State v. Williams, 272 S.E.2d 725 (Ga. 1980). · Go Syfert
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State v. Williams, 272 S.E.2d 725 (Ga. 1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
65 citation events (30 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Jerry Campbell (gactapp, 2025-11-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1981 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1981 2003 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jerry Campbell (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
“The government may not appeal a trial courts grant to a criminal defendant of a directed verdict of acquittal based on an insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, in that a new trial would be barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.” State v. Williams, 246 Ga. 788, 788-89 (1) ( 272 SE2d 725 ) (1980).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jerry Campbell (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
“The government may not appeal a trial courts grant to a criminal defendant of a directed verdict of acquittal based on an insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, in that a new trial would be barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment.” State v. Williams, 246 Ga. 788, 788-89 (1) ( 272 SE2d 725 ) (1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Shabazz
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Ingraham, for appellee. 1 State v. Williams, 246 Ga. 788, 788-789 (1) ( 272 SE2d 725 ) (1980); State v. Lawrence, 208 Ga. App. 588, 589 ( 431 SE2d 409 ) (1993). 2 See OCGA §§ 40-6-21 (meaning of traffic signal indications); 40-6-23 (meaning of flashing red and yellow signals); 40-6-24 (lane direction control signals).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Swint
Ga. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
(Citations omitted.) State v. Williams, 246 Ga. 788, 788-789 (1) ( 272 SE2d 725 ) (1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Barker
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
M. testified that when her then five-year-old daughter was three years old, she confided that Barker had fondled her breasts. 2 State v. Clark, 191 Ga. App. 708, 709 ( 382 SE2d 670 ) (1989). 3 State v. Williams, 246 Ga. 788, 788-789 (1) ( 272 SE2d 725 ) (1980). 4 Id. at 789 . 5 172 Ga. App. 708 ( 324 SE2d 557 ) (1984). 6 Id. at 708 (1). 7 Id. at 708-709 (citation and punctuation omitted). 8 See State v. Lawman, 198 Ga. App. 8 ( 400 SE2d 373 ) (1990). 9 OCGA§ 17-3-1 (b), (c).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lawrence
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Moreover, “the government may not appeal a trial court’s grant to a criminal defendant of a directed verdict of acquittal based on an insufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, [even if the directed verdict is erroneously granted,] in that a new trial would be barred by the double jeopardy [provisions of the Georgia and federal constitutions].” State v. Williams, 246 Ga. 788, 789 (1) ( 272 SE2d 725 ) (1980).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Seignious (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
State v. Williams, supra at 788 (1).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Jones
Ga. Ct. App. · 1990 · confidence medium
“The government cannot appeal such a directed verdict of acquittal, even if it is erroneously granted.” State v. Williams, 246 Ga. 788, 789 ( 272 SE2d 725 ) (1980).
examined Cited "see" Weldon v. State (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Williams, 246 Ga. 788, 789-790 (2) ( 272 SE2d 725 ) (1980).
examined Cited "see" Morris v. State (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Williams, 246 Ga. 788, 789 (1) ( 272 SE2d 725 ) (1980).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Bryant (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See in this connection State v. Williams, 246 Ga. 788 ( 272 SE2d 725 ) (1980); State v. Williams, 172 Ga. App. 708 (1) ( 324 SE2d 557 ) (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Fields v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Williams, 246 Ga. 788 ( 272 SE2d 725 ).
examined Cited "see, e.g." State v. Smith (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Rev. 1437 , 1454 (2007) (noting that "[v]ertical stare decisis refers to the binding effect of precedent on lower courts," and that "[s]erious rule of law costs would follow if lower courts were free to ignore precedent established by a higher court of appeal"). [22] Berky, 266 Ga. at 29 , 463 S.E.2d 891 . [23] Id. [24] Id. ("There is no basis for the State's appeal of an order granting a defendant's motion in limine on general evidentiary grounds."); see also State v. Kramer, 260 Ga.App. at 547 , 580 S.E.2d 314 (holding that the State "may not appeal the exclusion of evidence which is based o…
examined Cited "see, e.g." Parrish v. State (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1981 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare State v. Williams, 246 Ga. 788 (1) ( 272 SE2d 725 ) (1980); State v. Benton, supra; State v. O'Neal, 156 Ga. App. 384 (2) ( 274 SE2d 575 ) (1980).
The STATE
v.
WILLIAMS Et Al.
36633.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Dec 2, 1980.
272 S.E.2d 725
Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Robert S. Stubbs, II, Executive Assistant Attorney General, William C. Joy, Larry H. Evans, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant., J. Converse Bright, Tom W. Thomas, for appellees.
Marshall.
Cited by 27 opinions  |  Published
Marshall, Justice.

In this case, the appellees were brought to trial under an indictment charging that they intentionally “did destroy, damage and deface certain government property, to wit: 157 trees, property of State of Georgia, State Highway Department.” See Code Ann. § 26-2613. The state presented evidence, including oral admissions by the appellees, that they had cut down trees from a State Highway right-of-way to facilitate motorists’ viewing billboards owned by appellee Williams. After presentation of the state’s case-in-chief, the trial judge granted the appellees’ motion for directed verdict. In statements made by the judge at trial and in his written order subsequently entered, it appears that the trial judge made this ruling because the indictment charges the appellees with interfering with, property of the State Highway Department, but there is no such agency — the agency formerly known as State Highway Department now being the Department of Transportation (DOT). See Code Ann. § 40-35191 (Ga. L. 1972, pp. 1015, 1064).

The state appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the state’s appeal on the ground that directed verdicts of acquittal are not appealable by the state under Code Ann. § 6-1001a. We granted the state’s application for certiorari. We reverse.

1. It is true that the government may not appeal a trial court’s grant to a criminal defendant of a directed verdict of acquittal based[*789] on an insufficiency of the. evidence to support a conviction, in that a new trial would be barred by the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U. S. 564 (97 SC 1349, 51 LE2d 642) (1977). See also Burks v. United States, 437 U. S. 1 (98 SC 2141, 57 LE2d 1) (1978). The government cannot appeal such a directed verdict of acquittal, even if it is erroneously granted. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra.

In United States v. Jenkins, 420 U. S. 358 (95 SC 1006, 43 LE2d 250) (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that the government could not appeal the dismissal of an indictment after jeopardy had attached, even if the dismissal of the indictment did not amount to an acquittal on the merits. In United States v. Scott, 437 U. S. 82 (98 SC 2187, 57 LE2d 65) (1978), the Supreme Court overruled Jenkins and held that when a criminal defendant obtains a termination of the trial in his favor before any determination of factual guilt or innocence, a new trial is not barred by the double jeopardy clause. Accordingly, in Scott it was held that the government has the right to appeal a midtrial dismissal of various counts of an indictment based on prejudicial preindictment delay. In rendering the foregoing decisions, the Court has emphasized that what does and does not constitute an acquittal on the merits is to be controlled by the substance of the judge’s action and not the form. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., supra.

Looking to the substance of what the trial judge did here, we agree with the state that the order appealed from is not a directed verdict of acquittal on the merits, but a dismissal of the indictment because it alleges ownership of the trees in a now defunct agency of state government. In reaching the conclusion that this is in substance a dismissal of the indictment, we find it critical that the fact that the State Highway Department is now DOT is subject to judicial notice (see Code Ann. § 38-113) and, therefore, the trial judge’s grant of the appellees’ motion does not rest on the evidence or lack thereof adduced at trial. A directed verdict of acquittal is based on the evidence demanding a verdict of acquittal because of a lack of conflict therein. See Code Ann. § 27-1802. The ruling of the trial court is in substance a dismissal of the indictment, and the state may appeal an order dismissing an indictment under Code Ann. § 6-1001a (a), even if the order is entered during the course of the trial. United States v. Scott, supra.

2. Reaching the merits of this appeal, we hold that the trial judge erred in dismissing the indictment.

We do agree with the trial judge that when an accused is indicted for criminal interference with property of the State of Georgia under Code Ann. § 26-2613, ownership of the property is an essential[*790] element of the crime, but it is proof of ownership in the State of Georgia, not any particular agency thereof, that is essential. Whether referred to as the State Highway Department or the DOT, each of these is merely an agency of the state. See Tounsel v. State Highway Dept., 180 Ga. 112, 116 (178 SE 285) (1934). The indictment charges the appellees with damaging and defacing trees of the State of Georgia, and the fact that the indictment further alleges that the trees belong to the State Highway Department, rather than the DOT, does not constitute a fatal variance. See generally De Palma v. State, 225 Ga. 465 (3) (169 SE2d 801) (1969); Ingram v. State, 137 Ga. App. 412 (3b) (224 SE2d 527) (1976).

Argued November 17, 1980 Decided December 2, 1980 Rehearing denied December 16, 1980. Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Robert S. Stubbs, II, Executive Assistant Attorney General, William C. Joy, Larry H. Evans, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant. J. Converse Bright, Tom W. Thomas, for appellees.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Clarke, J., who dissents.