Pearce v. Pearce, 257 S.E.2d 904 (Ga. 1979). · Go Syfert
Pearce v. Pearce, 257 S.E.2d 904 (Ga. 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
50 citation events (30 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Carr v. Carr (gactapp, 1993-02-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carr v. Carr
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
The self-executing provision in the trial court’s decree here is more akin to the orders which were approved by the Supreme Court in Pearce v. Pearce, 244 Ga. 69, 70 ( 257 SE2d 904 ) (1979), and Weaver v. Jones, 260 Ga. 493, 494 (3) ( 396 SE2d 890 ) (1990).
discussed Cited "see" Perry v. Perry (2×)
Ga. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pearce v. Pearce, 244 Ga. 69, 70 ( 257 SE2d 904 ) (1979).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Ford v. Hanna (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id. at 494 ; see also Pearce v. Pearce, 244 Ga. 69 ( 257 SE2d 904 ) (1979).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Quillen v. Quillen (4×)
Ga. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Weaver v. Jones, 260 Ga. 493 (3) ( 396 SE2d 890 ) (1990) and Pearce v. Pearce, 244 Ga. 69 ( 257 SE2d 904 ) (1979) (inversion clause cases where change was not as to amount of support but only as to person responsible for making the payment); Perry v. Perry, 265 Ga. 186 ( 454 SE2d 122 ) (1995) and Cabaniss v. Cabaniss, 251 Ga. 177 (1) ( 304 SE2d 65 ) (1983) (escalation clause cases where fixed base amount of support was awarded and variable future award was made contingent upon objective, specified changes).
Pearce
v.
Pearce
35036.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jul 2, 1979.
257 S.E.2d 904
J. Robert Joiner, for appellant., Mary Walton Whiteman, for appellee.
Undercofler.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published
Undercofler, Presiding Justice.

The father and mother in this contempt action agreed at the time of their divorce "that within one year from the date of execution of this Agreement, or at such[*70] time as Wife remarries if earlier than one year, each of the children shall be given the opportunity to decide as to which of its parents the child wishes to live with [sic]. In the event one or both of the children decides that he or she wishes to live with the Husband, then in such event, the terms of this Agreement applicable to said child (i.e., visitation, child support and medical coverage) shall be inverted. Thereafter, for said child, the Wife shall have the visitation rights granted herein to the Husband, and the Wife shall have the child support and medical coverage obligations herein required of the Husband.” (Emphasis supplied.) One year later, the children decided to live with the father. The mother began paying child support in accordance with their divorce agreement and decree. In January, she terminated her payments, and the father filed this contempt action. She appeals from the trial court’s order finding her in contempt. We affirm.

Submitted June 15, 1979 Decided July 2, 1979 Rehearing denied July 18, 1979. J. Robert Joiner, for appellant. Mary Walton Whiteman, for appellee.

The wife’s argument that the divorce decree cannot be modified without a proper court proceeding, while true, is of no avail to her here. The original divorce decree included the possibility that her children might choose to live with their father and that she would then be obligated for their support. She is bound by its terms until it is appropriately modified by a court order. Nor is there any merit in her argument that she is not in wilful contempt because she discontinued the payments on her attorney’s advice.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.