Durrance v. State, 549 S.E.2d 406 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). · Go Syfert
Durrance v. State, 549 S.E.2d 406 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“objections presented for the first time on appeal furnish nothing for us to review, for this court is a court for correction of errors of law committed by the trial court where proper exception is taken”
64 citation events (64 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Smart v. State (gactapp, 2002-02-11)
Treatment trajectory · 2001 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2001 2013 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Smart v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
objections presented for the first time on appeal furnish nothing for us to review, for this court is a court for correction of errors of law committed by the trial court where proper exception is taken
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sheila Gunter v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
First, “absent a written request to charge, the failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is not error.” (Footnote omitted.) Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 187 (3) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gunter v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
First, “absent a written request to charge, the failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is not error.” (Footnote omitted.) Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185,187 (3) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Shivers v. State
Ga. · 2010 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Livery v. State, 233 Ga. App. 882, 884 ( 506 SE2d 165 ) (1998) (“ ‘The term offensive weapon . . . includes not only weapons which are offensive per se (such as firearms loaded with live ammunition), but also other instrumen-talities not normally considered to be offensive weapons per se which may be found by a jury to be likely to produce death or great bodily injury depending on the manner and means of their use.’ ” (citation omitted)); Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 186 ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001) (“Although an automobile is not per se a deadly or offensive weapon, it…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barnes v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Edwards, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. 1 See Bush v. State, 268 Ga. App. 200, 201 (1) ( 601 SE2d 511 ) (2004). 2 Id. 3 Id. 4 Id. 5 OCGA § 16-5-20 (a). 6 OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). 7 See Bush, supra; Frayall v. State, 259 Ga. App. 286, 287 (1) ( 576 SE2d 654 ) (2003). 8 Frayall, supra. 9 See Bush, supra. 10 OCGA § 24-4-8. 11 Frayall, supra at 288 (1). 12 Compare OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1), (2); Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 187 (2) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001). 13 Frayall, supra.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kirkland v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 186-187 (2) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Adams v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 186-187 (2) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bush v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Sutton v. State, 261 Ga. App. 860 (1) ( 583 SE2d 897 ) (2003). 1 OCGA§ 16-5-21 (a) (2). 2 OCGA§ 16-5-70 (c). 3 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 Frayall v. State, 259 Ga. App. 286, 287-288 (1) ( 576 SE2d 654 ) (2003). 6 Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 186-187 (2) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001). 7 Smiley v. State, 252 Ga. App. 235, 236 (2) ( 555 SE2d 887 ) (2001). 8 McAdams v. State, 258 Ga. App. 250, 251 (1) ( 573 SE2d 501 ) (2002). 9 Banks v. State, 260 Ga. App. 515, 519 (2) ( 580 SE2d 308 ) (2003). 10 Jones v. State, 272 Ga. 884, 886 (2) ( 536 SE2d 511 ) …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dyer v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 186-187 (2) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001); Black v. State, 222 Ga. App. 80, 81 (1) ( 473 SE2d 186 ) (1996); Payne v. State, 195 Ga. App. 523, 525 (4) ( 394 SE2d 781 ) (1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Riels v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
“Aggravated assault committed by means of a deadly or offensive weapon, unlike aggravated assault committed with the intent to murder, rape, or rob, does not require a specific criminal intent.” (Footnote omitted.) Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 186-187 ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Frayall v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Barnes and Adams, JJ, concur. 1 Frayall also was convicted of no proof of insurance, but she does not challenge this conviction on appeal. 2 See Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 187 (2) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001); Bogan v. State, 249 Ga. App. 242, 243 (1) ( 547 SE2d 326 ) (2001); Reynolds v. State, 234 Ga. App. 884, 885 (1) (b) ( 508 SE2d 674 ) (1998). 3 Thomas v. State, 255 Ga. App. 777, 778 (1) ( 567 SE2d 72 ) (2002). 4 See Brown v. State, 254 Ga. App. 345, 346 (1) ( 562 SE2d 513 ) (2002) (“ ‘The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence are the sole province …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chancey v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
This argument is without merit as we have held that “absent a written request to charge, the failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is not error.” (Footnote omitted.) Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 187 (3) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Webb v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
It is well settled that a motor vehicle may qualify as a deadly or offensive weapon under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), “depending on the manner and means by which the vehicle is used.” (Footnote omitted.) Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 187 (2) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Thomas v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Hyde, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 1 OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). 2 Spaulding v. State, 185 Ga. App. 812, 813 (1) ( 366 SE2d 174 ) (1988). 3 Id. 4 Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 187 (2) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001). 5 Hose v. State, 161 Ga. App. 401, 402 ( 288 SE2d 675 ) (1982). 6 See Stocks v. State, 224 Ga. App. 433, 434-435 (2) ( 481 SE2d 230 ) (1997) (criminal defendant not permitted to discharge counsel and employ another as tactic to delay trial). 7 OCGA § 40-6-395 (a); State v. Tiraboschi, 269 Ga. 812 ( 504 SE2d 689 ) (1998). 8 OCGA § 40-6-395 (b) (5) (A); State v. Tir…
discussed Cited "see" Johnson v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185 (2) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001).
discussed Cited "see" Turner v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185 (2) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001).
discussed Cited "see" Pace v. Capobianco (2×)
11th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185 , 549 S.E.2d 406, 407-08 (2001); Blalock v. State, 165 Ga.App. 269 , 299 S.E.2d 753, 753-54 (1983).
discussed Cited "see" Pace v. Capobianco (2×)
11th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185 , 549 S.E.2d 406, 407-08 (2001); Blalock v. State, 165 Ga.App. 269 , 299 S.E.2d 753, 753-54 (1983). 29 Given the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, reasonable police officers could have believed that the chase was not over when the police fired on Davis.
cited Cited "see" Brian L. Grech v. Clayton County, Georgia
11th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Durrance v. State, 549 S.E.2d 406, 407-08 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); Blalock v. State, 299 S.E.2d 753, 753-54 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Patterson v. State (4×)
Ga. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 187 (2) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001) (“Although an automobile is not per se a deadly or offensive weapon, it may become one depending on the manner and means by which the vehicle is used.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Patterson v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 187 (2) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001) (“Although an automobile is not per se a deadly or offensive weapon, it may become one depending on the manner and means by which the vehicle is used.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Elrod v. State (3×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Blackburn, P. J., and Ellington, J., concur. 1 OCGA § 16-1-6. 2 OCGA § 16-10-24. 3 See Holeman v. State, 226 Ga. App. 879, 880 (1) ( 487 SE2d 700 ) (1997). 4 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 131, 132 ( 442 SE2d 444 ) (1994). 5 (Citation omitted.) Holeman, supra. 6 Id.; see also Edwards, supra at 133 . 7 OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). 8 Durrance v. State, 250 Ga. App. 185, 186-187 (2) ( 549 SE2d 406 ) (2001). 9 See id. 10 Bundren v. State, 247 Ga. 180, 181-182 (2) ( 274 SE2d 455 ) (1981). 11 See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, p. 82 (3rd ed…
Durrance
v.
the State
A01A0828.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
Apr 24, 2001.
549 S.E.2d 406
Martin H. Eaves, for appellant., Johnny Durrance, pro se., Richard E. Currie, District Attorney, for appellee.
Mikell, Blackburn, Pope.
Cited by 28 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 63%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Georgia (1)
Mikell, Judge.

Johnny Durrance was charged in a thirteen-count indictment with five counts of aggravated assault (Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8), four counts of felony obstruction of an officer (Counts 3, 5, 7, and 9), fleeing and attempting to elude (Count 10), habitual violator (Count 11), battery (Count 12), and arson (Count 13). The trial court directed a verdict of acquittal on Counts 6, 7, and 13 and entered an order of nolle prosequi on Count 11. The jury was presented with a redacted indictment containing the remaining nine counts, and it returned a guilty verdict on all counts. The trial court subsequently merged Counts 1 and 3 with Count 2, Count 5 with Count 4, and Count 9 with Count 8. Durrance was then sentenced to serve fifteen years for each of the three aggravated assaults (Counts 2, 4, and 8), in addition to twelve months for each of the two misdemeanors. This appeal followed the denial of Durrance’s motion for new trial. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

1. In his first enumeration of error, Durrance contends that he was unfairly prejudiced in the eyes of the jury by the redacted indictment, which, he alleges, contained “unfounded” charges that were ultimately merged. However, the record reveals that Durrance failed to object to the presentation of the redacted indictment to the jury. “Objections presented for the first time on appeal furnish nothing for us to review, for this court is a court for correction of errors of law committed by the trial court where proper exception is taken.” [1] Consequently, this enumeration presents nothing for decision on appeal.

2. Durrance next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions of aggravated assault. On appeal of a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to support the verdict, and the defendant is no longer entitled to a presumption of innocence. We do not weigh the evidence or decide witness credibility, but simply determine whether the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the crimes charged. [2] Conflicts in the testimony of the witnesses are a matter of credibility for the jury to resolve. As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the state’s case, the jury’s verdict will be upheld. [3]

So viewed, the evidence shows that on July 9, 1999, Linda Giv[*186] ens called 911 to summon assistance to the home she shared with Durrance. The two had gotten into an argument, and Durrance, who was drunk, had slapped Givens twice. Givens also testified that Durrance had inadvertently set the bed on fire. Two Ware County deputy sheriffs, Sergeant Juan C. Spencer and Jimmy Clark, responded to the domestic disturbance call. Durrance left before they arrived. While the officers were conducting their investigation, Durrance drove by the house, ánd Clark, followed by Sgt. Spencer, gave chase. Ultimately, Durrance stopped at a traffic light and exited his truck. Deputy Clark testified that when he asked Durrance to approach Clark’s vehicle, Durrance replied, “F-you,” jumped back into his truck, and fled. The deputies radioed for additional officers and pursued Durrance. Deputies Danny Fullard and Tommy Allen and Georgia State Patrol Troopers Jeffrey A. Thomas and Mike Walker joined in the pursuit.

Sgt. Spencer and Deputy Clark, who were following each other, testified that when Durrance reached the Emerson Park area, Durrance turned around and sped toward them in their lane of traffic, forcing the officers to drive their patrol cars off the road and into a ditch to avoid being hit by Durrance. The deputies recovered their vehicles and continued their pursuit.

Deputy Fullard testified that during the high-speed chase, Durrance turned his truck around and Fullard tried to block him in. Durrance accelerated directly toward Fullard, who testified that he had to throw his car in reverse to get out of Durrance’s way. Trooper Walker testified that the officers tried to stop Durrance’s truck by using a maneuver called the precision immobilization technique, but Durrance struck Walker’s vehicle and accelerated. Finally, Durrance wrecked his truck and ran. Walker apprehended Durrance and arrested him.

Durrance testified that he never intended to strike the officers’ vehicles; rather, he was merely trying to flee. Durrance thus contends that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had a specific intent to injure the officers, and he enumerates as error the trial court’s denial of his motion for a directed verdict.

Contrary to Durrance’s argument, the state was required to prove only a general intent to injure. [4] Pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), an assault becomes aggravated when it is committed “with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily injury.” Aggravated assault committed by means of a deadly or offensive weapon, unlike aggravated assault committed with the intent to[*187] murder, rape, or rob, does not require a specific criminal intent. [5] Although an automobile is not per se a deadly or offensive weapon, it may become one depending on the manner and means by which the vehicle is used. [6] The question of whether an automobile has been used in such a manner so as to constitute a deadly or offensive weapon is one for the jury to resolve. [7]

Decided April 24, 2001 Reconsideration denied June 25, 2001 Martin H. Eaves, for appellant. Johnny Durrance, pro se. Richard E. Currie, District Attorney, for appellee.

The evidence in the instant case, including Durrance’s own testimony that he had crossed the centerline and was speeding, was sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the requisite criminal intent to commit aggravated assault. [8]

3. In his final enumeration of error, Durrance asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to give his orally requested charge on simple assault as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault. However, absent a written request to charge, the failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense is not error. [9] As Durrance failed to submit a written request, this enumeration is meritless.

Judgment affirmed.

Blackburn, C. J., and Pope, P. J., concur.
1

(Punctuation omitted.) Sparks v. State, 232 Ga. App. 179, 182 (3) (a) (501 SE2d 562) (1998).

2

Horne v. State, 237 Ga. App. 844-845 (1) (517 SE2d 74) (1999).

3

Ringo v. State, 236 Ga. App. 38, 39 (510 SE2d 893) (1999).

4

Cline v. State, 199 Ga. App. 532, 533-534 (405 SE2d 524) (1991).

6

Blalock v. State, 165 Ga. App. 269, 270 (299 SE2d 753) (1983).

7

Banks v. State, 169 Ga. App. 571, 572 (314 SE2d 235) (1984); Quarles v. State, 130 Ga. App. 756 (2) (204 SE2d 467) (1974).

8

Cline, supra. See also Anderson v. State, 254 Ga. 470, 472 (2) (330 SE2d 592) (1985); Reynolds v. State, 234 Ga. App. 884, 885-886 (1) (b) (508 SE2d 674) (1998).

9

Hawkins v. State, 267 Ga. 124, 125 (3) (475 SE2d 625) (1996).