton Superior Court and the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the State Personnel Board using as the standard of review the "any evidence rule.” Appellant contends the courts should have applied the "substantial evidence” test.

This court granted certiorari to review the question of what standard of review should be applied by a superior court in an appeal from an administrative decision of the State Personnel Board.

The standard of review to be applied by the courts is[*586] set forth in Code Ann. § 40-2207.1 (m), which provides, inter alia: "The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be confined to the record. The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the board as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision or order of the board or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse the decision or order of the board if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the board’s findings, inferences, conclusions, decisions or orders are:... (4) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record .. .” (Emphasis supplied.)

The language of Code Ann. § 40-2207.1 (m) and Code Ann. § 3A-120 (h) is identical in all material particulars and the Court of Appeals has twice before construed the clearly erroneous standard of the Administrative Procedure Act to be the same as the "any evidence rule.” Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Holland, 133 Ga. App. 616 (211 SE2d 635) (1974); Ga. Real Estate Commission v. Hooks, 139 Ga. App. 34 (227 SE2d 864) (1976).

This court in construing the "clearly erroneous” standard of the Civil Practice Act contained in Code Ann. § 81A-152 said: "Accordingly, assuming but not deciding that the findings of fact contended for by the appellants would have been authorized by the evidence presented on the trial, yet, where the facts found by the trial court were authorized by the evidence such findings will not be set aside.” Brook Forest Enterprises v. Paulding County, 231 Ga. 695 (203 SE2d 860) (1974).

The statute giving appellant a right to judicial review states, in part: "The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the board as to the weight of the evidence on the questions of fact.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the statute prevents a de novo determination of evidentiary questions leaving only a determination of whether the facts found by the board are supported by "any evidence.”

The trial court did not err in confining its scope of review to the "any evidence” standard, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except [*587] Hall, J., who dissents. Argued November 15, 1977 Decided January 24, 1978. Elizabeth Coleman Stroup, Richard K. Greenstein, Steven Gottlieb, for appellant. Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, G. Stephen Parker, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.

Dissent

Hall, Justice,

dissenting.

I dissent, because I do not believe that the phrase "[c]learly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record,” Code § 40-2207.1 (m) (4), is the equivalent of the "any evidence” test. The cases[1] in which the Court of Appeals held that the "any evidence” test is to be applied under the same language in the Administrative Procedure Act (Code § 3A-120), should be overruled.

The "clearly erroneous” standard first mentioned in the crucial phrase is not the same as the "any evidence” test. The United States Supreme Court has established the meaning of the "clearly erroneous” standard: "A finding is 'clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 395 (1948). This test provides a broader scope of review than the "substantial evidence” test used in reviewing agency decisions under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act. 5 USCA § 706 (2) (E). See Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U. S. 607, 619-620 (1966).

The "substantial evidence” test means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938), considering all of the evidence before the agency. Univer[*588] sal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U. S. 474, 487-488 (1951). This is not the same as determining the weight of the evidence. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, supra. Moreover, a comparison of the "substantial evidence” test and the "any evidence” test as used in Georgia cases makes it quite clear that the former provides a broader scope of review than the latter.

The issue is one of statutory construction. In using two terms of art ("clearly erroneous” and "substantial evidence”) in one section the legislature created some ambiguity. But there is no indication that the legislature intended the section in question to be the equivalent of yet a third distinct test, the "any evidence” test. Cf. Field, The Georgia Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. 1 Ga. St. Bar J. 269, 297-298 (1965) (discussing the same language used in the APA). The Court of Appeals rendered useless, if not meaningless, the terms of art used by the legislature when that court redefined them to mean the "any evidence” test. No rule of statutory construction supports the conclusion of the Court of Appeals.

This statute unambiguously rejects the "any evidence” test in favor of a broader standard of review. Whatever ambiguity there is involves only the question of which of the stricter standards is to be applied. I believe that the "substantial evidence” test was intended in light of the similarities of our Act and its federal counterpart. The federal judiciary has repeatedly considered the precise meaning of "substantial evidence,” and a suitable standard of review has evolved.

I would reverse the Court of Appeals.

1

Primarily Ga. Dept. of Human Resources v. Holland, 133 Ga. App. 616 (211 SE2d 635) (1974).