Vance v. State, 416 S.E.2d 516 (Ga. 1992). · Go Syfert
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Vance v. State, 416 S.E.2d 516 (Ga. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“what is perceived as 'moral' may differ from group to group, from class to class, and from individual to individual. this diversity renders any precise definition of'moral certainty' elusive, and any uniformity of interpretation by jurors unlikely.”
110 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Watkins v. State (gactapp, 2004-01-07) · Strongest negative: Ward v. State (ga, 1992-06-11)
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 24 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "but see" Ward v. State (2×)
Ga. · 1992 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 238 (2), fn. 5 ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992), in which we disapproved the use of the phrase “moral and reasonable certainty” when charging on reasonable doubt. 28.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Watkins v. State (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
what is perceived as 'moral' may differ from group to group, from class to class, and from individual to individual. this diversity renders any precise definition of'moral certainty' elusive, and any uniformity of interpretation by jurors unlikely.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hart v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Although the better practice is to omit any reference to “moral and reasonable certainty,” there was no reversible error because the charge viewed in its entirety “repeatedly and accurately conveyed to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt.” Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237-238 ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992), overruled on other grounds, 267 Ga. 209, 210 ( 477 SE2d 807 ) (1996); Caldwell v. State, 263 Ga. 560, 563-564 ( 436 SE2d 488 ) (1993); Armstrong v. State, 265 Ga. 18, 19 ( 453 SE2d 442 ) (1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cherry v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
While at the time of Cherry’s trial, in 1993, such references were permitted under Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237 (1) ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992), the Supreme Court later overruled Vance in Sterling v. State, 267 Ga. 209, 210 (2) ( 477 SE2d 807 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rivers v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that the above language violates due process by diminishing in the minds of the jury that the standard of proof that the State must carry is “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U. S. 1 (114 SC 1239, 127 LE2d 583) (1994); Baldwin v. State, 264 Ga. 664, 665-666 (1) ( 449 SE2d 853 ) (1994); Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237-238 (2) ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992), overruled in Sterling v. State, 267 Ga. 209, 210 (2) ( 477 SE2d 807 ) (1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McClain v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
McClain argues that the trial court erred while charging the jury on reasonable doubt by stating that “moral and reasonable certainty is all that can be expected in an investigation.” Although in Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237 (2) ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992), the Supreme Court specifically disapproved this language, the court’s charge in this case repeatedly and accurately conveyed the correct concepts of innocence until proven guilty and reasonable doubt.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Parker v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
The trial court gave the same charges during this 1990 trial which were later disapproved in Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237-238 ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stephenson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Although disapproved by the Supreme Court in Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 238, fn. 5 ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992), even if given, such a charge is not reversible error if the charge, as a whole, repeatedly and accurately conveyed to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tyson v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Floyd, District Attorney, Kelley S. Powell, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. (b) The charge as a whole is the pattern charge from the Council of Superior Court Judges, Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II, Part 2 (D), Suggested General Charges Required in All Criminal Cases (2d ed.) (1991) (revised July 1992), and does not contain the “moral and reasonable certainty” language disapproved of by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237 (2), 238, n. 5 ( 416 SE2d 516 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Armstrong v. State
Ga. · 1995 · confidence medium
Here, the trial court’s reference to a “moral and reasonable certainty” appears in the context of a charge which “as a whole repeatedly and accurately conveyed to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt.” Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237 (2) ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Burgess v. State (2×)
Ga. · 1994 · confidence medium
See Baldwin v. State, 264 Ga. 664 ( 449 SE2d 853 ) (1994); Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237 (2) ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baldwin v. State
Ga. · 1994 · confidence medium
(Emphasis supplied.) Appellant urges that, by instructing the jury that “[reasonable certainty is all that can be expected in a legal investigation,” the trial court impermissibly reduced the State’s burden of proof and allowed the jury to convict him on a lesser standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” However, we have held that use of the phrase “moral and reasonable certainty” does not constitute reversible error when it appears in the context of a charge which “as a whole repeatedly and accurately conveyed to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt.” Vance v. State, 26…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Edwards v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
In Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237-238 (2) ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992), the Georgia Supreme Court disapproved a charge in which the phrase “moral and reasonable certainty” was used, but held that it was not reversible error because, taken as a whole, the trial court’s charge “repeatedly and accurately conveyed to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt.” Id.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kidwell v. State (2×)
Ga. · 1994 · confidence medium
Swayzer v. State, 263 Ga. 689, 690 (2) ( 436 SE2d 652 ) (1993); Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237, 238 ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ruff v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
Ruff argues that the court erred in failing to charge that the State must prove each essential element of the crime not only “beyond a reasonable doubt,” but also to “a moral and reasonable certainty.” He claims that because of this omission, and also because of the later inclusion of the phrase in a “negative” charge describing the limitations of a legal investigation, the charge is actually more potentially misleading'than the charge criticized in Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237-238, nn. 4-5 ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Waugh v. State
Ga. · 1993 · confidence medium
Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237 (2) ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harris v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
In a case decided after the present trial, the Supreme Court noted that the better charge on burden of proof “would not include the unnecessary phrase ‘moral and reasonable certainty.’ ” Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 238, n. 5 ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dominick v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Although our own Supreme Court held recently in Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 238 ( 416 SE2d 516 ) that the better practice is not to use this language, the instant charge is not the charge condemned in Cage .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gearin v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237-238, n. 5 ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Greenway v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236, 237 (2), 238, fn. 4 ( 416 SE2d 516 ).
discussed Cited "see" Carter v. State (2×)
Ga. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
Carter’s notice of appeal was timely filed on December 22,1997, and the matter was submitted for decision without oral argument on June 15, 1998. 2 Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 3 Davis v. United States, 512 U. S. 452, 459 (114 SC 2350, 129 LE2d 362) (1994); see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 484-485 (101 SC 1880, 68 LE2d 378) (1981). 4 Spurlin v. State, 228 Ga. 2, 5 ( 183 SE2d 765 ) (1971); see OCGA § 24-3-3. 5 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640 ( 409 SE2d 649 ) (1991). 6 Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236 ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992), overruled, 267 G…
discussed Cited "see" Kimbrough v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236 (2) ( 416 SE2d 516 ); Oliver v. State, 207 Ga. App. 681 (2) ( 428 SE2d 681 ). 5.
cited Cited "see" Beck v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 238 ; but see McDonald v. State, 210 Ga. App. 689 ( 436 SE2d 811 ) (1993). 4.
discussed Cited "see" Oliver v. State (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Vance v. State, 262 Ga. 236 (2) ( 416 SE2d 516 ) (1992).
Vance
v.
the State
S92A0222.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
May 22, 1992.
416 S.E.2d 516
Michael C. Garrett, for appellant., Dupont K. Cheney, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Robert D. McCullers, Staff Attorney, for appellee.
Sears-Collins.
Cited by 51 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 89%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Georgia (1)
Sears-Collins, Justice.

Randy Edward Vance was convicted by a jury of one count of malice murder and one count of cruelty to children following the death of his girl friend’s 21-month-old son. The child died as the result of loss of blood from an internal organ ruptured by blunt trauma to the abdomen. Numerous other injuries were found on the child’s body, including hemorrhaging inside his skull and around his brain, bruises on his arms and torso, and a tear in his anus consistent with the forceful insertion of a large foreign object.

Vance appeals his conviction and the sentences of life imprisonment for murder and 20 years to serve for cruelty to children. [1] We[*237] affirm.

1. Vance contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial after the state asserted in its closing argument that the life of the couple’s other child might be in danger if Vance were acquitted. Vance argues that this statement was prejudicial, had no basis in the evidence, and invited the jury to abandon their investigation of guilt or innocence and adopt the role of guardian for the younger child.

We disagree.

“[T]he state is permitted to argue that a defendant’s probable future behavior ‘indicates a need for the most effective means of incapacitation. . . .’ ” Spencer v. State, 260 Ga. 640, 653 (398 SE2d 179) (1990) (death penalty sought as most effective means of incapacitation). “Arguments addressing [future dangerousness] are not improper if based on evidence adduced at trial.” Ross v. State, 254 Ga. 22, 34 (326 SE2d 194) (1985); Hicks v. State, 256 Ga. 715, 730 (352 SE2d 762) (1987). We find the state’s arguments regarding Vance’s possible future behavior were permissible based on evidence that Vance caused the deceased child’s death, and that the victim’s mother had since given birth to another child fathered by Vance, had married Vance, and did not acknowledge any culpability whatsoever on the part of Vance in the victim’s death.

2. In his second enumeration of error, Vance contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that “moral and reasonable certainty is all that can be required in a legal investigation.” [2] Vance argues that the charge permitted the jury to convict on a lesser standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” which is the standard of proof for conviction of a crime set forth in OCGA § 16-1-5. [3]

We find that the court’s charge as a whole repeatedly and accurately conveyed to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt. [4] In light[*238] of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant, the use of the words “moral and reasonable certainty” created no reversible error when “considered in the context of the charge as a whole.” [5] Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307, 315 (105 SC 1965, 85 LE2d 344) (1985).

Decided May 22, 1992. Michael C. Garrett, for appellant. Dupont K. Cheney, District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Robert D. McCullers, Staff Attorney, for appellee.

3. Finally, we find that the evidence presented at the trial was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find Vance guilty of malice murder and cruelty to children. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.
1

The crimes were committed on June 19,1989. Vance was indicted on February 9, 1990, by a Long County grand jury. He was tried between April 2 and 4, 1990, and sentenced on April 4, 1990. Vance filed a motion for new trial on April 27, 1990, which was amended on September 5, 1991, and was denied on September 30, 1991. Vance filed his notice of appeal on October 8, 1991. The appeal was docketed in this court on November 14, 1991, and sub[*237] mitted without oral argument on December 27, 1991.

2

This language appears in OCGA § 24-4-3, which reads in full as follows:

Moral and reasonable certainty is all that can be expected in legal investigation. In all civil cases a preponderance of evidence is considered sufficient to produce mental conviction. In criminal cases a greater strength of mental conviction is held necessary to justify a verdict of guilty.
3

OCGA § 16-1-5 states that “[n]o person shall be convicted of a crime unless each element of such crime is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

4

The trial judge gave the following charge regarding burden of proof, which is substantially the same as that recommended by the Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia in the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions (July 1991):

[TJhis defendant is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty. The defendant enters upon the trial of the case with a presumption of innocence in his favor. This presumption surrounds him and protects him until it is overcome by the State with evidence which is sufficient to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. No person shall be convicted of any crime unless and until each element of the crime is proven beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral and rea[*238] sonable certainty.
The burden of proof rests upon the State to prove every material allegation of the indictment and every essential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no burden of proof upon the defendant whatever and the burden never shifts to the defendant to prove his innocence. However, the State is not required to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond all doubt or to a mathematical certainty. Moral and reasonable certainty is all that can be expected in a legal investigation.
A reasonable doubt means just what it says. It is the doubt of a fair minded, impartial juror honestly seeking the truth. It is a doubt based upon common sense and reason. It does not mean a vague or arbitrary notion but is a doubt for which a reason can be given, arising from a consideration of the evidence, the lack of evidence, a conflict in the evidence, or a combination of these. If, after giving consideration to all the facts and circumstances of this case, your minds are wavering, unsettled and unsatisfied, then that is the doubt of the law and you should acquit the defendant. But if that doubt does not exist in your minds as to the defendant’s guilt, then you would be authorized to convict him. If the State fails to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to acquit the defendant. (Emphasis supplied.)
5

While the charge does not create reversible error, we note that the better charge would not include the unnecessary phrase “moral and reasonable certainty.” What is perceived as “moral” may differ from group to group, from class to class, and from individual to individual. This diversity renders any precise definition of “moral certainty” elusive, and any uniformity of interpretation by jurors unlikely. Further, because the term “reasonable” is inherently equivocal, it is conceivable that a juror could be reasonably certain of an element of a crime, and at the same time harbor a reasonable doubt as to that element. Hence, a juror who heard the phrase “reasonable certainty” might apply a lesser standard of proof than guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Given the entirety of the charge and the compelling evidence in this case, however, we reiterate that no reversible error is present.