S. Gen. Ins. v. Holt, 416 S.E.2d 274 (Ga. 1992). · Go Syfert
S. Gen. Ins. v. Holt, 416 S.E.2d 274 (Ga. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“a claim for punitive damages has efficacy only if there is a valid claim for actual damages to which it could attach. punitive damages may not be recovered where there is no entitlement to compensatory damages.”
330 citation events (279 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Edenfield v. Hiscox, Inc. (gasd, 2022-11-22)
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Edenfield v. Hiscox, Inc.
S.D. Ga. · 2022 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in deciding whether to settle a claim within the policy limits, the insurance company must give equal consideration to the interests of the insured.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Camacho v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. (8×) also: Cited as authority (quoted), Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
N.D. Ga. · 2016 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
in deciding whether 'to settle a claim within the policy limits, the insurance company must give equal consideration to the interests of the insured.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Andrews v. Ford Motor Co. (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
a claim for punitive damages has efficacy only if there is a valid claim for actual damages to which it could attach. punitive damages may not be recovered where there is no entitlement to compensatory damages.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Kilburn v. Patrick (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Ga. Ct. App. · 1999 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
unitive damages may not be recovered where there is no entitlement to compensatory damages
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Trever Cannon v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois
Ga. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 268 (1) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992). 5 The trial court found that Safeco had no duty nor opportunity to resolve the Barnes Estate Claim because Barnes never made a demand for payment of the policy limits before Safeco filed its interpleader complaint and tendered the policy limits into the court registry.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) GmbH v. Bass
N.D. Ga. · 2025 · confidence medium
The Appellants also filed emergency requests to impose the stay relief on a provisional basis. 4 A Demand is a settlement demand by one party to another that allows the demanding party to potentially bring a bad faith failure to settle claim against the receiving party’s insurance carrier. , et al., 262 Ga. 267, 268-69 (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) LACOM GmbH v. Bass
N.D. Ga. · 2025 · confidence medium
The Appellants also filed emergency requests to impose the stay relief on a provisional basis. 4 A Demand is a settlement demand by one party to another that allows the demanding party to potentially bring a bad faith failure to settle claim against the receiving party’s insurance carrier. , et al., 262 Ga. 267, 268-69 (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Whitaker Farms, LLC v. Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC (2×)
Ga. · 2024 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 270 ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992) (“A claim for punitive damages has efficacy only if there is a valid claim for actual damages to which it could attach.” (cleaned up)); Nat.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wah v. FCIA Trade Credit & Political Risk Division of Great American Insurance Company
N.D. Ga. · 2024 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 277 (1992) (holding that insured who assigned claim against insurer to third party had forfeited right to recover damages on that claim).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Deaton v. Town of Barrington
D.R.I. · 2023 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 416 S.E.2d 274, 276 (Ga. 1992); Liberty Mut.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kemper v. Equity Insurance Company (2×) also: Cited "see"
N.D. Ga. · 2021 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 416 S.E.2d 274, 276 (Ga. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Geico Indemnity Company v. Whiteside
Ga. · 2021 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 270 (2) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992). 19 The answer to the first certified question is a qualified “no.” Under the circumstances presented in the certified record, neither OCGA § 33-7-15 nor the related endorsement in the insurance policy relieves GEICO of liability for the bad faith or negligent failure-to- settle claim brought against it.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Geico Indemnity Company v. Whiteside
Ga. · 2021 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 270 (2) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992). 19 The answer to the first certified question is a qualified “no.” Under the circumstances presented in the certified record, neither OCGA § 33-7-15 nor the related endorsement in the insurance policy relieve GEICO of liability for the bad faith or negligent failure-to- settle claim brought against it.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Howard Wright v. John Edward Nelson (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
Holt expressly disavows any “inten[t] to lay down a rule of law that would mean that a plaintiff’s attorney . . . could ‘set up’ an insurer for an excess judgment merely by offering to settle within the policy limits and by imposing an unreasonably short time within which the offer would remain open.” Holt, 262 Ga. at 169 (1).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Company v. Liberty Surplus Insurance Corporation (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 416 S.E.2d 274, 276 (Ga. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Amy Marie Kemper v. Equity Insurance Company (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 416 S.E.2d 274, 276 (Ga. 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) First Acceptance Insurance Company of Georgia, Inc. v. Hughes
Ga. · 2019 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 268-269 (1) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992) (citation and punctuation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jamie Rebecca Flanders as Natural Mother and Legal Heir of James Gage Raper v. Dequavus D. Jackson
Ga. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 268 ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992) (same). 6 Holcomb v. Long, 329 Ga. App. 515, 517 (1) ( 765 SE2d 687 ) (2014); accord In the Interest of L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cynthia Dyches Linthicum v. Mendakota Insurance Company
11th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267 , 416 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1992), and “must use such care as would have been used by an ordinarily prudent insurer with no policy limit applicable to the claim,” Baker v. Huff, 323 Ga.App. 357 , 747 S.E.2d 1, 6 (2013) (quoting U.S. Fid. & Guar.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Woodard (3×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. · 2017 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 268 (1) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992), 4 spawned much litigation over, among other things, what constitutes an offer to which an insurer must respond, 5 when an insurer’s inquiry about medical liens amounts to a counteroffer, 6 and how much time an offeror must provide for a response in order to trigger an insurer’s duty to respond. 7 OCGA § 9-11-67.1 speaks to those issues.
examined Cited as authority (rule) GRANGE MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY v. WOODARD (3×)
Ga. · 2017 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 268 (1) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992),4 spawned much litigation over, among other things, what constitutes an offer to which an insurer must respond,5 when an insurer’s inquiry about medical liens amounts to a counteroffer,6 and how much time an offeror must provide for a response in order to trigger an insurer’s duty to respond.7 OCGA § 9-11-67.1 speaks to 4 Although this case does not call on us to consider whether Grange acted in bad faith, Georgia case law on insurers’ duties to their insured, specifically our decision in Holt, looms in the background.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Grange Mutual Casualty Company v. Boris Woodard
11th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
Id. at 276 (emphasis omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Owners Insurance Company v. Mitchell Winfred Chadwick
11th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267 , 416 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) The Medical Center Hospital Authority v. Marion Baker (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 270 (2) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992); Gwinnett Health 22 System v. Delu, 264 Ga. App. 863, 869 (3) ( 592 SE2d 497 ) (2003); Sharp v. Greer, Klosik & Daugherty, 256 Ga. App. 370, 373 (6) ( 568 SE2d 503 ) (2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gold Cross EMS, Inc. v. Children's Hospital of Alabama
S.D. Ga. · 2015 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267 , 416 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1992) (holding that where the evidence showed that liability for an accident was clear and damages exceeded the policy limits, a question of fact existed as to whether an insurance company acted in bad faith by refusing to settle).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carter v. Progressive Mountain Insurance
Ga. · 2014 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 269 (2) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992) (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Accordingly, nothing in OCGA § 33-24-41.1 precludes a statement in the release that a portion of the payment be allocated to punitive damages. 6 In its decision below, the Court of Appeals expressed concern that inclusion of an allocation to punitive damages in a release such as the one here would “force exhaustion of liability coverage” and “indirectly shift[] payment of punitive damages from the liability carrier to the underinsured motorist carrier, contrary to the purpose of underinsured m…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carter v. Progressive Mountain Insurance
Ga. · 2014 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 269 (2) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992) (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Accordingly, nothing in OCGA § 33-24-41.1 precludes a statement in the release that a portion of the payment be allocated to punitive damages.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Camacho v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance (3×) also: Cited "see"
N.D. Ga. · 2014 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267 , 416 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Piedmont Office Realty Trust, Inc. v. XL Specialty Insurance
N.D. Ga. · 2014 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267 , 416 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Eco-Clean, Inc. v. Brown
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 268 (1) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992), and construing the evidence in Brown’s favor, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Eco-Clean’s motion for a directed verdict on liability. 4.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Nicholas Brown
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
The driver testified subsequently that he discussed with Eco-Clean’s manager that the car needed handles to give people standing on the running board “something more robust to grab onto.” Considering that the standard for appellate review of a directed verdict is the “any evidence” test, Southern General v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 268 (1) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992), and construing the evidence in Brown’s favor, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Eco-Clean’s motion for a directed verdict on liability. 4.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nicholas Brown v. Eco-Clean, Inc.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
The driver testified subsequently that he discussed with Eco-Clean’s manager that the car needed handles to give people standing on the running board “something more robust to grab onto.” Considering that the standard for appellate review of a directed verdict is the “any evidence” test, Southern General v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 268 (1) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992), and construing the evidence in Brown’s favor, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Eco-Clean’s motion for a directed verdict on liability. 4.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rhonda Renae Jones as for the Estate of Patricia Huff v. Joshua E. Huff as Administrator Cum Testamenta Annexo for the Estate of Harlan E. Huff
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 269 ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Baker v. Huff (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 269 ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Camacho v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance (2×)
N.D. Ga. · 2012 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt that its decision should not be read to “mean that a plaintiffs attorney ... could set up an insurer for an excess judgment merely by offering to settle within the policy limits and by imposing an unreasonably short time within which the offer would remain open.” 416 S.E.2d 274, 276 (Ga. 1992).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Southern General Insurance v. Wellstar Health Systems, Inc. (8×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Ga. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
The insured is interested in protecting itself against an excess judgment; the insurer has less incentive to settle because litigation may result in a verdict below the policy limits or a defense verdict.”). 10 Holt, 262 Ga. at 269 (1) (punctuation omitted). 11 Id. 12 Id.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DeMarco v. Travelers Insurance Co. (2×)
R.I. · 2011 · confidence medium
See Davis, 412 F.2d at 480 (stating that it was “for the jury to decide whether the refusal to settle was primarily in [the insurer’s] own interests and with too little regard for the insured’s interests”); Southern General Insurance Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267 , 416 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1992) (noting that, in determining an insurer’s liability for failure to settle a claim, “[t]he jury generally must decide whether the insurer, in view of the existing circumstances, has accorded the insured the same faithful consideration it gives its own interest”) (internal quotation marks omitted); …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Whiteside v. Decker, Hallman, Barber & Briggs, P.C.
Ga. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 269 ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992); Fine v. Communication Trends, 305 Ga. App. 298, 305 ( 699 SE2d 623 ) (2010). 3.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Fortner v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co.
Ga. · 2009 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 268-269 ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Kim
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 270 (2) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Fortner v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co. (4×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 268-269 (1), 416 S.E.2d 274 (1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tomczyk v. JOCKS & JILLS RESTAURANTS, LLC
N.D. Ga. · 2007 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 200 Ga.App. 759, 768 (5), *1362 409 S.E.2d 852 (1991), rev’d in part on other grounds, 262 Ga. 267, 270 (2), 416 S.E.2d 274 (1992).]” Id. (emphasis in original).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCowan v. Progressive Preferred Insurance (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 270 (2), 416 S.E.2d 274 (1992). [40] See Stiefel, supra at 639 (2), 398 S.E.2d 194 . [41] OCGA § 33-6-30 et seq. [42] OCGA § 33-6-37. [43] See Anderson v. Shelby Mut.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Berges v. Infinity Ins. Co. (2×)
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267 , 416 S.E.2d 274, 276 (1992) ("An insurance company does not act in bad faith solely because it fails to accept a settlement offer within the deadline set by the injured person's attorney.").
cited Cited as authority (rule) Flynn v. Allstate Insurance
Ga. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 270 (2) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992). 5 See Brown v. Brewer, 237 Ga. App. 145, 147 (1) ( 513 SE2d 10 ) (1999). 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 See Southern Gen.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gwinnett Health System, Inc. v. Delu
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 270 (2) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Canal Indemnity Co. v. Greene
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 270 (2) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992). 22 Southern R.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Empire Fire & Marine Insurance v. Driskell
Ga. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 270 (2) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cotton States Mutual Insurance v. Brightman (2×)
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
(Footnote omitted.) 44 AmJur2d 331-333, Insurance, § 1399 (1982). 262 Ga. 267, 268 (1) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sharp v. Greer, Klosik & Daugherty
Ga. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Co. v. Holt, 262 Ga. 267, 270 (2) ( 416 SE2d 274 ) (1992).
SOUTHERN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
HOLT Et Al.
S91G1556.
Supreme Court of Georgia.
May 21, 1992.
416 S.E.2d 274
Freeman & Hawkins, Paul M. Hawkins, Michael J. Goldman, for appellant., Charles A. Gower, Terry Lee Strawser, Kelly, Denney, Pease & Allison, Ernest Kirk II, for appellees., Taylor & Harp, J. Sherrod Taylor, Jefferson C. Callier, William S. Stone, Middleton & Anderson, Elizabeth F. Bunce, Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Sidney F. Wheeler, Carol P. Michel, Neely & Player, John W. Winborne III, Julianna Kauderer, Wetzel & Carroll, Michael L. Wetzel, Frank J. Beltran, Foy R. Devine, amici curiae.
Fletcher.
Cited by 107 opinions  |  Published
3 passages pin-cited by 3 cases
Pinpoint authority: bottom 88%
Citer courts: Court of Appeals of Georgia (2) · N.D. Georgia (1)
Fletcher, Justice.

We granted the writ of certiorari to determine whether an insured has a claim for bad faith against an insurance company for its failure to settle a claim within the policy limits based on a time-limited settlement offer by the injured person’s attorney. We affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision upholding the jury verdict against the insurance company for bad faith refusal to settle, but reverse the award of punitive damages to the insured.

Bridget Holt drove her automobile through a stop sign and injured Geneva Fortson on June 19, 1987. Holt’s liability for the collision is undisputed and her insurance company, Southern General Insurance Company, paid Fortson’s property damage claim. On July 27, 1987, Southern General’s claims representative wrote Fortson’s attorney seeking information on her personal injuries for settlement purposes. On October 7, 1987, Fortson’s attorney wrote Southern General, offering to settle the claim within ten days for $30,000. He included medical bills and asserted claims for additional medical expenses and lost wages. He withdrew the offer on October 13 when Fortson entered the hospital for treatment of a ruptured disk. On October 19, he requested information on the amount of the policy. On October 28, Southern General refused to reveal the policy limits, but sought medical information on the ruptured disk.

On November 2, Fortson’s attorney again wrote Southern General offering to settle Fortson’s claim for the policy limits and stating[*268] that her medical bills totaled more than $10,000 and her lost wages exceeded $5,000. Included with this letter were doctor’s notes showing that Fortson had a herniated disk and medical bills totaling $6,568. The offer was good for ten days. On November 9, Fortson’s attorney reiterated that the offer to settle for the policy limits was open until November 12. On November 10, he sent proof of additional expenses of $4,335. On November 12, he extended the offer to settle for the policy limits for five more days until November 17 and enclosed a certified copy of Fortson’s complete medical records. Southern General did not seek more time to evaluate the claim or respond to the offer before it expired. On November 18, Fortson’s attorney withdrew the settlement offer. On November 20 and again on December 4, Southern General offered to settle Fortson’s claim for the policy limits of $15,000. Fortson rejected the offers. At trial, a jury returned a verdict of $82,000 in favor of Fortson.

Holt assigned her claim against Southern General for negligent or bad faith refusal to settle within the policy limits to Fortson. Fortson sued Southern General based on this assignment, seeking $67,000 plus interest for the insurance company’s bad faith failure to settle. Holt additionally brought a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and for punitive damages. A jury awarded $83,000 in compensatory damages to Fortson and $25,000 in compensatory and $100,000 in punitive damages to Holt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the jury award of compensatory damages to Fortson and punitive damages to Holt, but reversed the award of compensatory damages to Holt. Southern Gen. Ins. Co. v. Holt, 200 Ga. App. 759 (409 SE2d 852) (1991).

1. Southern General argues that it should have been granted a directed verdict because it breached no duty to Holt in refusing to settle Fortson’s claim by November 17. OCGA § 9-11-50 (a) provides for a directed verdict “[i]f there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict.” The court must construe the evidence most favorably towards the party opposing the motion. The standard for appellate review of a directed verdict is the “any evidence” test. Southern R. Co. v. Lawson, 256 Ga. 798, 800 (353 SE2d 491) (1987).

An insurance company may be liable for damages to its insured for failing to settle the claim of an injured person where the insurer is guilty of negligence, fraud, or bad faith in failing to compromise the claim. McCall v. Allstate Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 869, 870 (310 SE2d 513) (1984). In deciding whether to settle a claim within the policy limits, the insurance company must give equal consideration to the interests of the insured. Great American Ins. Co. v. Exum, 123 Ga. App. 515, 519 (181 SE2d 704) (1971). The jury generally must decide whether[*269] the insurer, in view of the existing circumstances, has accorded the insured “the same faithful consideration it gives its own interest.” Id.; see U. S. Fidelity &c. Co. v. Evans, 116 Ga. App. 93 (156 SE2d 809), aff'd, 223 Ga. 789 (158 SE2d 243) (1967).

An insurance company does not act in bad faith solely because it fails to accept a settlement offer within the deadline set by the injured person’s attorney. Grumbling v. Medallion Ins. Co., 392 FSupp. 717 (D. Or. 1975). Just like the court in Grumbling, we note:

Nothing in this decision is intended to lay down a rule of law that would mean that a plaintiff’s attorney under similar circumstances could “set up” an insurer for an excess judgment merely by offering to settle within the policy limits and by imposing an unreasonably short time within which the offer would remain open.

Id. at 721. We reject, however, Southern General’s argument that an insurance company has no duty to its insured to respond to a deadline to settle a claim within policy limits when the company has knowledge of clear liability and special damages exceeding the policy limits. Rather, the issue is whether all the facts show sufficient evidence to withstand an insurance company’s motion for directed verdict and permit a jury to determine whether the insurer acted unreasonably in declining to accept a time-limited settlement offer.

Despite Southern General’s contention, its liability is not based solely on its failure to settle Fortson’s claim within the time frame that her attorney set. The evidence shows that Holt’s liability for the automobile accident was clear and that Fortson had medical bills and lost wages exceeding the limits of Holt’s policy. Southern General’s claims manager testified that the claims representative should have concluded Fortson’s claim was a policy limits case after he saw the November 2, 1987 letter and enclosures. The insurance company’s expert testified that it would not be unreasonable for Southern General to make an offer for the full policy limits before November 17, once the company concluded on November 2 that it was a policy limits case. Southern General’s claims representative testified that he did not doubt the statements that Fortson’s attorney wrote about her injuries, but needed the medical documents to support it. Yet, neither he nor the claims manager requested an extension of time to evaluate Fortson’s claim. Reviewing the denial of the directed verdict motion under the “any evidence” standard and keeping in mind the duty of insurance companies to give equal consideration to the interests of their policyholders, both the trial court and Court of Appeals correctly found that a jury question was presented on Southern General’s negligent or bad faith refusal to settle.

[*270] Decided May 21, 1992 Reconsideration denied June 12, 1992. Freeman & Hawkins, Paul M. Hawkins, Michael J. Goldman, for appellant. Charles A. Gower, Terry Lee Strawser, Kelly, Denney, Pease & Allison, Ernest Kirk II, for appellees. Taylor & Harp, J. Sherrod Taylor, Jefferson C. Callier, William S. Stone, Middleton & Anderson, Elizabeth F. Bunce, Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, Sidney F. Wheeler, Carol P. Michel, Neely & Player, John W. Winborne III, Julianna Kauderer, Wetzel & Carroll, Michael L. Wetzel, Frank J. Beltran, Foy R. Devine, amici cu[*271] riae.

[*270] 2. “[A] claim for punitive damages has efficacy only if there is a valid claim for actual damages to which it could attach. Punitive damages may not be recovered where there is no entitlement to compensatory damages.” Barnes v. White County Bank, 170 Ga. App. 681 (318 SE2d 74) (1984); see Foster v. Sikes, 202 Ga. 122, 126 (42 SE2d 441) (1947) (“Since no injury is shown to the plaintiff . . ., he has no cause of action for punitive damages.”). In the complaint, Holt sued for emotional distress and punitive damages after assigning her claim against the insurance company for bad faith refusal to settle. An assignment is a complete transfer of all rights, title, and interest in property. Bank of Cave Spring v. Gold Kist, 173 Ga. App. 679, 680 (327 SE2d 800) (1985). By transferring her right to recover from Southern General for its bad faith or negligent refusal to settle, Holt forfeited her right to sue the company for punitive damages based on that claim.

Holt argues that she is entitled to recover punitive damages because her assignee recovered compensatory damages. The Court of Appeals decision in Southern R. Co. v. Malone Freight Lines, 174 Ga. App. 405, 409 (330 SE2d 371) (1985), on which Holt relies, does not hold that an assignor can recover punitive damages after assigning its claim for compensatory damages. Rather, that decision prohibited the assignee from recovering exemplary damages under a statute governing actions against railroad companies.

We decline to create an exception to the rule that a party must have a valid claim for compensatory damages to recover punitive damages. Because Holt had no claim for compensatory damages after she assigned her bad faith claim and the Court of Appeals reversed her emotional distress claim, she may not recover punitive damages.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

All the Justices concur.