Crowder v. Ginn, 286 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. 1982). · Go Syfert
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Crowder v. Ginn, 286 S.E.2d 706 (Ga. 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
27 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Farrie v. McCall (gactapp, 2002-07-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Farrie v. McCall
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Those opinions were subsequently overruled in Crowder v. Ginn, 248 Ga. 824, 825 ( 286 SE2d 706 ) (1982), in which the court held that “jurisdiction shall be exercised over nonresident parties to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due process. [Cit.]” (Punctuation omitted.) Id.
discussed Cited "see" Cooper v. Edwards (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Crowder v. Ginn, 248 Ga. 824, 825 ( 286 SE2d 706 ) (1982) (definition of “nonresident” in Long Arm Statute does not offend due process clauses of state and federal constitutions).
discussed Cited "see" Towns v. Brown (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See OCGA § 9-10-90 (former Code Ann. § 24-117, as amended, Ga. L. 1977, pp. 586-588, effective March 23, 1977.) See also Crowder v. Ginn, 248 Ga. 824 ( 286 SE2d 706 ) (1982).
discussed Cited "see" Smith v. Griggs (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Crowder v. Ginn, 248 Ga. 824 ( 286 SE2d 706 ) (1982).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Coles v. Reese (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Crowder v. Ginn, 248 Ga. 824, 825 ( 286 SE2d 706 ) (1982); Andrews v. Stark, 264 Ga. App. 792, 793 (1) ( 592 SE2d 438 ) (2003); Bailey v. Hall, 199 Ga. App. 602, 603 (1) ( 405 SE2d 579 ) (1991).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Brian Coles v. Sparkle Reese (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Crowder v. Ginn, 248 Ga. 824, 825 ( 286 SE2d 706 ) (1982); Andrews v. Stark, 264 Ga. App. 792, 793 (1) ( 592 SE2d 438 ) (2003); Bailey v. Hall, 199 Ga. App. 602, 603 (1)(405 SEd2 579) (1991).
Crowder
v.
Ginn
38164.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
Jan 27, 1982.
286 S.E.2d 706
Mullís, Reynolds, Marshall, Horne & Phillips, W. Carl Reynolds, Katherine L. McArthur, for appellant., Martin, Snow, Grant & Napier, Hendley V. Napier, for appellee., Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Mark H. Cohen, Staff Assistant Attorney General, amicus curiae.
Jordan.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published
Jordan, Chief Justice.

We decide this day that Ga. L. 1977, pp. 586, 587 (Code Ann. § 24-117) does not deny due process by defining the term “nonresident” as used in our Long Arm Statute so as to include a person who was a Georgia resident at the time a claim arose against him out of a motor vehicle collision occurring in Georgia, but who subsequently became a resident of another state before personal service was perfected upon him in the other state in accordance with the Statute.

Ginn, the defendant, was a resident of Bibb County on the date of the motor vehicle collision. The collision occurred in Bibb County. Ginn subsequently moved his residence to South Carolina, where he personally was served with process in this suit filed in the State Court of Bibb County. The trial court sustained his motion to quash service of process and dismissed the action. Crowder, the plaintiff, appealed. We reverse.

We have adopted the Illinois Rule of long arm jurisdiction, the premise of which is that “ ‘jurisdiction shall be exercised over nonresident parties to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due process.’ ” Clarkson Power Flow v. Thompson, 244 Ga. 300 (260 SE2d 9) (1979). Procedural due process permits jurisdiction of a Georgia court over a nonresident defendant “only if he has established ‘minimum contacts’ in this state so that the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with ‘ “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310, 316 (66 SC 154, 90 LE 95) (1945). Clarkson Power Flow, supra, at 301.

We overrule the decision of this court in Young v. Morrison, 220[*825] Ga. 127 (137 SE2d 456) (1964), because Young relied upon the views of the Supreme Court of the United States expressed in the early case of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (24 LE 565) (1877), rather than upon the more modern views of that court set forth in International Shoe, supra. See the dissenting opinion of Justice (now Presiding Justice) Hill in Webb v. Oliver, 234 Ga. 361, 362 (216 SE2d 76) (1975).

Decided January 27, 1982. Mullís, Reynolds, Marshall, Horne & Phillips, W. Carl Reynolds, Katherine L. McArthur, for appellant. Martin, Snow, Grant & Napier, Hendley V. Napier, for appellee. Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Mark H. Cohen, Staff Assistant Attorney General, amicus curiae.

We hold that the due process clauses of our state and federal constitutions do not preclude defining the term “nonresident” for purposes of our Long Arm Statute so as to include a defendant who was a resident of Georgia on the date of an automobile collision in Georgia but who had become a resident of another state by the day on which he personally was served with process in the other state in accordance with the statute.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur.